Human embryonic stem cell research: why the discarded-created-distinction cannot be based on the potentiality argument

Discussions about the use and derivation of pluripotent human embryonic stem cells are a stumbling block in developing public policy on stem cell research. On the one hand there is a broad consensus on the benefits of these cells for science and biomedicine; on the other hand there is the controversial issue of killing human embryos. I will focus on the compromise position that accepts research on spare embryos, but not on research embryos ('discarded-created-distinction', from now on d-c-d). I will point out that this viewpoint is hard to maintain. The main focus is that the 'revealed beliefs' of its defenders are inconsistent with their 'professed beliefs', more specifically with their main argument, i.e. the potentiality argument. I will point out that (1) the defenders of d-c-d actually grant a relative moral status to the human embryo, (2) this moral status is dependent on internal and external criteria of potentiality, (3) potentiality seen as a variable value that also depends on external criteria cannot justify d-c-d, and (4) an approach to human embryonic stem cell-research that would also allow the use of research embryos is more compatible with the feelings, attitudes and values of those who currently defend d-c-d and, therefore, could lead to a broader consensus and to actions that alleviate individual human suffering.     

Segmentation and moral status in vivo and in vitro: a scientific perspective

A basic consideration in research on human embryos is the controversy about when the embryo acquires moral status. The author refutes the contention that segmentation is the determinant of moral status. She notes that segmentation, as a stage in embryonic development, does not coincide with the development of "irreversible individuality" upon which the segmentation argument depends. Dawson also finds a lack of clarity in the meaning of "individuality." These problems, she maintains, prevent segmentation from being morally important and render the proposed 14-day limit on embryo research unnecessary. Dawson concludes that to introduce a time restriction on embryo research is premature because it is based on an inadequate philosophical argument.     

Intermediate Moral Respect and Proportionality Reasoning

In a recent article in this journal Jonathan Pugh critiques the idea of intermediate ‘moral respect’ which some say is owed to embryos. This concept is inherent within the ‘principle of proportionality’, the principle that destructive research on embryos is permissable only if the research serves an important purpose. Pugh poses two specific questions to proponents of the idea of intermediate moral respect. This article argues that while the questions posed by Pugh are certainly pertinent to the debate, the hypothetical responses he suggests to these questions do not quite get to the core of what is troublesome about the concept. The article suggests alternative responses to Pugh's questions in order to focus attention on more fundamental problems facing the idea of intermediate moral respect, while also pointing to how the intermediate moral respect proponent might best develop these responses. It goes on to argue that these hypothetical responses fail to answer convincingly the questions posed. More specifically, this article challenges two possible justifications for the distinct idea of intermediate moral respect, namely the argument from potentiality (the argument raised by Pugh) and an argument from the proportionality of fundamental moral status (not considered by Pugh). The article also raises a dilemma inherent in the application of the principle of proportionality to cases involving beings to which intermediate moral respect is owed even where it is allowed, ex hypothesi, that both the category of intermediate moral respect and the general proportionality reasoning underpinning the principle of proportionality are basically cogent. This article thus develops and adds to the challenge laid down by Pugh to proponents of the idea of intermediate moral respect.     

Aspects on properties, use and ethical considerations of embryonic stem cells – A short review

Mammalian embryonic stem cells have the potential to differentiate into all cell types of an adult individual. The culturing of human embryonic stem cells renders possible studies that were previously only available in animal models. Embryonic stem cells constitute a particularly attractive tool for studies of self-renewal, commitment, differentiation, maturation and cell-cell interaction. There is currently considerable hope that studies of embryonic stem cells will lead to new therapies; either by themselves, through cell replacement strategies, or by generating results assisting other fields of research to reach clinical results. There are, however, considerable challenges to be met before embryonic stem cells can be used in large-scale clinical trials.Stem cell research is an area that has given rise to much debate internationally, within science, law and politics as well as within philosophy and ethics. The ethical attitudes expressed in the public debate over stem cell research notably divide over three important distinctions: (1) Reproductive versus therapeutic cloning; (2) Using already existing embryos versus producing new embryos for research purposes; (3) Production of embryos from eggs and sperm versus through somatic-cell nuclear transfer. The potential medical benefits that may result from embryonic stem cell research arguably support a continued development in this area. However, some opponents argue that this research offends the (relative or absolute) moral status of an unborn human. Furthermore, the research would probably prove to be a both time-consuming and very expensive method for treating disease. Thus, the questions arise whom the new technique wouldbenefit and at what cost, if ever developed. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Moral status of embryonic stem cells: perspective of an African villager

