Semioticians Make Strange Bedfellows! Or, Once Again: “Is Language a Primary Modelling System?”

Like other sciences, biosemiotics also has its time-honoured archive, consisting of writings by those who have been invented and revered as ancestors of the discipline. One such example is Jakob von Uexküll. As to the people who ‘invented’ him, they are either, to paraphrase a French cliché, ‘agents du cosmopolitisme sémiotique’ like Thomas Sebeok, or de jure and de facto progenitor like Thure von Uexküll. In the archive is the special issue of Semiotica 42. 1 (1982) edited by the late Sebeok and introduced by Thure von Uexküll. It is in the opening essay that Thure von UexküIl tries to restore Jakob von Uexküll’s role as a precursor of semiotics by negotiating the Elder with Saussure and the linguistics-oriented ‘semiology’ in his wake. However, semiotic mapping, in the strictly ‘disciplinary’ sense, of Jakob von Uexküll is no easy task because he ‘knew neither Peirce nor Saussure and did not use their terminology’ (Thure von Uexküll 1982,2). Because Thure prefers to call the Elder’s science ‘general semiotics’ (Thure von Uexküll 1982), this paper begins by assessing Thure von Uexküll’s semiotic configuration of Jakob, probe into the force and limits of the linguistic analogy, revisit the already time-honoured debate on the primary and secondary modelling systems, which was made famous by the Moscow-Tartu semioticians in the early 1970s, but severely criticized by Sebeok and his followers. The paper engages Sebeok from several fronts, directed first at his relegation of the Saussurian linguistic model, then at his critique of the Primary Modelling System, and finally at his reservation about evolutionism in light of the current debate on gene/meme co-evolution. Paper presented at the Eighth Annual International Gatherings in Biosemiotics University of the Aegean, Syros, Greece, 23–28 June 2008     

Biosemiotics Within and Without Biological Holism: A Semio-historical Analysis

On the basis of a comparative analysis of the biosemiotic work of Jakob von Uexküll and of various theories on biological holism, this article takes a look at the question: what is the status of a semiotic approach in respect to a holistic one? The period from 1920 to 1940 was the peak-time of holistic theories, despite the fact that agreement on a unified and accepted set of holistic ideas was never reached. A variety of holisms, dependent on the cultural and disciplinary contexts, is sketched here from the works of Jan Smuts, Adolf Meyer-Abich, John Scott Haldane, Kurt Goldstein, Alfred North Whitehead and Wolfgang Köhler. In contrast with his contemporary holists, who used the model of an organism as a unifying explanatory tool for all levels of reality, Jakob von Uexküll confined himself to disciplinary organicism by extending the borders of the definition of “organism” without any intention to surpass the borders of biology itself. The comparison reveals also a significant difference in the perspectives of Uexküll and his contemporary holists, a difference between a view from a subjective centre in contrast with an all-encompassing structural view. Uexküll’s theories are fairly near to J. S. Haldane’s interpretation of an organism as a coordinative centre, but even here their models do not coincide. Although biosemiotics and holistic biology have different theoretical starting points and research-goals, it is possible nonetheless to place them under one and the same doctrinal roof.     

The Biosemiotic Glossary Project: Umwelt

This is the second article in a series of review articles addressing biosemiotic terminology. The biosemiotic glossary project is designed to integrate views of members within the biosemiotic community based on a standard survey and related publications. The methodology section describes the format of the survey conducted July–August 2014 in preparation of the current review and targeted on Jakob von Uexküll’s term ‘Umwelt’. Next, we summarize denotation, synonyms and antonyms, with special emphasis on the denotation of this term in current biosemiotic usage. The survey findings include ratings of eight citations defining or making use of the term Umwelt. We provide a summary of respondents’ own definitions and suggested term usage. Further sections address etymology, relevant contexts of use, and related terms in English and other languages. A section on the notion’s Uexküllian meaning and later biosemiotic meaning is followed by attempt at synthesis and conclusion. We conclude that the Umwelt is a centerpiece phenomenon, a phenomenon that other phenomena in the living realm are organized around. To sum up Uexküll’s view, we can characterize an Umwelt as the subjective world of an organism, enveloping a perceptual world and an effector world, which is always part of the organism itself and a key component of nature, which is held together by functional cycles connecting different Umwelten. In order to pay respect to Uexküll’s work, we must move from notion to model, from mention of Uexküll’s Umwelt term to actual application of it.     

