Marquis: A Defense of Abortion?

This is a reply to Don Marquis'Why Abortion is Immoral.' Marquis, who asserts that abortion is morally wrong, bases his argument on the following premise: Killing a being is morally wrong if that being is the sort of being who has a valuable future. I argue that this premise is false. I then assert that if I am correct about this premise being false, Marquis is faced with a dilemma. If he does not alter the premise in a way that makes it true, his argument is unsound. However, if he does make such an alteration, he must also alter a second premise in his argument, and this second change opens him to the charge of question begging. In addition, I conclude that such an alteration requires Marquis to adopt a position much like that taken by Judith J. Thompson in 'A Defense of Abortion,' a position he initially states is indefensible.     

The parenthood argument

Don Marquis is well known for his future like ours theory (FLO), according to which the killing beings like us is seriously morally wrong because it deprives us of a future we can value. According to Marquis, human fetuses possess a future they can come to value, and thus according to FLO have a right to life. Recently Mark Brown has argued that even if FLO shows fetuses have a right to life, it fails to show that fetuses have a right to use their mother's body, evoking Judith Jarvis Thomson's famous violinist case. In the wake of Brown's conclusion, Marquis presents a new argument—the parenthood argument (PA)—which he believes shows that abortion is seriously morally wrong. Here I argue that the PA fails to show abortion is seriously morally wrong for the same reasons FLO fails to show abortion is seriously morally wrong.     

Psychological Sequelae of Elective Abortion

A mild, short, depressive and guilt ridden period following abortion is quite common, but a severe psychological reaction is rare. The indication for the abortion and the preabortal psychological state of the patient are the two most important factors. Almost all reported instances of postabortion psychoses have occurred in patients who had severe preabortal psychiatric problems. Women undergoing abortion for socioeconomic or psychosocial indications appear to be at minimal risk for long-term negative psychological sequelae. In contrast, women in whom abortion is carried out because of exposure to rubella and the risk of fetal malformation, maternal organic disease or the prenatal diagnosis of a genetically defective fetus are at greater risk and may need supportive psychotherapy.     

A Critique of Henrik Friberg‐Fernros's Defense of the Substance View

Proponents of the substance view contend that abortion is seriously morally wrong because it is killing something with the same inherent value and right to life as you or I. Rob Lovering offers two innovative criticisms of the anti‐abortion position taken by the substance view – the rescue argument and the problem of spontaneous abortion. Henrik Friberg‐Fernros offers an interesting response to Lovering, but one I argue would be inconsistent with the anti‐abortion stance taken by most substance view theorists.     

The future‐like‐ours argument,animalism, and mereological universalism

Which metaphysical theories are involved—whether presupposed or implied—in Marquis’ future‐like‐ours (FLO) argument against abortion? Vogelstein has recently argued that the supporter of the FLO argument faces a problematic dilemma; in particular, Marquis, the main supporter of the argument, seems to have to either (a) abandon diachronic universalism (DU) or (b) acquiesce and declare that contraception is morally wrong. I argue that the premises of Marquis’ argument can be reasonably combined with a form of unrestricted composition and that the FLO argument is better viewed as including animalism, i.e., the thesis that we are animals.     

Two puzzles for Marquis's conservative view on abortion

Don Marquis argues that abortion is morally wrong in most cases since it deprives the fetus of the value of its future. I criticize Marquis’s argument for the modified conservative view by adopting an argumentative strategy in which I work within his basic account: if it is granted that his fundamental idea is sound, what follows about the morality of abortion? I conclude that Marquis is faced with a dilemma: either his position must shift towards the extreme conservative view on which abortion is never morally permissible, or he must abandon any recognizably conservative view. This dilemma suggests that Marquis’s view is either deeply implausible or that he cannot use this argument to successfully support his preferred position.     

