Biosecurity and yield improvement technologies are strategic complements in the fight against food insecurity

The delivery of food security via continued crop yield improvement alone is not an effective food security strategy, and must be supported by pre- and post-border biosecurity policies to guard against perverse outcomes. In the wake of the green revolution, yield gains have been in steady decline, while post-harvest crop losses have increased as a result of insufficiently resourced and uncoordinated efforts to control spoilage throughout global transport and storage networks. This paper focuses on the role that biosecurity is set to play in future food security by preventing both pre- and post-harvest losses, thereby protecting crop yield. We model biosecurity as a food security technology that may complement conventional yield improvement policies if the gains in global farm profits are sufficient to offset the costs of implementation and maintenance. Using phytosanitary measures that slow global spread of the Ug99 strain of wheat stem rust as an example of pre-border biosecurity risk mitigation and combining it with post-border surveillance and invasive alien species control efforts, we estimate global farm profitability may be improved by over US$4.5 billion per annum.     

新工科背景下高校生物安全人才培养体系建设北大核心CSCD

近年来,全球生物安全形势日趋严峻,重大传染病疫情、生物技术误用和谬用、生物武器等生物安全威胁不断显现,生物安全已跃升为我国国家安全的重要组成部分;而与此同时,生物安全作为一门新兴的交叉型学科,其教育体系的建立与完善还处于起步阶段。受国内外生物安全形势、生物安全产业发展以及国家安全学学科设立的影响,凸显了我国在生物安全这一交叉领域的人才储备的短板和不足。尤其在新工科建设背景下,更加显现出生物安全人才培养的重要性。本文根据作者在实际教学中的经验,从建立交叉融合课程体系、构建创新性教学模式、探索通识教育改革方案和完善持续改进机制等几个方面,系统介绍了新工科背景下完善生物安全领域人才体系的具体措施。     

英国国家植物生物安全治理路径研究

植物病虫疫情是全球粮食生产安全的重大威胁。英国较重视植物安全治理,较早开始布局相关政策,构建风险防控体系,取得了良好成效。本文采用文献调研、分析与综合、比较研究等方法,围绕英国面临的植物安全的严峻形势,分析了英国在战略规划、治理体系、制度建设、技术研发、国际合作等方面的经验与做法。英国政府把植物生物安全纳入国家安全战略,统筹植物生物安全组织体系,制定国际先进水平的安全制度,构建有生物安全保障的植物供应链,推进产学研深度融合,大力开展全民科学,对我国生物安全建设具有重要借鉴意义。纵观英国植物生物安全治理体系建设的做法,本文对我国植物生物安全体系建设提出了相应建议,以期为相关领域研究者和政策制定者提供参考。     

Biosecurity in Scandinavia

This article investigates the extent to which biosecurity measures are recognized and have been implemented in the Nordic countries, in the absence of formalized security standards and legislation. Two trials were undertaken: first, a broad combined biosafety and biosecurity questionnaire survey of the Nordic countries, and, second, a focused on-site audit of 22 facilities, with 94 laboratories, in Denmark. Both trials indicated that external security had been partially implemented but that little attention had been paid to internal security and the establishment of biosecurity. It was demonstrated that the backgrounds and identities of insiders were rarely checked and that they could have gained access to both pathogen inventory lists and freezers in many facilities. In 81% of pathogen-containing facilities, pathogens were not routinely and centrally accounted for. The authors recommend the establishment of a legal framework congruent with international standards and obligations; novel governmental national biosecurity authorities, requiring a fusion of both microbiological and technical expertise and legislative powers; and the formulation of a new code of conduct termed "Good Biosecurity Practice."     

