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1.
When individuals interact, phenotypic variation can be partitioned into direct genetic effects (DGEs) of the individuals’ own genotypes, indirect genetic effects (IGEs) of their social partners’ genotypes and epistatic interactions between the genotypes of interacting individuals (‘genotype‐by‐genotype (G×G) epistasis’). These components can all play important roles in evolutionary processes, but few empirical studies have examined their importance. The social amoeba Dictyostelium discoideum provides an ideal system to measure these effects during social interactions and development. When starved, free‐living amoebae aggregate and differentiate into a multicellular fruiting body with a dead stalk that holds aloft viable spores. By measuring interactions among a set of natural strains, we quantify DGEs, IGEs and G×G epistasis affecting spore formation. We find that DGEs explain most of the phenotypic variance (57.6%) whereas IGEs explain a smaller (13.3%) but highly significant component. Interestingly, G×G epistasis explains nearly a quarter of the variance (23.0%), highlighting the complex nature of genotype interactions. These results demonstrate the large impact that social interactions can have on development and suggest that social effects should play an important role in developmental evolution in this system. 相似文献
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R. KÜMMERLI N. JIRICNY L. S. CLARKE S. A. WEST A. S. GRIFFIN 《Journal of evolutionary biology》2009,22(3):589-598
There is strong evidence that natural selection can favour phenotypic plasticity as a mechanism to maximize fitness in animals. Here, we aim to investigate phenotypic plasticity of a cooperative trait in bacteria – the production of an iron‐scavenging molecule (pyoverdin) by Pseudomonas aeruginosa. Pyoverdin production is metabolically costly to the individual cell, but provides a benefit to the local group and can potentially be exploited by nonpyoverdin‐producing cheats. Here, we subject bacteria to changes in the social environment in media with different iron availabilities and test whether cells can adjust pyoverdin production in response to these changes. We found that pyoverdin production per cell significantly decreased at higher cell densities and increased in the presence of cheats. This phenotypic plasticity significantly influenced the costs and benefits of cooperation. Specifically, the investment of resources into pyoverdin production was reduced in iron‐rich environments and at high cell densities, but increased under iron limitation, and when pyoverdin was exploited by cheats. Our study demonstrates that phenotypic plasticity in a cooperative trait as a response to changes in the environment occurs in even the simplest of organisms, a bacterium. 相似文献
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Asher Leeks;Lisa M. Bono;Elizabeth A. Ampolini;Lucas S. Souza;Thomas Höfler;Courtney L. Mattson;Anna E. Dye;Samuel L. Díaz-Muñoz; 《Journal of evolutionary biology》2024,36(11):1551-1567
Social interactions among viruses occur whenever multiple viral genomes infect the same cells, hosts, or populations of hosts. Viral social interactions range from cooperation to conflict, occur throughout the viral world, and affect every stage of the viral lifecycle. The ubiquity of these social interactions means that they can determine the population dynamics, evolutionary trajectory, and clinical progression of viral infections. At the same time, social interactions in viruses raise new questions for evolutionary theory, providing opportunities to test and extend existing frameworks within social evolution. Many opportunities exist at this interface: Insights into the evolution of viral social interactions have immediate implications for our understanding of the fundamental biology and clinical manifestation of viral diseases. However, these opportunities are currently limited because evolutionary biologists only rarely study social evolution in viruses. Here, we bridge this gap by (1) summarizing the ways in which viruses can interact socially, including consequences for social evolution and evolvability; (2) outlining some open questions raised by viruses that could challenge concepts within social evolution theory; and (3) providing some illustrative examples, data sources, and conceptual questions, for studying the natural history of social viruses. 相似文献
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F. Harrison 《Journal of evolutionary biology》2013,26(6):1370-1378
Cooperation underlies diverse phenomena including the origins of multicellular life, human behaviour in economic markets and the mechanisms by which pathogenic bacteria cause disease. Experiments with microorganisms have advanced our understanding of how, when and why cooperation evolves, but the extent to which microbial cooperation can recapitulate aspects of animal behaviour is debated. For instance, understanding the evolution of behavioural response rules (how should one individual respond to another's decision to cooperate or defect?) is a key part of social evolution theory, but the possible existence of such rules in social microbes has not been explored. In one specific context (biparental care in animals), cooperation is maintained if individuals respond to a partner's defection by increasing their own investment into cooperation, but not so much that this fully compensates for the defector's lack of investment. This is termed ‘partial compensation’. Here, I show that partial compensation for the presence of noncooperating ‘cheats’ is also observed in a microbial social behaviour: the cooperative production of iron‐scavenging siderophores by the bacterium Pseudomonas aeruginosa. A period of evolution in the presence of cheats maintains this response, whereas evolution in the absence of cheats leads to a loss of compensatory behaviour. These results demonstrate (i) the remarkable flexibility of bacterial social behaviour, (ii) the potential generality of partial compensation as a social response rule and (iii) the need for mathematical models to explore the evolution of response rules in multi‐player social interactions. 相似文献
6.
