Domain independence and stability in young and older adults' discounting of delayed rewards

Individual discounting rates for different types of delayed reward are typically assumed to reflect a single, underlying trait of impulsivity. Recently, we showed that discounting rates are orders of magnitude steeper for directly consumable liquid rewards than for monetary rewards (Jimura et al., 2009), raising the question of whether discounting rates for different types of reward covary at the individual level. Accordingly, the present study examined the relation between discounting of hypothetical money and real liquid rewards in young adults (Experiment 1) and older adults (Experiment 2). At the group level, young adults discounted monetary rewards more steeply than the older adults, but there was no significant age difference with respect to liquid rewards. At the individual level, the rates at which young and older participants discounted each reward type were stable over a two- to fifteen-week interval (rs > 70), but there was no significant correlation between the rates at which they discounted the two reward types. These results suggest that although similar decision-making processes may underlie the discounting of different types of rewards, the rates at which individuals discount money and directly consumable rewards may reflect separate, stable traits, rather than a single trait of impulsivity.     

Measurement of delay discounting using trial-by-trial consequences

DELAY DISCOUNTING IN HUMANS WAS INVESTIGATED USING THREE DIFFERENT PROCEDURES: a frequently used discounting procedure with hypothetical rewards and delays; a procedure with hypothetical rewards and delays compressed down to much smaller values; and a contingent procedure in which each choice had a direct consequence. In the contingent procedure, on every trial, participants actually experienced the delay and obtained the reward amount associated with their choice. Each participant was exposed to all three procedures. Orderly temporal discounting patterns were obtained in all three procedures and described well by a hyperbolic model. Comparisons of the data revealed patterns unique to each procedure. The distributions of the discounting measures differed across the three procedures. In the contingent procedure, several subjects showed no discounting, e.g. complete self-control. Procedural factors in studies of impulsivity are discussed, and suggestions are offered for experiments in which the contingent-discounting procedure may prove useful.     

The combined effects of delay and probability in discounting

Human discounting studies have frequently observed hyperbolic discounting of rewards that are delayed or probabilistic. However, no studies have systematically combined delay and probability in a single discounting procedure. Indifference points of hypothetical money rewards that are both delayed and probabilistic were determined. Probabilities were converted into comparable delays according to the h/k constant of proportionality determined by , and discounting rates were calculated. These data provided a very good fit to the hyperbolic model of discounting, suggesting that delay and probability can be combined into a single metric in studies of discounting. The inclusion of a magnitude condition found the Magnitude Effect commonly found in studies of temporal discounting. A temporal resolution of uncertainty condition found no effect. The present paper offers a novel statistical method, within an established framework, for the analysis of data from studies of discounting that combine delay and probability.     

Parameters of delay discounting assessment: number of trials, effort, and sequential effects.

Procedural variants in estimating delay discounting (DD) have been shown to yield significant within-subject differences in estimated degree of delay discounting as well as variations in the patterns of choice. The purpose of this study was to evaluate the effect of subject control over the number of trials in a delay discounting task, on degree of delay discounting. Participants were assessed with two computerized DD assessments: the full-length method presented participants with a fixed set of 240 trials, and the abbreviated task, where once participants had shown indifference between the immediate and delayed rewards, the remaining trials for that delay value were omitted. While the full-length and abbreviated methods did not differentially affect patterns of choice or estimated delay discounting, the order of presentation (ascending or descending) of immediate rewards produced differences in each measure: rate of delay discounting was significantly lower when estimated with the descending sequence; a larger proportion of area under the discounting curve was concentrated around the indifference point trial with the descending sequence; and a lower correlation was observed between estimates obtained across methods with the descending sequence.     

Delay discounting of real and hypothetical rewards III: steady-state assessments, forced-choice trials, and all real rewards

Human research in delay discounting has omitted several procedures typical of animal studies: forced-choice trials, consequences following each response, and assessment of stable response patterns. The present study manipulated these procedures across two conditions in which real or hypothetical rewards were arranged. Six college students participated in daily sessions, in which steady-state discounting of hypothetical and real rewards was assessed. No systematic effects of repeated exposure to hypothetical rewards was detected when compared with first day assessments of discounting. Likewise, no systematic effect of reward type (real versus hypothetical) was detected. When combined with previous research failing to detect a difference between hypothetical and potentially real rewards, these findings suggest that assessing discounting of hypothetical rewards in single sessions is a practical and valid procedure in the study of delay discounting.     

