How should we define goodness?--reputation dynamics in indirect reciprocity

Theory of indirect reciprocity is important in explaining cooperation between humans. Since a partner of a social interaction often changes, an individual should assess his partner by using social information such as reputation and make decisions whether to help him or not. To those who have 'good' social reputation does a player give aid as reciprocation, whereas he has to refuse to help those who have 'bad' reputation. Otherwise benefits of altruism is easily exploited by them. Little has been known, however, about the definition of 'goodness' in reputation. What kind of actions are and should be regarded as good and what kind of actions bad? And what sort of goodness enables sustaining exchange of altruism? We herein challenge this question with an evolutionary perspective. We generalize social reputation as 'Honor-score' (H-score) and examine the conditions under which individuals in a group stably maintain cooperative relationships based on indirect reciprocity. We examine the condition for evolutionarily stable strategies (ESSs) over 4096 possible cases exhaustively. Mathematical analysis reveals that only eight cases called 'leading eight' are crucial to the evolution of indirect reciprocity. Each in the leading eight shares two common characteristics: (i) cooperation with good persons is regarded as good while defection against them is regarded as bad, and (ii) defection against bad persons should be regarded as a good behavior because it works as sanction. Our results give one solution to the definition of goodness from an evolutionary viewpoint. In addition, we believe that the formalism of reputation dynamics gives general insights into the way social information is generated, handled, and transmitted in animal societies.     

The leading eight: social norms that can maintain cooperation by indirect reciprocity

The theory of indirect reciprocation explains the evolution of cooperation among unrelated individuals, engaging in one-shot interaction. Using reputation, a player acquires information on who are worth cooperating and who are not. In a previous paper, we formalized the reputation dynamics, a rule to assign a binary reputation (good or bad) to each player when his action, his current reputation, and the opponent's reputation are given. We then examined all the possible reputation dynamics, and found that there exist only eight reputation dynamics named "leading eight" that can maintain the ESS with a high level of cooperation, even if errors are included in executing intended cooperation and in reporting the observation to the public. In this paper, we study the nature of these successful social norms. First, we characterize the role of each pivot of the reputation dynamics common to all of the leading eight. We conclude that keys to the success in indirect reciprocity are to be nice (maintenance of cooperation among themselves), retaliatory (detection of defectors, punishment, and justification of punishment), apologetic, and forgiving. Second, we prove the two basic properties of the leading eight, which give a quantitative evaluation of the ESS condition and the level of cooperation maintained at the ESS.     

Deception Undermines the Stability of Cooperation in Games of Indirect Reciprocity

Indirect reciprocity is often claimed as one of the key mechanisms of human cooperation. It works only if there is a reputational score keeping and each individual can inform with high probability which other individuals were good or bad in the previous round. Gossip is often proposed as a mechanism that can maintain such coherence of reputations in the face of errors of transmission. Random errors, however, are not the only source of uncertainty in such situations. The possibility of deceptive communication, where the signallers aim to misinform the receiver cannot be excluded. While there is plenty of evidence for deceptive communication in humans the possibility of deception is not yet incorporated into models of indirect reciprocity. Here we show that when deceptive strategies are allowed in the population it will cause the collapse of the coherence of reputations and thus in turn it results the collapse of cooperation. This collapse is independent of the norms and the cost and benefit values. It is due to the fact that there is no selection for honest communication in the framework of indirect reciprocity. It follows that indirect reciprocity can be only proposed plausibly as a mechanism of human cooperation if additional mechanisms are specified in the model that maintains honesty.     