Modernizing confidence-building measures for the Biological Weapons Convention

The Seventh Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention in December 2011 provides an opportunity to modernize the treaty to better address the challenges of the 21st century. The key to this modernization is to redesign the treaty's Confidence-Building Measures (CBMs), the only formal mechanism for increasing transparency and demonstrating compliance with the treaty, to address changes in the global scientific, health, and security environments since the end of the Cold War. The scope of the CBMs should be expanded beyond state-run biological warfare programs to encompass a broader array of threats to global security, such as biological terrorism, laboratory accidents, dual-use research, and disease pandemics. Modernizing the CBM mechanism to take into account these new risks would extend the transparency-enhancing benefits of CBMs to a range of new and important topics, such as biosafety, laboratory biosecurity, and dual-use research oversight; make the CBMs and the treaty itself more relevant to the concerns and priorities of more states; and build on progress made during the recent series of intersessional meetings. To accomplish this, the CBMs need to be revised to shift their focus from hardware, the dual-use capabilities relevant to the treaty, to software, the political and legal institutions that govern the development and use of these capabilities. A more modern CBM mechanism should encourage greater participation in the confidence-building process, improve international cooperation against the full spectrum of biological risks, and promote the goal of universal membership in the treaty.     

Drivers for the emergence and re-emergence of vector-borne protozoal and bacterial diseases

In recent years, vector-borne parasitic and bacterial diseases have emerged or re-emerged in many geographical regions causing global health and economic problems that involve humans, livestock, companion animals and wild life. The ecology and epidemiology of vector-borne diseases are affected by the interrelations between three major factors comprising the pathogen, the host (human, animal or vector) and the environment. Important drivers for the emergence and spread of vector-borne parasites include habitat changes, alterations in water storage and irrigation habits, atmospheric and climate changes, immunosuppression by HIV, pollution, development of insecticide and drug resistance, globalization and the significant increase in international trade, tourism and travel. War and civil unrest, and governmental or global management failure are also major contributors to the spread of infectious diseases. The improvement of epidemic understanding and planning together with the development of new diagnostic molecular techniques in the last few decades have allowed researchers to better diagnose and trace pathogens, their origin and routes of infection, and to develop preventive public health and intervention programs. Health care workers, physicians, veterinarians and biosecurity officers should play a key role in future prevention of vector-borne diseases. A coordinated global approach for the prevention of vector-borne diseases should be implemented by international organizations and governmental agencies in collaboration with research institutions.     

Bio-safety and bio-security: A major global concern for ongoing COVID-19 pandemic

Besides its impacts on governance, economics, human culture, geostrategic partnership and environment, globalization greatly exerted control over science and security policies. Biosecurity is the critical job of efforts, policy and preparation to protect health of human, animal and environmental against any biological threats. With the transition into a global village, the possibility of biosecurity breaches has significantly increased. The COVID-19 pandemic is an example of an infringement on biosecurity that has posed a serious threat to the world. Since the first report on the recognition of COVID-19, a number of governments have taken preventive measures, like; lockdown, screening and early detection of suspected and implementing the required response to protect the loss of life and economy. Unfortunately, some of these measures have only recently been taken in some countries, which have contributed significantly to an increased morbidity and loss of life on a daily basis. In this article, the biological risks affecting human, animal and environmental conditions, biosafety violations and preventive measures have been discussed in order to reduce the outbreak and impacts of a pandemic like COVID-19.     

生物安全时代:新生物科技变革与国家安全治理*

科技进步改进了人类对天然生物危害因子的操控能力,在诱发新的生物安全危害形态的同时,也赋予了生物安全客体的源头难以追溯性、生物安全主体的多元性、生物安全危害演变机理的复杂性等特点。生物安全在很大程度上体现了非传统安全的非传统特点。随着生物科技与生物安全在推动人类社会发展进程的作用日益显著,21世纪或将成为生物安全的时代。新一轮生物科技变革及其与人类社会互动衍生的生物安全问题,已经逐渐触及人类安全观念和现代文明的内源性危机或挑战。全面提升国家生物安全能力、优化国家生物安全治理,不仅是世界各国的战略选择,也是对人类科技文明与政治文明的新探索。     

Japan's innovation for global health – GHIT's catalytic role

The global fight against infectious diseases, both emerging and re-emerging, endures. Japan's commitments and reputation as a good global citizen and its responsibility to uphold domestic and international human security mean that it is in Japan's best interest to leverage its innovative and technological capabilities for global infectious disease prevention and control. The Global Health Innovative Technology Fund (GHIT Fund), an international non-profit organization based in Tokyo, Japan, was established by the Japanese government, multiple Japanese pharmaceutical companies, and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation as the first fund of its kind, with an aim to tackle the global burden of infectious diseases by facilitating and funding global health R&D of drugs, vaccines, and diagnostics. Since its inception in 2013, the GHIT Fund has invested more than 209 million USD in more than 90 projects, which consist of collaborations among Japanese and non-Japanese entities, six of which have already progressed to clinical stage development. Japan will continue to play a major role in the global health arena by further advancing R&D innovations for infectious diseases.     

