Is there a Real Nexus Between Ethics and Aesthetics?

Aesthetics is a vexed topic in philosophy, with a long history. For my purposes, an aesthetic experience is a foundational affective response to an object, to which terms such as “ugly”, “beautiful”, “pretty” or “harmonious” are applied. These terms are derived from a Discourse of aesthetics; some remain constant, others change from generation to generation. Aesthetics and ethics have been linked in Western thought since the days of Plato and Aristotle. This essay examines what is happening to that link in contemporary experience. It emphasises the ways in which the popular media exploit aesthetic appeal to penetrate their market, and to exploit and frame intuitive responses to current and past events. Production values, the artfulness of editors and the financial interests of producers and directors thus do much to determine contemporary aesthetic and ethical judgements. That which is beautifully presented invites the ethical involvement of the audience. Events whose images are beautifully presented constitute “hyperevidence”, a pre-judged, reinforced and amplified illusion of reality and participation. Understanding how aesthetic excellence draws audiences into ethical relationship with what is presented becomes an important part of education in ethics, including bioethics.     

Critical bioethics: beyond the social science critique of applied ethics

This article attempts to show a way in which social science research can contribute in a meaningful and equitable way to philosophical bioethics. It builds on the social science critique of bioethics present in the work of authors such as Renee Fox, Barry Hoffmaster and Charles Bosk, proposing the characteristics of a critical bioethics that would take social science seriously. The social science critique claims that traditional philosophical bioethics gives a dominant role to idealised, rational thought, and tends to exclude social and cultural factors, relegating them to the status of irrelevancies. Another problem is they way in which bioethics assumes social reality divides down the same lines/categories as philosophical theories. Critical bioethics requires bioethicists to root their enquiries in empirical research, to challenge theories using evidence, to be reflexive and to be sceptical about the claims of other bioethicists, scientists and clinicians. The aim is to produce a rigorous normative analysis of lived moral experience.     

WHO'S ARGUING? A CALL FOR REFLEXIVITY IN BIOETHICS

In this paper we set forth what we believe to be a relatively controversial argument, claiming that ‘bioethics’ needs to undergo a fundamental change in the way it is practised. This change, we argue, requires philosophical bioethicists to adopt reflexive practices when applying their analyses in public forums, acknowledging openly that bioethics is an embedded socio‐cultural practice, shaped by the ever‐changing intuitions of individual philosophers, which cannot be viewed as a detached intellectual endeavour. This said, we argue that in order to manage the personal, social and cultural embeddedness of bioethics, philosophical bioethicists should openly acknowledge how their practices are constructed and should, in their writing, explicitly deal with issues of bias and conflict of interest, just as empirical scientists are required to do.     

“Bioethics in Action” and Human Population Genetics Research

Recent disputes about human population genetics research have been provoked by the field's political vulnerability (the historic imbalance of power between the geneticists and the people they study) and conceptual vulnerability (the mismatch between scientific and popular understandings of the genetic basis of collective identity). The small, isolated groups often studied by this science are now mobilizing themselves as political subjects, pressing sovereignty claims, and demanding control over the direction and interpretation of research. Negotiations between the geneticists and the people asked to donate DNA have resulted not only in explicit bioethics protocols but also in diffuse anxiety over the incommensurability between expert and non-expert views about genetic evidence for identity claims. This article compares two disputes over genetics research: the Human Genome Diversity Project and the use of genetics to prove identity claims among the Melungeons of Tennessee. The case studies illustrate “bioethics in action”: how particular controversies and interests drive the production of bioethics discourses and techniques (such as informed consent protocols). They also illustrate some limits on the usual apparatus of bioethics in overcoming this science's multiple vulnerabilities.     

Living Precisely in Fin-de-Siècle Vienna

Vienna’s Institute of Experimental Biology, better known as the Vivarium, helped pioneer the quantification of experimental biology from 1903 to 1938. Among its noteable scientists were the director Hans Przibram and his brother Karl (a physicist), Paul Kammerer, Eugen Steinach, Paul Weiss, and Karl Frisch. The Vivarium’s scientists sought to derive laws describing the development of the individual organism and its relationship to the environment. Unlike other contemporary proponents of biological laws, however, these researchers created an explicitly anti-deterministic science. By “laws” they meant statistical regularities or “patterns.” They interpreted their experimental results in ways that forged a “third way” between determinism and pure spontaneity, aiming to capture the complexity of the interaction between the organism and its environment. This common feature of their research was made possible by the availability at the Vivarium of the latest in climate-control technology and of methods borrowed from statistical physics. The deeper roots of this search for a “third way” lay, I suggest, in the shared educational, social, and aesthetic experiences of the laboratory’s workers.     