Evolution of direct and indirect reciprocity

Indirect reciprocity (IR) occurs when individuals help those who help others. It is important as a potential explanation for why people might develop cooperative reputations. However, previous models of IR are based on the assumption that individuals never meet again. Yet humans and other animals often interact repeatedly within groups, thereby violating the fundamental basis of these models. Whenever re-meeting can occur, discriminating reciprocators can decide whether to help those who helped others (IR) or those who helped them (direct reciprocity, DR). Here I used simulation models to investigate the conditions in which we can expect the different forms of reciprocity to predominate. I show that IR through image scoring becomes unstable with respect to DR by experience scoring as the probability of re-meeting increases. However, using the standing strategy, which takes into account the context of observed defections, IR can be stable with respect to DR even when individuals interact with few partners many times. The findings are important in showing that IR cannot explain a concern for reputation in typical societies unless reputations provide as reliable a guide to cooperative behaviour as does experience.     

Three-person game facilitates indirect reciprocity under image scoring

Reputation building plays an important role in the evolution of reciprocal altruism when the same individuals do not interact repeatedly because, by referring to reputation, a reciprocator can know which partners are cooperative and can reciprocate with a cooperator. This reciprocity based on reputation is called indirect reciprocity. Previous studies of indirect reciprocity have focused only on two-person games in which only two individuals participate in a single interaction, and have claimed that indirectly reciprocal cooperation cannot be established under image scoring reputation criterion where the reputation of an individual who has cooperated (defected) becomes good (bad). In this study, we specifically examine three-person games, and reveal that indirectly reciprocal cooperation can be formed and maintained stably, even under image scoring, by a nucleus shield mechanism. In the nucleus shield, reciprocators are a shield that keeps out unconditional defectors, whereas unconditional cooperators are the backbone of cooperation that retains a good reputation among the population.     

The development of contingent reciprocity in children

Cooperation between nonrelatives is common in humans. Reciprocal altruism is a plausible evolutionary mechanism for cooperation within unrelated pairs, as selection may favor individuals who selectively cooperate with those who have cooperated with them in the past. Reciprocity is often observed in humans, but there is only limited evidence of reciprocal altruism in other primate species, raising questions about the origins of human reciprocity. Here, we explore how reciprocity develops in a sample of American children ranging from 3 to 7.5 years of age, and also compare children's behavior to that of chimpanzees in prior studies to gain insight into the phylogeny of human reciprocity. Children show a marked tendency to respond contingently to both prosocial and selfish acts, patterns that have not been seen among chimpanzees in prior studies. Our results show that reciprocity increases markedly with age in this population of children, and by about 5.5 years of age children consistently match the previous behavior of their partners.     

Evolutionary stability of first-order-information indirect reciprocity in sizable groups

Indirect reciprocity is considered as a key mechanism for explaining the evolution of cooperation in situations where the same individuals interact only a few times. Under indirect reciprocity, an individual who helps others gets returns indirectly from others who know her good reputation. Recently, many studies have discussed the effect of reputation criteria based only on the former actions of the others (first-order information) and of those based also on the former reputation of opponents of the others (second-order information) on the evolution of indirect reciprocity. In this study, we investigate the evolutionary stability of the indirectly reciprocal strategy (discriminating strategy: DIS), which cooperates only with opponents who have good reputations, in -person games where more than two individuals take part in a single group (interaction). We show that in n-person games, DIS is an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) even under the image-scoring reputation criterion, which is based only on first-order information and where cooperations (defections) are judged to be good (bad). This result is in contrast to that of 2-person games where DIS is not an ESS under reputation criteria based only on first-order information.     

Indirect reciprocity under incomplete observation

Indirect reciprocity, in which individuals help others with a good reputation but not those with a bad reputation, is a mechanism for cooperation in social dilemma situations when individuals do not repeatedly interact with the same partners. In a relatively large society where indirect reciprocity is relevant, individuals may not know each other's reputation even indirectly. Previous studies investigated the situations where individuals playing the game have to determine the action possibly without knowing others' reputations. Nevertheless, the possibility that observers of the game, who generate the reputation of the interacting players, assign reputations without complete information about them has been neglected. Because an individual acts as an interacting player and as an observer on different occasions if indirect reciprocity is endogenously sustained in a society, the incompleteness of information may affect either role. We examine the game of indirect reciprocity when the reputations of players are not necessarily known to observers and to interacting players. We find that the trustful discriminator, which cooperates with good and unknown players and defects against bad players, realizes cooperative societies under seven social norms. Among the seven social norms, three of the four suspicious norms under which cooperation (defection) to unknown players leads to a good (bad) reputation enable cooperation down to a relatively small observation probability. In contrast, the three trustful norms under which both cooperation and defection to unknown players lead to a good reputation are relatively efficient.     

