Do capuchin monkeys, Cebus apella, know what conspecifics do and do not see?

Capuchin monkeys were tested in five experiments in which two individuals competed over food. When given a choice between retrieving a piece of food that was visible or hidden from the dominant, subordinate animals preferred to retrieve hidden food. This preference is consistent with the hypotheses that either (1) the subordinate knew what the dominant could and could not see or (2) the subordinate was monitoring the behaviour of the dominant and avoiding the piece of food that it approached. To test between these alternatives, we released subordinates with a slight head start forcing them to make their choice (between a piece of food hidden or visible to the dominant) before the dominant entered the area. Unlike chimpanzees, Pan troglodytes, subordinates that were given a head start did not preferentially approach hidden pieces of food first. Therefore, our experiments provide little support for the hypothesis that capuchin monkeys are sensitive to what another individual does or does not see. We compare our results with those obtained with chimpanzees in the same paradigm and discuss the evolution of primate social cognition. Copyright 2003 The Association for the Study of Animal Behaviour. Published by Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.      

Do chimpanzees build comfortable nests?

Nests built by wild chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes verus) were studied at the Fongoli research site in southeastern Senegal from January 2004-May 2004 to investigate the role of comfort in nest building behavior by relating measures of nest comfort and building effort. Nest comfort across zones of the nest surface were compared with construction effort for 25 nests. Several variables of nest comfort were assessed: (1) physical discomfort, (2) visible discomfort, and (3) softness. Physical discomfort was used as a representative measure of nest discomfort. Building effort was measured by (1) construction force, (2) complexity, and (3) added material. Spearman rank correlations compared Effort and Comfort measures for both whole nests and central versus edge zones. The results show that construction force and complexity do not influence comfort of the nest as a whole. Greater Construction force correlates with more nest edge discomfort, yet the central area shows no difference. More complex nests do result in a more comfortable central area in the nest. Nests built with greater force may result in more discomfort, whereas complexity may allow chimpanzees to maintain comfort in a central area for sleep. Chimpanzees may place additional leaves or twigs over hard branches, protruding from the nest surface after construction, to increase comfort of the central nest area. Functions of chimpanzee nest building are likely to be several, but these results suggest comfort is a factor in nest building behavior.     

Do chimpanzees cooperate in a learning task?

The aim of this study was to assess the ability of chimpanzees (Pan troglodytes) to cooperate in an instrumental task. A specially constructed fruit distributor was presented to a group of six captive chimpanzees. A cooperative response required two chimpanzees: both had to pull a handle simultaneously to make a fruit fall into the cage. The dominant male of the group and an infant produced most of the operant responses, and the male got nearly all the fruits. Other conspecifics avoided the dominant male at the apparatus. Social influences appear to limit the possibility of co-operation between individuals because a certain level of interindividual tolerance is required. The results revealed a significant increase in the number of pulls each time both chimpanzees were together at the apparatus. Operant chimpanzees learn to coordinate their actions in time and space.     

Do cattle egrets gain information from conspecifics when foraging?

Summary We examined whether individual cattle egrets (Bubulcus ibis) base their decisions of where to forage, and how long to stay in a patch, on the behavior of other flock members. Cattle egrets commonly forage in flocks associated with cattle and capture prey at higher rates when they do not share a cow with another egret. Foraging egrets provide cues of the location of prey and their success in capturing prey. Therefore, there is the possibility of information transfer between egrets in a flock. We predicted that egrets should only move to occupied patches when the resident was capturing enough prey that it is profitable for the invader to share the patch or take over the patch. However, egrets did not seem to decide where to forage based on neighbors' rates of energy intake, but rather on the presence or absence of conspecifics in a patch. We also predicted that an egret should remain in a patch until its rate of energy intake dropped to or below the average rate for other egrets within the flock. However, egrets that were foraging more efficiently than the average rate for the flock switched patches sooner than less efficient foragers. Egrets did not appear to increase foraging success by gaining information on patch quality from neighbors.     

Do young rhesus macaques know what others see?: A comparative developmental perspective

Humans undergo robust ontogenetic shifts in the theory of mind capabilities. Are these developmental changes unique to human development or are they shared with other closely related non-human species? To explore this issue, we tested the development of the theory of mind capacities in a population of 236 infant and juvenile rhesus macaques (Macaca mulatta). Using a looking-time method, we examined what developing monkeys know about others’ perceptions. Specifically, we tested whether younger monkeys predict that a person will reach for an object where she last saw it. Overall, we found a significant interaction between a monkey's age and performance on this task (p = .014). Juvenile monkeys (between two and 5 years of age) show a nonsignificant trend towards human infant-like patterns of performance, looking longer during the unexpected condition as compared to the expected condition, though this difference is nonsignificant (p = .09). However, contrary to findings in human infants, infant rhesus macaques show a different trend. Infant monkeys on average look slightly longer on average during the expected condition than the unexpected condition, though this pattern was not significant (p = .06). Our developmental results in monkeys provide some hints about the development of the theory of mind capacities in non-humans. First, young rhesus macaques appear to show some interest in the perception of other agents. Second, young rhesus seems able to make predictions based on the visual perspective of another agent, though the developmental pattern of this ability is not as clear nor as robust as in humans. As such, though an understanding of others’ perceptions is early-emerging in human infants, it may require more experience interacting with other social agents in our non-human relatives.     

