The plaza and the pendulum: two concepts of ecological science

This essay explores two strategies of inquiryin ecological science. Ecologists may regardthe sites they study either as contingentcollections of plants and animals, therelations of which are place-specific andidiosyncratic, or as structured systems andcommunites that are governed by general rules,forces, or principles. Ecologists who take thefirst approach rely on observation, induction,and experiment – a case-study or historicalmethod – to determine the causes of particularevents. Ecologists who take the secondapproach, seeking to explain by inferringevents from general patterns or principles,confront four conceptual obstacles which thisessay describes. Theory in ecology must (1)define and classify the object it studies,e.g., the ecosystem, and thus determine theconditions under which it remains the ``same'system through time and change. Ecologistsmust (2) find ways to reject as well as tocreate mathematical models of the ecosystem,possibly by (3) identifying efficient causes ofecosystem organization or design. Finally,ecologists will (4) show ecological theory canhelp solve environmental problems both inpristine and in human-dominated systems. Afailure to solve – or even to address – theseobstacles suggests that theoretical ecology maybecome a formal science that studies themathematical consequences of assumptionswithout regard to the relation of theseassumptions to the world.     

Xerophytes, xeromorphs and sclerophylls: the history of some concepts in ecology

Research on xeromorphic and sclerophyllous (the literal meanings of which are "dry-form" and "hard-leaved") plants offers a case-history illustrating the nature of "progress" in one branch of science. The story runs from about 1890–1970, beginning with the birth of ecological concepts, including Warming's 1895 classification of plants into hydrophytes, xerophytes and meso-phytes, Schimper's pioneer work on the sclerophylls, and with the conceptions that lay behind this work; and so on through the main lines of research, concluding with an account of work on the "anomalous" distribution of the sclerophylls in Australia. This case-history shows how the problems of classification and categorization may be linked to conceptual and empirical problems of substance, and hence are not "merely" classificatory. Indeed, the hypotheses under test are not formulated explicitly, but are encapsulated in the terminology, as is so often the case in the biological sciences.     

LATAH: The symbolism of a putative mental disorder

This paper examines the symbolic properties and cultural relevance of latah, a behavioral state noted in Malaya and Indonesia since the 19th Century. Most interpretations of latah have been psychological, latah being perceived as a mental disorder. In the following, it is concluded that latat is intimately related to other aspects of Malayo-Indonesian culture and that it is a well-known cultural pattern and not a mental disorder as such, though it may occur among persons, largely women, in a socially and psychologically marginal situation. Latah is a symbolic representation of marginality, and it is as appropriate to certain mythological and religious figures as to the socially marginal.     