Violinists,demandingness, and the impairment argument against abortion

The ‘impairment argument’ against abortion developed by Perry Hendricks aims to derive the wrongness of abortion from the wrongness of causing foetal alcohol syndrome (FAS). Hendricks endorses an ‘impairment principle’, which states that, if it is wrong to inflict an impairment of a certain degree on an organism, then, ceteris paribus, it is also wrong to inflict a more severe impairment on that organism. Causing FAS is wrong in virtue of the impairment it inflicts. But abortion inflicts an even more severe impairment (death), and so, ceteris paribus, is also wrong. Notably, Hendricks thinks that this argument does not require the claim that the foetus is a person. Here, I respond to Hendricks by arguing that the ceteris paribus clause of the impairment principle is not met in ordinary cases of pregnancy. Carrying an unwanted pregnancy to term is much more burdensome than is refraining from excessive drinking for nine months. This provides a pro tanto justification for obtaining an abortion that does not apply to causing FAS. If the foetus is not a person, it seems fairly clear to me that this justification is strong enough to render abortion permissible. Hendricks is therefore incorrect in claiming that the impairment argument can go without claims concerning foetal personhood. If the foetus is a person, then whether burdensomeness justifies abortion depends on certain questions relating to Thomson’s famous violinist argument. I will not attempt to answer those. But anyone who is otherwise sympathetic to Thomson’s argument should not be moved by the impairment argument.     

Arguing by analogy in the fetal tissue debate

In the debate over fetal tissue use, an analogy is often drawn between removing organs from the body of a person who has been murdered to use for transplantation, and collecting tissue from an aborted fetus to use for the same purpose. The murder victim analogy is taken by its proponents to show that even if abortion is the moral equivalent of murder, there is still no good reason to refrain from using the fetal tissue, since as a society we do not see any problem about using organs from murder victims. However, I argue that the analogy between murder victims and aborted fetuses does not hold — the two situations are not the same in all morally relevant respects. Thus the murder victim analogy does not provide an argument in favour of fetal tissue transplant. In conclusion, I point to some of the potential pitfalls of using analogies in ethical argument.     

Abortion Rights along the Irish-English Border and the Liminality of Women’s Experiences

My research in European abortion laws and restrictions focuses on the migration of thousands of Irish women who travel to England each year to access safe and legal abortion services. This article is an investigation of the Irish-English border as a symbol for reproductive freedom and the new value systems in which Irish women participate when they cross its boundary. I provide a brief history of abortion law in the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland and emphasize a specific case in which border crossing was severely restricted for a young rape victim desiring an abortion. Additionally, my research examines women’s experiences of liminality as they cross the Irish-English border and the complex, conflicting emotions that they may feel as they travel abroad. In particular, I address a recent pro-choice initiative by a Dutch organization called Women on Waves, which sent a ship converted into a reproductive clinic to Dublin to provide services to Irish women. The ship, which has since sailed to Poland and Portugal to offer further assistance to women in countries with bans on abortion, complicates the notion of crossing concrete national lines as it moves throughout international waters.     

Abortion is incommensurable with fetal alcohol syndrome

A recent article argued for the immorality of abortion regardless of personhood status by comparing the impairment caused by fetal alcohol syndrome to the impairment caused by abortion. I argue that two of the premises in this argument fail and that, as such, one cannot reasonably attribute moral harms to abortion on the basis of the moral harms caused by fetal alcohol syndrome. The impairment argument relies on an inconsistent instantiation, which undermines the claim that personhood is irrelevant, and it does not fulfill its own ceteris paribus clause, which demands that no additional benefit be gained from abortion that would not be gained from causing fetal alcohol syndrome.     

Against the impairment argument: A reply to Hendricks

In an article of this journal, Perry Hendricks makes a novel argument for the immorality of abortion. According to his impairment argument, abortion is immoral because: (a) it is wrong to impair a fetus to the nth degree, such as causing the fetus to have fetal alcohol syndrome (FAS); (b) it is wrong to impair a fetus to the n+1 degree (to cause the fetus to be more impaired than to have FAS); (c) killing the fetus impairs the fetus to the n+1 degree (causes it to be more impaired than to have FAS); (d) abortion kills the fetus; (e) therefore, abortion is immoral. The impairment argument is a promising account for the wrongness of abortion because it does not rely on the controversial metaphysical premise that a fetus is a person. This article aims to show, that despite some immediate advantages over the rival theories of the immorality of abortion there is a reason to believe that the impairment argument is untenable. That is because there are goods that can be achieved by abortion but that cannot be achieved by impairing the fetus.     