Strain differences in delay discounting using inbred rats

A heightened aversion to delayed rewards is associated with substance abuse and numerous other neuropsychiatric disorders. Many of these disorders are heritable, raising the possibility that delay aversion may also have a significant genetic or heritable component. To examine this possibility, we compared delay discounting in six inbred strains of rats (Brown Norway, Copenhagen, Lewis, Fischer, Noble and Wistar Furth) using the adjusting amount procedure, which provides a measure of the subjective value of delayed rewards. The subjective value of rewards decreased as the delay to receipt increased for all strains. However, a main effect of strain and a strain × delay interaction indicated that some strains were more sensitive to the imposition of delays than others. Fitting a hyperbolic discount equation showed significant strain differences in sensitivity to delay ( k ). These data indicate that there are significant strain differences in delay discounting. All strains strongly preferred the 10% sucrose solution (the reinforcer in the delay discounting task) over water and the amount of sucrose consumed was correlated with sensitivity to delay. Locomotor activity was not correlated with delay discounting behavior. Additional research will be required to disentangle genetic influences from maternal effects and to determine how these factors influence the underlying association between heightened delay discounting and neuropsychiatric disorders.     

The present values of delayed rewards are approximately additive

In two experiments, human subjects were asked to estimate their present values of single delayed rewards and their present values of temporal sequences of three rewards. Present values were solicited by asking subjects to indicate an amount of money v for which they would be indifferent between receiving v at the end of the session and receiving the delayed reward(s). A procedure was used for which responding the true value of v was the optimal strategy, and the actual payoff that each subject received was determined by one randomly selected trial. In Experiment 1 (n=29) each delayed reward was 9.90 dollars in cash. In Experiment 2 (n=19) the delayed rewards were dated 15 dollars gift certificates to a local restaurant. In both experiments, the present values of the sequences were approximately equal to the sums of the present values of their component rewards. The presence of outliers suggests that a few subjects may have valued sequences less than the sums of their single rewards. Effects of a preference for uniform sequences, if any, were too small to be detected. Discounting of sequences was well fit by a parallel hyperbolic discounting equation, consistent with Mazur's [Mazur, J.E., 1986. Choice between single and multiple delayed reinforcers. J. Exp. Anal. Behav. 46 (1), 67-77] results using multiple reinforcers.     

Reduced sensitivity to immediate reward during decision-making in older than younger adults

We examined whether older adults differ from younger adults in the degree to which they favor immediate over delayed rewards during decision-making. To examine the neural correlates of age-related differences in delay discounting we acquired functional MR images while participants made decisions between smaller but sooner and larger but later monetary rewards. The behavioral results show age-related reductions in delay discounting. Less impulsive decision-making in older adults was associated with lower ventral striatal activations to immediate reward. Furthermore, older adults showed an overall higher percentage of delayed choices and reduced activity in the dorsal striatum than younger adults. This points to a reduced reward sensitivity of the dorsal striatum in older adults. Taken together, our findings indicate that less impulsive decision-making in older adults is due to a reduced sensitivity of striatal areas to reward. These age-related changes in reward sensitivity may result from transformations in dopaminergic neuromodulation with age.     

The Nature of Impulsivity: Visual Exposure to Natural Environments Decreases Impulsive Decision-Making in a Delay Discounting Task

The benefits of visual exposure to natural environments for human well-being in areas of stress reduction, mood improvement, and attention restoration are well documented, but the effects of natural environments on impulsive decision-making remain unknown. Impulsive decision-making in delay discounting offers generality, predictive validity, and insight into decision-making related to unhealthy behaviors. The present experiment evaluated differences in such decision-making in humans experiencing visual exposure to one of the following conditions: natural (e.g., mountains), built (e.g., buildings), or control (e.g., triangles) using a delay discounting task that required participants to choose between immediate and delayed hypothetical monetary outcomes. Participants viewed the images before and during the delay discounting task. Participants were less impulsive in the condition providing visual exposure to natural scenes compared to built and geometric scenes. Results suggest that exposure to natural environments results in decreased impulsive decision-making relative to built environments.     

Discrimination,discounting and impulsivity: a role for an informational constraint

Feeding animals often prefer small, quickly delivered rewards over larger, more delayed rewards. Students of feeding behaviour typically explain this behaviour by saying that animals discount delayed benefits. Temporal discounting implies that delayed benefits are worth less than immediate benefits. This paper presents a new explanation of short-sighted decision-making called the discrimination advantage model that does not rely on discounting. A new model that includes several possible causes of discounting is developed. This model has many interesting features, but it cannot account for two empirical results: the strength of the 'discounting' effect and the fact that the time between choice presentations (the intertrial interval or ITI) has no effect. This leads to the conclusion that although discounting may be important it is probably not a complete explanation of the experimental facts. In the discrimination advantage model the observation that the ITI does not affect choice is seen as a strategy to make a cleaner discrimination between delayed alternatives in a noisy world. A simple example shows that when discrimination is imperfect a short-sighted choice rule can, in some situations, lead to a higher long-term rate than a rule that actually compares long-term rates. This idea is developed and extended in several ways.     

