Mother nature kicks back: review of Sean B. Carroll’s 2016 <Emphasis Type="Italic">The Serengeti Rules</Emphasis>

Sean B. Carroll’s new book, The Serengeti Rules: The Quest to Discover How Life Works and Why it Matters, is a well-written mix of history of science and philosophy of biology. In his book, Carroll articulates a set of ecological generalisations, the Serengeti Rules, which are supposed to make salient the structures in ecosystems that ensure the persistence of those ecosystems. In this essay review, I evaluate Carroll’s use of the controversial concept of regulation and his thesis that ecosystems have a natural balance comparable to that of human bodies. My conclusion is optimistic. Carroll’s generalisations provide a tool-kit for building relatively simple models that are accurate enough to be widely applied in experimental ecology and conservation science, guiding interventions upon unhealthy ecosystems.     

Guessing the future of the past

I review the book “Making Prehistory: Historical Science and the Scientific Realism Debate” by Derek Turner. Turner suggests that philsophers should take seriously the historical sciences such as geology when considering philosophy of science issues. To that end, he explores the scientific realism debate with the historical sciences in mind. His conclusion is a view allied to that of Arthur Fine: a view Turner calls the natural historical attitude. While I find Turner’s motivations good, I find his characterisation of the historical sciences unconvincing. I say why in a section at the end of the review. The result is that I am unpersuaded by his thesis.     

Ernst Mayr,naturalist: His contributions to systematics and evolution

Ernst Mayr's scientific career continues strongly 70 years after he published his first scientific paper in 1923. He is primarily a naturalist and ornithologist which has influenced his basic approach in science and later in philosophy and history of science. Mayr studied at the Natural History Museum in Berlin with Professor E. Stresemann, a leader in the most progressive school of avian systematics of the time. The contracts gained through Stresemann were central to Mayr's participation in a three year expedition to New Guinea and The Solomons, and the offer of a position in the Department of Ornithology, American Museum of Natural History, beginning in 1931. At the AMNH, Mayr was able to blend the best of the academic traditions of Europe with those of North America in developing a unified research program in biodiversity embracing systematics, biogeography and nomenclature. His tasks at the AMNH were to curate and study the huge collections amassed by the Whitney South Sea Expedition plus the just purchased Rothschild collection of birds. These studies provided Mayr with the empirical foundation essential for his 1942Systematics and the Origin of Species and his subsequent theoretical work in evolutionary biology as well as all his later work in the philosophy and history of science. Without a detailed understanding of Mayr's empirical systematic and biogeographic work, one cannot possibly comprehend fully his immense contributions to evolutionary biology and his later analyses in the philosophy and history of science.     

The tribunal of philosophy and its norms: history and philosophy in Georges Canguilhem’s historical epistemology

In this article I assess Georges Canguilhem’s historical epistemology with both theoretical and historical questions in mind. From a theoretical point of view, I am concerned with the relation between history and philosophy, and in particular with the philosophical assumptions and external norms that are involved in history writing. Moreover, I am concerned with the role that history can play in the understanding and evaluation of philosophical concepts. From a historical point of view, I regard historical epistemology, as developed by Gaston Bachelard and Georges Canguilhem, as a conception and practice which came out of the project, elaborated in France from the 1920s to the 1940s, of combining history of science and philosophy. I analyse in particular Canguilhem’s epistemology in his theory and practice of history of science. What he called ‘normative history’ is the focus of my analysis. I evaluate the question of the nature and provenience of the norm employed in normative history, and I compare it with the norm as discussed by Canguilhem in Le normal et le pathologique. While I am critical of Canguilhem’s treatment of history, I conclude that his philosophical suggestion to analyse the formation of scientific concepts ‘from below’ represents a useful model for history and philosophy of science, and that it can be very profitably extended to philosophical concepts.     