Arne Jungwirth Michael Taborsky 《Proceedings. Biological sciences / The Royal Society》2015,282(1819)
Cooperative breeders serve as a model to study the evolution of cooperation, where costs and benefits of helping are typically scrutinized at the level of group membership. However, cooperation is often observed in multi-level social organizations involving interactions among individuals at various levels. Here, we argue that a full understanding of the adaptive value of cooperation and the evolution of complex social organization requires identifying the effect of different levels of social organization on direct and indirect fitness components. Our long-term field data show that in the cooperatively breeding, colonial cichlid fish Neolamprologus pulcher, both large group size and high colony density significantly raised group persistence. Neither group size nor density affected survival at the individual level, but they had interactive effects on reproductive output; large group size raised productivity when local population density was low, whereas in contrast, small groups were more productive at high densities. Fitness estimates of individually marked fish revealed indirect fitness benefits associated with staying in large groups. Inclusive fitness, however, was not significantly affected by group size, because the direct fitness component was not increased in larger groups. Together, our findings highlight that the reproductive output of groups may be affected in opposite directions by different levels of sociality, and that complex forms of sociality and costly cooperation may evolve in the absence of large indirect fitness benefits and the influence of kin selection. 相似文献
7.
Ryan L. Earley 《Philosophical transactions of the Royal Society of London. Series B, Biological sciences》2010,365(1553):2675-2686
The response of bystanders to information available in their social environment can have a potent influence on the evolution of cooperation and signalling systems. In the presence of bystanders, individuals might be able to increase their payoff by exaggerating signals beyond their means (cheating) or investing to help others despite considerable costs. In doing so, animals can accrue immediate benefits by manipulating (or helping) individuals with whom they are currently interacting and delayed benefits by convincing bystanders that they are more fit or cooperative than perhaps is warranted. In this paper, I provide some illustrative examples of how bystanders could apply added positive selection pressure on both cooperative behaviour and dishonest signalling during courtship or conflict. I also discuss how the presence of bystanders might select for greater flexibility in behavioural strategies (e.g. conditional or condition dependence), which could maintain dishonesty at evolutionarily stable frequencies under some ecological conditions. By recognizing bystanders as a significant selection pressure, we might gain a more realistic approximation of what drives signalling and/or interaction dynamics in social animals. 相似文献
8.
