Sleep loss produces false memories

People sometimes claim with high confidence to remember events that in fact never happened, typically due to strong semantic associations with actually encoded events. Sleep is known to provide optimal neurobiological conditions for consolidation of memories for long-term storage, whereas sleep deprivation acutely impairs retrieval of stored memories. Here, focusing on the role of sleep-related memory processes, we tested whether false memories can be created (a) as enduring memory representations due to a consolidation-associated reorganization of new memory representations during post-learning sleep and/or (b) as an acute retrieval-related phenomenon induced by sleep deprivation at memory testing. According to the Deese, Roediger, McDermott (DRM) false memory paradigm, subjects learned lists of semantically associated words (e.g., "night", "dark", "coal",...), lacking the strongest common associate or theme word (here: "black"). Subjects either slept or stayed awake immediately after learning, and they were either sleep deprived or not at recognition testing 9, 33, or 44 hours after learning. Sleep deprivation at retrieval, but not sleep following learning, critically enhanced false memories of theme words. This effect was abolished by caffeine administration prior to retrieval, indicating that adenosinergic mechanisms can contribute to the generation of false memories associated with sleep loss.     

Characteristics of Near-Death Experiences Memories as Compared to Real and Imagined Events Memories

Since the dawn of time, Near-Death Experiences (NDEs) have intrigued and, nowadays, are still not fully explained. Since reports of NDEs are proposed to be imagined events, and since memories of imagined events have, on average, fewer phenomenological characteristics than real events memories, we here compared phenomenological characteristics of NDEs reports with memories of imagined and real events. We included three groups of coma survivors (8 patients with NDE as defined by the Greyson NDE scale, 6 patients without NDE but with memories of their coma, 7 patients without memories of their coma) and a group of 18 age-matched healthy volunteers. Five types of memories were assessed using Memory Characteristics Questionnaire (MCQ – Johnson et al., 1988): target memories (NDE for NDE memory group, coma memory for coma memory group, and first childhood memory for no memory and control groups), old and recent real event memories and old and recent imagined event memories. Since NDEs are known to have high emotional content, participants were requested to choose the most emotionally salient memories for both real and imagined recent and old event memories. Results showed that, in NDE memories group, NDE memories have more characteristics than memories of imagined and real events (p<0.02). NDE memories contain more self-referential and emotional information and have better clarity than memories of coma (all ps<0.02). The present study showed that NDE memories contained more characteristics than real event memories and coma memories. Thus, this suggests that they cannot be considered as imagined event memories. On the contrary, their physiological origins could lead them to be really perceived although not lived in the reality. Further work is needed to better understand this phenomenon.     

Hippocampus: memory, habit and voluntary movement

A general method for studying monkeys' memories is to teach the animals memory-dependent performance rules: for example, to choose, out of two visual stimuli, the one that flashed last time the animal saw it. One may thus assess the animal's memory for any arbitrarily chosen event such as flashing even if the event itself has no intrinsic importance for the animal. The method also allows assessment of an animal's memory of the animal's own previous behaviour. The use of these methods has revealed a simple generalization about the function of the hippocampus in memory: hippocampal lesions impair memory of the voluntary movement that a stimulus previously elicited, but leave intact memory for relations between environmental events other than voluntary movements. The impairment in memory for voluntary movements produces deficits in exploration and in habit formation.     

Relationship between Fear Conditionability and Aversive Memories: Evidence from a Novel Conditioned-Intrusion Paradigm

