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1.
Journal of Ethology - Game theory models predict the outcome of a dyadic contest to depend on opponents’ asymmetries in three main traits: resource-holding potential (RHP), resource value...  相似文献   

2.
《Animal behaviour》2004,68(1):213-221
We tested predictions of evolutionary game theory focusing on fight duration and intensity during contests between European fallow deer, Dama dama L. We examined the relation between contest duration and intensity and resource-holding potential (RHP; body weight and antler size), in an effort to reveal the assessment rules used by competing males. We examined other potential determinants of duration and intensity: resource value (the oestrous female) and experience of agonistic interactions. Asymmetry in body weight or antler length of contestants was not correlated with fight duration. Body weight and antler length of the fight winner or loser were also not correlated with fight duration. Neither were the body weight of the heavier or lighter animal or the antler length of the animal that had longer or shorter antlers. A measure of intensity (the jump clash) was positively related to the body weight of the losing animal and the lighter member of the dyad. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that opponents escalate contest intensity based on assessment of their own ability rather than through mutual assessment. There was no evidence that resource value is an important factor in either fight duration or intensity in this population. As the number of fights between pairs of males increased, there was a decrease in fight duration. Fights were longer when at least one member of a competing pair of males had previously experienced a victory.  相似文献   

3.
Game theory models predict that individuals in contests adjust their strategy appropriately to the current value of the contested resource and the resource holding potential (RHP) of their opponent. In the current investigation, I examined interactively operating, multiple contest asymmetries on dyadic disputes for precopulatory guarding positions in the crab spider Misumenoides formosipes. In contests between equally sized adult males with no previous contest experience, residents had clear advantages in fighting success over intruders. Asymmetries in experience predicted outcome when tested against residency status, and experience operating in concert with residency status predicted resolution when tested against size asymmetries. Data from this investigation suggest that crab spiders learn strategies through experience rather than rely solely on the assessment of their opponent's RHP before determining contest effort.  相似文献   

4.
Territorial residents usually win asymmetrical owner‐intruder contests and a variety of hypotheses have been proposed to explain this phenomenon. In the butterfly Chrysozephyrus smaragdinus (Lepidoptera: Lycaenidae), male territorial residents defended their territories against intruders during numerous contests and kept them for many successive days. Field observations and experiments were conducted to examine the factors related to this superiority of residents. Forewing length did not differ between residents and intruders, suggesting that body size is not correlated with resource holding potential. Removal–replacement experiments demonstrated that residency did not serve as an arbitrary means for contest settlement, and did not support the recently presented alternative hypothesis that males with higher body temperature are more likely to win. New residents fought longer in defense of the territory as their residence duration in the territory increased. I discuss these results in light of game theory and suggest that the superiority of residents in C. smaragdinus may be based on the asymmetry of resource (territory) value for residents and intruders.  相似文献   

5.
Territorial behaviour can only be adaptive if its costs are outweighed by its benefits. Territorial individuals incur costs by defending their territories against intruders. Usually these intruders are assumed to be non-territorial floaters attempting to take over the whole territory or neighbours trying to extend the borders of their own territory. We instead investigate how costs and benefits of territorial behaviour are affected by neighbours which invade to steal resources on a territory.We show analytically that in the absence of defence intrusion into neighbouring territories always pays and that even if territories are defended intrusion levels can still be high. Using a more detailed simulation model we find that territory defence usually disappears from the population even if owners have a strong advantage over intruders in terms of fighting costs or foraging efficiency. Defence and thus territoriality can only be evolutionarily stable if fighting costs for the intruder relative to the productivity of the territory are very high or if crossing the borders between territories carries additional costs.Our results show that stealing of resources by neighbours can have a considerable effect on the evolutionary stability of territory defence and thus territoriality itself. A more mechanistic model of territorial behaviour is needed to incorporate these kinds of mechanisms into a general theory on the evolution of territoriality.  相似文献   

6.
Agonistic behaviour between male orb-web spiders Metellina mengei competing for access to female webs was examined in field experiments to test the major predictions of game theory. Winners of fights were significantly larger than losers, particularly with respect to the length of the first pair of legs, which are sexually dimorphic in this species and used extensively in agonistic encounters. The size of the winning male had no influence on contest intensity or duration, and neither did relative size. However, fight intensity and duration were both positively correlated with the size of the losing male. Resident males won significantly more contests than intruders. Winning intruders were significantly larger than winning residents and it was these winning intruders that tended to produce the longer fights. Female weight and hence reproductive value had a marked influence on fight intensity and duration of fights won by the intruder but not those won by the resident. This indicates that only the resident obtains information about the female. These data are discussed with reference to the discrepancy with theory and a failure of some contestants to obtain information on resource value and relative contestant size necessary to optimize fight strategy.  相似文献   