Shifting to structures in physics and biology: a prophylactic for promiscuous realism

Within the philosophy of science, the realism debate has been revitalised by the development of forms of structural realism. These urge a shift in focus from the object oriented ontologies that come and go through the history of science to the structures that remain through theory change. Such views have typically been elaborated in the context of theories of physics and are motivated by, first of all, the presence within such theories of mathematical equations that allow straightforward representation of the relevant structures; and secondly, the implications of such theories for the individuality and identity of putative objects. My aim in this paper is to explore the possibility of extending such views to biological theories. An obvious concern is that within the context of the latter it is typically insisted that we cannot find the kinds of highly mathematised structures that structural realism can point to in physics. I shall indicate how the model-theoretic approach to theories might help allay such concerns. Furthermore, issues of identity and individuality also arise within biology. Thus Dupré has recently noted that there exists a 'General Problem of Biological Individuality' which relates to the issue of how one divides 'massively integrated and interconnected' systems into discrete components. In response Dupré advocates a form of 'Promiscuous Realism' that holds, for example, that there is no unique way of dividing the phylogenetic tree into kinds. Instead I shall urge serious consideration of those aspects of the work of Dupré and others that lean towards a structuralist interpretation. By doing so I hope to suggest possible ways in which a structuralist stance might be extended to biology.     

Experimental history and Herman Boerhaave’s chemistry of plants

In the early eighteenth century, chemistry became the main academic locus where, in Francis Bacon’s words, Experimenta lucifera were performed alongside Experimenta fructifera and where natural philosophy was coupled with natural history and ‘experimental history’ in the Baconian and Boyleian sense of an inventory and exploration of the extant operations of the arts and crafts. The Dutch social and political system and the institutional setting of the university of Leiden endorsed this empiricist, utilitarian orientation toward the sciences, which was forcefully propagated by one of the university’s most famous representatives in the first half of the eighteenth century, the professor of medicine, botany and chemistry Herman Boerhaave. Recent historical investigations on Boerhaave’s chemistry have provided important insights into Boerhaave’s religious background, his theoretical and philosophical goals, and his pedagogical agenda. But comparatively little attention has been paid to the chemical experiments presented in Boerhaave’s famous chemical textbook, the Elementa chemiae, and to the question of how these experiments relate not only to experimental philosophy but also to experimental history and natural history, and to contemporary utilitarianism. I argue in this essay that Boerhaave shared a strong commitment to Baconian utilitarianism and empiricism with many other European chemists around the middle of the eighteenth century, in particular to what Bacon designated ‘experimental history’ and I will provide evidence for this claim through a careful analysis of Boerhaave’s plant-chemical experiments presented in the Elementa chemiae.     

Teaching bioethics as a new paradigm for health professionals

In The Clouds by Aristophanes, Strepsiades brings his son before Socrates so that he could learn Philosophy for he has heard that this science teaches how to overcome the most difficult causes with reasons. And Strepsiades wants his son to learn the art of failing to pay debts. Regarding medical education in our time, Edmund Pellegrino has noted that the educational philosophy of medical schools determines what a "good" physician is. Thus, teaching bioethics to future health professionals makes us face old problems now: What teaching method to choose among all the possible various ones? What should teaching aim at? Which will be our educational philosophy? Therefore I shall introduce here the epistemological basis of our Bioethics teaching program in Argentina and its implementing strategies in the undergraduate curriculum and the post-graduate level.     

HOMEOPATHY AND EXTRAORDINARY CLAIMS – A RESPONSE TO SMITH'S UTILITARIAN ARGUMENT

Kevin Smith's utilitarian argument against homeopathy 1 is flawed because he did not review and refute the relevant basic science literature on ultra‐high dilutions. He also failed to appreciate that allopathic medicine is based on a deductive‐nomothetic method and that homeopathic medicine is based on an inductive‐idiographic method, and thus that the implications for clinical research are very different. His misunderstanding of provings and of the holism of homeopathic medicine also demonstrated his failure to understand the history, philosophy and method of homeopathy. Finally, I questioned the value of introducing ethical judgment into an ongoing scientific debate.     

Bayer revisited

Bayer accuses me of wrongly claiming that he holds a negative thesis about the role that the liberal emphasis on privacy rights has had on AIDS public health policy. In his reply to my review essay, he denies holding such a thesis and, moreover, makes the stronger claim that his position is sympathetic to liberalism, or at least to some versions of it. Although I appreciate Bayer's efforts to clarify his views about liberalism and a "culture of restraint and responsibility", it is clear to me that our differences are related not to a misunderstanding on my part, but to a fundamental disagreement concerning what liberalism as a political philosophy is, and what public policy implications it entails in the case of AIDS....     

A chemist building paths to cell biology

Galileo is reported to have stated, “Measure what is measurable and make measurable what is not so.” My group''s trajectory in cell biology has closely followed this philosophy, although it took some searching to find this path.     