Intrusive memories – a hallmark symptom of posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) – are often triggered by stimuli possessing similarity with cues that predicted or accompanied the traumatic event. According to learning theories, intrusive memories can be seen as a conditioned response to trauma reminders. However, direct laboratory evidence for the link between fear conditionability and intrusive memories is missing. Furthermore, fear conditioning studies have predominantly relied on standardized aversive stimuli (e.g. electric stimulation) that bear little resemblance to typical traumatic events. To investigate the general relationship between fear conditionability and aversive memories, we tested 66 mentally healthy females in a novel conditioned-intrusion paradigm designed to model real-life traumatic experiences. The paradigm included a differential fear conditioning procedure with neutral sounds as conditioned stimuli and short violent film clips as unconditioned stimuli. Subsequent aversive memories were assessed through a memory triggering task (within 30 minutes, in the laboratory) and ambulatory assessment (involuntary aversive memories in the 2 days following the experiment). Skin conductance responses and subjective ratings demonstrated successful differential conditioning indicating that naturalistic aversive film stimuli can be used in a fear conditioning experiment. Furthermore, aversive memories were elicited in response to the conditioned stimuli during the memory triggering task and also occurred in the 2 days following the experiment. Importantly, participants who displayed higher conditionability showed more aversive memories during the memory triggering task and during ambulatory assessment. This suggests that fear conditioning constitutes an important source of persistent aversive memories. Implications for PTSD and its treatment are discussed.     

Odor-evoked autobiographical memories: age and gender differences along the life span

Odors are powerful in bringing back old and vivid memories bearing emotional content. This inherent hedonic property of olfactory stimuli makes this sensory modality particularly suitable for studying autobiographical memory. In the present work, adolescents (first experiment), young adults (second experiment), and elderly (third experiment) of both sexes were asked to smell 10 familiar odorants and to report if these odorants evoked personal autobiographical memories or referential memories (i.e., names and objects). The participants were then required to link these memories to triplets of words using the progressive elaboration method of the Loci mnemonic. The aim of the study was to investigate whether 1) odorants evoking autobiographical memories led to faster reaction times (RTs) and to a greater number of correct responses in the recall of the items associated to such memories than do odorants evoking referential memories, 2) females differed from males on the above tasks along with the life span, and 3) the preferential codes (i.e., autobiographical or referential) attributed to the odorants vary according to gender and age. In general, it was observed that the way in which the odorants were encoded affected the subsequent retrieval. Indeed, data analyses have shown that odorants evoking autobiographical memories lead to faster RTs (experiments 2 and 3) and that females outperform males (experiments 1 and 2). However, these effects are greatly age and gender dependent. Furthermore, females are more prone than males to code the odorants autobiographically (as shown by the higher amount of autobiographical experiences that they have provided at all ages relative to males). Results are discussed in terms of developmental differences and odor-emotion links and the possible role of odors and autobiographical memory in learning and retrieval of other items.     

Hypnosis,memory and amnesia.

Hypnotized subjects respond to suggestions from the hypnotist for imaginative experiences involving alterations in perception and memory. Individual differences in hypnotizability are only weakly related to other forms of suggestibility. Neuropsychological speculations about hypnosis focus on the right hemisphere and/or the frontal lobes. Posthypnotic amnesia refers to subjects'' difficulty in remembering, after hypnosis, the events and experiences that transpired while they were hypnotized. Posthypnotic amnesia is not an instance of state-dependent memory, but it does seem to involve a disruption of retrieval processes similar to the functional amnesias observed in clinical dissociative disorders. Implicit memory, however, is largely spared, and may underlie subjects'' ability to recognize events that they cannot recall. Hypnotic hypermnesia refers to improved memory for past events. However, such improvements are illusory: hypermnesia suggestions increase false recollection, as well as subjects'' confidence in both true and false memories. Hypnotic age regression can be subjectively compelling, but does not involve the ablation of adult memory, or the reinstatement of childlike modes of mental functioning, or the revivification of memory. The clinical and forensic use of hypermnesia and age regression to enhance memory in patients, victims and witnesses (e.g. recovered memory therapy for child sexual abuse) should be discouraged.     

Sleep supports selective retention of associative memories based on relevance for future utilization

An outstanding question is whether memory consolidation occurs passively or involves active processes that selectively stabilize memories based on future utility. Here, we differentially modulated the expected future relevance of two sets of picture-location associations after learning. Participants first studied two sets of picture-location associations. After a baseline memory test, they were instructed that only one set of associations would be retested after a 14-hour delay. For half of the participants, this test-retest delay contained a night of sleep; for the other half the delay included a normal working day. At retest, participants were re-instructed and against their expectations tested on both sets of associations. Our results show that post-learning instruction about subsequent relevance selectively improves memory retention for specific associative memories. This effect was sleep-dependent; it was present only in the group of subjects for which the test-retest delay contained sleep. Moreover, time spent asleep for participants in this sleep group correlated with retention of relevant but not irrelevant associations; participants who slept longer forgot fewer associations from the relevant category. In contrast, participants that did not sleep forgot more relevant than irrelevant associations across the test-retest delay. In summary, our results indicate that it is possible to modulate the retention of selected memories after learning with simple verbal instructions on their future relevance. The finding that this effect depends on sleep demonstrates this state's active role in memory consolidation and may have utility for educational settings.     