Do dolphins know their own minds?

Knowledge of one's own states of mind is one of the varieties of self-knowledge. Do any nonhuman animals have the capacity for this variety of self-knowledge? The question is open to empirical inquiry, which is most often conducted with primate subjects. Research with a bottlenose dolphin gives some evidence for the capacity in a nonprimate taxon. I describe the research and evaluate the metacognitive interpretation of the dolphin's behaviour. The research exhibits some of the difficulties attached to the task of eliciting behaviour that both attracts a higher-order interpretation while also resisting deflationary, lower-order interpretations. Lloyd Morgan's Canon, which prohibits inflationary interpretations of animal behaviour, has influenced many animal psychologists. There is one defensible version of the Canon, the version that warns specifically against unnecessary intentional ascent. The Canon on this interpretation seems at first to tell against a metacognitive interpretation of the data collected in the dolphin study. However, the model of metacognition that is in play in the dolphin studies is a functional model, one that does not implicate intentional ascent. I explore some interpretations of the dolphin's behaviour as metacognitive, in this sense. While this species of metacognitive interpretation breaks the connection with the more familiar theory of mind research using animal subjects, the interpretation also points in an interesting way towards issues concerning consciousness in dolphins.     

Do bonobos copulate more frequently and promiscuously than chimpanzees?

The copulatory activities of bonobos (Pan paniscus) of Wamba, Zaire, were compared with those of chimpanzees (P. troglodytes schweinfurthii) of Mahale, Tanzania. The copulation rates of adult male bonobos were equal to or lower than those of adult male chimpanzees. The copulation rates of adult female bonobos were approximately equal to those of adult female chimpanzees who were in maximal genital swelling, but it should be much higher than those of the adult female chimpanzees throughout the birth interval. The copulation rates of adolescent male bonobos were lower than those of adolescent male chimpanzees, whereas the copulation rates of adolescent female bonobos were much higher than those of adolescent female chimpanzees. It was suggested that the bonobos of Wamba did not copulate more promiscuously than did the chimpanzees of Mahale. The female bonobos may show “receptivity”, whereas female chimpanzees may show rather “proceptivity”.     

Do "savanna" chimpanzees consume C4 resources?

Several stable carbon isotopic studies have shown that South African australopiths consumed significant quantities of C(4) resources (tropical grasses, sedges, or animals that eat those foods), but relatively little is known about the consumption of such resources by chimpanzees. Here, we present stable carbon isotopic data for 36 chimpanzee hair samples from Fongoli, one of the driest and most open areas inhabited by chimpanzees. These data suggest that the Fongoli chimpanzees consume little in the way of C(4) vegetation or animals that eat such vegetation, even though these resources are locally abundant and preferred fruits are more widely scattered than at most chimpanzee study sites. The homogeneity of the Fongoli results is especially striking and recalls the narrow isotopic distribution of stenotopic savanna mammals. This is in stark contrast to what has been observed for australopiths, which had highly variable diets and consumed about 35% C(4) vegetation on average. Carbon isotope data for modern and fossil Papio depict a dietarily variable genus with a tendency to consume C(4) vegetation. This trophic flexibility, or willingness to consume C(4) savanna resources, may make Papio a more profitable ecological analog for australopiths than chimpanzees.     

Do estimates of contemporary effective population size tell us what we want to know?

Estimation of effective population size (N_e) from genetic marker data is a major focus for biodiversity conservation because it is essential to know at what rates inbreeding is increasing and additive genetic variation is lost. But are these the rates assessed when applying commonly used N_e estimation techniques? Here we use recently developed analytical tools and demonstrate that in the case of substructured populations the answer is no. This is because the following: Genetic change can be quantified in several ways reflecting different types of N_e such as inbreeding (N_eI), variance (N_eV), additive genetic variance (N_eAV), linkage disequilibrium equilibrium (N_eLD), eigenvalue (N_eE) and coalescence (N_eCo) effective size. They are all the same for an isolated population of constant size, but the realized values of these effective sizes can differ dramatically in populations under migration. Commonly applied N_e‐estimators target N_eV or N_eLD of individual subpopulations. While such estimates are safe proxies for the rates of inbreeding and loss of additive genetic variation under isolation, we show that they are poor indicators of these rates in populations affected by migration. In fact, both the local and global inbreeding (N_eI) and additive genetic variance (N_eAV) effective sizes are consistently underestimated in a subdivided population. This is serious because these are the effective sizes that are relevant to the widely accepted 50/500 rule for short and long term genetic conservation.  The bias can be infinitely large and is due to inappropriate parameters being estimated when applying theory for isolated populations to subdivided ones.     