一种非洲猪瘟病毒假病毒细胞感染模型的建立及应用

目前国内外大多数针对非洲猪瘟病毒(African swine fever virus, ASFV)的研究须在生物安全三级实验室(biosafety level 3 laboratories, BSL-3 labs)中进行,因此针对该病毒的感染过程、中和抗体逃逸机制、药物研发等研究受到了一定限制。鉴于此,本研究选择ASFV包膜蛋白中与其进入细胞紧密相关的蛋白p12、CD2v、p30、p54和pE248R,构建表达这5种包膜蛋白的真核表达质粒,利用水疱性口炎病毒(vesicular stomatitis virus, VSV)假病毒包装体系,制备多种ASFV假病毒。以荧光素酶报告基因实验(luciferase assay)检测假病毒感染水平;选择1个包膜蛋白为代表,使用蛋白质印迹法(Western blot,WB)检测其在假病毒中的表达情况;采用芫花素检测其对所建立的ASFV假病毒(p30-pE248R-ASFV-PsV)的抑制活性。结果显示,VSV包装体系以及p30、pE248R包膜蛋白质粒的组合制备方法所包装出的假病毒具有较优的感染活性,适合用于建立细胞感染模型。ASFV的包膜蛋白pE248R被有效整合到VSV-ΔG rLuc颗粒中,并包装出ASFV假病毒。芫花素可浓度依赖性地抑制ASFV假病毒感染Vero细胞,其半数抑制浓度(half maximal inhibitory concentration, IC50)为4.05±0.88 μmol/L。本研究通过建立基于ASFV假病毒的细胞感染模型,筛选获得了1种可感染已报道的一些ASFV敏感细胞的假病毒。该假病毒无复制性,可在生物安全级别较低的实验室中进行操作,并且带有海肾荧光素酶报告基因,有望用于ASFV入侵抑制剂的高通量筛选及中和活性的初步评价,为研发抗ASFV药物提供了一个安全、方便的研究模型。     

The role of academic health sciences centres in international health.

For many years, Canadian academic health science centres have been active in international health. This brief review describes the activities of the Canadian Society for International Health, the Canadian University Consortium for Health in Development, and McGill, McMaster and Ottawa universities. Three principles are derived from these examples. Health must be placed in the broader context of development, and international health initiatives must be intersectoral. Canadian universities can make a distinctive and important contribution to health and development internationally, but this requires a clear commitment to scientific excellence and social responsibility. Finally, Canadian institutions, as representatives of the North, have much to learn through collaboration and partnerships with institutions in the South.     

Tackling the threat of antimicrobial resistance: from policy to sustainable action

Antibiotics underpin all of modern medicine, from routine major surgery through to caesarean sections and modern cancer therapies. These drugs have revolutionized how we practice medicine, but we are in a constant evolutionary battle to evade microbial resistance and this has become a major global public health problem. We have overused and misused these essential medicines both in the human and animal health sectors and this threatens the effectiveness of antimicrobials for future generations. We can only address the threat of antimicrobial resistance (AMR) through international collaboration across human and animal health sectors integrating social, economic and behavioural factors. Our global organizations are rising to the challenge with the recent World Health Assembly resolution on AMR and development of the Global Action plan but we must act now to avoid a return to a pre-antibiotic era.     