Seeking a spotless mind: extinction, deconsolidation, and erasure of fear memory

Learning to contend with threats in the environment is essential to survival, but dysregulation of memories for traumatic events can lead to disabling psychopathology. Recent years have witnessed an impressive growth in our understanding of the neural systems and synaptic mechanisms underlying emotional memory formation. As a consequence, interest has emerged in developing strategies for suppressing, if not eliminating, fear memories. Here, I review recent work employing sophisticated behavioral, pharmacological, and molecular tools to target fear memories, placing these memories firmly behind the crosshairs of neurobiologically informed interventions.     

Interaction of Sleep and Emotional Content on the Production of False Memories

Sleep benefits veridical memories, resulting in superior recall relative to off-line intervals spent awake. Sleep also increases false memory recall in the Deese-Roediger-McDermott (DRM) paradigm. Given the suggestion that emotional veridical memories are prioritized for consolidation over sleep, here we examined whether emotion modulates sleep’s effect on false memory formation. Participants listened to semantically related word lists lacking a critical lure representing each list’s “gist.” Free recall was tested after 12 hours containing sleep or wake. The Sleep group recalled more studied words than the Wake group but only for emotionally neutral lists. False memories of both negative and neutral critical lures were greater following sleep relative to wake. Morning and Evening control groups (20-minute delay) did not differ ruling out circadian accounts for these differences. These results support the adaptive function of sleep in both promoting the consolidation of veridical declarative memories and in extracting unifying aspects from memory details.     

Memory processing in great apes: the effect of time and sleep

Following encoding, memory remains temporarily vulnerable to disruption. Consolidation refers to offline time-dependent processes that continue after encoding and stabilize, transform or enhance the memory trace. Memory consolidation resulting from sleep has been reported for declarative and non-declarative memories in humans. We first investigated the temporal course of memory retrieval in chimpanzees, bonobos and orangutans. We found that the amount of retrieved information was time dependent: apes' performance degraded after 1 and 2 h, stabilized after 4 h, started to increase after 8 and 12 h and fully recovered after 24 h. Second, we show that although memories during wakefulness were highly vulnerable to interference from events similar to those witnessed during the original encoding event, an intervening period of sleep not only stabilized apes' memories into more permanent ones but also protected them against interference.     

Epigenetic mechanisms in the dentate gyrus act as a molecular switch in hippocampus-associated memory formation

We make strong memories of significant events in our lives which may serve to increase our resilience and adaptation capacity to deal with future challenges. It is well established that the neurotransmitter glutamate and the ERK MAPK intracellular signaling pathway play a principal role in memory formation. In addition, stress-associated hormones like glucocorticoids released during such events are known to strengthen formation of memories. But, how do these hormones work? Do they interact with the ERK MAPK pathway or otherwise? What are the more distal, epigenomic effects? We discovered in rats and mice that confrontation with a psychological challenge (e.g. forced swimming, Morris water maze) would lead, through NMDA-ERK signaling, to MSK1 and Elk-1 activation in dentate gyrus neurons (a part of the hippocampus involved in encoding of memories) resulting in histone H3 S10-phosphorylation and K14-acetylation, H4 hyper-acetylation, gene induction and formation of memories of the event. Moreover, glucocorticoid hormones via the glucocorticoid receptor (GR) greatly facilitated the epigenomic mechanisms and cognitive performance. Therefore, we propose that formation of enduring memories of significant events requires an interaction of GRs with the NMDA/ERK/MSK1/Elk-1 signaling pathways to allow an optimal epigenomic activation pattern in dentate gyrus neurons to accommodate their altered neurophysiological function.     