Dynamic indirect reciprocity; When is indirect reciprocity bounded by group membership?

Indirect reciprocity is a strong driver of reputation-based cooperation and previous studies have offered ample evidence as to when and how it guides cooperation towards others. However, the current empirical literature suffers from mixed evidence about the realm of indirect reciprocity; some studies showed that people assume that in-group members, but not out-group members belong to the same system of indirect reciprocity and they, thus, display reputation-based cooperation only towards in-group members. In other words, indirect reciprocity is bounded by group membership. On the other hand, other studies found that people display reputation-based cooperation towards out-group members as well, suggesting that indirect reciprocity is unbounded. Thus, there remains an important question to address. When is indirect reciprocity bounded by group membership? We carefully examined previous studies supporting bounded and unbounded indirect reciprocity perspectives and argue that the realm of indirect reciprocity is conditional to the presence of cues of reputational consequences (i.e., consequences of immediate cooperation). Based on our review, we further propose a new perspective, the dynamic indirect reciprocity perspective, which integrates bounded and unbounded indirect reciprocity perspectives. We propose a highly powered preregistered study to test hypotheses derived from the proposed perspective.     

Learning curves, taking instructions, and patient safety: using a theoretical domains framework in an interview study to investigate prescribing errors among trainee doctors

ABSTRACT: BACKGROUND: Prescribing errors are a major source of morbidity and mortality and represent a significant patient safety concern. Evidence suggests that trainee doctors are responsible for most prescribing errors. Understanding the factors that influence prescribing behavior may lead to effective interventions to reduce errors. Existing investigations of prescribing errors have been based on Human Error Theory but not on other relevant behavioral theories. The aim of this study was to apply a broad theory-based approach using the Theoretical Domains Framework (TDF) to investigate prescribing in the hospital context among a sample of trainee doctors. METHOD: Semistructured interviews, based on 12 theoretical domains, were conducted with 22 trainee doctors to explore views, opinions, and experiences of prescribing and prescribing errors. Content analysis was conducted, followed by applying relevance criteria and a novel stage of critical appraisal, to identify which theoretical domains could be targeted in interventions to improve prescribing. RESULTS: Seven theoretical domains met the criteria of relevance: "social professional role and identity," "environmental context and resources," "social influences," "knowledge," "skills," "memory, attention, and decision making," and "behavioral regulation." From critical appraisal of the interview data, "beliefs about consequences" and "beliefs about capabilities" were also identified as potentially important domains. Interrelationships between domains were evident. Additionally, the data supported theoretical elaboration of the domain behavioral regulation. CONCLUSIONS: In this investigation of hospital-based prescribing, participants' attributions about causes of errors were used to identify domains that could be targeted in interventions to improve prescribing. In a departure from previous TDF practice, critical appraisal was used to identify additional domains that should also be targeted, despite participants' perceptions that they were not relevant to prescribing errors. These were beliefs about consequences and beliefs about capabilities. Specifically, in the light of the documented high error rate, beliefs that prescribing errors were not likely to have consequences for patients and that trainee doctors are capable of prescribing without error should also be targeted in an intervention. This study is the first to suggest critical appraisal for domain identification and to use interview data to propose theoretical elaborations and interrelationships between domains.     