Rats bred for high alcohol drinking are more sensitive to delayed and probabilistic outcomes

Alcoholics and heavy drinkers score higher on measures of impulsivity than nonalcoholics and light drinkers. This may be because of factors that predate drug exposure (e.g. genetics). This study examined the role of genetics by comparing impulsivity measures in ethanol-naive rats selectively bred based on their high [high alcohol drinking (HAD)] or low [low alcohol drinking (LAD)] consumption of ethanol. Replicates 1 and 2 of the HAD and LAD rats, developed by the University of Indiana Alcohol Research Center, completed two different discounting tasks. Delay discounting examines sensitivity to rewards that are delayed in time and is commonly used to assess 'choice' impulsivity. Probability discounting examines sensitivity to the uncertain delivery of rewards and has been used to assess risk taking and risk assessment. High alcohol drinking rats discounted delayed and probabilistic rewards more steeply than LAD rats. Discount rates associated with probabilistic and delayed rewards were weakly correlated, while bias was strongly correlated with discount rate in both delay and probability discounting. The results suggest that selective breeding for high alcohol consumption selects for animals that are more sensitive to delayed and probabilistic outcomes. Sensitivity to delayed or probabilistic outcomes may be predictive of future drinking in genetically predisposed individuals.     

Discounting of sequences of delayed rewards of different amounts

The main purpose of this study was to determine whether the magnitude effect is present in cases where delayed sequences of rewards are discounted. The magnitude effect refers to the inverse relationship between the amount of a reward and the steepness of temporal discounting. This study was conducted with a computer program to estimate the indifference points, which served as indicators of the present subjective value of delayed sequences of small and large rewards. In the indifference point the subjective value of a single, immediate reward was equal to the subjective value of the delayed sequence (or to the value of a single delayed reward). As a control condition, we added an experimental task involving choices between single immediate and single delayed rewards. The experiment showed that the sequences of large rewards are discounted less steeply than are the sequences of small rewards. This finding suggests that the magnitude effect is present within the delayed sequences of rewards. In addition, when outcomes are relatively large, the results suggest that a single reward is discounted less steeply than the sequence of a total nominal value equal to this single reward. However, for relatively small rewards, the difference is not statistically significant. The less steep discounting of sequences of large rewards may explain the reward-bundling effect, which refers to less steep discounting of longer sequences than of shorter ones: longer sequences usually have greater overall nominal value. The present study was conducted on hypothetical rewards, and the results should be validated using real rewards.     

Pathological gambling severity is associated with impulsivity in a delay discounting procedure

Research and clinical expertise indicates that impulsivity is an underlying feature of pathological gambling. This study examined the extent to which impulsive behavior, defined by the rate of discounting delayed monetary rewards, varies with pathological gambling severity, assessed by the South Oaks Gambling Screen (SOGS). Sixty-two pathological gamblers completed a delay discounting task, the SOGS, the Eysenck impulsivity scale, the Addiction Severity Index (ASI), and questions about gambling and substance use at intake to outpatient treatment for pathological gambling. In the delay discounting task, participants chose between a large delayed reward (US $1000) and smaller more immediate rewards (US $1-$999) across a range of delays (6h to 25 years). The rate at which the delayed reward was discounted (k value) was derived for each participant and linear regression was used to identify the variables that predicted k values. Age, gender, years of education, substance abuse treatment history, and cigarette smoking history failed to significantly predict k values. Scores on the Eysenck impulsivity scale and the SOGS both accounted for a significant proportion of the variance in k values. The predictive value of the SOGS was 1.4 times that of the Eysenck scale. These results indicate that of the measures tested, gambling severity was the best single predictor of impulsive behavior in a delay discounting task in this sample of pathological gamblers.     

The subjective value of delayed and probabilistic outcomes: Outcome size matters for gains but not for losses

The subjective value of a reward (gain) is related to factors such as its size, the delay to its receipt and the probability of its receipt. We examined whether the subjective value of losses was similarly affected by these factors in 128 adults. Participants chose between immediate/certain gains or losses and larger delayed/probabilistic gains or losses. Rewards of $100 were devalued as a function of their delay (“discounted”) relatively less than $10 gains while probabilistic $100 rewards were discounted relatively more than $10 rewards. However, there was no effect of outcome size on discounting of delayed or probabilistic losses. For delayed outcomes of each size, the degree to which gains were discounted was positively correlated with the degree to which losses were discounted, whereas for probabilistic outcomes, no such correlation was observed. These results suggest that the processes underlying the subjective valuation of losses are different from those underlying the subjective valuation of gains.     