IS IT TIME FOR BIOETHICS TO GO EMPIRICAL?

Observers who note the increasing popularity of bioethics discussions often complain that the social sciences are poorly represented in discussions about things like abortion and stem-cell research. Critics say that bioethicists should be incorporating the methods and findings of social scientists, and should move towards making the discipline more empirically oriented. This way, critics argue, bioethics will remain relevant, and truly reflect the needs of actual people. Such recommendations ignore the diversity of viewpoints in bioethics, however. Bioethics can gain much from the methods and findings from ethnographies and similar research. But it is misleading to suggest that bioethicists are unaware of this potential benefit. Not only that, bioethicists are justified in having doubts about the utility of the social science approach in some cases. This is not because there is some inherent superiority in non-empirical approaches to moral argument. Rather, the doubts concern the nature of the facts that the sciences would provide. Perhaps the larger point is that disagreements about the relationship between facts and normative arguments should be seen as part of the normal inquiry in bioethics, not evidence that reform is needed.     

Bioethics and conflicts of interest

Bioethics has been subject to considerable social criticism in recent years. One criticism that has caused particular discomfort in the bioethics community is that bioethicists, because of the way their work is funded, are involved in profound conflicts of interest that undermine their title to be considered independent moral commentators on developments in biomedicine and biotechnology. This criticism draws its force from the assumption that bioethics is, or ought to be, a type of normative social criticism. Versions of this criticism come from both the political left and right. For instance, such criticisms include allegations that bioethics is inherently socially conservative, that it is inherently “pro-technology”, that it lays spurious claims to moral and social authority and expertise, that its focus on autonomy links it to neoliberal theories of choice, and that it is an ideological mystification of real social relationships and political power. This commentary paper analyses the problem of bioethical conflict of interest, and argues that the types of conflict of interest facing bioethics are inherent to the role of “public intellectual” that bioethicists generally wish to assume. The paper defends this conception of the role of the bioethicist, arguing that bioethicists should be interested and openly so.     

On optimal arrangements in some social learning situations

The problem of social learning has been studied by psychologists and sociologists in the laboratory and the real world. We first consider the special, somewhat timely, problem of teaching a group of men to be good paratroopers. Some mathematical models are developed for a simple social learning situation, and necessary and sufficient conditions are then given for obtaining the “best” learning results or “most” learning for these models. The results are then generalized to cover other social learning situations; for example, classroom teaching, possibly. This paper was prepared in connection with research sponsored by the Office of Naval Research. The author is indebted to Dr. H. G. Landau of the University of Chicago Committee on Mathematical Biology for some very helpful comments.     

On the ethics and practice of contemporary social theory: from crisis talk to multiattentional method

Using an approach derived from the anthropology and sociology of knowledge, this article explores the historical emergence of European social theory and its contemporary place in the human sciences. I direct ethnographic attention to a sense of crisis or impasse in social theory’s capacity to frame and to analyze the complexity of contemporary relations in the world. By reanalyzing this crisis talk as a phenomenological reaction to the growing (sub)specialization of social theory, I offer a new way of thinking about social theory in terms of specialized analytical attentions. I also suggest how we can move from crisis talk to a new ethics of theoretical complementarity, inspired by Dilthey, which I term “multiattentional method.”     

Interactive Bodies: The Semiosis of Architectural Forms

In this paper architectural forms are presented as symbolic forms issued from the complex semiosis that characterises human cognition (Ferreira (2007, 2010)). Being semiotic objects, these symbolic forms are, consequently, context- dependent_they emerge and have meaning, i.e., they are assigned a functional and/or aesthetic value, in particular physical, social and cultural frameworks. As it happens with all semiotic objects, architectural forms, whatever their nature, are not static but highly interactive. In fact, they act as agents of specific semiotic processes, engaged in a permanent dialectic relationship with the environment they are embedded in. From this dialectics important physical, social, cultural and economic changes frequently arise, redefining this way the original framework for decades to come. As Pallasmaa (2009) points out: “Architecture is existentially rooted, and it expresses fundamental existential experiences, the complex condensation of how it feels to be human being in this world. Architecture grounds and frames existence and creates specific horizons of perception, understanding and identity.” Architecture happens in the context of particular landscapes both natural and man-made, individuating spaces, assigning them an identity, turning the frequently undifferentiated physical environment into “locus”, “place”, “site”, “ort”, definitely contributing to the definition of the mental map that individual minds are able to share collectively. The fundamental role played by architectural forms in the definition of “place” and identity and in the shaping or reshaping of a physical, social and cultural environment is analysed in this paper through a case study that observes the consequences of this dynamics in the development of the social and cultural tissue of a particular city.     

