Unstable relations: a critical appraisal of indigeneity and environmentalism in contemporary Australia

The 1970s witnessed the emergence of a protest‐based environmental movement in Australia. We outline here the history of the unstable meeting of environmentalism and Aboriginal interests, before turning to Marcia Langton's recent critique of the progressive ‘green left’ in Australia. 1 We summarise Langton's argument: environmentalists would deny Aboriginal groups the benefits that flow from native title‐related agreements; environmentalists live at luxurious distance from the realities of remote and rural Aboriginal poverty and social problems; environmentalists exalt ‘noble savages’. We critique these claims on the basis that they pay inadequate attention to the structural inequities that underpin the market in native title interests and, further, deny the reality that Aboriginal groups often seek to form strategic alliances with green groups, arguing for conservation of their country on their own—or shared—terms. We argue that any appraisal of the present status of ‘green‐black’ relations needs to consider these factors seriously.     

‘Cross-cultural’ practices: interpreting non-African-American participation in hip-hop dance

This article examines how participants interpret a cultural practice commonly associated with a race other than their own. Determining if, how and why participants experience such ‘cross-cultural’ forms in racialized terms can clarify whether these practices promote tolerance or essentialism in everyday life, and whether they enable appropriation in the field of cultural production. Through interviews and participant observation with non-African-American women learning and teaching hip-hop dance, I capture a spectrum of participant views. Most dancers see hip-hop as African American in its origins. But while novices often speak of an inherent or learned authenticity among blacks, experts rarely express racialized views of the dance's contemporary practice. Experts' views are shaped by personal ability, exposure to dancers whose ability is not racially patterned, and exposure to others who accept their skill. How dancers act on these interpretations challenges common associations of racialized views with tolerance, and non-racialized views with appropriation.     

History,Houses and Regional Identities

The Indonesian government authorises particular modes of representations of the diverse cultural traditions of the archipelago which are subservient to the display of a national culture in the pursuit of national unity. The ‘Taman Mini Indonesia Indah’ theme park in Jakarta manifests the authorised version of difference, as do regional museums. In the province of South Sulawesi, under the guiding influence of local scholars, the provincial government has developed its own theme park which, in the manner of the Jakarta park, uses house forms as emblems of the cultural diversity found in the province. This paper investigates the historical sensibilities displayed in the park, those of the planners and those of the people who live in and use the park. The planners have tried to avoid the use of ersatz forms, with a stress on cultural ‘authenticity’ in the creation of the displays. They have made the park a showcase for an expression of a regional sensibility about the historical genesis of the place of the province in the modern world, giving their own traditions a centrality which is lacking in expressions of culture authorised by the national government.     

Why a right to life rules out infanticide: A final reply to Räsänen

Joona Räsänen has argued that pro‐life arguments against the permissibility of infanticide are not persuasive, and fail to show it to be immoral. We responded to Räsänen’s arguments, concluding that his critique of pro‐life arguments was misplaced. Räsänen has recently replied in ‘Why pro‐life arguments still are not convincing: A reply to my critics’, providing some additional arguments as to why he does not find pro‐life arguments against infanticide convincing. Here, we respond briefly to Räsänen’s critique of the substance view, and also to his most important claim: that possession of a right to life by an infant does not rule out the permissibility of infanticide. We demonstrate that this claim is unfounded, and conclude that Räsänen has not refuted pro‐life arguments against infanticide.     

Culturalizing politics,hyper-politicizing ‘culture’: ‘White’ vs. ‘Black Turks’ and the making of authoritarian populism in Turkey

This paper focuses on the uses and abuses of two terms, ‘White’ and ‘Black Turk’, which have been significant in the ways modern Turkish society and national identity have been defined and contested in recent decades. Initially emerging in social analysis in the 1990s, ‘White Turk’ was a metaphor for and critique of the class culture, subjectivity and worldviews of the ‘new middle classes’ in a period of rapid integration to neoliberalism and globalized capitalism. Over time, both White and Black Turks have come to be used as part of a politics of identity and a politics of authenticity to characterize who are seen as the ‘authentic self’ and inauthentic others of national identity and to assert different visions for the future of Turkish society. White Turk has been adopted as an identity by outspoken members of the media and business elite, whereas its binary opposite, Black Turk, has been appropriated by Islamist politicians of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) as a metaphor to characterize the marginalization and purported oppression of their conservative Muslim constituency. As White and Black Turks were adopted as self-proclaimed identities, they provided a basis for a culturalist depiction of Turkish society, contributing over time to an increasingly divisive politics. Even though the AKP initially used the reference to White and Black Turks to appeal to specific demands for inclusion, as it increased its grip on power, it also (hyper)politicized the terms to articulate nativist claims to authenticity. In recent years, this nativist populism has been used to justify increasing authoritarianism and to delegitimize belonging and political participation of those deemed inauthentic others of the body politics.     