Delectable Creatures and the Fundamental Reality of Metaphor: Biosemiotics and Animal Mind

This article argues that organisms, defined by a semi-permeable membrane or skin separating organism from environment, are (must be) semiotically alert responders to environments (both Innenwelt and Umwelt). As organisms and environments complexify over time, so, necessarily, does semiotic responsiveness, or ‘semiotic freedom’. In complex environments, semiotic responsiveness necessitates increasing plasticity of discernment, or discrimination. Such judgements, in other words, involve interpretations. The latter, in effect, consist of translations of a range of sign relations which, like metaphor, are based on transfers (carryings over) of meanings or expressions from one semiotic ‘site’ to another. The article argues that what humans describe as ‘metaphor’ (and believe is something which only pertains to human speech and mind and, in essence, is ‘not real’) is, in fact, fundamental to all semiotic and biosemiotic sign processes in all living things. The article first argues that metaphor and mind are immanent in all life, and are evolutionary, and, thus, that animals certainly do have minds. Following Heidegger and then Agamben, the article continues by asking about the place of animal mind in humans, and concludes that, as a kind of ‘night science’, ‘humananimal’ mind is central to the semiotics of Peircean abduction.     

From the Hiatus Model to the Diffuse Discontinuities: A Turning Point in Human-Animal Studies

In twentieth-century continental philosophy, German philosophical anthropology (Max Scheler, Helmuth Plessner, and Arnold Gehlen) can be seen as a sort of conceptual laboratory devoted to human/animal research, and, in particular, to the discontinuity between human and non-human animals. Its main notion—the idea of the special position of humans in nature—is one of the first philosophical attempts to think of the specificity of humans as a natural and qualitative difference from non-human animals. This school of thought correctly rejects both the metaphysical and/or religious characterisations of humans, and the positivistic gradualism, that sees the human being as an animal endowed with a greater degree of certain faculties (intelligence, etc.). At the same time, German philosophical anthropology still takes it for granted that such natural-qualitative novelty is unique in the realm of the living, that in correspondence with humans there is the hiatus, the discontinuity par excellence. The semiotic side of this view is the distinction between signs and symbols developed by Ernst Cassirer and Susanne Langer: animal signs would be mere proxies for perceptive elements or stimuli, whereas only human symbols could convey complex representation of objects and situations. The goal of this contribution is to criticise the alleged uniqueness of the hiatus and its semiotic implications through the opposite approach of the diffuse discontinuities. This approach that focuses on the semiotic traits of different species-specific environments (Umwelten) can be traced back to Jakob von Uexküll’s biosemiotical phenomenology, which thinks of discontinuities as a normal phenomenon of animal life.     

Animism,fetishism, and objectivism as strategies for knowing (or not knowing) the world

Animistic or ‘relational’ ontologies encountered in non-Western (i.e. premodern) settings pose a challenge to Western (i.e. modern) knowledge production, as they violate fundamentalassumptions of Cartesian science. Naturalscientists who have tried seriously to incorporate subject-subject relations into their intellectual practice (e.g. Uexküll, Bateson) have inexorably been relegated to the margins. Surrounded by philosophers and sociologists of science (e.g. Latour) announcing the end of Cartesian objectivism, however,late modern or ‘post-modern’ anthropologists discussing animistic understandings of nature will be excused for taking them more seriously than their predecessors. It is incumbent on them to analytically sort out what epistemological options there are, and to ask why pre-modern, modern, and post-modern people will tend to deal with culture/nature or subject/object hybridity in such different ways. Animism, fetishism, and objectivism can be understood as alternative responses to universal semiotic anxieties about where or how to draw boundaries between persons and things.     

