The birth of the empirical turn in bioethics

Since its origin, bioethics has attracted the collaboration of few social scientists, and social scientific methods of gathering empirical data have remained unfamiliar to ethicists. Recently, however, the clouded relations between the empirical and normative perspectives on bioethics appear to be changing. Three reasons explain why there was no easy and consistent input of empirical evidence in bioethics. Firstly, interdisciplinary dialogue runs the risk of communication problems and divergent objectives. Secondly, the social sciences were absent partners since the beginning of bioethics. Thirdly, the meta-ethical distinction between 'is' and 'ought' created a 'natural' border between the disciplines. Now, bioethics tends to accommodate more empirical research. Three hypotheses explain this emergence. Firstly, dissatisfaction with a foundationalist interpretation of applied ethics created a stimulus to incorporate empirical research in bioethics. Secondly, clinical ethicists became engaged in empirical research due to their strong integration in the medical setting. Thirdly, the rise of the evidence-based paradigm had an influence on the practice of bioethics. However, a problematic relationship cannot simply and easily evolve into a perfect interaction. A new and positive climate for empirical approaches has arisen, but the original difficulties have not disappeared.     

Animal Abolitionism Meets Moral Abolitionism

The use of other animals for human purposes is as contentious an issue as one is likely to find in ethics. And this is so not only because there are both passionate defenders and opponents of such use, but also because even among the latter there are adamant and diametric differences about the bases of their opposition. In both disputes, the approach taken tends to be that of applied ethics, by which a position on the issue is derived from a fundamental moral commitment. This commitment in turn depends on normative ethics, which investigates the various moral theories for the best fit to our moral intuitions. Thus it is that the use of animals in biomedical research is typically defended by appeal to a utilitarian theory, which legitimates harm to some for the greater good of others; while the opposition condemns that use either by appeal to the same theory, but disagreeing about the actual efficacy of animal experimentation, or by appeal to an alternative theory, such as the right of all sentient beings not to be exploited. Unfortunately, the normative issue seems likely never to be resolved, hence leaving the applied issue in limbo. The present essay seeks to circumvent this impasse by dispensing altogether with any moral claim or argument, thereby cutting the Gordian knot of animal ethics with a meta-ethical sword. The alternative schema defended is simply to advance relevant considerations, whereupon “there is nothing left but to feel.” In a word, motivation replaces justification.     

The ethics of HIV research in developing nations

This paper discusses a dispute concerning the ethics of research on preventing the perinatal transmission of HIV in developing nations. Critics of this research argue that it is unethical because it denies a proven treatment to placebo-control groups. Since studies conducted in developed nations would not deny this treatment to subjects, the critics maintain that these experiments manifest a double standard for ethical research and that a single standard of ethics should apply to all research on human subjects. Proponents of the research, however, argue that these charges fail to understand the ethical complexities of research in developing nations, and that study designs can vary according to the social, economic, and scientific conditions of research. This essay explores some of the ethical issues raised by this controversial case in order to shed some light on the deeper, meta-ethical questions. The paper argues that standards of ethical research on human subjects are universal but not absolute: there are some general ethical principles that apply to all cases of human subjects research but the application of these principles must take into account factors inherent in particular situations.     

Relative Values: Perspectives on a Neuroimaging Technology From Above and Within the Ethical Landscape