Surrogate Motherhood and Abortion for Fetal Abnormality

A diagnosis of fetal abnormality presents parents with a difficult – even tragic – moral dilemma. Where this diagnosis is made in the context of surrogate motherhood there is an added difficulty, namely that it is not obvious who should be involved in making decisions about abortion, for the person who would normally have the right to decide – the pregnant woman – does not intend to raise the child. This raises the question: To what extent, if at all, should the intended parents be involved in decision‐making? In commercial surrogacy it is thought that as part of the contractual agreement the intended parents acquire the right to make this decision. By contrast, in altruistic surrogacy the pregnant woman retains the right to make these decisions, but the intended parents are free to decide not to adopt the child. We argue that both these strategies are morally unsound, and that the problems encountered serve to highlight more fundamental defects within the commercial and altruistic models, as well as in the legal and institutional frameworks that support them. We argue in favour of the professional model, which acknowledges the rights and responsibilities of both parties and provides a legal and institutional framework that supports good decision‐making. In particular, the professional model acknowledges the surrogate's right to decide whether to undergo an abortion, and the intended parents' obligation to accept legal custody of the child. While not solving all the problems that arise in surrogacy, the model provides a framework that supports good decision‐making.     

On Abortion: Exploring Psychological Meaning and Attitudes in a Sample of Mexican Gynecologists

Elective abortion has become an issue of ethical and political debate in many countries including Mexico. As gynecologists are directly involved in the practice of abortion, it is important to know the psychological meaning that the term ‘elective abortion’ has for them. This study explores the psychological meaning and attitudes toward elective abortion of one hundred and twenty‐three Mexican gynecologists. We used the semantic networks technique, which analyzed the words the participants associated with the term ‘elective abortion’. The defining words most frequently used by participants implied a negative sanction. There were important differences by gender and religiosity: male gynecologists, as well as those with strong religious beliefs (mainly Catholics), revealed a more negative psychological meaning and more negative attitudes than females or physicians with weak religious beliefs. A contribution of the present study is that it highlights the importance of psychology to enhancing understanding of the issue of elective abortion.     

Thinking about Possible People: A Comment on Tooley and Rachels

Most people believe it would be wrong to bring a child into the world if in all likelihood its life would be miserable. But if pain and suffering count against bringing someone into existence, why do pleasure and happiness not count in favour of bringing them into existence? Recently in this journal Michael Tooley has re‐affirmed his rights‐based explanation for this asymmetry. In a nutshell: to create an individual whose life is not worth living would be to wrong that individual – to create an obligation that cannot be fulfilled – but it is not possible to wrong an individual who is not brought into existence. In the same issue of this journal, in an article covering a range of arguments for and against the claim that it would be good for additional people to exist, Stuart Rachels objects to Tooley’s account on the ground that it has counterintuitive implications. His most interesting argument involves a Parfit‐style counterexample: a woman is about to take a fertility pill that will result in twins, one of whom will be healthy and the other of whom will not. Does it make a difference, morally speaking, if the woman knows which of the twins will be healthy and which will not? In this paper I argue that both Rachels’ criticism of Tooley’s rights‐based account, and Tooley’s own defence of it, are unsuccessful due to their failure to come to grips with the semantics of names for possible individuals. Both of them implicitly assume that it is possible to have a potential person in mind, in a way that misleads them about the fairness of actions that involve possible people. The significance of this extends to other areas such as abortion, population policy, and embryo experimentation, where examples involving possible people are common.     

Abortion induced with methotrexate and misoprostol.