Marmoset monkeys evaluate third-party reciprocity

Many non-human primates have been observed to reciprocate and to understand reciprocity in one-to-one social exchanges. A recent study demonstrated that capuchin monkeys are sensitive to both third-party reciprocity and violation of reciprocity; however, whether this sensitivity is a function of general intelligence, evidenced by their larger brain size relative to other primates, remains unclear. We hypothesized that highly pro-social primates, even with a relatively smaller brain, would be sensitive to others'' reciprocity. Here, we show that common marmosets discriminated between human actors who reciprocated in social exchanges with others and those who did not. Monkeys accepted rewards less frequently from non-reciprocators than they did from reciprocators when the non-reciprocators had retained all food items, but they accepted rewards from both actors equally when they had observed reciprocal exchange between the actors. These results suggest that mechanisms to detect unfair reciprocity in third-party social exchanges do not require domain-general higher cognitive ability based on proportionally larger brains, but rather emerge from the cooperative and pro-social tendencies of species, and thereby suggest this ability evolved in multiple primate lineages.     

Reciprocity on the Hardwood: Passing Patterns among Professional Basketball Players

Past theory and research view reciprocal resource sharing as a fundamental building block of human societies. Most studies of reciprocity dynamics have focused on trading among individuals in laboratory settings. But if motivations to engage in these patterns of resource sharing are powerful, then we should observe forms of reciprocity even in highly structured group environments in which reciprocity does not clearly serve individual or group interests. To this end, we investigated whether patterns of reciprocity might emerge among teammates in professional basketball games. Using data from logs of National Basketball Association (NBA) games of the 2008–9 season, we estimated a series of conditional logistic regression models to test the impact of different factors on the probability that a given player would assist another player in scoring a basket. Our analysis found evidence for a direct reciprocity effect in which players who had “received” assists in the past tended to subsequently reciprocate their benefactors. Further, this tendency was time-dependent, with the probability of repayment highest soon after receiving an assist and declining as game time passed. We found no evidence for generalized reciprocity – a tendency to “pay forward” assists – and only very limited evidence for indirect reciprocity – a tendency to reward players who had sent others many assists. These findings highlight the power of reciprocity to shape human behavior, even in a setting characterized by extensive planning, division of labor, quick decision-making, and a focus on inter-group competition.     

Preschool Children’s Behavioral Tendency toward Social Indirect Reciprocity

Social indirect reciprocity seems to be crucial in enabling large-scale cooperative networks among genetically unrelated individuals in humans. However, there are relatively few studies on social indirect reciprocity in children compared to adults. Investigating whether young children have a behavioral tendency toward social indirect reciprocity will help us understand how and when the fundamental ability to form cooperative relationships among adults is acquired. Using naturalistic observation at a nursery school, this study examined whether 5- to 6-year-olds show a behavioral tendency to engage in social indirect reciprocity in response to their peers’ prosocial behavior toward a third party. The results revealed that bystander children tended to display prosocial behavior toward their peers more frequently after observing these peers’ prosocial behavior toward third-party peers, compared with control situations; this suggests that 5- to 6-year-olds may have an essential behavioral tendency to establish social indirect reciprocity when interacting with peers in their daily lives. In addition, bystanders tended to display affiliative behavior after observing focal children’s prosocial behavior. In other words, observing peers’ prosocial behavior toward third-party peers evoked bystanders’ positive emotions toward the helpers. Considering both the present results and previous findings, we speculate that in preschoolers, such positive emotions might mediate the increase in the bystander’s prosocial behavior toward the helper. In addition, an intuitional emotional process plays an important role in the preschooler’s behavioral tendency toward social indirect reciprocity in natural interactions with peers.     