Factors shaping Ernst Mayr's concepts in the history of biology

Conclusion As frequently pointed out in this discussion, one of the most characteristic features of Mayr's approach to the history of biology stems from the fact that he is dealing to a considerable degree with his own professional history. Furthermore, his main criterion for the selection of historical episodes is their relevance for modern biological theory. As W. F. Bynum and others have noted, the general impression of his reviewers is that one of the towering figures of evolutionary biology has now written a towering history of his discipline.¹³⁸ Bynum is here referring to The Growth of Biological Thought, but this observation holds equally true for Mayr's other historical writings: One must surely read this book [One Long Argument] not only for its content in itself, but for what it tells of its author. And certainly as one does so, one comes away full-handed. Many, if not all, of the disputes and controversies that have driven Mayr through his long intellectual life reappear, stated as forcefully and elegantly as ever.¹³⁹ Up to this point, most reviewers agree; the bone of contention is, rather, how to evaluate Mayr's historical work, considering this observation. The two related characteristics of his work-I will call them subjectivity and presentism-stand in opposition to a widespread approach in the history of science exemplified by Kuhn's suggestion that insofar as possible..., the historian should set aside the science that he knows. His science should be learned from the textbooks and journals of the period he studies.¹⁴⁰ There are, however, historians who consider the close connection between Mayr and the subject matter of his historical studies to be an advantage.¹⁴¹ On the other hand, it is assumed that the connection between past and present must result in a distortion of the historical truth and lead to a historiographical fallacy, commonly referred to as Whig history. Herbert Butterfield, who in 1931 gave the term its now generally accepted meaning, believed that real historical understanding is not achieved by the subordination of the past to the present, but rather by our making the past our present and attempting to see life with the eyes of another century than our own¹⁴². Unfortunately, Butterfield's definition of what he considers Whig history remains somewhat vague, and modern authors have emphasized what they consider most important. Butterfield's subordination of the past to the present is referred to in respect to the selection of subjects (there are more biographies of Charles Darwin than of, let's say, Louis Agassiz),¹⁴³ to the evaluation of historical authors,¹⁴⁴ or, more generally, to all kinds of histories with one eye, so to speak, upon the present.¹⁴⁵ The underlying tendency of Whig historians is to produce a historical account told from the viewpoint of those in power,¹⁴⁶ leading to a glorification of the present.¹⁴⁷ It is obvious that Mayr's strongly presentist approach to the history of biology can be called Whiggish, if we apply the criteria of selection or reference. However, it might be worth mentioning that the program of writing a strictly historicist account of the history of science is challenged by various authors.¹⁴⁸ For Mayr, it is not only legitimate but necessary to compare the present situation with the past. Whiggish is only the evaluation of an author in terms of our time.¹⁴⁹ I cannot discuss the Whit/anti-Whig controversy in any detail here, apart from saying that Mayr has defended himself rather extensively against the charges of being Whiggish.¹⁵⁰ Nevertheless, it may be useful to touch on some of the criticisms that are predominant in reviews of his writings. First, we encounter the notion that historians can write a true and convincing historical account only if they have no personal interest or interpretation of their own; Mayr, on the other hand, because he has such strong interpretations of his own, ... cannot possibly convince everyone that he is right about everything.¹⁵¹ It makes one wonder, what historian has ever been able to convince everyone that he or she is right about everything? But apart from this peculiar idea, it unquestionably poses certain dangers if the subject matter of historical scrutiny and the author are identical. At the same time, this identity brings certain advantages with it, especially firsthand experiences of the period in discussion. Whether these personal memories ultimately result in a distorted picture of the past has to be decided in every particular instance. The notion that a scientific study can be conducted by a completely detached observer from a neutral standpoint has been shown to be impossible in physics, and it is also an illusion in historiography. The question is not whether, but which kind of interest are the underlying motivation for a historian. At this point, Mayr is ahead of his critics when he suggests that our understanding of the past always has a subjective component: The main reason, however, why histories are in constant need of revision is that at any given time they merely reflect the present state of understanding; they depend on how the author interpreted the current zeitgeist of biology and on his own conceptual framework and background. Thus, by necessity the writing of history is subjective and ephemeral.¹⁵² Second, the temporal proximity between the event and the historical analysis makes difficulties inevitable and will finally result in certain false assessments. But this applies to all historians when they discuss recent problems, regardless of whether they are personally involved or not: As long as the battle between Darwinism and Lamarckism was raging, it was quite impossible to undertake an unbiased evaluation of Lamarck. ...[The] definite refutation of Lamarck's theory of evolutionary causation clears the air. We can now study him without bias and emotion and give him the attention that this major figure in the history of biology clearly deserves.¹⁵³ Third, Mayr is primarily interested in biological problems and not, for instance, historiographical, sociological, or psychological questions. Several authors have remarked that since the beginning of the professionalization of the history of science in the 1960s, a rift between two groups has developed, resulting from the heterogeneous professional backgrounds and interests of the people involved: the authors who were originally biologists and became interested in the history of their discipline only later on, and the authors who were trained as historians.¹⁵⁴ Whereas the first group, the biologists, tend to be laymen in history proper, the historians are in most cases laymen in biology. Different professional backgrounds obviously shape the historical perspective in both groups, but neither approach is necessarily superior. The great number of important books in the history of biology written by biologist documents how valuable this point of view can be. On the other hand, it cannot be denied that the writings of biologists in the history of science tend to have a strong internalist tendency and often neglect the professional, cultural, and political context of science. Mayr's approach is that of a biologist; it is internalist, and typical for scientists who turn to the history of their discipline.I want to conclude my analysis with a quotation from a review by Douglas J. Futuyma, which gives a perceptive glimpse of Mayr's personality and style: One cannot help standing in awe of the germanic capacity for vast, allembracing synthesis: consider the lifelong devotion of Goethe to Faust, or Wagner's integration of the arts into a Gesamtkunstwerk in which all of human history and experience is wrought into epic myth. It is perhaps in this tradition that Ernst Mayr's The Growth of Biological Thought stands: a history of all of biology, a Ring des Nibelungen complete with leitmotivs such as the failures of reductionism, the struggle of biology for independence from physics, and the liberation of population thinking from the bounds of essentialism.¹⁵⁵ Within this style of thinking Mayr has to offer...nothing less than a vision of biology that places neodarwinian evolutionary theory firmly at the centre.¹⁵⁶ There may be other visions of biology, but few of them have as indefatigable and able representatives as Darwinism has in Ernst Mayr.     