“Disorganized in time”: Impact of bottom-up and top-down negative emotion generation on memory formation among healthy and traumatized adolescents

“Travelling in time,” a central feature of episodic memory is severely affected among individuals with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) with two opposite effects: vivid traumatic memories are unorganized in temporality (bottom-up processes), non-traumatic personal memories tend to lack spatio-temporal details and false recognitions occur more frequently that in the general population (top-down processes). To test the effect of these two types of processes (i.e. bottom-up and top-down) on emotional memory, we conducted two studies in healthy and traumatized adolescents, a period of life in which vulnerability to emotion is particularly high. Using negative and neutral images selected from the international affective picture system (IAPS), stimuli were divided into perceptual images (emotion generated by perceptual details) and conceptual images (emotion generated by the general meaning of the material). Both categories of stimuli were then used, along with neutral pictures, in a memory task with two phases (encoding and recognition). In both populations, we reported a differential effect of the emotional material on encoding and recognition. Negative perceptual scenes induced an attentional capture effect during encoding and enhanced the recollective distinctiveness. Conversely, the encoding of conceptual scenes was similar to neutral ones, but the conceptual relatedness induced false memories at retrieval. However, among individuals with PTSD, two subgroups of patients were identified. The first subgroup processed the scenes faster than controls, except for the perceptual scenes, and obtained similar performances to controls in the recognition task. The second subgroup group desmonstrated an attentional deficit in the encoding task with no benefit from the distinctiveness associated with negative perceptual scenes on memory performances. These findings provide a new perspective on how negative emotional information may have opposite influences on memory in normal and traumatized individuals. It also gives clues to understand how intrusive memories and overgeneralization takes place in PTSD.     

Emergence of Collective Memories

Background

We understand the dynamics of the world around us as by associating pairs of events, where one event has some influence on the other. These pairs of events can be aggregated into a web of memories representing our understanding of an episode of history. The events and the associations between them need not be directly experienced—they can also be acquired by communication. In this paper we take a network approach to study the dynamics of memories of history.

Methodology/Principal Findings

First we investigate the network structure of a data set consisting of reported events by several individuals and how associations connect them. We focus our measurement on degree distributions, degree correlations, cycles (which represent inconsistencies as they would break the time ordering) and community structure. We proceed to model effects of communication using an agent-based model. We investigate the conditions for the memory webs of different individuals to converge to collective memories, how groups where the individuals have similar memories (but different from other groups) can form.

Conclusions/Significance

Our work outlines how the cognitive representation of memories and social structure can co-evolve as a contagious process. We generate some testable hypotheses including that the number of groups is limited as a function of the total population size.     

Amnesia and neglect: beyond the Delay-Brion system and the Hebb synapse.

Hippocampal damage in people causes impairments of episodic memory, but in rats it causes impairments of spatial learning. Experiments in macaque monkeys show that these two kinds of impairment are functionally similar to each other. After any lesion that interrupts the Delay-Brion system (hippocampus, fornix, mamillary bodies and anterior thalamus) monkeys are impaired in scene-specific memory, where an event takes place against a background that is specific to that event. Scene-specific memory in the monkey corresponds to human episodic memory, which is the memory of a unique event set in a particular scene, as opposed to scene-independent human knowledge, which is abstracted from many different scenes. However, interruption of the Delay-Brion system is not sufficient to explain all of the memory impairments that are seen in amnesic patients. To explain amnesia the specialized function of the hippocampus in scene memory needs to be considered alongside the other, qualitatively different functional specializations of other memory systems of the temporal lobe, including the perirhinal cortex and the amygdala. In all these specialized areas, however, including the hippocampus, there is no fundamental distinction between memory systems and perceptual systems. In explaining memory disorders in amnesia it is also important to consider them alongside the memory disorders of neglect patients. Neglect patients fail to represent in memory the side of the world that is contralateral to the current fixation point, in both short- and long-term memory retrieval. Neglect was produced experimentally by unilateral visual disconnection in the monkey, confirming the idea that visual memory retrieval is retinotopically organized; patients with unilateral medial temporal-lobe removals showed lateralized memory impairments for half-scenes in the visual hemifield contralateral to the removal. Thus, in scene-memory retrieval the Delay-Brion system contributes to the retrieval of visual memories into the retinotopically organized visual cortex. This scene memory interpretation of hippocampal function needs to be contrasted with the cognitive-map hypothesis. The cognitive-map model of hippocampal function shares some common assumptions with the Hebb-synapse model of association formation, and the Hebb-synapse model can be rejected on the basis of recent evidence that monkeys can form direct associations in memory between temporally discontiguous events. Our general conclusion is that the primate brain encompasses widespread and powerful memory mechanisms which will continue to be poorly understood if theory and experimentation continue to concentrate too much, as they have in the past, on the hippocampus and the Hebb synapse.     