Evolution of indirect reciprocity in groups of various sizes and comparison with direct reciprocity

Recently many studies have investigated the evolution of indirect reciprocity through which cooperative action is returned by a third individual, e.g. individual A helped B and then receives help from C. Most studies on indirect reciprocity have presumed that only two individuals take part in a single interaction (group), e.g. A helps B and C helps A. In this paper, we investigate the evolution of indirect reciprocity when more than two individuals take part in a single group, and compare the result with direct reciprocity through which cooperative action is directly returned by the recipient. Our analyses show the following. In the population with discriminating cooperators and unconditional defectors, whether implementation error is included or not, (i) both strategies are evolutionarily stable and the evolution of indirect reciprocity becomes more difficult as group size increases, and (ii) the condition for the evolution of indirect reciprocity under standing reputation criterion where the third individuals distinguish between justified and unjustified defections is more relaxed than that under image scoring reputation criterion in which the third individuals do not distinguish with. Furthermore, in the population that also includes unconditional cooperators, (iii) in the presence of errors in implementation, the discriminating strategy is evolutionarily stable not only under standing but also under image scoring if group size is larger than two. Finally, (iv) in the absence of errors in implementation, the condition for the evolution of direct reciprocity is equivalent to that for the evolution of indirect reciprocity under standing, and, in the presence of errors, the condition for the evolution of direct reciprocity is very close to that for the evolution of indirect reciprocity under image scoring.     

Affiliative relationships and reciprocity among adult male bonnet macaques (Macaca radiata) at Arunachala Hill, India

In captivity, male bonnet macaques (Macaca radiata) frequently express "friendship" toward one another, including affiliative behavior such as huddling, grooming, coalitionary support, and sitting in close proximity. The purpose of this study was to determine whether wild adult male bonnet macaques also express "friendship" by investigating whether or not (1) adult male bonnet macaques have affiliative social relationships with other males, (2) the strength of social relationships varies among dyads, (3) there is time-matched reciprocity in allogrooming among dyads, and if so, whether the level of reciprocity occurs within a bout of grooming, a day, or over 2 months (the limit of this study), and (4) a correlation exists between the strength of social relationships and dominance ranks among adult males. Focal samples totaling 150 hr on all seven adult males in one study group were conducted to record both agonistic and affiliative interactions. Agonistic interactions were used to construct a dominance hierarchy, whereas affiliative interactions (sitting in proximity to within 1 m with and without grooming) were used to quantify the existence and strength of social bonds within dyads. Results show that adult male bonnet macaques had differentiated affiliative relationships with other males in their group. There was little reciprocity of grooming within a bout of grooming or within a day, but greater reciprocity over the study period of 2 months. There was no correlation between dominance ranking distance and the strength of affiliative relationship within dyads; however, within dyads lower-ranking males groomed higher-ranking males more than vice versa. This study suggests that friendships in male bonnet macaques are characterized not by immediate tit-for-tat reciprocal altruism, but by reciprocity over a longer time span, and that affiliative social relationships may be less constrained by agonistic relationships than is the case in more despotic species of macaques.     

Allowance for random dose estimation errors in atomic bomb survivor studies: a revision

Allowing for imprecision of radiation dose estimates for A-bomb survivors followed up by the Radiation Effects Research Foundation can be improved through recent statistical methodology. Since the entire RERF dosimetry system has recently been revised, it is timely to reconsider this. We have found that the dosimetry revision itself does not warrant changes in these methods but that the new methodology does. In addition to assumptions regarding the form and magnitude of dose estimation errors, previous and current methods involve the apparent distribution of true doses in the cohort. New formulas give results conveniently and explicitly in terms of these inputs. Further, it is now possible to use assumptions about two components of the dose errors, referred to in the statistical literature as "classical" and "Berkson-type". There are indirect statistical indications, involving non-cancer biological effects, that errors may be somewhat larger than assumed before, in line with recommendations made here. Inevitably, methods must rely on uncertain assumptions about the magnitude of dose errors, and it is comforting to find that, within the range of plausibility, eventual cancer risk estimates are not very sensitive to these.     