One of the most important as well as most awesome achievements of modern biotechnology is the possibility of cloning human embryonic stem cells, if not human beings themselves. The possible revolutionary role of such stem cells in curative, preventive and enhancement medicine has been voiced and chorused around the globe. However, the question of the moral status of embryonic stem cells has not been clearly and unequivocally answered. Taking inspiration from the African adage that 'the hand that reaches beneath the incubating hen is not guiltless', I attempt answering this question, from the background of traditional African moral sensibility and sensitivity. I reach the following conclusions. Stem cells in themselves do not have human status and therefore lack moral worth/value. Embryos do have human status and a morally significant line cannot be drawn between human embryos and other human beings. What is morally at stake in stem cell research is therefore the question of the source of derivation or generation of the cells, not of the cells as such.     

NO ETHICAL BYPASS OF MORAL STATUS IN STEM CELL RESEARCH

Recent advances in reprogramming technology do not bypass the ethical challenge of embryo sacrifice. Induced pluripotent stem cell (iPS) research has been and almost certainly will continue to be conducted within the context of embryo sacrifice. If human embryos have moral status as human beings, then participation in iPS research renders one morally complicit in their destruction; if human embryos have moral status as mere precursors of human beings, then advocacy of iPS research policy that is inhibited by embryo sacrifice concerns renders one morally complicit in avoidable harms to persons. Steps may be taken to address these complicity concerns, but in the final analysis there is no alternative to achieving clarity with respect to the moral status of the human embryo.     

DEEPER PROBLEMS FOR NOONAN'S PROBABILITY ARGUMENT AGAINST ABORTION: ON A CHARITABLE READING OF NOONAN'S CONCEPTION CRITERION OF HUMANITY

In ‘An Almost Absolute Value in History’ John T. Noonan criticizes several attempts to provide a criterion for when an entity deserves rights. These criteria, he argues are either arbitrary or lead to absurd consequence. Noonan proposes human conception as the criterion of rights, and justifies it by appeal to the sharp shift in probability, at conception, of becoming a being possessed of human reason. Conception, then, is when abortion becomes immoral. The article has an historical and a philosophical goal. The historical goal is to carefully present the probability argument in a charitable manner. The philosophical goal is to offer a unique criticism of Noonan's probability argument against abortion. I argue that, even on a very charitable reading of Noonan's argument for the conception criterion, this criterion is also susceptible to charges of arbitrariness and absurdity. Noonan's claim that probability shifts have anything to do with the moral rights of fetuses cannot be made coherent. I also show that there are problems with Noonan's assumptions about moral rights and the potential to become a being possessed of human reason.     

Do Embryos Have Interests? Why Embryos Are Identical to Future Persons but Not Harmed by Death

Are embryos deserving of moral consideration in our actions? A standard view suggests that embryos are considerable only if they have interests. One argument for embryonic interests contends that embryos are harmed by death because they are deprived of valuable future lives as adult persons. Some have challenged this argument on the grounds that embryos aren’t identical to adults: either due to the potential for embryos to twin or because we do not exist until the fetus develops consciousness. These arguments fail to show that embryos do not have future adult lives. There is a better reason to think that embryos cannot have interests; namely, because they are not capable of having desires. Others have held this view but have not sufficiently justified it. The justification lies in the fact that the capacity for desires is necessary to make sense of the normativity of interests.     

Will cognitive enhancement create post‐persons? The use(lessness) of induction in determining the likelihood of moral status enhancement

The prospect of cognitive enhancement well beyond current human capacities raises worries that the fundamental equality in moral status of human beings could be undermined. Cognitive enhancement might create beings with moral status higher than persons. Yet, there is an expressibility problem of spelling out what the higher threshold in cognitive capacity would be like. Nicholas Agar has put forward the bold claim that we can show by means of inductive reasoning that indefinite cognitive enhancement will probably mark a difference in moral status. The hope is that induction can determine the plausibility of post‐personhood existence in the absence of an account of what the higher status would be like. In this article, we argue that Agar's argument fails and, more generally, that inductive reasoning has little bearing on assessing the likelihood of post‐personhood in the absence of an account of higher status. We conclude that induction cannot bypass the expressibility problem about post‐persons.     