A Biosemiotic Approach to the Problem of Structure and Agency

A human being is the simultaneous composite of several different levels of being, from atomic and subatomic to the level of complex social interaction, and these levels are nested within the individual hierarchically (lower levels giving rise to higher levels, etc.). One of the most important and influential approaches developed in the history of science has been that of systems theory and systemic thinking, in which the different levels of the hierarchy, and the interactions between those levels, are considered simultaneously. Although this model provides a comprehensive view of biological being, the transition from one level to the other is not well defined in it. Uexküll and Pauli (Advances: Journal of the Institute for 417 the Advancement of Health 3:158–174, 1986) suggested that semiosis is the translator of the events from one level to the other. From a psychological point of view, a myriad of semiotic events happen inside an individual, and it has been suggested that among other semiotic events, inner speech plays an important role in mediating personal agency. Dialogical theories of the self, Jungian psychology and hypnosis research evidence show that there is a semiotic multiplicity in human agency and consciousness, and that these multiple streams are all converge to a central semiotic singularity. I argue in this paper that by taking a biosemiotic point of view, human ‘agency’ may be defined as the ability of an individual to direct the incoming and internal streams of semioses and the ability to create an integrative and superordinate new stream of semiosis in addition to the upwardly and downwardly component ones, and how such a view might open a new door for research into the concept of human ‘personality’ and ‘agency’.     

Umwelt Transitions: Uexküll and Environmental Change

What role does environmental change play in Jakob von Uexküll’s thought? And what role can it play in a up-to-date Uexküllian framework? Admittedly, in hindsight it appears that the Umwelt theory suffers from its reliance on Uexküll’s false premise that the environment (including its mixture of species) is generally stable. In this article, the Umwelt theory of Uexküll is reviewed in light of modern findings related to environmental change, especially from macroevolution. Uexküll’s thought is interpreted as a distinctive theory of phenomenology—an ‘Uexküllian phenomenology’—characterized by an assumption of the (in the realm of life) universal existence of a genuine first person perspective, i.e., of experienced worlds. It is suggested that acknowledging this distinctiveness is critical for eco-phenomenology as well as for biosemiotics; the latter of which can only thus thrive as a true ‘semiotics of being’, rather than a mere ‘semiotics of functioning’.     

Worthy heir or treacherous patricide? Konrad Lorenz and Jakob v. Uexküll.

The biologist Jakob v. Uexküll is often seen as the preceptor of modern behavioral theory, who lastingly influenced Konrad Lorenz in particular. Nevertheless, Uexküll has been highly inadequately received by the school Lorenz founded. This neglect of Uexküll's works resulted because Lorenz and Uexküll came into contact at a time when the biological sciences were sundered by a deep ideological division. On the one side stood the Darwin-rejecting Neo-Vitalists (for example Uexküll), on the other side were the Neo-Darwinists (for example Lorenz). After Vitalism was overcome as a consequence of the Evolutionary Synthesis, Darwinists who had taken an intermittent interest in Vitalists and their theories could now only distance themselves completely from earlier ideas. This went not only for biologists and behavioral researchers, but also for medical scientists. The emancipation from the starting points of their own science was so complete that, even decades later, when the earlier debates about Mechanism and Vitalism were long since historically outdated, behavioral research never investigated its own history.     

Uexküllian <Emphasis Type="Italic">Umwelt</Emphasis> as science and as ideology: the light and the dark side of a concept

The concept of Umwelt, in particular the interpretation originally developed by Jakob von Uexküll, played an important role in the development of biological thought of the first half of the twentieth century. The theory of Umwelt (Umweltlehre) was one of the most original ideas that appeared in German biology at that time. It was the first attempt to introduce subjectivity into a science about organisms; it laid down the foundations of behavioural research and inspired the development of ethology. However, the theory of Umwelt has also been used to support more sinister activities and even some dangerous ideologies. The concept of Umwelt is of interest not only to historians: within some intellectual circles, it is still broadly used today. Our aim was to analyse the notion’s historic development within the context of biological thought of the first half of the 20th century. In particular, we focus (1) on how the concept was adopted and adapted for various, often widely diverging purposes; (2) on interactions between the Umweltlehre and other contemporary worldviews. We argue that in order to understand the developments that occurred in twentieth century biology, one needs to properly appreciate the role which Umweltlehre played in these. Even more importantly, the Umweltlehre is a worldview that influenced not only science but also politics and social affairs. In this respect it functioned rather like a number of other scientific and ideological frameworks of that time, such as Synthetic Darwinism.     