Philosophy and tinkering

I characterize Wimsatt’s approach to philosophy of science as philosophy for science and then briefly consider a theme emerging from his work that informs just one of the many current developments in philosophy of biology that he inspired: scaffolding as a problem of mechanistic explanation for functionalists.     

The “Cycle of Life” in Ecology: Sergei Vinogradskii’s Soil Microbiology, 1885–1940

Historians of science have attributed the emergence of ecology as a discipline in the late nineteenth century to the synthesis of Humboldtian botanical geography and Darwinian evolution. In this essay, I begin to explore another, largely neglected but very important dimension of this history. Using Sergei Vinogradskii’s career and scientific research trajectory as a point of entry, I illustrate the manner in which microbiologists, chemists, botanists, and plant physiologists inscribed the concept of a “cycle of life” into their investigations. Their research transformed a longstanding notion into the fundamental approaches and concepts that underlay the new ecological disciplines that emerged in the 1920s. Pasteur thus joins Humboldt as a foundational figure in ecological thinking, and the broader picture that emerges of the history of ecology explains some otherwise puzzling features of that discipline – such as its fusion of experimental and natural historical methodologies. Vinogradskii’s personal “cycle of life” is also interesting as an example of the interplay between Russian and Western European scientific networks and intellectual traditions. Trained in Russia to investigate nature as a super-organism comprised of circulating energy, matter, and life; over the course of five decades – in contact with scientists and scientific discourses in France, Germany, and Switzerland – he developed a series of research methods that translated the concept of a “cycle of life” into an ecologically conceived soil science and microbiology in the 1920s and 1930s. These methods, bolstered by his authority as a founding father of microbiology, captured the attention of an international network of scientists. Vinogradskii’s conceptualization of the “cycle of life” as chemosynthesis, autotrophy, and global nutrient cycles attracted the attention of ecosystem ecologists; and his methods appealed to practitioners at agricultural experiment stations and microbiological institutes in the United States, Western Europe, and the Soviet Union.     

Speaking out about the social implications of science: the uneven legacy of H. J. Muller

H. J. Muller (1890-1967) was unusual as a scientist because he spoke out on numerous occasions about the uses and abuses of genetics in society. In this article, I follow Muller's efforts to do so and the consequences that they had on his career, his productivity as a research scientist, and his reputation. The shifting sites of Muller's work--which ranged from Columbia University to Texas, from Berlin to Moscow and Leningrad, from Madrid to Edinburgh, and from Amherst to Indiana University--made his activism unusual. Muller paid a price for his activism, and his reputation today is still marred by what most historians would consider risky judgments and reversals of position about genetics and society. My analysis is not a defense but rather an evaluation of the circumstances that led him to these positions and an analysis of the consequences of challenging society when scientists believe their science is being ignored or abused.     

Husserl's Crisis as a crisis of psychology

This paper places Husserl's mature work, The Crisis of the European Sciences, in the context of his engagement with--and critique of--experimental psychology at the time. I begin by showing (a) that Husserl accorded psychology a crucial role in his philosophy, i.e., that of providing a scientific analysis of subjectivity, and (b) that he viewed contemporary psychology--due to its naturalism--as having failed to pursue this goal in the appropriate manner. I then provide an analysis of Husserl's views about naturalism and scientific philosophy. Some central themes of the Crisis are traced back to Husserl's earlier work and to his relationship with his teacher, Franz Brentano, with whom he disagreed about the status of "inner perception" as the proper scientific method for a phenomenological analysis. The paper then shows that Husserl was well aware of at least one publication about the crisis of psychology (Bühler's 1927 book), and it teases out some aspects of the complicated relationship between Husserl and members of the Würzburg School of thought psychology: The latter had drawn on Husserl's writings, but Husserl felt that they had misunderstood his central thesis. I conclude by placing Husserl's work in the wider context of scientific, cultural, and political crisis-discourses at the time.     

Transcendental Niche Construction

I discuss various reactions to my article "Again, what the philosophy of science is not" [Callebaut (Acta Biotheor 53:92-122 (2005a))], most of which concern the naturalism issue, the place of the philosophy of biology within philosophy of science and philosophy at large, and the proper tasks of the philosophy of biology.     