Why current UK legislation on embryo research is immoral. How the argument from lack of qualities and the argument from potentiality have been applied and why they should be rejected

On 22 January 2001, the UK became the first country to approve of embryonic stem cell research by passing the Human Fertilisation (Research Purposes) Regulations 2001, which legislated new research purposes for which early embryos can be used, in addition to those approved by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990. Legal advisory committees, most notably the Chief Medical Officer's Expert Group and the House of Lords' Select Committee, have offered various reasons, which can also be found in the ethics literature, to justify this change. Those examined here are the views that: 1. Early embryos lack relevant qualities (or 'the argument from lack of qualities') and 2. Early embryos only have a potentiality to become humans with moral status (or 'the argument from potentiality'). The validity of these arguments is questioned and a case is made for egalitarian speciesism. Embryos have moral status (used here in the restricted sense of the status possessed by all members of the class of beings which deserve the greatest moral significance in equal measure). They have more value than the value that should be assigned to non-human beings from the start of fertilisation. Current UK legislation on embryo research is immoral.     

Principles of ethical decision making regarding embryonic stem cell research in Germany

The availability of embryonic stem (ES) cells isolated from human blastocysts may open novel avenues for medical treatment of otherwise incurable diseases. Yet the generation of human ES cells requires the destruction of early human embryos. This confronts us with the moral problem of whether it is justifiable to sacrifice human life in order to treat other human life. This article outlines the development of the German debate about research with ES cells and explicates the arguments that are central to that debate with respect to the aims and means of research with ES cells. With regard to the means, the isolation of ES cells from human embryos raises the question of the moral status of the human embryo. A restrictive position acknowledges the human dignity of the embryo in its very early stage of development and claims that the embryo's life must be protected accordingly. In contrast, a gradualist position acknowledges human dignity, and therefore the full level of protection, only when the embryo has reached a certain stage of development. In addition, the intentions behind the generation of human embryos, i.e. exclusively for research purposes, and the mode of generating them, i.e. by nuclear transfer technology, have strong ethical relevance in the German debate. Based on these results, the ethical reasoning underlying the draft of a Stem Cell Act recently passed by the German Parliament is outlined.     

Potentiality and human embryos

Consideration of the potentiality of human embryos to develop characteristics of personhood, such as intellect and will, has figured prominently in arguments against abortion and the use of human embryos for research. In particular, such consideration was the basis for the call of the US President's Council on Bioethics for a moratorium on stem cell research on human embryos. In this paper, I critique the concept of potentiality invoked by the Council and offer an alternative account. In contrast to the Council's view that an embryo's potentiality is determined by definition and is not affected by external conditions that may prevent certain possibilities from ever being realized, I propose an empirically grounded account of potentiality that involves an assessment of the physical and decisional conditions that may restrict an embryo's possibilities. In my view, some human embryos lack the potentiality to become a person that other human embryos have. Assuming for the sake of argument that the potential to become a person gives a being special moral status, it follows that some human embryos lack this status. This argument is then used to support Gene Outka's suggestion that it is morally permissible to experiment on 'spare' frozen embryos that are destined to be destroyed.     

Stemming the Tide of Normalisation: An Expanded Feminist Analysis of the Ethics and Social Impact of Embryonic Stem Cell Research

Feminists have indicated the inadequacies of bioethical debates about human embryonic stem cell research, which have for the most part revolved around concerns about the moral status of the human embryo. Feminists have argued, for instance, that inquiry concerning the ethics and politics of human embryonic stem cell research should consider the relations of social power in which the research is embedded. My argument is that this feminist work on stem cells is itself inadequate, however, insofar as it has not incorporated an analysis of disability into its considerations of the ethical and political issues that surround the phenomena. Thus, I consider claims that disability theorists and anti-disability activists have made about the research. I conclude by indicating that stem cell research must be situated within a cultural matrix that operates in the service of normalisation.     