Reactive strategies in indirect reciprocity

Evolution of reactive strategy of indirect reciprocity is discussed, where individuals interact with others through the one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma game, changing their partners in every round. We investigate all of the reactive strategies that are stochastic, including deterministic ones as special cases. First we study adaptive dynamics of reactive strategies by assuming monomorphic population. Results are very similar to the corresponding evolutionary dynamics of direct reciprocity. The discriminating strategy, which prescribes cooperation only with those who cooperated in the previous round, cannot be an outcome of the evolution. Next we examine the case where the population includes a diversity of strategies. We find that only the mean 'discriminatoriness' in the population is the parameter that affects the evolutionary dynamics. The discriminating strategy works as a promoter of cooperation there. However, it is again not the end point of the evolution. This is because retaliatory defection, which was prescribed by the discriminating strategy, is regarded as another defection toward the society. These results caution that we have to reconsider the role of retaliatory defection much more carefully.     

A tale of two defectors: the importance of standing for evolution of indirect reciprocity

Indirect reciprocity occurs when the cooperative behavior between two individuals is contingent on their previous behavior toward others. Previous theoretical analysis indicates that indirect reciprocity can evolve if individuals use an image-scoring strategy. In this paper, we show that, when errors are added, indirect reciprocity cannot be based on an image-scoring strategy. However, if individuals use a standing strategy, then cooperation through indirect reciprocity is evolutionarily stable. These two strategies differ with respect to the information to which they attend. While image-scoring strategies only need attend to the actions of others, standing strategies also require information about intent. We speculate that this difference may shed light on the evolvability of indirect reciprocity. Additionally, we show that systems of indirect reciprocity are highly sensitive to the availability of information. Finally, we present a model which shows that if indirect reciprocity were to evolve, selection should also favor trusting behavior in relations between strangers.     

Norway rats reciprocate help according to the quality of help they received

Direct reciprocity, according to the decision rule ‘help someone who has helped you before’, reflects cooperation based on the principle of postponed benefits. A predominant factor influencing Homo sapiens'' motivation to reciprocate is an individ­ual''s perceived benefit resulting from the value of received help. But hitherto it has been unclear whether other species also base their decision to cooperate on the quality of received help. Previous experiments have demonstrated that Norway rats, Rattus norvegicus, cooperate using direct reciprocity decision rules in a variant of the iterated Prisoner''s Dilemma, where they preferentially help cooperators instead of defectors. But, as the quality of obtained benefits has not been varied, it is yet unclear whether rats use the value of received help as decision criterion to pay help back. Here, we tested whether rats distinguish between different cooperators depending purely on the quality of their help. Our data show that a rat''s propensity to reciprocate help is, indeed, adjusted to the perceived quality of the partner''s previous help. When cooperating with two conspecific partners expending the same effort, rats apparently rely on obtained benefit to adjust their level of returned help.     

Smell-induced gamma oscillations in human olfactory cortex are required for accurate perception of odor identity

Studies of neuronal oscillations have contributed substantial insight into the mechanisms of visual, auditory, and somatosensory perception. However, progress in such research in the human olfactory system has lagged behind. As a result, the electrophysiological properties of the human olfactory system are poorly understood, and, in particular, whether stimulus-driven high-frequency oscillations play a role in odor processing is unknown. Here, we used direct intracranial recordings from human piriform cortex during an odor identification task to show that 3 key oscillatory rhythms are an integral part of the human olfactory cortical response to smell: Odor induces theta, beta, and gamma rhythms in human piriform cortex. We further show that these rhythms have distinct relationships with perceptual behavior. Odor-elicited gamma oscillations occur only during trials in which the odor is accurately perceived, and features of gamma oscillations predict odor identification accuracy, suggesting that they are critical for odor identity perception in humans. We also found that the amplitude of high-frequency oscillations is organized by the phase of low-frequency signals shortly following sniff onset, only when odor is present. Our findings reinforce previous work on theta oscillations, suggest that gamma oscillations in human piriform cortex are important for perception of odor identity, and constitute a robust identification of the characteristic electrophysiological response to smell in the human brain. Future work will determine whether the distinct oscillations we identified reflect distinct perceptual features of odor stimuli.

Intracranial recordings from human olfactory cortex reveal a characteristic spectrotemporal response to odors, including theta, beta and gamma oscillations, and show that high-frequency responses are critical for accurate perception of odors.