Skin and diabetes mellitus: what do we know?

Diabetes mellitus (DM) is becoming increasingly prevalent worldwide. Although major complications of this condition involve kidney, retina and peripheral nerves, the skin of diabetic patients is also frequently injured. Hence, interest is mounting in the definition of the structural and molecular profile of non-complicated diabetic skin, i.e., before injuries occur. Most of the available knowledge in this area has been obtained relatively recently and, in part, derives from various diabetic animal models. These include both insulin-dependent and insulin-resistant models. Structural work in human diabetic skin has also been carried out by means of tissue samples or of non-invasive methods. Indications have indeed been found for molecular/structural changes in diabetic skin. However, the overall picture that emerges is heterogeneous, incomplete and often contradictory and many questions remain unanswered. This review aims to detail, as much as possible, the various pieces of current knowledge in a systematic and synoptic manner. This should aid the identification of areas in which key questions are still open and more research is needed. A comprehensive understanding of this field could help in determining molecular targets for the prevention and treatment of skin injuries in DM and markers for the monitoring of cutaneous and systemic aspects of the disease. Additionally, with the increasing development of non-invasive optics-based deep-tissue-imaging diagnostic technologies, precise knowledge of cutaneous texture and molecular structure becomes an important pre-requisite for the use of such methods in diabetic patients.     

Do African grey parrots (Psittacus erithacus) know what a human experimenter does and does not see?

Perspective-taking is a cognitive ability that can be useful to access information during social interactions. This ability is extensively exploited in humans, and some evidence of it has been found in other mammals and some bird species. Perspective-taking requires individuals to be sensitive to the attentional state of others. In this experiment, three hand-reared grey parrots were tested on their ability to adapt their behaviours according to the perception of a human handler. Two different screens placed on a table separating the human side from the parrot's side were used: one transparent and one opaque. In the Control condition food was put behind each screen, whereas in the Test condition ‘forbidden’ objects (attractive for the bird but normally not accessible) were placed behind each screen. Birds were expected to choose at random between the two screens in the Control condition but to prefer the opaque one in the Test condition in order to avoid being scolded and chased away. In the Control condition, birds chose at random, whereas the older parrot chose the opaque screen significantly more in the Test condition. The latency for the decision was longer in the Test condition compared to Control, and when choosing the Transparent screen compared to the Opaque.     

Sexual selection and environmental change:what do we know and what comes next?

Anthropogenic environmental change is the most significant threat to biodiversity in the 21st century.Animal populations are experi-encing rapid changes in thei...     

Dying with dementia: what do we know about it?

Death with dementia is increasingly common, yet research on end of life with dementia and end-of-life care for such patients has been sparse. This article reviews recent studies in this area, most of which were done in US nursing homes. Research focused on five domains: prognosis, decision making, treatment, patient's health and suffering, and family's circumstances and satisfaction with care. Prognostication focused on developing risk scores for mortality within 6 months or a year, and while decision making was usually studied qualitatively, the other three domains were largely covered by a series of small, retrospective studies. Future direction in research is discussed, including the ongoing CASCADE project in Boston and the Dutch End of Life with Dementia Study (DEOLD). Both of these prospective studies in nursing home residents assess decision making, as well as factors associated with family's satisfaction and patient suffering. These studies will provide insight into interventions that are most likely to improve end of life care of patients with dementia in the respective countries and elsewhere.     

Host cell invasion by apicomplexans: what do we know?

Apicomplexan zoites enter host cells by forming and actively moving through a tight junction (TJ) formed between the parasite and host cell surfaces. Although the TJ was first described decades ago, its molecular characterization has proved difficult mainly because of its transient existence during an internalization process that lasts only seconds. In the past 7 years, work has led to a model of the TJ in which the association between AMA1 and RON proteins structures the TJ and bridges the cytoskeletons of the two cells. However, more recent work questions this view. Here, we critically discuss the current model and speculate on alternative models of the AMA1-RON association and of the apicomplexan TJ.     

Where do you know what you know? The representation of semantic knowledge in the human brain

Mr M, a patient with semantic dementia--a neurodegenerative disease that is characterized by the gradual deterioration of semantic memory--was being driven through the countryside to visit a friend and was able to remind his wife where to turn along the not-recently-travelled route. Then, pointing at the sheep in the field, he asked her "What are those things?" Prior to the onset of symptoms in his late 40s, this man had normal semantic memory. What has gone wrong in his brain to produce this dramatic and selective erosion of conceptual knowledge?