2PN cell donation in Germany. Or: How the German Embryo Protection (Act) undermines itself

In contrast to embryo donation, the permissibility of 2PN cell donation is highly controversial in Germany. This article is based on there being a legal loophole with respect to 2PN cell donation, which results from an inconsistency within the Embryo Protection Act on the normative status of 2PN cells. Following that thesis, the article argues that, on the basis of the normative criterion totipotency (i.e. the capacity to develop into a born human being), 2PN cells should also be considered human embryos within the meaning of the Act and thereby be protected by that Act in the same way as embryos. However, the normative assumption that 2PN cells should already be endowed with human dignity and the right to life has absurd consequences. Moreover, the consistent continuation of the Embryo Protection Act, as well as of the underlying ethical position or argumentation (i.e. the potentiality argument), leads to the even more absurd consequence of having to place every human somatic cell under the protection of human dignity and the right to life. As totipotency or the developmental potential therefore cannot delimit entities considered worthy of protection (i.e. human embryos) from entities considered not worthy of protection (i.e. 2PN cells, gametes, hESC, hiPSC and human somatic cells), it is not a suitable normative criterion. As a paradigmatic case, 2PN cell donation demonstrates that by retaining this normative criterion the now obsolete German Embryo Protection (Act) ultimately undermines itself.     

"So, what is an embryo?" A comparative study of the views of those asked to donate embryos for hESC research in the UK and Switzerland

The moral status of the human embryo has gained much attention in debates over the acceptability, or otherwise, of human embryonic stem cell research. Far less attention has been paid to the suppliers of those embryos: people who have undergone IVF treatment to produce embryos to assist them to have a baby. It is sociologically and ethically important to understand their views and experiences of being asked to donate embryos for research if we are to fully understand the wider social and regulatory aspects of hESC science. This paper reports on parallel studies investigating these issues in the UK and in Switzerland. The studies reveal the inextricable entangling of the social and moral status of embryos. Since donors participate in different discursive domains and contexts (public, clinic, family) that shape their perception of "what" an embryo is, their views of embryos embody conflicting ideas and ambivalences.     

Challenges to human embryonic stem cell patents

The patenting of human embryonic stem (hES) cells has produced one of the most unusual and fraught situations in the history of science, ethics, and law. This Commentary examines legal and moral challenges to three foundational patents held by the Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation (WARF). We conclude that, in the United States, technical challenges may, paradoxically, produce a stronger patent position for WARF. In the European Union, moral challenges mean confusion for member states. We demonstrate that hES cell intellectual property will be guided and bound by a welter of moral, technical, and legal inputs, with discrete national and jurisdictional dimensions.     

Derivation of stem cells from human embryos: the principled arguments of potential donors and recipients

Evidence is emerging that embryonic stem cells may have the potential to alleviate many debilitating conditions, but opinions remain polarized on the derivation of stem cells from human embryos obtained during in vitro fertilization treatment. The views of scientists, donors and unaffected members of the general public have been sought, but not those of patients likely to benefit. Semi-structured interviews were completed with 15 people living with Parkinson's disease, 15 with type I diabetes, 15 couples living with infertility and 21 members of the general public. In all four groups, religious, cultural and personal beliefs affected perceptions of the moral status of the embryo and the system of regulating science and scientists involved, overriding differences resulting from their status as potential beneficiaries or facilitators. Whether they came to the interview to defend or promote stem cell research, they cited the same four justifications (utilitarian, ecologic, moral duty and eugenic) but varied in their capacity to present a consistent argument.     

Frozen embryos and the obligation to adopt

Rob Lovering has developed an interesting new critique of views that regard embryos as equally valuable as other human beings: the moral argument for frozen human embryo adoption. The argument is aimed at those who believe that the death of a frozen embryo is a very bad thing, and Lovering concludes that some who hold this view ought to prevent one of these deaths by adopting and gestating a frozen embryo. Contra Lovering, we show that there are far more effective strategies for preserving the lives of frozen embryos than adoption. Moreover, we point out that those who regard the deaths of frozen embryos as a very bad thing will generally regard the deaths of all embryos as a very bad thing, whether they are discarded embryos, aborted embryos or embryos that spontaneously abort. This entails that these other embryos must be taken into account when considering moral obligations, as well as other human lives at risk from preventable causes.     

Embryonic potential and stem cells

This paper examines three arguments that use the concept of potential to identify embryos that are morally suitable for embryonic stem cell research (ESCR). According to the first argument, due to Ronald Green, the fact that they are scheduled for disposal makes embryos left over from IVF treatments morally appropriate for research. Paul McHugh argues that embryos created by somatic cell nuclear transfer differ from those that result directly from the meeting of sperm and egg in having potential especially conducive to the therapeutic use of their stem cells. I reject both of these arguments. According to the way of making distinctions in embryonic potential that I defend, it is the absence of a functional relationship with a womb that marks embryos morally suitable for ESCR.