Sexes,species, and genomes: why males and females are not like humans and chimpanzees

This paper describes, analyzes, and critiques the construction of separate “male” and “female” genomes in current human genome research. Comparative genomic work on human sex differences conceives of the sexes as like different species, with different genomes. I argue that this construct is empirically unsound, distortive to research, and ethically questionable. I propose a conceptual model of biological sex that clarifies the distinction between species and sexes as genetic classes. The dynamic interdependence of the sexes makes them “dyadic kinds” that are not like species, which are “individual kinds.” The concept of sex as a “dyadic kind” may be fruitful as a remedy to the tendency to conceive of the sexes as distinct, binary classes in biological research on sex more generally.     

Fear of selfing in the American cultural imaginary or "you are never alone with a clone"

Recently the New York Times reported that scientists had "cloned" a human embryo. The alarmed response of journalists, bioethicists, and the general public focused a spotlight on the ethics of human embryo research. The popular debate reiterated the critiques of cultural theorists that humans not be figured as (marketable) products. But the debate's attribution of an unproblematic value for individual personhood illustrates the importance of a more powerful engagement by anthropology.     

Grandmothers,hunters and human life history

This paper critiques the competing “Grandmother Hypothesis” and “Embodied Capital Theory” as evolutionary explanations of the peculiarities of human life history traits. Instead, I argue that the correct explanation for human life history probably involves elements of both hypotheses: long male developmental periods and lives probably evolved due to group selection for male hunting via increased female fertility, and female long lives due to the differential contribution women’s complex foraging skills made to their children and grandchildren’s nutritional status within groups provisioned by male hunting.     

“Theory” in Theory and Practice

A central obstacle to accepting evolution, both among students and the general public, is the idea that evolution is “just a theory,” where “theory” is understood in a pejorative sense as something conjectural or speculative. Although scientists and textbooks constantly explain that the scientific use of “theory” is quite different, the pejorative use continues to cause confusion, in part because of its deep roots in a popular, Baconian, understanding of science. A constructivist approach, whereby students are helped to examine the adequacy of their preconceptions about “theory” for themselves and to revise or replace them appropriately, is recommended.     

Challenges of Macro-ethics: Bioethics and the Transformation of Knowledge Production

One interesting aspect of the Hwang-case has been the way in which this affair was assessed by academic journals such as Nature. Initially, Hwang’s success was regarded as evidence for the detrimental effects of research ethics, slowing down the pace of research in Western countries. Eventually, however, Hwang’s debacle was seen as evidence for the importance of ethics in the life sciences. Ironically, it was concluded that the West maintains its prominence in science (as a global endeavour) precisely because it has its ethics in place. Bioethics was now seen as an indispensable part of quality control. In this article, I will claim that the Hwang case rather reveals that there is no reason for complacency and that there are substantial challenges awaiting us. They have to do with major transformations in the way knowledge is produced and research in the life sciences is conducted (such as the increase in pace and scale, globalisation and the growing importance of ICT and bioinformation). These transformations call for a different kind of bioethics. The focus must shift from duties of autonomous researchers concerning visible research subjects (“micro-ethics”) to responsibilities of institutionalised research networks in managing and processing large amounts of bioinformation (“macro-ethics”). Concepts such as transparency, reliability and benefit-sharing will become more important than concepts such as informed consent. Basically, it is a resurgence of the tension between the Kantian and the Hegelian view of ethics. The contours of macro-ethics will be elaborated notably as it is emerging in bioethical debates over biobanking and genetic databanks.

A century of oceanographic and fisheries exploration on the continental shelf off Argentina

A detailed analysis is presented of the main contributions, both local and international, to the fields of oceanography and fishery sciences resulting from exploratory cruises carried out on the continental shelf off Argentina over the last 100 years. The end of the 19th century is chosen as a starting point for this analysis as it marks the beginning of active marine research by Argentinian scientists and an accumulation of information on Antarctic and Subantarctic organisms in foreign journals. Mention is also made of previous contributions derived from the classic expeditions and global circumnavigational voyages during the 18th and 19th centuries. Although the aims of those were not always strictly oceanographic, they rendered significant information to this field of knowledge. In the early years, references arose mainly from the particular geographic situation of the Argentinian shelf, a necessary passage in the navigation routes to the Pacific Ocean, and later on the way to Antarctica. Sources of information are divided into four categories: (a) foreign scientific projects in the area; (b) investigation by Argentinian scientists and research vessels; (c) joint projects between Argentinian and foreign institutions; and (d) contributions from sources other than oceanographic cruises (commercial navigation, maritime weather reports, satellite images, etc.). The analysis includes an updated and classified bibliographical list of the main contributions to the fields of oceanography and fishery sciences derived from those sources, published either in international or local journals or appearing as technical and internal reports. The motivations, objectives and main achievements of foreign surveys and programmes in the area and their impact on local scientific progress are discussed. The early sixties mark a turning point in the evolution of international research in the area. The creation of biological stations along the Argentinian coast, and the support given to the pooling of human resources set the basis for the development of bilateral programmes. Similar progress in Brazil and Uruguay led to the outgrowth of regional activities. Joint scientific efforts described in this analysis include the programmes carried out by the research vessels of Germany (“Walther Herwig”, “Meteor”), Japan (“Kaiyo Maru”, “Orient Maru”, “Shinkai Maru”), Poland (“Professor Siedlecki”), Russia (“Evrika”, “Dimitry Stefanov”) and the USA (“Vema”, “Atlantis II”), the achievements of which are a landmark in the evolution of marine science in the aea.     