Biosecurity in an age of open science

The risk of accidental or deliberate misuse of biological research is increasing as biotechnology advances. As open science becomes widespread, we must consider its impact on those risks and develop solutions that ensure security while facilitating scientific progress. Here, we examine the interaction between open science practices and biosecurity and biosafety to identify risks and opportunities for risk mitigation. Increasing the availability of computational tools, datasets, and protocols could increase risks from research with misuse potential. For instance, in the context of viral engineering, open code, data, and materials may increase the risk of release of enhanced pathogens. For this dangerous subset of research, both open science and biosecurity goals may be achieved by using access-controlled repositories or application programming interfaces. While preprints accelerate dissemination of findings, their increased use could challenge strategies for risk mitigation at the publication stage. This highlights the importance of oversight earlier in the research lifecycle. Preregistration of research, a practice promoted by the open science community, provides an opportunity for achieving biosecurity risk assessment at the conception of research. Open science and biosecurity experts have an important role to play in enabling responsible research with maximal societal benefit.

The risk of biotechnology being misused is growing and may even be increased by moves towards open science. How can we ensure that the goals of both open science and biosecurity are met?     

Interactive learning and action: realizing the promise of synthetic biology for global health

The emerging field of synthetic biology has the potential to improve global health. For example, synthetic biology could contribute to efforts at vaccine development in a context in which vaccines and immunization have been identified by the international community as being crucial to international development efforts and, in particular, the millennium development goals. However, past experience with innovations shows that realizing a technology’s potential can be difficult and complex. To achieve better societal embedding of synthetic biology and to make sure it reaches its potential, science and technology development should be made more inclusive and interactive. Responsible research and innovation is based on the premise that a broad range of stakeholders with different views, needs and ideas should have a voice in the technological development and deployment process. The interactive learning and action (ILA) approach has been developed as a methodology to bring societal stakeholders into a science and technology development process. This paper proposes an ILA in five phases for an international effort, with national case studies, to develop socially robust applications of synthetic biology for global health, based on the example of vaccine development. The design is based on results of a recently initiated ILA project on synthetic biology; results from other interactive initiatives described in the literature; and examples of possible applications of synthetic biology for global health that are currently being developed.     

Biosecurity risk factors presented by international vessels: a statistical analysis

Invasive non-indigenous species are among the greatest threats to global biodiversity. Shipping is the principal vector for international dispersal of nonindigenous species, and shipping rates are increasing globally. The Australian government performs a range of regulatory actions to mitigate biosecurity risks associated with marine vessels, and in so doing has amassed a large volume of operational inspection data. This data can be used to quantitatively examine risk factors of vessels failing biosecurity procedures after arriving from international ports, the nature of biosecurity failures, and the types and seizure rates of biosecurity risk material (BRM). Classification trees with gradient boosting were used to assess characteristics that predict high risk vessels (n = 93,006) for carrying BRM, across 7 years of inspection data. Undeclared vessels and suspected irregular entry vessels posed the highest risk, but both were rare. Vessels that visit infrequently (<20 visits in 7 years) were common and had almost three times greater odds of failing inspection than vessels visiting frequently. On statistical analysis, yachts appeared to pose less risk than commercial vessels. In operational terms, a tentative profiled 20% fraction would contain 57% of genuine failures, and the concomitant non-screened group would contain 82% of passes. The most common reason for inspection failures was ballast water non-compliance (2.53%) and plant or insect detections (1.77%); biofouling was less common (0.13%) but testing for biofouling is not exhaustive. Invertebrate species comprised almost 90% of invasive organisms detected and seized from vessels failing biosecurity inspections. This study targets an entire transportation vector, which includes many pathways. Understanding the characteristics of transport vectors is pivotal to characterising the risk of biological invasions and applying adequate controls and prevention strategies. Our results show that biosecurity risk is not uniform on maritime pathways, so there is considerable scope for biosecurity regulators to impose risk-based intervention.     

The people's role in U.S. national health security: past, present, and future

Over the past decade, assumptions have been made and unmade about what officials can expect of average people confronting a bioterrorist attack or other major health incident. The reframing of the public in national discourse and doctrine from a panic-stricken mob to a band of hearty survivors is a positive development and more realistic in terms of the empirical record. So, too, is the realization that citizen contributions to national health security encompass not only individual preparedness and volunteerism but also mutual aid and collective deliberation of the tough choices posed by health disasters. In projecting what needs to occur over the next 10 years in biosecurity, 2 priority challenges emerge: retaining the lesson that a public prone to panic, social disorder, and civil unrest is a myth, and building an infrastructure to bolster the public's full contributions to health emergency management.     