R. Kümmerli L. A. Santorelli E. T. Granato Z. Dumas A. Dobay A. S. Griffin S. A. West 《Journal of evolutionary biology》2015,28(12):2264-2274
The production of beneficial public goods is common in the microbial world, and so is cheating – the exploitation of public goods by nonproducing mutants. Here, we examine co‐evolutionary dynamics between cooperators and cheats and ask whether cooperators can evolve strategies to reduce the burden of exploitation, and whether cheats in turn can improve their exploitation abilities. We evolved cooperators of the bacterium Pseudomonas aeruginosa, producing the shareable iron‐scavenging siderophore pyoverdine, together with cheats, defective in pyoverdine production but proficient in uptake. We found that cooperators managed to co‐exist with cheats in 56% of all replicates over approximately 150 generations of experimental evolution. Growth and competition assays revealed that co‐existence was fostered by a combination of general adaptions to the media and specific adaptions to the co‐evolving opponent. Phenotypic screening and whole‐genome resequencing of evolved clones confirmed this pattern, and suggest that cooperators became less exploitable by cheats because they significantly reduced their pyoverdine investment. Cheats, meanwhile, improved exploitation efficiency through mutations blocking the costly pyoverdine‐signalling pathway. Moreover, cooperators and cheats evolved reduced motility, a pattern that likely represents adaptation to laboratory conditions, but at the same time also affects social interactions by reducing strain mixing and pyoverdine sharing. Overall, we observed parallel evolution, where co‐existence of cooperators and cheats was enabled by a combination of adaptations to the abiotic and social environment and their interactions. 相似文献
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M. Ghoul S. A. West F. A. McCorkell Z.‐B. Lee J. B. Bruce A. S. Griffin 《Journal of evolutionary biology》2016,29(9):1728-1736
Microbes engage in cooperative behaviours by producing and secreting public goods, the benefits of which are shared among cells, and are therefore susceptible to exploitation by nonproducing cheats. In nature, bacteria are not typically colonizing sterile, rich environments in contrast to laboratory experiments, which involve inoculating sterile culture with few bacterial cells that then race to fill the available niche. Here, we study the potential implications of this difference, using the production of pyoverdin, an iron‐scavenging siderophore that acts as a public good in the bacteria Pseudomonas aeruginosa. We show that (1) nonproducers are able to invade cultures of producers when added at the start of growth or during early exponential growth phase, but not during late exponential or stationary phase; (2) the producer strain does not produce pyoverdin in the late exponential and stationary phases and so is not paying the cost of cooperating during those phases. These results suggest that whether a nonproducing mutant can invade will depend upon when the mutation arises, as well as the population structure, and raise a potential difficulty with the use of antimicrobial treatment strategies that propose to exploit the invasive abilities of cheats. 相似文献
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Kümmerli R Colliard C Fiechter N Petitpierre B Russier F Keller L 《Proceedings. Biological sciences / The Royal Society》2007,274(1628):2965-2970
Explaining the evolution of cooperation among non-relatives is one of the major challenges for evolutionary biology. In this study, we experimentally examined human cooperation in the iterated Snowdrift game (ISD), which has received little attention so far, and compared it with human cooperation in the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma (IPD), which has become the paradigm for the evolution of cooperation. We show that iteration in the ISD leads to consistently higher levels of cooperation than in the IPD. We further demonstrate that the most successful strategies known for the IPD (generous Tit-for-Tat and Pavlov) were also successfully used in the ISD. Interestingly, we found that female players cooperated significantly more often than male players in the IPD but not in the ISD. Moreover, female players in the IPD applied Tit-for-Tat-like or Pavlovian strategies significantly more often than male players, thereby achieving significantly higher pay-offs than male players did. These data demonstrate that the willingness to cooperate does not only depend on the type of the social dilemma, but also on the class of individuals involved. Altogether, our study shows that the ISD can potentially explain high levels of cooperation among non-relatives in humans. In addition, the ISD seems to reflect the social dilemma more realistically than the IPD because individuals obtain immediate direct benefits from the cooperative acts they perform and costs of cooperation are shared between cooperators. 相似文献
11.
NJ Buttery CN Jack B Adu-Oppong KT Snyder CR Thompson DC Queller JE Strassmann 《Biology letters》2012,8(5):794-797
One condition for the evolution of altruism is genetic relatedness between altruist and beneficiary, often achieved through active kin recognition. Here, we investigate the power of a passive process resulting from genetic drift during population growth in the social amoeba Dictyostelium discoideum. We put labelled and unlabelled cells of the same clone in the centre of a plate, and allowed them to proliferate outward. Zones formed by genetic drift owing to the small population of actively growing cells at the colony edge. We also found that single cells could form zones of high relatedness. Relatedness increased at a significantly higher rate when food was in short supply. This study shows that relatedness can be significantly elevated before the social stage without a small founding population size or recognition mechanism. 相似文献
12.