In this paper we contribute to “sociology in bioethics” and help clarify the range of ways sociological work can contribute to ethics scholarship. We do this using a case study of an innovative neurotechnology, functional magnetic resonance imaging, and its use to attempt to diagnose and communicate with severely brain-injured patients. We compare empirical data from interviews with relatives of patients who have a severe brain injury with perspectives from mainstream bioethics scholars. We use the notion of an “ethical landscape” as an analogy for the different ethical positions subjects can take—whereby a person’s position relative to the landscape makes a difference to the way they experience and interact with it. We show that, in comparison to studying abstract ethics “from above” the ethical landscape, which involves universal generalizations and global judgements, studying ethics empirically “from the ground,” within the ethical landscape foregrounds a more plural and differentiated picture. We argue it is important not to treat empirical ethics as secondary to abstract ethics, to treat on-the-ground perspectives as useful only insofar as they can inform ethics from above. Rather, empirical perspectives can illuminate the plural vantage points in ethical judgments, highlight the “lived” nature of ethical reasoning, and point to all ethical vantage points as being significant. This is of epistemic importance to normative ethics, since researchers who pay attention to the various positions in and trajectories through the ethical landscape are unlikely to think about ethics in terms of abstract agency—as can happen with top-down ethics—or to elide agency with the agency of policymakers. Moreover, empirical perspectives may have transformative implications for people on the ground, especially where focus on the potential harms and benefits they face brings their experiences and interests to the forefront of ethical and policy discussion.     

EMPIRICAL ETHICS AS DIALOGICAL PRACTICE

In this article, we present a dialogical approach to empirical ethics, based upon hermeneutic ethics and responsive evaluation. Hermeneutic ethics regards experience as the concrete source of moral wisdom. In order to gain a good understanding of moral issues, concrete detailed experiences and perspectives need to be exchanged. Within hermeneutic ethics dialogue is seen as a vehicle for moral learning and developing normative conclusions. Dialogue stands for a specific view on moral epistemology and methodological criteria for moral inquiry. Responsive evaluation involves a structured way of setting up dialogical learning processes, by eliciting stories of participants, exchanging experiences in (homogeneous and heterogeneous) groups and drawing normative conclusions for practice. By combining these traditions we develop both a theoretical and a practical approach to empirical ethics, in which ethical issues are addressed and shaped together with stakeholders in practice. Stakeholders' experiences are not only used as a source for reflection by the ethicist; stakeholders are involved in the process of reflection and analysis, which takes place in a dialogue between participants in practice, facilitated by the ethicist. This dialogical approach to empirical ethics may give rise to questions such as: What contribution does the ethicist make? What role does ethical theory play? What is the relationship between empirical research and ethical theory in the dialogical process? In this article, these questions will be addressed by reflecting upon a project in empirical ethics that was set up in a dialogical way. The aim of this project was to develop and implement normative guidelines with and within practice, in order to improve the practice concerning coercion and compulsion in psychiatry.     

Philosophical justifications for the extirpation of non-indigenous species: the case of the grasshopper Schistocerca nitens (Orthoptera) on the Island of Nihoa, Hawaii

The case of Schistocerca nitens’ establishment on the island of Nihoa presents a challenging case for conservation biologists with respect to the justification for human efforts to extirpate the insect. In justifying our actions we seek reasons that are ecologically plausible (i.e., consistent with empirical and theoretical understandings of science), ethically compelling (i.e., based on sound reasoning from well-established moral principles), and logically consistent (i.e., avoiding fallacies and contradictions). Our analysis shows that the conventional arguments for conservation programs do not meet these criteria in the case of S. nitens. The following reasons fail on the basis of ecological, ethical, or logical standards: the protection of biodiversity, avoidance of ecological harm, biological qualities of the invasive species (herbivory, fecundity, mobility, recency, and functional integration), anthropogenic basis of arrival, harmfulness or unnaturalness of human agency, the interference with ecological processes, or disturbance of equilibria. Rather, we suggest that an aesthetic argument provides an ecologically, ethically, and logically sound basis for conservation biologists to justify taking action against the grasshopper. The aesthetic concept of a “thick sense” of beauty gives rise to a compelling moral case for extirpation based on virtue ethics in a manner similar to the argument against tolerating roadside litter.     

The use of Ethics Decision‐Making Frameworks by Canadian Ethics Consultants: A Qualitative Study

In this study, Canadian healthcare ethics consultants describe their use of ethics decision‐making frameworks. Our research finds that ethics consultants in Canada use multi‐purpose ethics decision‐making frameworks, as well as targeted frameworks that focus on reaching an ethical resolution to a particular healthcare issue, such as adverse event reporting, or difficult triage scenarios. Several interviewees mention the influence that the accreditation process in Canadian healthcare organizations has on the adoption and use of such frameworks. Some of the ethics consultants we interviewed also report on their reluctance to use these tools. Limited empirical work has been done previously on the use of ethics decision‐making frameworks. This study begins to fill this gap in our understanding of the work of healthcare ethics consultants.     