Our changeable memories: legal and practical implications

The malleability of memory is becoming increasingly clear. Many influences can cause memories to change or even be created anew, including our imaginations and the leading questions or different recollections of others. The knowledge that we cannot rely on our memories, however compelling they might be, leads to questions about the validity of criminal convictions that are based largely on the testimony of victims or witnesses. Our scientific understanding of memory should be used to help the legal system to navigate this minefield.     

The labile nature of consolidation theory

'Consolidation' has been used to describe distinct but related processes. In considering the implications of our recent findings on the lability of reactivated fear memories, we view consolidation and reconsolidation in terms of molecular events taking place within neurons as opposed to interactions between brain regions. Our findings open up a new dimension in the study of memory consolidation. We argue that consolidation is not a one-time event, but instead is reiterated with subsequent activation of the memories.     

Alternative conceptions of memory consolidation and the role of the hippocampus at the systems level in rodents

We discuss very recent experiments with rodents addressing the idea that long-term memories initially depending on the hippocampus, over a prolonged period, become independent of it. No unambiguous recent evidence exists to substantiate that this occurs. Most experiments find that recent and remote memories are equally affected by hippocampus damage. Nearly all experiments that report spared remote memories suffer from two problems: retrieval could be based upon substantial regions of spared hippocampus and recent memory is tested at intervals that are of the same order of magnitude as cellular consolidation. Accordingly, we point the way beyond systems consolidation theories, both the Standard Model of Consolidation and the Multiple Trace Theory, and propose a simpler multiple storage site hypothesis. On this view, with event reiterations, different memory representations are independently established in multiple networks. Many detailed memories always depend on the hippocampus; the others may be established and maintained independently.     

New Episodic Learning Interferes with the Reconsolidation of Autobiographical Memories

It is commonly assumed that, with time, an initially labile memory is transformed into a permanent one via a process of consolidation. Yet, recent evidence indicates that memories can return to a fragile state again when reactivated, requiring a period of reconsolidation. In the study described here, we found that participants who memorized a story immediately after they had recalled neutral and emotional experiences from their past were impaired in their memory for the neutral (but not for the emotional) experiences one week later. The effect of learning the story depended critically on the preceding reactivation of the autobiographical memories since learning without reactivation had no effect. These results suggest that new learning impedes the reconsolidation of neutral autobiographical memories.     

Rapid memory reactivation revealed by oscillatory entrainment

Episodic memory refers to humans' unique ability to mentally reconstruct past events. Neurocomputational models predict that remembering entails the reinstatement of brain activity that was present when an event was initially experienced [1-5], a claim that has recently gained support from functional imaging work in humans [6-14]. The nature of this reactivation, however, is still unclear. Cognitive models claim that retrieval is set off by an early reactivation of stored memory representations ("ecphory") [15-17]. However, reinstatement as found in imaging studies might also reflect postretrieval processes that operate on the products of retrieval and are thus a consequence rather than a precondition of remembering. Here, we used frequency entrainment as a novel method of tagging memories in the human electroencephalogram (EEG). Participants studied words presented on flickering backgrounds, entraining a steady-state brain response at either 6 or 10?Hz. We found that these frequency signatures rapidly reemerged during a later memory test when participants successfully recognized?a word. An additional behavioral experiment suggested that this reactivation occurs in the absence of conscious memory for the frequencies entrained during study. The findings provide empirical evidence for the role of rapid, likely unconscious memory reactivation during retrieval.