Content,cost, and context: A framework for understanding human signaling systems

Humans frequently perform extravagant and seemingly costly behaviors, such as widely sharing hunted resources, erecting conspicuous monumental structures, and performing dramatic acts of religious devotion. Evolutionary anthropologists and archeologists have used signaling theory to explain the function of such displays, drawing inspiration from behavioral ecology, economics, and the social sciences. While signaling theory is broadly aimed at explaining honest communication, it has come to be strongly associated with the handicap principle, which proposes that such costly extravagance is in fact an adaptation for signal reliability. Most empirical studies of signaling theory have focused on obviously costly acts, and consequently anthropologists have likely overlooked a wide range of signals that also promote reliable communication. Here, we build on recent developments in signaling theory and animal communication, developing an updated framework that highlights the diversity of signal contents, costs, contexts, and reliability mechanisms present within human signaling systems. By broadening the perspective of signaling theory in human systems, we strive to identify promising areas for further empirical and theoretical work.     

Why not lie? Costs enforce honesty in an experimental signalling game

Communication depends on reliability. Yet, the existence of stable honest signalling presents an evolutionary puzzle. Why should animals signal honestly in the face of a conflict of interest? While students of animal signalling have offered several theoretical answers to this puzzle, the most widely studied model, commonly called the ‘handicap principle’, postulates that the costs of signals stabilize honesty. This model is the motivating force behind an enormous research enterprise that explores signal costs—whether they are physiological, immunological, neural, developmental or caloric. While there can be no question that many signals are costly, we lack definitive experimental evidence demonstrating that costs stabilize honesty. This study presents a laboratory signalling game using blue jays (Cyanocitta cristata) that provides, to our knowledge, the first experimental evidence showing honesty persists when costs are high and disappears when costs are low.     

Costly signaling and the handicap principle in hunter‐gatherer research: A critical review

It has been argued that men's hunting in many forager groups is not, primarily, a means of family provisioning but is a costly way of signaling otherwise cryptic qualities related to hunting ability. Much literature concerning the signaling value of hunting draws links to Zahavi's handicap principle and the costly signaling literature in zoology. However, although nominally grounded in the same theoretical paradigm, these literatures have evolved separately. Here I review honest signaling theory in both hunter‐gatherer studies and zoology and highlight three issues with the costly signaling literature in hunter‐gather studies: (a) an overemphasis on the demonstration of realized costs, which are neither necessary nor sufficient to diagnose costly signaling; (b) a lack of clear predictions about what specific qualities hunting actually signals; and (c) an insufficient focus on the broadcast effectiveness of hunting and its value as a heuristics for signal recipients. Rather than signaling hunting prowess, hunting might instead facilitate reputation‐building.     

Some mistakes go unpunished: the evolution of "all or nothing" signalling

Many models of honest signaling, based on Zahavi's handicap principle, predict that if receivers are interested in a quality that shows continuous variation across the population of signalers, then the distribution of signal intensities will also be continuous. However, it has previously been noted that this prediction does not agree with empirical observation in many signaling systems, where signals are limited to a small number of levels despite continuous variation in the trait being signaled. Typically, there is a critical value of the trait, with all individuals with trait values on one side of the threshold using the same cheap signal, and all those with trait values on the other side of the threshold using the same expensive signal. It has already been demonstrated that these classical models naturally predict such "all-or-nothing signaling" if it is additionally assumed that receivers suffer from perceptual error in evaluating signal strength. We show that such all-or-nothing signaling is also predicted if receivers are limited to responding to the signals in one of two ways. We suggest that many ecological situations (such as the decision to attack the signaler or not, or mate with the signaler or not) involve such binary choices.     

TESTING THE QUALITY OF A CARRIER: A FIELD EXPERIMENT ON LIZARD SIGNALERS

In the Australian painted dragon lizard ( Ctenophorus pictus ), males occur in two different morphs with respect to gular color, with or without a yellow bib. Males without a bib lost within-clutch paternity significantly more often to rivals than bibbed males. Thus, it appears that bibs identify some phenotypic advantage linked to competitive ability. To test whether this could be related to whole-organism capacity to withstand an increased workload (due to better health and vigor, or evolved differences in self-maintenance), we implanted males with a lead pellet (loaded), Styrofoam pellet (controls), or sham-operated males without implants (shams), and compared male categories with respect to how they maintained body mass during the mating season. Somewhat unexpectedly, bibbed males consistently lost more body weight across all treatments and controls, although we could not verify that this translated into higher mortality in this short-lived animal (about 80% survive for one year only). However, bibbed males may invest more into "mating success" than nonbibbed males, which agrees with our experimental results and paternity data.     