跨国土地利用及其生态影响

在全球食物价格不断上涨,粮食安全已经威胁到经济安全的环境下,跨国农用地投资成为国际浪潮。跨国农用地投资推动着各国的土地资源向全球化资源转变,对土地的跨国利用成为全球土地资源优化配置的必然。在对跨国土地利用的背景及现状进行阐述的基础上,指出"代理性农业耕作"方式对区域生态环境可能造成的影响。同时,新型农业科技与跨国土地利用的结合,也在推动着农业经济发展的同时,改变着传统的土地利用模式,进而改变着区域生态环境。最后,指出需要对跨国土地利用做出理性分析并建立相关的国际规则,从而维护可持续粮食安全及生态安全。     

Integrative Analysis of the Physical Transport Network into Australia

Effective biosecurity is necessary to protect nations and their citizens from a variety of threats, including emerging infectious diseases, agricultural or environmental pests and pathogens, and illegal wildlife trade. The physical pathways by which these threats are transported internationally, predominantly shipping and air traffic, have undergone significant growth and changes in spatial distributions in recent decades. An understanding of the specific pathways and donor-traffic hotspots created by this integrated physical transport network is vital for the development of effective biosecurity strategies into the future. In this study, we analysed the physical transport network into Australia over the period 1999–2012. Seaborne and air traffic were weighted to calculate a “weighted cumulative impact” score for each source region worldwide, each year. High risk source regions, and those source regions that underwent substantial changes in risk over the study period, were determined. An overall risk ranking was calculated by integrating across all possible weighting combinations. The source regions having greatest overall physical connectedness with Australia were Singapore, which is a global transport hub, and the North Island of New Zealand, a close regional trading partner with Australia. Both those regions with large amounts of traffic across multiple vectors (e.g., Hong Kong), and those with high levels of traffic of only one type (e.g., Bali, Indonesia with respect to passenger flights), were represented among high risk source regions. These data provide a baseline model for the transport of individuals and commodities against which the effectiveness of biosecurity controls may be assessed, and are a valuable tool in the development of future biosecurity policy.     

Biosecurity and the review and publication of dual-use research of concern

Dual-use research of concern (DURC) is scientific research with significant potential for generating information that could be used to harm national security, the public health, or the environment. Editors responsible for journal policies and publication decisions play a vital role in ensuring that effective safeguards exist to cope with the risks of publishing scientific research with dual-use implications. We conducted an online survey of 127 chief editors of life science journals in 27 countries to examine their attitudes toward and experience with the review and publication of dual-use research of concern. Very few editors (11) had experience with biosecurity review, and no editor in our study reported having ever refused a submission on biosecurity grounds. Most respondents (74.8%) agreed that editors have a responsibility to consider biosecurity risks during the review process, but little consensus existed among editors on how to handle specific issues in the review and publication of research with potential dual-use implications. More work is needed to establish consensus on standards for the review and publication of dual-use research of concern in life science journals.     

LINKING INTERNATIONAL RESEARCH TO GLOBAL HEALTH EQUITY: THE LIMITED CONTRIBUTION OF BIOETHICS

Health research has been identified as a vehicle for advancing global justice in health. However, in bioethics, issues of global justice are mainly discussed within an ongoing debate on the conditions under which international clinical research is permissible. As a result, current ethical guidance predominantly links one type of international research (biomedical) to advancing one aspect of health equity (access to new treatments). International guidelines largely fail to connect international research to promoting broader aspects of health equity – namely, healthier social environments and stronger health systems. Bioethical frameworks such as the human development approach do consider how international clinical research is connected to the social determinants of health but, again, do so to address the question of when international clinical research is permissible. It is suggested that the narrow focus of this debate is shaped by high‐income countries' economic strategies. The article further argues that the debate's focus obscures a stronger imperative to consider how other types of international research might advance justice in global health. Bioethics should consider the need for non‐clinical health research and its contribution to advancing global justice.