Semiotic Mechanisms Underlying Niche Construction

The explanatory value of niche construction can be strengthened by firm footing in semiotic theory. Anthropologists have a unique perspective on the integration of such diverse approaches to human action and evolutionary processes. Here, we seek to open a dialogue between anthropology and biosemiotics. The overarching aim of this paper is to demonstrate that niche construction, including the underlying mechanism of reciprocal causation, is a semiotic process relating to biological development (sensu stricto) as well as cognitive development and cultural change. In making this argument we emphasize the semiotic mechanisms underlying the niche concept. We argue that the “niche” in ecology and evolutionary biology can be consistent with the Umwelt of Jakob von Uexkull. Following John Deely we therefore suggest that investigations into the organism—environment interface constituting niche construction should emphasize the semiotic basis of experience. Peircean signs are pervasive and allow for flexible interpretations of phenomena in relation to the perceptual and cognitive capacities of the behaving organism, which is particularly pertinent for understanding the relation of proximate/ultimate selective forces as co-productive (i.e., reciprocal). Additionally, theoretical work by Kinji Imanishi on the evolution of daily life and Gregory Bateson’s relational view of evolution both support the linkage between proximate and ultimate evolutionary processes of causation necessitated by the niche construction perspective. We will then apply this theoretical framework to two specific examples: 1) hominin evolution, including uniquely human cultural behaviors with niche constructive implications; and 2) the multispecies and anthropocentric niche of human-dog coevolution from which complex cognitive capacities and semiotic relationships emerged. The intended outcome of this paper is the establishment of concrete semiotic mechanisms and theory underlying niche constructive behavior which can then be applied to a broad spectrum of organisms to contextualize the reciprocal relation between proximate and ultimate drivers of behavior.     

Becoming a Sign: The Mimic’s Activity in Biological Mimicry

From a semiotic perspective biological mimicry can be described as a tripartite system with a double structure that consists of ecological relations between species and semiotic relations of sign. In this article the focus is on the mimic who is the individual benefiting from its resemblance to the cues or signals of other species or to the environment. In establishing the mimetic resemblance the question of mimic’s activity becomes crucial, and the activity can range from the fixed bodily patterns to fully dynamic behavioural displays. The mimic’s activity can be targeted at two other participants of the mimicry system—either at the model or at the receiver. The first possibility is quite common in camouflage and there are several possibilities for mimic’s activity to occur: selecting a resting place or habitat based on conformity with the environment, changing body coloration to correspond to the surrounding environment, covering oneself with particles of the soil. In its activity aimed at the model, the mimic develops a strong semiotic connection with its specific perceptual environment or part of it and obtains a representational character. In the second possibility the activity of a mimetic organism is aimed at the receiver who is confused by the resemblance, and between the two participants an active communicative interaction is established. Such type of mimicry can be exemplified by abstract threat displays found in various groups of animals, for instance a toad’s upright posture as a response to the presence of a snake. From the semiotic viewpoint it can be interpreted as the motive of fear in the predator’s Umwelt being entered into the mimic’s subjective world and manifested in its behaviour. The mimetic organism ends up in an ambiguous position, where it needs to pretend to be something other than it is. In the final part of the article it is argued that the mimetic sign is basically a false designator as the mimic’s activity to become a sign is aimed at a specific type of signs. Rather than signifying belonging to its own species or group, a mimetic sign indicates that its carrier belongs to the type of some other species. The tension between the form and behaviour of mimetic organisms arises from the discrepancy between the type of organism that it essentially is and the type of organism that the mimetic sign it carries imposes on it.     