The Experimental Study of Bacterial Evolution and Its Implications for the Modern Synthesis of Evolutionary Biology

Since the 1940s, microbiologists, biochemists and population geneticists have experimented with the genetic mechanisms of microorganisms in order to investigate evolutionary processes. These evolutionary studies of bacteria and other microorganisms gained some recognition from the standard-bearers of the modern synthesis of evolutionary biology, especially Theodosius Dobzhansky and Ledyard Stebbins. A further period of post-synthesis bacterial evolutionary research occurred between the 1950s and 1980s. These experimental analyses focused on the evolution of population and genetic structure, the adaptive gain of new functions, and the evolutionary consequences of competition dynamics. This large body of research aimed to make evolutionary theory testable and predictive, by giving it mechanistic underpinnings. Although evolutionary microbiologists promoted bacterial experiments as methodologically advantageous and a source of general insight into evolution, they also acknowledged the biological differences of bacteria. My historical overview concludes with reflections on what bacterial evolutionary research achieved in this period, and its implications for the still-developing modern synthesis.     

Replication, lies and lesser-known truths regarding experimental design in environmental microbiology

A recent analysis revealed that most environmental microbiologists neglect replication in their science (Prosser, 2010). Of all peer-reviewed papers published during 2009 in the field's leading journals, slightly more than 70% lacked replication when it came to analyzing microbial community data. The paucity of replication is viewed as an 'endemic' and 'embarrassing' problem that amounts to 'bad science', or worse yet, as the title suggests, lying (Prosser, 2010). Although replication is an important component of experimental design, it is possible to do good science without replication. There are various quantitative techniques - some old, some new - that, when used properly, will allow environmental microbiologists to make strong statistical conclusions from experimental and comparative data. Here, I provide examples where unreplicated data can be used to test hypotheses and yield novel information in a statistically robust manner.     

The anthropology of deep history

The history of anthropology reveals a discipline driven by fission and fusion. In this article I use the framework of deep history as an example of what might be achieved if anthropology resolved to travel the road of fusion rather than continue with atomization. I will illustrate the pathway by examining the fusion of interdisciplinary endeavour that is encapsulated in the concept of a social brain. By placing social life at the heart of the historical process we find common ground for all the fields of anthropology, and beyond to other disciplines. Here anthropologists have the opportunity to set the agenda. The social brain works in deep as well as shallow history. It unites experimental and historical science. And it marks a return to those core principles which Lubbock and the founders of our Institute established.     

'Yes:--no:--I have been sleeping--and now--now--I am dead': undeath, the body and medicine

In this paper I propose that, since the mid-eighteenth century medical science has simultaneously generated and disavowed 'undead' bodies, suspended between life and death. Through close analysis of three examples of 'undeath' taken from different moments in medical history, I consider what these bodies can tell us about medicine, its history, cultural meaning, scientific status and its role in shaping ideas of embodiment, identity and death. My first example is Edgar Allan Poe's story 'The facts in the case of M. Valdemar' which imagines the possibility of a man mesmerised at the point of death. I read this story as a response to the rise of professional, scientific medicine in the 1840s. I then look at the recurring issue of brain death in order to consider tensions within twentieth-century medical hegemony. Finally I read the Alder Hey scandal as a reactivation of undead anxiety in response to the emergent culture of medical consumerism at the end of the twentieth century.     

Fleck and the social constitution of scientific objectivity

Ludwik Fleck’s theory of thought-styles has been hailed as a pioneer of constructivist science studies and sociology of scientific knowledge. But this consensus ignores an important feature of Fleck’s epistemology. At the core of his account is the ideal of ‘objective truth, clarity, and accuracy’. I begin with Fleck’s account of modern natural science, locating the ideal of scientific objectivity within his general social epistemology. I then draw on Fleck’s view of scientific objectivity to improve upon reflexive accounts of the origin and development of the theory of thought-styles, and reply to objections that Fleck’s epistemological stance is self-undermining or inconsistent. Explicating the role of scientific objectivity in Fleck’s epistemology reveals his view to be an internally consistent alternative to recent social accounts of scientific objectivity by Harding, Daston and Galison. I use these contrasts to indicate the strengths and weaknesses of Fleck’s innovative social epistemology, and propose modifications to address the latter. The result is a renewed version of Fleck’s social epistemology, which reconciles commitment to scientific objectivity with integrated sociology, history and philosophy of science.