Delay and Probability Discounting of Sexual and Monetary Outcomes in Individuals with Cocaine Use Disorders and Matched Controls

Individuals with cocaine use disorders are disproportionately affected by HIV/AIDS, partly due to higher rates of unprotected sex. Recent research suggests delay discounting of condom use is a factor in sexual HIV risk. Delay discounting is a behavioral economic concept describing how delaying an event reduces that event’s value or impact on behavior. Probability discounting is a related concept describing how the uncertainty of an event decreases its impact on behavior. Individuals with cocaine use disorders (n = 23) and matched non-cocaine-using controls (n = 24) were compared in decision-making tasks involving hypothetical outcomes: delay discounting of condom-protected sex (Sexual Delay Discounting Task), delay discounting of money, the effect of sexually transmitted infection (STI) risk on likelihood of condom use (Sexual Probability Discounting Task), and probability discounting of money. The Cocaine group discounted delayed condom-protected sex (i.e., were more likely to have unprotected sex vs. wait for a condom) significantly more than controls in two of four Sexual Delay Discounting Task partner conditions. The Cocaine group also discounted delayed money (i.e., preferred smaller immediate amounts over larger delayed amounts) significantly more than controls. In the Sexual Probability Discounting Task, both groups showed sensitivity to STI risk, however the groups did not differ. The Cocaine group did not consistently discount probabilistic money more or less than controls. Steeper discounting of delayed, but not probabilistic, sexual outcomes may contribute to greater rates of sexual HIV risk among individuals with cocaine use disorders. Probability discounting of sexual outcomes may contribute to risk of unprotected sex in both groups. Correlations showed sexual and monetary results were unrelated, for both delay and probability discounting. The results highlight the importance of studying specific behavioral processes (e.g., delay and probability discounting) with respect to specific outcomes (e.g., monetary and sexual) to understand decision making in problematic behavior.     

Response bias is unaffected by delay length in a delay discounting paradigm

This study examined the contribution of response bias to measures of delay discounting in Long-Evans rats (n = 8) using the adjusting amount procedure. Under this procedure, we assessed preference for 150 μl of 10% sucrose solution delivered following a delay over a variable-amount alternative delivered immediately. Bias was calculated based on relative preference when reinforcers were delivered immediately from both alternatives. We extended this assessment procedure to examine preference when rewards from both alternatives were equally delayed (2, 4, 8, or 16 s) in addition to assessing a traditional delay discounting function. Relative preference was similar across delays and slightly larger than 150 μl. These results indicate that response bias was stable and suggests a relative aversion for the adjusting alternative, which may be due to the variability in reward size associated with that alternative.     

Impulsivity, risk taking, and timing

This study examined the relations among measures of impulsivity and timing. Impulsivity was assessed using delay and probability discounting, and self-report impulsivity (as measured by the Barratt Impulsiveness Scale; BIS-11). Timing was assessed using temporal perception as measured on a temporal bisection task and time perspective (as measured by the Zimbardo Time Perspective Inventory). One hundred and forty three college students completed these measures in a computer laboratory. The degree of delay discounting was positively correlated with the mean and range of the temporal bisection procedure. The degree of delay and probability discounting were also positively correlated. Self-reported motor impulsiveness on the BIS-11 was positively correlated with present hedonism and negatively correlated with future orientation on the ZTPI. Self-reported non-planning on the BIS-11 was positively correlated with fatalism on the ZTPI. These results show that people who overestimate the passage of time (perceive time as passing more quickly) hold less value in delayed rewards. They also confirm previous results regarding the relation between delay and probability discounting, as well as highlight similarities in self-report measures of impulsivity and time perspective.     

On the scaling interpretation of exponents in hyperboloid models of delay and probability discounting

Previously, we (McKerchar et al., 2009) showed that two-parameter hyperboloid models ( [Green and Myerson, 2004] and [Rachlin, 2006]) provide significantly better fits to delay discounting data than simple, one-parameter hyperbolic and exponential models. Here, we extend this effort by comparing fits of the two-parameter hyperboloid models to data from a larger sample of participants (N = 171) who discounted probabilistic as well as delayed rewards. In particular, we examined the effects of amount on the exponents in the two hyperboloid models of delay and probability discounting in order to evaluate key theoretical predictions of the standard psychophysical scaling interpretation of these exponents. Both the Rachlin model and the Green and Myerson model provided very good fits to delay and probability discounting of both small and large amounts at both the group and individual levels (all R²s > .97 at the group level; all median R²s > .92 at the individual level). For delay discounting, the exponent in both models did not vary as a function of delayed amount, consistent with the psychophysical scaling interpretation. For probability discounting, however, the exponent in both models increased as the probabilistic amount increased—a finding inconsistent with the scaling interpretation.