Jean-Pascal Capp Frédéric Thomas Andriy Marusyk Antoine M. Dujon Sophie Tissot Robert Gatenby Benjamin Roche Beata Ujvari James DeGregori Joel S. Brown Aurora M. Nedelcu 《Evolutionary Applications》2023,16(7):1239-1256
It is traditionally assumed that during cancer development, tumor cells abort their initially cooperative behavior (i.e., cheat) in favor of evolutionary strategies designed solely to enhance their own fitness (i.e., a “selfish” life style) at the expense of that of the multicellular organism. However, the growth and progress of solid tumors can also involve cooperation among these presumed selfish cells (which, by definition, should be noncooperative) and with stromal cells. The ultimate and proximate reasons behind this paradox are not fully understood. Here, in the light of current theories on the evolution of cooperation, we discuss the possible evolutionary mechanisms that could explain the apparent cooperative behaviors among selfish malignant cells. In addition to the most classical explanations for cooperation in cancer and in general (by-product mutualism, kin selection, direct reciprocity, indirect reciprocity, network reciprocity, group selection), we propose the idea that “greenbeard” effects are relevant to explaining some cooperative behaviors in cancer. Also, we discuss the possibility that malignant cooperative cells express or co-opt cooperative traits normally expressed by healthy cells. We provide examples where considerations of these processes could help understand tumorigenesis and metastasis and argue that this framework provides novel insights into cancer biology and potential strategies for cancer prevention and treatment. 相似文献
13.
Triadic social games are interesting from a cognitive perspective because they require a high degree of mutual social awareness. They consist of two agents incorporating an object in turn-taking sequences and require individuals to coordinate their attention to the task, the object, and to one another. Social games are observed commonly in domesticated dogs interacting with humans, but they have received only little empirical attention in nonhuman primates. Here, we report observations of bonobos (Pan paniscus) engaging in social games with a human playmate. Our behavioral analyses revealed that the bonobos behaved in many ways similar to human children during these games. They were interested in the joint activity, rather than the play objects themselves, and used communicative gestures to encourage reluctant partners to perform their role, suggesting rudimentary understanding of others' intentions. Our observations thus may imply that shared intentionality, the ability to understand and shares intention with other individuals, has emerged in the primate lineage before the origins of hominids. 相似文献
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Cooperation can be maintained if cooperative behaviours are preferentially directed towards other cooperative individuals. Tag‐based cooperation (greenbeards) – where cooperation benefits individuals with the same tag as the actor – is one way to achieve this. Tag‐based cooperation can be exploited by individuals who maintain the specific tag but do not cooperate, and selection to escape this exploitation can result in the evolution of tag diversity. We tested key predictions crucial for the evolution of cheat‐mediated tag diversity using the production of iron‐scavenging pyoverdine by the opportunistic pathogen, Pseduomonas aeruginosa as a model system. Using two strains that produce different pyoverdine types and their respective cheats, we show that cheats outcompete their homologous pyoverdine producer, but are outcompeted by the heterologous producer in well‐mixed environments. As a consequence, co‐inoculating two types of pyoverdine producer and one type of pyoverdine cheat resulted in the pyoverdine type whose cheat was not present having a large fitness advantage. Theory suggests that in such interactions, cheats can maintain tag diversity in spatially structured environments, but that tag‐based cooperation will be lost in well‐mixed populations, regardless of tag diversity. We saw that when all pyoverdine producers and cheats were co‐inoculated in well‐mixed environments, both types of pyoverdine producers were outcompeted, whereas spatial structure (agar plates and compost microcosms), rather than maintaining diversity, resulted in the domination of one pyoverdine producer. These results suggest cheats may play a more limited role in the evolution of pyoverdine diversity than predicted. 相似文献
16.