Darwinian psychiatry and the concept of mental disorder

In this paper, we discuss the concept of mental disorder from the perspective of Darwinian psychiatry. Using this perspective does not resolve all of the quandaries which philosophers of medicine face when trying to provide a general definition of disease. However, it does take an important step toward clarifying why current methods of psychiatric diagnosis are criticizable and how clinicians can improve the identification of true mental disorders. According to Darwinian psychiatry, the validity of the conventional criteria of psychiatric morbidity is dependent on their association with functional impairment. Suffering, statistical deviance, and physical lesion are frequent correlates of mental disorders but, in absence of dysfunctional consequences, none of these criteria is sufficient for considering a psychological or behavioral condition as a psychiatric disorder. The Darwinian concept of mental disorder builds from two basic ideas: (1) the capacity to achieve biological goals is the best single attribute that characterizes mental health; and (2), the assessment of functional capacities cannot be properly made without consideration of the environment in which the individual lives. These two ideas reflect a concept of mental disorder that is both functional and ecological. A correct application of evolutionary knowledge should not necessarily lead to the conclusion that therapeutic intervention should be limited to conditions that jeopardize biological adaptation. Because one of the basic aims of medicine is to alleviate human suffering, an understanding of the evolutionary foundations of the concept of mental disorder should translate into more effective ways for promoting individual and social well-being, not into the search for natural laws determining what is therapeutically right or wrong.     

Mesenchymal stem cells: revisiting history, concepts, and assays

The concept of mesenchymal stem cells has gained wide popularity. Despite the rapid growth of the field, uncertainties remain with respect to the defining characteristics of these cells, including their potency and self-renewal. These uncertainties are reflected in a growing tendency to question the very use of the term. This commentary revisits the experimental origin of the concept of the population(s) referred to as mesenchymal stem cells and the experimental framework required to assess their stemness and function.     

Experience of time with mental disorder

The aim of research was to examine subjective experience of time with examinees with diagnosed schizophrenia and examinees with diagnosed neurotic disorder. Differences inside those two diagnostic categories of mental disorders, and differences u compare to examinees without diagnosed mental disorder were explored. For needs of research questionnaire was constructed accordingly to available data from literature. In research participated examinees from 30-50 of age, which were equaled by age and gender. Research was performed on three groups, first group was made of examinees with diagnosed schizophrenic disorder (n=43), second group was made of examinees with diagnosed neurotic disorder (n=40), and third group consisted of examines without mental disorder (n=39). Results of examination have showed significant statistical differences between certain groups considering particles of poll requester. Differences in subjective experience of time were presented according to items from questionnaire. Mutual for both groups of examinees with mental disorder is existence of pathological deviation in anticipating future. This was manifested in different ways and levels, depending of mental disorder. Given results confirm assumption that capability of anticipating future is important fact of mature and healthy individual.