Towards an Evolutionary Biosemiotics: Semiotic Selection and Semiotic Co-option

In biosemiotics, living beings are not conceived of as the passive result of anonymous selection pressures acted upon through the course of evolution. Rather, organisms are considered active participants that influence, shape and re-shape other organisms, the surrounding environment, and eventually also their own constitutional and functional integrity. The traditional Darwinian division between natural and sexual selection seems insufficient to encompass the richness of these processes, particularly in light of recent knowledge on communicational processes in the realm of life. Here, we introduce the concepts of semiotic selection and semiotic co-option which in part represent a reinterpretation of classical biological terms and, at the same time, keep explanations sensitive to semiosic processes taking place in living nature. We introduce the term ‘semiotic selection’ to emphasize the fact that actions of different semiotic subjects (selectors) will produce qualitatively different selection pressures. Thereafter, ‘semiotic co-option’ explains how semiotic selection may shape appearance in animals through remodelling existing forms and relations. Considering the event of co-option followed by the process of semiotic selection enables us to describe the evolution of semantic organs.     

The Beer/Bethe/Uexküll paper (1899) and misinterpretations surrounding 'vitalistic behaviorism'

In the history of behaviorism the paper of the three physiologists Theodor Beer, Albrecht Bethe and Jakob von Uexküll from 1899 plays an important role. Many researchers were influenced by this paper and identified it as fundamental for objective psychological research. But during the period of its adoption (1900-1925) psychologists did not notice that Beer, Bethe and Uexküll had distanced themselves from their own paper, because it had been ignored in physiological and biological discussions. Moreover, one of the three (Beer) had to resign from the scientific community because of private scandal and another one (Uexküll) changed all of his views and left the base of objective science for subjective vitalism. However, this did not change his adoption of behaviorism.     

Steps to a Semiotics of Being

The following points, which represent a path to a semiotics of being, are pertinent to various sub-fields at the conjunction of semiotics of nature (biosemiotics, ecosemiotics, zoosemiotics) and semiotics of culture—semioethics and existential semiotics included. 1) Semiotics of being entails inquiry at all levels of biological organization, albeit, wherever there are individuals, with emphasis on the living qua individuals (integrated biological individualism). 2) An Umwelt is the public aspect (cf. the Innenwelt, the private aspect) of a phenomenal/experienced world that is organism-specific (rather than species-specific) and ultimately refers to an existential realm. 3) Existential universals at work on Earth include seeking out the edible, dwelling in a medium, holding a phenomenal world (possibly an Umwelt) and being endowed with life, and consequently being mortal. 4) Human Umwelten include speechless Umwelten, spoken Umwelten and alphabetic Umwelten. 5) An Uexküllian phenomenology—stating that semiotic states represent the general class to which all mental/cognitive states belong—can draw on the works of the phenomenologists David Abram and Ted Toadvine (The notion of semiotic states is treated in Tønnessen 2009a: 62–63. For an introduction to eco-phenomenology, see Brown and Toadvine (eds.) 2003). 6) A task for such a phenomenology is to portray the natural history of the phenomenal world. 7) An imperative task in our contemporary world of faltering biological diversity is that of Umwelt mapping, i.e. a mapping of ontological niches. 8) The ecological crisis is an ontological crisis with historical roots in humankind’s domestication of animals and plants, which can be taken as archetypical for our attempted planet-scale taming of the wild. 9) The process of globalization is expressed by correlated trends of depletion of semiotic diversity and semiotic diversification. 10) Semiotic economy is a field which task it is to map the human ontological niche insofar as its semiotic relations are of an economic nature. All ten points will be commented (explicitly or implicitly) in due time.     