Matishalin Patel Ben Raymond Michael B. Bonsall Stuart A. West 《Journal of evolutionary biology》2019,32(4):310-319
The growth and virulence of the bacteria Bacillus thuringiensis depend on the production of Cry toxins, which are used to perforate the gut of its host. Successful invasion of the host relies on producing a threshold amount of toxin, after which there is no benefit from producing more toxin. Consequently, the production of Cry toxin appears to be a different type of social problem compared with the public goods scenarios that bacteria usually encounter. We show that selection for toxin production is a volunteer's dilemma. We make specific predictions that (a) selection for toxin production depends upon an interplay between the number of bacterial cells that each host ingests and the genetic relatedness between those cells; (b) cheats that do not produce toxin gain an advantage when at low frequencies, and at high bacterial density, allowing them to be maintained in a population alongside toxin‐producing cells. More generally, our results emphasize the diversity of the social games that bacteria play. 相似文献
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Greater size and strength are common attributes of contest winners. Even in social insects with high cooperation, the right to reproduce falls to the well-fed queens rather than to poorly fed workers. In Dictyostelium discoideum, formerly solitary amoebae aggregate when faced with starvation, and some cells die to form a stalk which others ride up to reach a better location to sporulate. The first cells to starve have lower energy reserves than those that starve later, and previous studies have shown that the better-fed cells in a mix tend to form disproportionately more reproductive spores. Therefore, one might expect that the first cells to starve and initiate the social stage should act altruistically and form disproportionately more of the sterile stalk, thereby enticing other better-fed cells into joining the aggregate. This would resemble caste determination in social insects, where altruistic workers are typically fed less than reproductive queens. However, we show that the opposite result holds: the first cells to starve become reproductive spores, presumably by gearing up for competition and outcompeting late starvers to become prespore first. These findings pose the interesting question of why others would join selfish organizers. 相似文献
19.
Jessica L. Barker Judith L. Bronstein Maren L. Friesen Emily I. Jones H. Kern Reeve Andrew G. Zink Megan E. Frederickson 《Evolution; international journal of organic evolution》2017,71(4):814-825
Cooperation is widespread both within and between species, but are intraspecific and interspecific cooperation fundamentally similar or qualitatively different phenomena? This review evaluates this question, necessary for a general understanding of the evolution of cooperation. First, we outline three advantages of cooperation relative to noncooperation (acquisition of otherwise inaccessible goods and services, more efficient acquisition of resources, and buffering against variability), and predict when individuals should cooperate with a conspecific versus a heterospecific partner to obtain these advantages. Second, we highlight five axes along which heterospecific and conspecific partners may differ: relatedness and fitness feedbacks, competition and resource use, resource‐generation abilities, relative evolutionary rates, and asymmetric strategy sets and outside options. Along all of these axes, certain asymmetries between partners are more common in, but not exclusive to, cooperation between species, especially complementary resource use and production. We conclude that cooperation within and between species share many fundamental qualities, and that differences between the two systems are explained by the various asymmetries between partners. Consideration of the parallels between intra‐ and interspecific cooperation facilitates application of well‐studied topics in one system to the other, such as direct benefits within species and kin‐selected cooperation between species, generating promising directions for future research. 相似文献
20.
The sociobiology of biofilms 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Biofilms are densely packed communities of microbial cells that grow on surfaces and surround themselves with secreted polymers. Many bacterial species form biofilms, and their study has revealed them to be complex and diverse. The structural and physiological complexity of biofilms has led to the idea that they are coordinated and cooperative groups, analogous to multicellular organisms. We evaluate this idea by addressing the findings of microbiologists from the perspective of sociobiology, including theories of collective behavior (self-organization) and social evolution. This yields two main conclusions. First, the appearance of organization in biofilms can emerge without active coordination. That is, biofilm properties such as phenotypic differentiation, species stratification and channel formation do not necessarily require that cells communicate with one another using specialized signaling molecules. Second, while local cooperation among bacteria may often occur, the evolution of cooperation among all cells is unlikely for most biofilms. Strong conflict can arise among multiple species and strains in a biofilm, and spontaneous mutation can generate conflict even within biofilms initiated by genetically identical cells. Biofilms will typically result from a balance between competition and cooperation, and we argue that understanding this balance is central to building a complete and predictive model of biofilm formation. 相似文献