Beyond rupture: Christian culture in the Pacific

In its many forms, Christianity tends to focus adherents’ attention upon earlier religious traditions, compelling them to renew their faith, repent and seek redemption. This special issue takes up questions about Christianity’s temporal ‘secondarity’. Contributors move beyond increasingly futile theoretical debates about rupture and continuity by considering how Christians in Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands conceptualise and enact their fraught relationships with prior religious traditions. By examining the place of culture within Christianity, contributors avoid the analytical pitfalls of assuming that Pacific culture is not already thoroughly Christian. Rather than taking up questions about initial Christian conversion, these articles focus on revival. The relentless campaigns of Christian renewal that have transformed religious landscapes more than a generation aim not only to overcome pre‐Christian powers, but also to supersede earlier versions of Christianity. In examining not only highly localised ethnotheologies, but also regional movements, this issue opens questions that should be of interest beyond the anthropology of Christianity.     

Vatted dreams: neurophilosophy and the politics of phenomenal internalism

Despite much social‐scientific work on the neurosciences, little ethnographic and historical attention has been paid to the field of neurophilosophy. Yet anthropologists studying brain research occasionally critique neurophilosophers for reducing the mind to the brain while affirmatively citing philosophers of mind who present the mind as emerging from interactions between brain, body, and environment. This article examines the ostracized camp of so‐called ‘phenomenal internalists’ – neurophilosophers who believe that consciousness can supervene on the brain alone. This ontological commitment is driven by certain existential and political experiences from false awakenings to disenchantment with the counterculture of the 1970s. But it also draws from neuroscientific research on the dreaming brain. The inquiry concludes with a plea to anthropologists to attend to relations of detachment, both social and neural, and to reconsider their own ontological commitment to externalism in the light of dream research.     

‘Deep engagement’ and disengaged reason

In this paper, I explore what it would mean to pursue modes of ‘deeper engagement’ and how this might be done without abandoning the capacity for disengaged reasoning. Charles Taylor recognises disengaged reasoning as ‘one of the most important developments of the modern era’ and as essential to the pursuit of the good society, even though (like everything else) when taken to an extreme it corrupts or distorts the modes of being‐in‐the‐world. In A Secular Age, Taylor continues a long‐running critique of disengaged reason and its contributions to the malaise of modernity, focusing especially on its conflictual relationship with religious belief and its central role in the disenchantment of the world. My objective here is to relativise and contextualise the relationship between disengaged and engaged modes of being, in part by exploring some of the ways in which we may be deeply engaged in the world and with one another while also employing the critical faculties that enable us to analyse dispassionately, amongst other things, theistic and other interpretations of being‐in‐the‐world.     

Stages of life: A new metaphysics of conceptionism

When a human being comes into existence is crucial in bioethics. Conceptionism is the view that a human being comes into existence at conception. The twinning argument is an influential objection to this view. All versions of the twinning argument rely on a metaphysics of material objects, namely, endurantism. Given this, a strategy for defending conceptionism against the twinning argument is to deny endurantism and adopt an alternative metaphysics of material objects. A version of this strategy which has been debated in this journal is to adopt perdurantism, or the ‘multiple occupancy view’, on which monozygotic twins share the zygote region as a temporal part. We present a novel version of this strategy: conceptionists can evade the twinning argument by adopting an exdurantist metaphysics of material objects. We suggest reasons for thinking that this is a plausible and, indeed, preferable way for conceptionists to avoid the twinning argument.     

The ‘generalism’ debate: misinterpreting the term in the empirical literature focusing on dietary breadth in insects

We here attempt to show, using three broad insect groups – Lepidoptera (mainly leaf‐chewing larval herbivores and nectar‐sucking adults), parasitic Hymenoptera (mainly endoparasitoids, especially of other insects) and aphids (sap‐sucking plant parasites) – how the terms ‘generalist’, usually equated with levels of phagy (oligo‐ and polyphagy), and ‘specialist’ (monophagy), still in widespread parlance, have often been misrepresented. Probably, the reality of generalism, be that herbivorous, predatory and parasitic, can only be demonstrated by detailed empirical field observations plus the use of high‐resolution molecular (DNA) markers, including sequencing, and thereby determining whether the organism in question is really a homogeneous species population over a wide geographical range, or rather comprises a series of morphologically similar/identical cryptic, host‐adapted specialist populations. In the case of insects, the largest group of terrestrial animals on the planet, even if it can be shown that certain species are indeed polyphagous and feed on a variety of plant hosts (herbivores) or prey species (predators and parasitoids), nevertheless, the range of these food items may be highly selective and restricted, depending on morphological–genetical (biochemical/chemical)–behavioural constraints. In the end, while some animals appear to be generalist, this situation may well be illusory. Our present recognition of the term is at best inappropriate, and at worse, inaccurate, as we demonstrate in the examples given, mostly insects. In the meantime, we suggest that the terms used should be re‐defined as four broad classes of specialism–generalism, although the apparent ‘generalism’ is itself conditional on proof following further empirical analyses.     