OBJECTIVE: To determine the outcome and side effects of a new drug protocol to induce abortion. DESIGN: Case series. SETTING: An urban primary care practice. PATIENTS: One hundred consecutive patients who requested elective termination of pregnancies of less than 8 weeks'' gestation. INTERVENTION: Subjects received methotrexate (50 mg/m2 body surface area, administered intramuscularly) and, 3 days afterward, misoprostol (800 micrograms, given vaginally). OUTCOME MEASURES: Number of abortions induced within 24 hours and within 10 days of misoprostol administration, number of surgical aspirations conducted because of incomplete abortion, mean amount of bleeding and pain and the number of women who, if faced with the same situation, said they would again choose a drug-induced abortion over a surgical one. RESULTS: Abortion occurred within 24 hours of misoprostol administration among 48 women and within 10 days among 69 women. In total, 89 women had an abortion without surgical aspiration. Of these women, 71 said they would choose a drug-induced abortion if faced with the choice again. CONCLUSION: Abortion induced with methotrexate and misoprostol appears to be a feasible alternative to surgical abortion and deserves further study.     

无核早熟沙田柚与花粉败育--无核机理研究(1)

在无核沙田柚的基础上，得到了一种新的早熟无核沙田柚。成熟期提前了一个月。本文将同时讨论无核化与花粉败育的关系。无核机理涉及诸多问题，比如花粉败育、雌雄配子体的发育、染色体和基因的变化等。花粉败育是无核的一个重要性状     

Lawful Sinners: Reproductive Governance and Moral Agency Around Abortion in Mexico

The Catholic Hierarchy unequivocally bans abortion, defining it as a mortal sin. In Mexico City, where the Catholic Church wields considerable political and popular power, abortion was recently decriminalized in a historic vote. Of the roughly 170,000 abortions that have been carried out in Mexico City's new public sector abortion program to date, more than 60% were among self-reported Catholic women. Drawing on eighteen months of fieldwork, including interviews with 34 Catholic patients, this article examines how Catholic women in Mexico City grapple with abortion decisions that contravene Church teachings in the context of recent abortion reform. Catholic women consistently leveraged the local cultural, economic, and legal context to morally justify their abortion decisions against church condemnation. I argue that Catholic women seeking abortion resist religious injunctions on their reproductive behavior by articulating and asserting their own moral agency grounded in the contextual dimensions of their lives. My analysis informs conversations in medical anthropology on moral decision-making around reproduction and on local dynamics of resistance to reproductive governance. Moreover, my findings speak to the deficiencies of a feminist vision focused narrowly on fertility limitation, versus an expanded framework of reproductive justice that considers as well the need for conditions of income equality and structural supports to facilitate reproduction and parenting among women who desire to keep their pregnancies.     

Mass-Produced,Assembly-Line Abortion—A Prime Example of Unethical,Unscientific Medicine

The incidence of psychologic sequelae associated with abortion cannot be established scientifically, and so continues to be disputed. Since there are no truly scientific criteria on which to make a prediction as to the psychologic outcome, it seems only proper that elective abortion be labeled “experimental,” rather than “therapeutic.”This uncertainty as to therapeutic benefit is compounded by the fact that adequate studies and information about physical sequelae are also lacking. Furthermore, preliminary statistics from the Population Council indicate that the morbidity rate of abortion performed even under proper medical auspices is unacceptably high.Viewed in this light and in relation to our own ethical code, the current practice of performing innumerable, mechanized, elective abortions can only be considered unethical. If it is argued that abortion can be ethically validated merely by surrounding it with the same controls used in other experimental procedures, then the medical profession should insist on such controls forthwith.     

ARE PATIENTS’ DECISIONS TO REFUSE TREATMENT BINDING ON HEALTH CARE PROFESSIONALS?

When patients refuse to receive medical treatment, the consequences of honouring their decisions can be tragic. This is no less true of patients who autonomously decide to refuse treatment. I distinguish three possible implications of these autonomous decisions. According to the Permissibility Claim, such a decision implies that it is permissible for the patient who has made the autonomous decision to forego medical treatment. According to the Anti-Paternalism Claim, it follows that health-care professionals are not morally permitted to treat that patient. According to the Binding Claim it follows that these decisions are binding on health-care professionals. My focus is the last claim. After arguing that it is importantly different from each of the first two claims, I give two arguments to show that it is false. One argument against the Binding Claim draws a comparison with cases in which patients autonomously choose perilous positive treatments. The other argument appeals to considered judgments about cases in which disincentives are used to deter patients from refusing sound treatments.