What is wrong with ethics review,the impact on teaching anthropology,and how to fix it: results of an empirical study

There is no empirical evidence that ethics review protects anthropologists’ research participants, but there is ample evidence that it is stifling research agendas and reshaping how we teach anthropological research methods, entrenching a positivist, clinical model of what constitutes research. This paper examines the impact of ethics review on student research in Australia, based on interviews conducted at 14 Australian universities. The data clearly show that the risks posed by student research are minor, and vastly overestimated by ethics committees. To avoid problems with ethics committees, we shepherd students into undertaking low‐risk, and consequently low‐impact, research. Many departments are abandoning research‐led teaching altogether because of the obstacle of ethics review. One solution would be to locate ethics discussions in disciplines and departments, radically restructuring the encounter to reconceptualise it as collegial debate about ethics dilemmas rather than ‘ethics review’.     

REFLECTIVE EQUILIBRIUM AND EMPIRICAL DATA: THIRD PERSON MORAL EXPERIENCES IN EMPIRICAL MEDICAL ETHICS

In ethics, the use of empirical data has become more and more popular, leading to a distinct form of applied ethics, namely empirical ethics. This ‘empirical turn’ is especially visible in bioethics. There are various ways of combining empirical research and ethical reflection. In this paper we discuss the use of empirical data in a special form of Reflective Equilibrium (RE), namely the Network Model with Third Person Moral Experiences. In this model, the empirical data consist of the moral experiences of people in a practice. Although inclusion of these moral experiences in this specific model of RE can be well defended, their use in the application of the model still raises important questions. What precisely are moral experiences? How to determine relevance of experiences, in other words: should there be a selection of the moral experiences that are eventually used in the RE? How much weight should the empirical data have in the RE? And the key question: can the use of RE by empirical ethicists really produce answers to practical moral questions? In this paper we start to answer the above questions by giving examples taken from our research project on understanding the norm of informed consent in the field of pediatric oncology. We especially emphasize that incorporation of empirical data in a network model can reduce the risk of self‐justification and bias and can increase the credibility of the RE reached.     

WHICH NATURALISM FOR BIOETHICS? A DEFENSE OF MODERATE (PRAGMATIC) NATURALISM

There is a growing interest in various forms of naturalism in bioethics, but there is a clear need for further clarification. In an effort to address this situation, I present three epistemological stances: anti-naturalism, strong naturalism, and moderate pragmatic naturalism. I argue that the dominant paradigm within philosophical ethics has been a form of anti-naturalism mainly supported by a strong 'is' and 'ought' distinction. This fundamental epistemological commitment has contributed to the estrangement of academic philosophical ethics from major social problems and explains partially why, in the early 1980s, 'medicine saved the life of ethics'. Rejection of anti-naturalism, however, is often associated with strong forms of naturalism that commit the naturalistic fallacy and threaten to reduce the normative dimensions of ethics to biological imperatives. This move is rightly dismissed as a pitfall since ethics is, in part, a struggle against the course of nature. Rejection of naturalism has drawbacks, however, such as deterring bioethicists from acknowledging the implicit naturalistic epistemological commitments of bioethics. I argue that a moderate pragmatic form of naturalism represents an epistemological position that best embraces the tension of anti-naturalism and strong naturalism: bioethics is neither disconnected from empirical knowledge nor subjugated to it. The discussion is based upon historical writings in philosophy and bioethics.     