Digital aspirations: ‘wrong‐number’ mobile‐phone relationships and experimental ethics among women entrepreneurs in rural Bangladesh

‘Wrong‐number’ mobile‐phone relationships are initiated by men dialling random numbers, but they enable young women entrepreneurs in Bangladesh to experiment with the boundaries of fearful excitement; negotiate purdah, dowry, and gender norms; and reimagine their futures. These virtual relationships thus constitute a field of cultural struggle for young women that involves ambivalence, ethical‐boundary work, cultural critique and the recognition of social alternatives, and the expansion of aspirations. These processes are vernacularized in women's notions of ‘being digital’, a Bangladeshi idiomatic response to the contradictions of contemporary social life.     

Understanding: Between belief and unbelief

This paper addresses issues raised in Taylor’s work concerning how communities may come to work in normatively secular ways. For Taylor, it seems to be sufficient for believers (and nonbelievers) to acknowledge that their own ‘construals’ are not shared by everyone. However, this leaves open the question of how the acknowledgement of difference may be turned into respect. A common strategy is to require that faith‐based truth claims are ‘bracketed out’, treating secular and religious discourse as ‘nonoverlapping magisteria’. This secularising strategy is, however, problematic on a number of counts. The article makes a case for a less confrontational, more cosmopolitan conversation between secular and religious reason in a postsecular age, examining in particular the possibilities for conversation between science and mysticism. It concludes that it is possible to retain a commitment to naturalism and yet also accept some of the most mystical of propositions, thereby establishing a bridge between ‘secular’ and ‘religious’ forms of reasoning.     

Knowing and the truth: Three histories of Daugo Island,Papua New Guinea

Courts of law in Melanesian countries, particularly in the aftermath of the colonial period, have attempted to accommodate ‘custom’. In Papua New Guinea they commonly hear land claims under terms of reference that acknowledge the wide variety of customs among the many ethno‐linguistic groups comprising the nation. A corollary of this liberalism is that, in theory, they admit ‘traditional evidence’ including legends and myths. Yet as courts of law they are required to apply some criteria of proof and to search for the ‘truth’ by examining the ‘facts’. A long‐running land case from Papua New Guinea and its aftermath raises interesting questions about what happens when oral history encounters these legal imperatives, and may help us appreciate why Melanesians often do not regard a court's decision as final.     

Handling ‘immunocompetence’ in ecological studies: do we operate with confused terms?

‘Immunocompetence’ is a term used in avian immunological ecology to refer to the ability of an individual to overcome potential parasite infections. However, there are multiple ecological definitions of this term currently used and all of them are rather liberal in immunological terms. This prevents much of the potential intellectual interchange between avian ecologists and immunologists, which decelerates the development of immunological ecology as a scientific discipline. We therefore highlight that the term should be handled with care. In any individual host‐parasite interrelationship the demands on host immunity are distinct and thus also the measurements of immunity in any particular case should be aimed differently. Although ornithologists often aspire to obtain a single variable for immunity in their research, due to the enormous diversity of parasites possessing the ability to infect the host, there is no single value for anti‐parasite resistance, i.e. no overall ‘immunocompetence’ per se exists. We propose to use more rigorous terminology, consistent with the one used in classical immunology. The term ‘immunocompetence’ (defined as the ability to produce anti‐parasite or anti‐antigen immune response) should be used as 0/1 character. The magnitude of a particular immune response (i.e. a continuous quantitative trait) should be referred to as ‘immune responsiveness’. Most importantly, both terms should always be used only with respect to a certain parasite taxon or antigen studied as otherwise they lose their explanatory value.     

‘The Miserablest People in the World’: Race,Humanism and the Australian Aborigine