Moments of Hierarchy: Constructing Social Stratification by Means of Language, Food, Space, and the Body in Pohnpei, Micronesia

In this paper I examine relationships between multiple semiotic modes used to construct hierarchy, and I show the importance of going beyond our traditional notion of language to look at how social actors employ a range of semiotic resources in organizing and interpreting social relations. Using examples from Pohnpei, Micronesia, I show how notions of superior and inferior are compounded through several sign systems—spatial relations, food sharing, the body, and language. These systems act oppositionally as well as cooperatively to produce situated ideas of social inequality, ideas built out of disequilibrium of bodies in space, of referents in language, and distribution of resources, as well as contradictions in the interactions of these signs. The compounding of signs not only recruits multiple sensory modes and perspectives in the exposition of hierarchical relations, but entails a notion of the contradictory nature of status relations. Using examples from a Pohnpeian feast, I explore the creative interplay of sign systems in the construction of "moments" of hierarchy in a large, public setting and discuss how through the practice of title-giving, which virtually every adult member of the society participates in, a particular idea of social inequality, built out of multiple sign systems, is mapped onto each body, [language, interaction, politics, Oceania, social stratification, hierarchy]     

Biosemiotics in a Gallery

In this article we review the biosemiotic art exhibition ?Signs of life? (Livstegn), that was organized by the Danish installation artist Morten Skriver and the biosemiotician Jesper Hoffmeyer in 2011 at the Esbjerg Art Museum (Denmark). The exhibition presented five central (bio)semiotic concepts using artistic tools: the semiosphere, the sign, semiotic scaffolding, semiotic freedom, and surfaces.     

Outline of a unified approach to physics,biology and sociology

The theory of organismic sets, introduced by N. Rashevsky (Bulletin of Mathematical Biophysics,29, 139–152, 1967;30, 163–174, 1968), is developed further. As has been pointed out, a society is a set of individuals plus the products of their activities, which result in their interactions. A multicellular organism is a set of cells plus the products of their activities, while a unicellular organism is a set of genes plus the products of their activities. It is now pointed out that a physical system is a set of elementary particles plus the product of their activities, such as transitions from one energy level to another. Therefore physical, biological and sociological phenomena can be considered from a unified set-theoretical point of view. The notion of a “world set” is introduced. It consists of the union of physical and of organismic sets. In physical sets the formation of different structure is governed preponderantly by analytical functions, which are special type of relations. In organismic sets, which represent biological organisms and societies, the formation of various structures is governed preponderantly by requirements that some relations, which are not functions, be satisfied. This is called the postulate of relational forces. Inasmuch as every function is a relation (F-relation) but not every relation is a function (Q-relation), it has been shown previously (Rashevsky,Bulletin of Mathematical Biophysics,29, 643–648, 1967) that the physical forces are only a special kind of relational force and that, therefore, the postulate of relational forces applies equally to physics, biology and sociology. By developing the earlier theory of organismic sets, we deduce the following conclusions: 1) A cell in which the genes are completely specialized, as is implied by the “one gene—one enzyme” principle, cannot be formed spontaneously. 2) By introducing the notion of organismic sets of different orders so that the elements of an organismic set of ordern are themselves organismic sets of order (n−1), we prove that in multicellular organisms no cell can be specialized completely; it performs, in addition to its special functions, also a number of others performed by other cells. 3) A differentiated multicellular organism cannot form spontaneously. It can only develop from simpler, less differentiated organisms. The same holds about societies. Highly specialized contemporary societies cannot appear spontaneously; they gradually develop from primitive, non-specialized societies. 4) In a multicellular organism a specialization of a cell is practically irreversible. 5) Every organismic set of ordern>1, that is, a multicellular organism as well as a society, is mortal. Civilizations die, and others may come in their place. 6) Barring special inhibitory conditions, all organisms multiply. 7) In cells there must exist specially-regulatory genes besides the so-called structural genes. 8) In basically identically-built organisms, but which are built from different material (proteins), a substitution of a part of one organism for the homologous part of another impairs the normal functioning (protein specificity of different species). 9) Even unicellular organisms show sexual differentiation and polarization. 10) Symbiotic and parasitic phenomena are included in the theory of organismic sets. Finally some general speculations are made in regard to the possibility of discovering laws of physics by pure mathematical reasoning, something in which Einstein has expressed explicit faith. From the above theory, such a thing appears to be possible. Also the idea of Poincaré, that the laws of physics as we perceive them are largely due to our psychobiological structure, is discussed.