Relationships and burden: An empirical‐ethical investigation of lived experience in home nursing arrangements

Quantitative research has called attention to the burden associated with informal caregiving in home nursing arrangements. Less emphasis has been placed, however, on care recipients’ subjective feelings of being a burden and on caregivers’ willingness to carry the burden in home care. This article uses empirical material from semi‐structured interviews conducted with older people affected by multiple chronic conditions and in need of long‐term home care, and with informal and professional caregivers, as two groups of relevant others. The high burden of home‐care arrangements is unanimously stressed by all three groups involved in the triangle of care. An empirical‐ethical investigation of what can be legitimately expected from family members and informal caregivers, informed by Frith's symbiotic empirical ethics approach, was undertaken. Key tenets from the special goods theory and nursing professionalism are used as analytical tools. The study concludes that the current situation may hinder professional development and can reinforce feelings of being a burden to relevant others.     

Randomised Placebo-controlled trials and HIV-infected Pregnant Women in Developing Countries. Ethical Imperialism or Unethical Exploitation

The maternal-fetal HIV transmission trials, conducted in developing countries in the 1990s, undoubtedly generated one of the most intense, high profile controversies in international research ethics. They sparked off a prolonged acrimonious and public debate and deeply divided the scientific community. They also provided an impetus for the revision of the Declaration of Helsinki – the most widely known guideline for international research. In this paper, I provide a brief summary of the context, outline the arguments for and against the controversial use of placebo controls, and focus on particular areas that I believe merit further discussion or clarification. On balance, I argue that the researchers failed in their duties to protect the best interests of their research subjects, and to promote distributive justice. I discuss the difficulties of obtaining valid consent in this research context, and argue that it is unethical to inform women of their HIV status without at least offering them prophylactic treatment for their unborn children. A global view of justice, which endorses international equity, cannot be squared with international research guidelines that allow 'local conditions' to define the scope of duty to the control group. Finally, I suggest that the heated debate reflects a tension, if not an outright war, between two conflicting meta-ethical systems, or incommensurable paradigms, that underpin scientific research involving human subjects.     

The Ethical Basis for Sustainable Human Security: A Place for Anthropocentrism?

The deep and lasting changes to human behaviour that are required to address the global environmental crisis necessitate profound shifts in moral foundations. They amount to a change in what individuals and societies conceive of as progress. This imperative raises important questions about the justification, ends, and means of large-scale changes in people’s ethics. In this essay I will focus on the ends—the direction of moral change as prescribed by the goal of sustainable human flourishing. I shall present a meta-ethical critique of anthropocentrism and propose that only an ecocentric ethic can support the sustainable flourishing of humanity. This proposition does not necessarily contradict itself. My claim will be that the values subsumed under the broad concept of anthropocentrism are categorically counterproductive, informing an undesirable concept of “progress”. I support this claim with two lines of argument. On the one hand, the end values of anthropocentrism are shallow and the “flourishing of humanity” is ill-defined. The conceptual constraints of anthropocentrism itself preclude a more concise definition which would take into account the utter dependence of the flourishing of humanity on the health of ecological support structures. On the other hand, pursuing the values that inform the actions of anthropocentrists (which may be identical with the “flourishing of humanity”) leads to unintended and undesirable outcomes, even from the view of the anthropocentrist herself. Those problems are not encountered with an ecocentric ethic, and the conceptual steps necessary to adopt it are not insurmountable.     

From applied ethics to empirical ethics to contextual ethics

Bioethics became applied ethics when it was assimilated to moral philosophy. Because deduction is the rationality of moral philosophy, subsuming facts under moral principles to deduce conclusions about what ought to be done became the prescribed reasoning of bioethics, and bioethics became a theory comprised of moral principles. Bioethicists now realize that applied ethics is too abstract and spare to apprehend the specificity, particularity, complexity and contingency of real moral issues. Empirical ethics and contextual ethics are needed to incorporate these features into morality, not just bioethics. The relevant facts and features of problems have to be identified, investigated and framed coherently, and potential resolutions have to be constructed and assessed. Moreover, these tasks are pursued and melded within manifold contexts, for example, families, work and health care systems, as well as societal, economic, legal and political backgrounds and encompassing worldviews. This naturalist orientation and both empirical ethics and contextual ethics require judgment, but how can judgment be rational? Rationality, fortunately, is more expansive than deductive reasoning. Judgment is rational when it emanates from a rational process of deliberation, and a process of deliberation is rational when it uses the resources of non‐formal reason: observation, creative construction, formal and informal reasoning methods and systematic critical assessment. Empirical ethics and contextual ethics recognize that finite, fallible human beings live in complex, dynamic, contingent worlds, and they foster creative, critical deliberation and employ non‐formal reason to make rational moral judgments.     