THE IMPORTANCE OF FEMALE CHOICE,MALE–MALE COMPETITION,AND SIGNAL TRANSMISSION AS CAUSES OF SELECTION ON MALE MATING SIGNALS

Selection on advertisement signals arises from interacting sources including female choice, male–male competition, and the communication channel (i.e., the signaling environment). To identify the contribution of individual sources of selection, we used previously quantified relationships between signal traits and each putative source to predict relationships between signal variation and fitness in Enchenopa binotata treehoppers (Hemiptera: Membracidae). We then measured phenotypic selection on signals and compared predicted and realized relationships between signal traits and mating success. We recorded male signals, then measured lifetime mating success at two population densities in a realistic environment in which sources of selection could interact. We identified which sources best predicted the relationship between signal variation and mating success using a multiple regression approach. All signal traits were under selection in at least one of the two breeding seasons measured, and in some cases selection was variable between years. Female preference was the strongest source of selection shaping male signals. The E. binotata species complex is a model of ecological speciation initiated by host shifts. Signal and preference divergence contribute to behavioral isolation within the complex, and the finding that female mate preferences drive signal evolution suggests that speciation in this group results from both ecological divergence and sexual selection.     

DIFFERENTIAL COSTS OF A SECONDARY SEXUAL CHARACTER: AN EXPERIMENTAL TEST OF THE HANDICAP PRINCIPLE

The evolution of reliable signaling can be explained by the handicap principle, which assumes that (1) the cost of a signal guarantees its reliability, and (2) cheating is prevented because the cost of a unit of display is greater for low-quality than for high-quality individuals. A test of these two assumptions was performed using manipulations of the length of the outermost tail feathers of male barn swallows Hirundo rustica, a trait currently subject to a directional female mate preference. We found that survival decreased with tail elongation and increased with tail shortening of males, supporting the assumption that the secondary sexual character is costly. Naturally long-tailed males were better able to survive with an elongated tail, whereas naturally short-tailed males improved their survival following tail shortening. This observation supports the second assumption of a differential cost of a signal. One mechanism imposing differential costs on sexually signaling barn swallows is foraging. Males with elongated tails captured smaller, less profitable Diptera, whereas males with shortened tails captured large, profitable prey items. The conditions for reliable sexual signaling by the tail ornament of male barn swallows are thus fulfilled.     

The Handicap Principle: how an erroneous hypothesis became a scientific principle

The most widely cited explanation for the evolution of reliable signals is Zahavi's so‐called Handicap Principle, which proposes that signals are honest because they are costly to produce. Here we provide a critical review of the Handicap Principle and its theoretical development. We explain why this idea is erroneous, and how it nevertheless became widely accepted as the leading explanation for honest signalling. In 1975, Zahavi proposed that elaborate secondary sexual characters impose ‘handicaps’ on male survival, not due to inadvertent signalling trade‐offs, but as a mechanism that functions to demonstrate males' genetic quality to potential mates. His handicap hypothesis received many criticisms, and in response, Zahavi clarified his hypothesis and explained that it assumes that signals are wasteful as well as costly, and that they evolve because wastefulness enforces honesty. He proposed that signals evolve under ‘signal selection’, a non‐Darwinian type of selection that favours waste rather than efficiency. He maintained that the handicap hypothesis provides a general principle to explain the evolution of all types of signalling systems, i.e. the Handicap Principle. In 1977, Zahavi proposed a second hypothesis for honest signalling, which received many different labels and interpretations, although it was assumed to be another example of handicap signalling. In 1990, Grafen published models that he claimed vindicated Zahavi's Handicap Principle. His conclusions were widely accepted and the Handicap Principle subsequently became the dominant paradigm for explaining the evolution of honest signalling in the biological and social sciences. Researchers have subsequently focused on testing predications of the Handicap Principle, such as measuring the absolute costs of honest signals (and using energetic and other proximate costs as proxies for fitness), but very few have attempted to test Grafen's models. We show that Grafen's models do not support the handicap hypothesis, although they do support Zahavi's second hypothesis, which proposes that males adjust their investment into the expression of their sexual signals according to their condition and ability to bear the costs (and risks to their survival). Rather than being wasteful over‐investments, honest signals evolve in this scenario because selection favours efficient and optimal investment into signal expression and minimizes signalling costs. This idea is very different from the handicap hypothesis, but it has been widely misinterpreted and equated to the Handicap Principle. Theoretical studies have since shown that signalling costs paid at the equilibrium are neither sufficient nor necessary to maintain signal honesty, and that honesty can evolve through differential benefits, as well as differential costs. There have been increasing criticisms of the Handicap Principle, but they have focused on the limitations of Grafen's model and overlooked the fact that it is not a handicap model. This model is better understood within a Darwinian framework of adaptive signalling trade‐offs, without the added burden and confusing logic of the Handicap Principle. There is no theoretical or empirical support for the Handicap Principle and the time is long overdue to usher this idea into an ‘honorable retirement’.     