7.
When two social groups are close enough to hear each other’s short-range vocalizations but not yet close enough to see each other, they can choose whether to approach to initiate a direct contest. In this study, I evaluated whether expected payoffs and group resource-holding potential affected the likelihood of approach toward a neighboring group during naturally occurring intergroup interactions and experimental playback trials by grey-cheeked mangabeys (Lophocebus albigena). Females approached calling groups at low rates, and only if males did so as well. Groups that had recently arrived (≤30 min) at the interaction location were more likely to approach than groups that were in the interaction location for >30 min. Site residency likely indicates the degree of short-term, local resource exploitation, and explains this pattern of patch defense. There was no evidence that mangabeys defended home range core or peripheral areas, that males defended female mates, or that infant defense affected the likelihood of approach. Surprisingly, resource-holding potential had no effect on patterns of contest initiation, but may influence other aspects of intergroup contests. The unexpected importance of payoff asymmetries, relative to asymmetries in resource-holding potential, points to the need for an expanded theoretical framework.  相似文献   

8.
European badgers, Meles meles, possess a large subcaudal gland which is used for scent-marking the territory and other members of the clan. It was shown experimentally that a badger can distinguish secretions from different individuals. Dominant males scent-mark most, and lactating females more than other females. Scent-marks are distributed along the border of the territory, on bedding materials and around the sett, and on all members of the clan, especially females and cubs. The data support, in many details, the hypothesis that scent-making in badgers serves to establish an asymmetry of contest during encounters with intruders.  相似文献   

9.
The Siamese fighting fish (Betta splendens) is well known as an aggressive fish with unique spawning and parental care behavior. During reproduction, male fish construct a bubble nest, court females, protect the brood, and defend the territory through aggressive displays. Aggression in male Siamese fighting fish has long been the subject of investigation; however, the kinematics of aggression during contests have been largely overlooked. Here we investigated how nest-holding, male Siamese fighting fish use two different types of displays, gill flaring and fin spreading, towards intruders during various reproductive phases; before (BB) and after bubble nest building, and after spawning (AS), and hatching (AH). Males were more aggressive towards male than female intruders and the level of aggression changed significantly between reproductive phases. Gill flaring, the more energetically costly display, was the dominant initial display towards male and female intruders in BB, AS, AH phases. However, defending males switched to fin spreading after prolonged exposure to intruders. The results suggest that Siamese fighting fish use gill flaring as an acute response in order to defend their territory; this response may be replaced by fin spreading as a chronic response, probably to reduce the energetic costs during the contest.  相似文献   

10.
Resource holding power (RHP), as expressed by gaining dominance, can be affected by extrinsic and intrinsic factors. Extrinsic factors that increase the RHP include e.g. prior exposure to the contest area. The pay-off asymmetry hypothesis was tested according to which there is an asymmetry in the value the resident's territory has for the resident and intruders, i.e. the resident loses more than intruder opponents when losing the contest over a territory in which it has invested much energy during the exploration of food and shelter resources, during the settlement of conflicts with territorial neighbours, etc. This asymmetry will increase the resident's chance to win the fight over intruders. If the resident-intruder asymmetry is enhanced by presenting resource-rich territories to e.g. fish (structurally diverse or 'rich' aquariums), the hypothesis predicts that the resident's dominance chance (probability to win the fight) will be higher than in structurally 'poor' aquariums. It was found that residents were proportionately more often dominant (fight winners) than intruders in the rich compared to the poor aquariums in all seven tested fish species. This demonstrates that a high territory resource value (aquarium enrichment) significantly facilitates the expression of the resident's dominance advantage (prior residence effect). In contrast to dominance, aggressive behaviour before the dominance settlement did not generally differ between residents and intruders when compared in rich and poor aquariums. This suggests that dominance in itself and aggression prior to dominance settlement are at least partially guided by different motivational systems.  相似文献   

11.
According to current theory, dominance relationships may depend on asymmetries between adversaries in their expected net gain from contested resources. A prediction derived from this theory was confirmed in the field by experimentally creating asymmetries between neighbouring territorial hummingbirds with regard to their net energy gains from their territories, and then forcing them to fight for ownership of the combined resources of the two territories. When territory productivity was increased to levels well above the daily energy requirements of each contestant, energetic asymmetries no longer detectably influenced dominance, and the amounts of aggression per contest were lower. Contests in which an energetic asymmetry was partially offset by an age-related asymmetry involved more fights than contests in which opponents belonged to different age classes but controlled feeders of identical productivity. The predicted negative correlation between the magnitude of the asymmetry in net energy gain and agonistic investment in the contest did not occur.  相似文献   