Weismann, Wittgenstein and the homunculus fallacy

A problem that has troubled both neo-Darwinists and neo-Lamarckians is whether instincts involve knowledge. This paper discusses the contributions to this problem of the evolutionary biologist August Weismann and the philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein. Weismann discussed an empirical homunculus fallacy: Lamarck's theory mistakenly presupposes a homunculus in the germ cells. Wittgenstein discussed a conceptual homunculus fallacy which applies to Lamarck's theory: it is mistaken to suppose that knowledge is stored in the brain or DNA. The upshot of these two fallacies is that instincts arise through a neo-Darwinian process but are not cognitions in the sense that they involve (the recollection of stored) knowledge. Although neo-Lamarckians have rightly argued that learning processes may contribute to the development of instincts, their ideas about the role of knowledge in the evolution and development of instincts are mistaken.     

TWO CONCEPTS OF EMPIRICAL ETHICS

The turn to empirical ethics answers two calls. The first is for a richer account of morality than that afforded by bioethical principlism, which is cast as excessively abstract and thin on the facts. The second is for the facts in question to be those of human experience and not some other, unworldly realm. Empirical ethics therefore promises a richer naturalistic ethics, but in fulfilling the second call it often fails to heed the metaethical requirements related to the first. Empirical ethics risks losing the normative edge which necessarily characterizes the ethical, by failing to account for the nature and the logic of moral norms. I sketch a naturalistic theory, teleological expressivism (TE), which negotiates the naturalistic fallacy by providing a more satisfactory means of taking into account facts and research data with ethical implications. The examples of informed consent and the euthanasia debate are used to illustrate the superiority of this approach, and the problems consequent on including the facts in the wrong kind of way.     

Community Members' Engagement with and Involvement in Genomic Research: Lessons to Learn from the Field

In this paper, we describe the potential role laypersons on ethics committees can play in ensuring community concerns are addressed in the design and implementation of genomic research. We draw inferences from the outcome of an empirical study of the impact of training of laypersons to address community engagement issues in ethics review of research protocol. While this paper does not advocate a particular solution, it describes the importance of community engagement in genomic research, the current limitations there are in engaging communities in the design of these research projects and how communities can be indirectly engaged in the design and implementation of genomic research through the engagement of laypersons on ethics committees. However, to ensure that these laypersons can play this role, their capacity needs to be built to play this role appropriately. There is evidence to show that where resources are invested in building the capacity of laypersons to play their role as community ‘watchdogs’ in research, they play this role aptly. Community engagement is important in genomic research as genomic researchers will increasingly require community perspectives in critical ethics decision making.     

Law as Clinical Evidence: A New ConstitutiveModel of Medical Education and Decision-Making

Over several decades, ethics and law have been applied to medical education and practice in a way that reflects the continuation during the twentieth century of the strong distinction between facts and values. We explain the development of applied ethics and applied medical law and report selected results that reflect this applied model from an empirical project examining doctors’ decisions on withdrawing/withholding treatment from patients who lack decision-making capacity. The model is critiqued, and an alternative “constitutive” model is supported on the basis that medicine, medical law, and medical ethics exemplify the inevitable entanglement of facts and values. The model requires that ethics and law be taught across the medical education curriculum and integrated with the basic and clinical sciences and that they be perceived as an integral component of medical evidence and practice. Law, in particular, would rank as equal in normative authority to the relevant clinical scientific “facts” of the case, with graduating doctors having as strong a basic command of each category as the other. The normalization of legal knowledge as part of the clinician’s evidence base to be utilized in practice may provide adequate consolation for clinicians who may initially resent further perceived incursions on their traditional independence and discretion.