This paper considers how an idea of the Australian Aborigine impacted upon the development of racial thinking throughout the nineteenth century. We distinguish three phases of this development. Against the background of what was considered to be a distinctly human capacity to rise above nature, our central argument however is that the extreme and irremediable savagery attributed to the Aborigine led to the mid‐nineteenth shift to a polygenist, or an innatist, idea of race. The first part of our discussion, covering the early 1800s, elicits a specifically humanist puzzlement at the unimproved condition of the Aborigines. But, as we will show in the central part of our discussion, it was not only the Aborigines' inclination but their capacity for ‘improvement’ that came to be doubted. Challenging the very basis upon which ‘the human’ had been defined, and the unity of humankind assumed, the Aborigine could not be accommodated within a prevailing conception of racial difference as a mere variety of the human. The elaboration of polygenism may therefore be understood as arising out of this humanist incomprehension: as an attempt to account for the ontologically inexplicable difference of the Australian Aborigine. In the final part of our discussion, we trace the legacy of the Aborigine's place within polygenism through the evolutionary thought of the late nineteenth century. Despite an explicit return to monogenism, here the Aborigine is invoked to support the claim that race constitutes a more or less permanent difference and, for certain races, a more or less permanent deficiency. And as, in these terms, the anomalous Aborigine became an anachronism, so Australia's indigenous peoples came to embody the most devastating conclusion of evolutionary thought: that in the human struggle for existence certain races were destined not even to survive.     

The ‘sparkle’ in fake eyes – the protective effect of mimic eyespots in lepidoptera

Many species of lepidoptera bear conspicuous circular patterns on their wings, known as eyespots, that are hypothesised to protect their bearers against predatory birds. In this study, we focus on a small but ubiquitous feature occurring naturally in lepidopteran eyespots, namely the so‐called ‘sparkle’. The ‘pupil’ in an eyespot is often highlighted by a ‘sparkle’, which is hypothesised to mimic a natural corneal total light reflection evident as a highlight, twinkle, or sparkle in the vertebrate eye. In a study exploring the presence of such sparkles, we found that 53% of lepidopteran eyespots exceeding 1 mm in diameter have a central, pinpoint‐like ‘sparkle’, 12% have a marginal, crescent‐shaped ‘sparkle’, 13% have a semi‐circular ‘sparkle’, and 22% have an intermediate semi‐circular to crescent‐shaped ‘sparkle’. In the lepidopterans’ natural resting position, the marginal ‘sparkles’ are positioned in the upper part of the eyespots’‘pupil’ and thus may create the illusion of a spherical eyeball. The ‘sparkles’ in lepidopteran eyespots do not only appear white to humans, but also reflect ultraviolet light. White and UV‐reflecting ‘sparkles’ also appear ‘white’ for UV‐sensitive viewers such as birds, and thus may effectively mimic the natural highlight in vertebrate eyes as an area of total light reflection. In field experiments using lepidopteran dummies baited with a mealworm, we show that the ‘sparkle’ is one of several components of eyespots eliciting a deterrent effect and that eyespots with a ‘sparkle’ in a natural position have a stronger deterrent effect than those with a ‘sparkle’ in an unnatural position. These findings support the eye mimicry hypothesis that better vertebrate eye mimicry improves the deterrent effect of eyespots.     

Rethinking fakes,authenticating selves

People who engage with objects that are deemed inauthentic under intellectual property laws might dismiss this classification and might ascribe different meanings to these objects. However, they cannot always disregard it, as circumstances might at any time bring this classification to the fore. In such situations, they are not only accused of deceiving others, but also derided for the deception they presumably work upon themselves. Drawing upon an ethnography of people's engagement with fake branded garments in Turkey and Romania and using theoretical perspectives on materiality and authenticity, I argue that a reconceptualization of the fake is a dignifying resolution to this crisis of authenticity. The fake is seen as a copy that does not hide its true nature. This is further elaborated on, in light of individual agendas and approaches to the world. These objects are ‘similar enough’, ‘good enough’, and ‘famous enough’. The fake is, thus, ‘sort of something’, the approximation of the ideal. Moreover, the fake is truthful to how the world truly is, namely a place full of half‐truths and half‐measures. The fake is, therefore, ‘sort of something’, as opposed to being ‘absolutely something’, the objectification of the ideal.     

Toward a pluralistic account of parenthood

What is it that makes someone a parent? Many writers – call them ‘monists’– claim that parenthood is grounded solely in one essential feature that is both necessary and sufficient for someone's being a parent. We reject not only monism but also ‘necessity’ views, in which some specific feature is necessary but not also sufficient for parenthood. Our argument supports what we call ‘pluralism’, the view that any one of several kinds of relationship is sufficient for parenthood. We begin by challenging monistic versions of gestationalism, the view that gestation uniquely grounds parenthood. Monistic and necessity gestationalism are implausible. First, we raise the ‘paternity problem’– necessity gestationalists lack an adequate account of how men become fathers. Second, the positive arguments that necessity gestationalists give are not compelling. However, although gestation may not be a necessary condition for parenthood, there is good reason to think that it is sufficient. After further rebutting an ‘intentionalist’ account of parenthood, in which having and acting on intentions to procreate and rear is necessary for parenthood, we end by sketching a pluralist picture of the nature of parenthood, rooted in causation, on which gestation, direct genetic derivation, extended custody, and even, sometimes, intentions, may be individually sufficient for parenthood.