12.
Evolutionary dynamics shape the living world around us. At the centre of every evolutionary process is a population of reproducing individuals. The structure of that population affects evolutionary dynamics. The individuals can be molecules, cells, viruses, multicellular organisms or humans. Whenever the fitness of individuals depends on the relative abundance of phenotypes in the population, we are in the realm of evolutionary game theory. Evolutionary game theory is a general approach that can describe the competition of species in an ecosystem, the interaction between hosts and parasites, between viruses and cells, and also the spread of ideas and behaviours in the human population. In this perspective, we review the recent advances in evolutionary game dynamics with a particular emphasis on stochastic approaches in finite sized and structured populations. We give simple, fundamental laws that determine how natural selection chooses between competing strategies. We study the well-mixed population, evolutionary graph theory, games in phenotype space and evolutionary set theory. We apply these results to the evolution of cooperation. The mechanism that leads to the evolution of cooperation in these settings could be called ‘spatial selection’: cooperators prevail against defectors by clustering in physical or other spaces.  相似文献   

13.
Territoriality is a potentially costly endeavor, and several mechanisms for mitigating the costs of territoriality have been investigated in the wild. For example, territory owners can reduce the costs of defending territory boundaries by prioritizing defense of the most valuable areas within territories, investing less energy in low quality areas. We staged pairwise encounters between adult male lizards on natural territories in the wild, to test whether male brown anoles, Anolis sagrei, would differentially defend certain regions of their territories over others. Based on our observations that male A. sagrei spend most of their time on elevated perches on tree trunks or branches compared with sites on the ground, we predicted that territory residents would respond more aggressively to territory invasions that took place on elevated perches than to invasions on the ground. We measured significant differences in the behavior of residents following invasion on the ground vs. on the elevated perches, and results partially supported our hypothesis. Males performed more displays and approached intruders more often when territory invasion took place on the ground, but were quicker to attack intruders that entered territories on elevated perches. Our hypothesis was only partially supported, potentially indicating that elevated perches are preferred as outposts to monitor valuable sites on the ground. Our study provides evidence that territory defense varies not just among individuals, but also within individuals at different locations in a territory.  相似文献   

14.
In this article, we develop population game theory, a theory that combines the dynamics of animal behavior with population dynamics. In particular, we study interaction and distribution of two species in a two-patch environment assuming that individuals behave adaptively (i.e., they maximize Darwinian fitness). Either the two species are competing for resources or they are in a predator-prey relationship. Using some recent advances in evolutionary game theory, we extend the classical ideal free distribution (IFD) concept for single species to two interacting species. We study population dynamical consequences of two-species IFD by comparing two systems: one where individuals cannot migrate between habitats and one where migration is possible. For single species, predator-prey interactions, and competing species, we show that these two types of behavior lead to the same population equilibria and corresponding species spatial distributions, provided interspecific competition is patch independent. However, if differences between patches are such that competition is patch dependent, then our predictions strongly depend on whether animals can migrate or not. In particular, we show that when species are settled at their equilibrium population densities in both habitats in the environment where migration between habitats is blocked, then the corresponding species spatial distribution need not be an IFD. Thus, when species are given the opportunity to migrate, they will redistribute to reach an IFD (e.g., under which the two species can completely segregate), and this redistribution will also influence species population equilibrial densities. Alternatively, we also show that when two species are distributed according to the IFD, the corresponding population equilibrium can be unstable.  相似文献   

15.
Signalling behaviour is integral to animal contests. However, post‐contest signals, such as victory displays, have received relatively little attention. One hypothesised function of victory displays is to ensure a more lasting dominance by reducing the risk of losers re‐initiating a new contest with winners. Despite several theoretical studies using game theory that support this hypothesis, empirical support for the understanding of when and why victory displays are used with respect to browbeating is lacking. We use a common South‐East Asian mangrove crab, Perisesarma eumolpe, to examine whether the performance of victory displays by winners, among other factors, affects the time of fight re‐initiation by losers, if at all re‐initiated. Using mixed‐effects survival analysis models, we analysed 77 fights from 27 staged contest trials between randomly paired males. We found losers that experienced victory display performed by winners, presented a decreased instantaneous hazard rate of re‐initiating a new fight than losers that did not. These results corroborate previous game theoretical models indicating that victory displays may function to reduce the chances of losers re‐initiating another fight. In discouraging losers from restarting a fight, winners reduce the potential costs of a future contest.  相似文献   