Voiceprint identification and its application to sociological studies of wild Japanese monkeys (Macaca fuscata yakui)

Japanese monkeys often exchange the particular vocal sound, “coo,” especially when they feed or move as a group. It was considered that the “coo” sound had no positive social meaning, perhaps because the “coo” sound network and its function were hidden behind other behavioral observations. For identification of the vocalizer only from hearing the “coo” sound, three phonetic values, i.e., the “fundamental,” “duration,” and “formants,” plus other characteristics were used as indices of voiceprints. The results indicated that these were effective for identifying the vocalizer in two-thirds of the adults in the study troop which was composed of 12 adults and 16 immature members. The “coo” sound exchange network among the troop members (adults) was drawn on the basis of the voiceprint identification. The network showed three characteristics as follows: (1) matriarchs of the kin-groups frequently exchanged “coo” sounds with each other; (2) the other females exchanged “coo” sounds mostly within their own kin-groups; and (3) males seldom participated in the “coo” sound exchange. This suggests that “coo” sound exchange plays a central role for the matriarch of kin-groups in binding each kin-group and, ultimately, in binding all members together into an organized troop.     

The Futility of Futility: Death Causation is the ��Elephant in the Room�� in Discussions about Limitation of Medical Treatment

The term “futility” has been widely used in medical ethics and clinical medicine for more than twenty years now. At first glance it appears to offer a clear-cut categorical characterisation of medical treatments at the end of life, and an apparently objective way of making decisions that are seen to be emotionally painful for those close to the patient, and ethically, and also potentially legally hazardous for clinicians. It also appears to deal with causation, because omission of a futile treatment cannot surely be a cause of death. The problem is that futility can be argued to be a “false friend”, in that it gives an appearance of representing a reliable conceptual basis, in ethics, for limitation of medical treatment—usually in the context of dying—without actually doing so. In fact, the concept of futility is a conflation of clinical judgement about outcomes of treatment and the quality or even value of life, and has really failed to contribute much to the advancement of decision-making and hence care at the end-of-life. It also has the capacity to medicalise the personal space. Deliberations about the likely outcomes of medical treatment are necessary, and medical expertise is pivotal. However, futility is argued to have a better future in partnership with a broad social action agenda about the process of dying, such as that articulated in health promoting palliative care, as a basis for better “death-ways” in the 21st century (Kellehear 2005). Medicine needs to more honest and upfront about its limits, as death is, after all, the elephant in everybody's room.     

Joyeuses Tropiques: Five Encounters with Alterities in Brazil

The paper describes the predicament of Brazilian anthropology through a personal experience of teaching and living in Brasilia. Just like Brasilia, Brazil is many ways considered as “a work in progress” – and Brazilian anthropology as a lively and thriving area, although frequently overlooked by non-Brazilian scholars. The situation in which Brazilian anthropologists find themselves is put in the context of their own history, as well as the particular social conditions of the country – with special reference to Brazil as invention, taking as an example celebration of “500 years of Brazil.”     

Intellectual property law: a primer for scientists

“Intellectual property” (IP) is a generic legal term for patents, copyrights, and trademarks, which provide legal rights to protect ideas, the expression of ideas, and the inventors and creators of such ideas. A patent provides legal protection for a new invention, an application of a new idea, discovery, or concept that is useful. Copyright provides legal protection from copying for any creative work, as well as business and scientific publications, computer software, and compilations of information. A trademark provides rights to use symbols, particular words, logos, or other markings that indicate the source of a product or service. A further method of benefiting from an invention is simply to keep it secret, rather than to disclose it—a “trade secret.” IP impinges on almost everything scientists do. As scientists are paid to come up with ideas and aspire to patent and/or publish their work, the protection of ideas and of written works especially should be of interest and concern to all.