Ready to Fight: Reliable Predictors of Attack in a Cooperatively Breeding,Non‐Passerine Bird

Signal reliability is a major focus of animal communication research. Aggressive signals are ideal for measuring signal reliability because the signal referent – attack or no attack – can be measured unambiguously. Signals of aggressive intent occur at elevated rates in aggressive contexts, predict subsequent aggression by the signaler, and elicit appropriate responses from receivers. We tested the ‘predictive criterion’ in smooth‐billed anis, Crotophaga ani, by broadcasting one of two playback types (‘ahnee’ calls only or ‘ahnee + hoot’ calls), presenting a taxidermic mount, and observing the animals’ behavior. Based on the hypotheses that ‘hoot’ calls and ‘throat‐inflation’ displays signal aggressive intent, we predicted that they would be associated with attack, and that signaling rate would increase over the time period leading up to an attack. Indeed, both hoots and throat‐inflation displays reliably predicted attack. The second prediction, that signaling rate increases in the time leading up to attack, was strongly supported for throat‐inflation displays, which increased over the pre‐attack period in both treatments. Hoots increased over the pre‐attack period in ahnee playbacks but not in ahnee + hoot playbacks. Hierarchical signaling systems are characterized by early, less‐reliable predictors of attack, and later, more reliable predictors of attack. During both natural and simulated interactions, the more‐reliable throat‐inflation display tended to precede the less‐reliable hoot call, suggesting that this signaling system is not hierarchical. In a comparison of 11 putative signals of aggressive intent in birds, the throat‐inflation display had the second highest mutual information (reduction in uncertainty) among visual signals and non‐passerine signals while hoots had below‐average mutual information. Natural observations indicate that both hoots and throat‐inflation displays occur in the context of aggressive between‐group encounters, and hoots also occur during within‐group interactions. Throat‐inflation displays appear to be reliable indicators of aggressive intent, but the function of hoot calls is less clear.     

A review of shark agonistic displays: comparison of display features and implications for shark-human interactions

Agonistic displays in 23 species of sharks of six families are described and illustrated. These displays are reviewed in terms of ethological concepts and shark hydrodynamic models. Shark agonistic displays feature many common elements rendering them readily distinguishable from normal swimming and pseudodisplays caused by sharksucker irritation. Shark agonistic displays are most readily elicited by rapid, direct diver approach when food is absent and potential escape routes restricted. Such displays appear to be motivated by defence of self or the immediately surrounding space rather than defence of territory or resources. Costs and benefits of display versus attack in shark-shark and shark-diver contests are evaluated using payoff matrices and optimal strategies are identified. Shark-human interactions are modelled in terms of a system of nested critical approach distances. For divers faced with a displaying shark, responses which may decrease the likelihood of defensive attack are suggested. Recommendations for future work on shark agonistic behaviour are offered.     

INVESTIGATING EVOLUTIONARY TRADE‐OFFS IN WILD POPULATIONS OF ATLANTIC SALMON (SALMO SALAR): INCORPORATING DETECTION PROBABILITIES AND INDIVIDUAL HETEROGENEITY

Evolutionary trade‐offs among demographic parameters are important determinants of life‐history evolution. Investigating such trade‐offs under natural conditions has been limited by inappropriate analytical methods that fail to address the bias in demographic estimates that can result when issues of detection (uncertain detection of individual) are ignored. We propose a new statistical approach to quantify evolutionary trade‐offs in wild populations. Our method is based on a state‐space modeling framework that focuses on both the demographic process of interest as well as the observation process. As a case study, we used individual mark–recapture data for stream‐dwelling Atlantic salmon juveniles in the Scorff River (Southern Brittany, France). In freshwater, juveniles face two life‐history choices: migration to the ocean and sexual maturation (for males). Trade‐offs may appear with these life‐history choices and survival, because all are energy dependent. We found a cost of reproduction on survival for fish staying in freshwater and a survival advantage associated with the “decision” to migrate. Our modeling framework opens up promising prospects for the study of evolutionary trade‐offs when some life‐history traits are not, or only partially, observable.