16.
1. Some male tarantula hawk wasps Hemipepsis ustulata defend landmark shrubs growing on mountain tops, while others only visit a succession of territory sites, generally fleeing from territorial males. To determine whether residency asymmetries contribute to the short duration of most interactions between territorial males and visiting intruders, established residents were held captive for varying periods while other males replaced them at their territories.
2. Replacement males immediately assumed resident status and began to defend the shrubs and trees with success against non-resident intruders, many of which were larger. Interactions between replacements and non-resident intruders rarely escalated into pursuits leading to ascending flights.
3. In contrast, when the original resident was released, its subsequent encounter with the replacement male almost always resulted in one or more ascending flights, even when the replacement had been on territory for less than 10 min. The longer the period of territory occupation by replacements, the longer on average the interaction and the more ascending flights, showing that the duration of time on a territory affects male motivation to defend the site. Despite strong resistance from long-term replacements, however, returning residents almost always regained their territories.
4. The strong residency effect in H. ustulata may be an adaptive proximate control mechanism for male behaviour that arises because established residents typically have high resource holding power, which makes them difficult to displace.  相似文献   

17.
A one-step (birth–death) process is used to investigate stochastic noise in an elementary two-phenotype evolutionary game model based on a payoff matrix. In this model, we assume that the population size is finite but not fixed and that all individuals have, in addition to the frequency-dependent fitness given by the evolutionary game, the same background fitness that decreases linearly in the total population size. Although this assumption guarantees population extinction is a globally attracting absorbing barrier of the Markov process, sample trajectories do not illustrate this result even for relatively small carrying capacities. Instead, the observed persistent transient behavior can be analyzed using the steady-state statistics (i.e., mean and variance) of a stochastic model for intrinsic noise that assumes the population does not go extinct. It is shown that there is good agreement between the theory of these statistics and the simulation results. Furthermore, the ESS of the evolutionary game can be used to predict the mean steady state.  相似文献   

18.
Most of the work in evolutionary game theory starts with a model of a social situation that gives rise to a particular payoff matrix and analyses how behaviour evolves through natural selection. Here, we invert this approach and ask, given a model of how individuals behave, how the payoff matrix will evolve through natural selection. In particular, we ask whether a prisoner's dilemma game is stable against invasions by mutant genotypes that alter the payoffs. To answer this question, we develop a two-tiered framework with goal-oriented dynamics at the behavioural time scale and a diploid population genetic model at the evolutionary time scale. Our results are two-fold: first, we show that the prisoner's dilemma is subject to invasions by mutants that provide incentives for cooperation to their partners, and that the resulting game is a coordination game similar to the hawk-dove game. Second, we find that for a large class of mutants and symmetric games, a stable genetic polymorphism will exist in the locus determining the payoff matrix, resulting in a complex pattern of behavioural diversity in the population. Our results highlight the importance of considering the evolution of payoff matrices to understand the evolution of animal social systems.  相似文献   

19.
Random matching between individuals, or the complete-mixing model, is often assumed in analyzing evolutionary or population dynamics in ecology and game theory or other models in social sciences. Making and analyzing a model is not difficult under this simple assumption. However spatial- or network-structured populations, including the lattice model and the power-law network, are more realistic for many ecological and social phenomena than the complete-mixing model. In this review, I will show first that a lattice model can be useful in investigating the effect of neighborhood interactions on the dynamics, not only of plants and forests, but also of animal and human societies. Second, the lattice model promotes the evolution of spiteful behavior, even though it is well-known that the lattice model promotes the evolution of cooperation. Finally, different social networks result in traits, such as social norms, spreading at different speeds.  相似文献   

20.
动物个性研究进展   总被引:2,自引:1,他引:1  
"个性"是指不同时空条件下动物种群个体间行为的稳定差异。大量的理论和实验性研究表明,个性差异在动物界普遍存在,其是种群多度和分布、物种共存及群落构建的重要驱动因子。介绍了动物个性的概念、分类及衡量指标,将前人测量个性类型的方法加以总结;随后介绍了动物个性的生态学意义,尤其是个性对动物生活史策略、种群分布与多度、群落结构和动态、生态系统功能和过程以及疾病与信息传播等的影响。在此基础上,进一步分析了在人类活动增加等全球变化背景下,动物个性如何调控动物个体行为、种群和群落动态对这些环境变化的响应。阐述了动物个性的形成与维持机制,并对未来的研究方向进行了展望。  相似文献   

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