Two kinds of physician‐assisted death

I argue that the concept ‘physician‐assisted suicide’ covers two procedures that should be distinguished: giving someone access to humane means to end his own life, and taking co‐responsibility for the safe and effective execution of that plan. In the first section I explain the distinction, in the following sections I show why it is important. To begin with I argue that we should expect the laws that permit these two kinds of ‘assistance’ to be different in their justificatory structure. Laws that permit giving access only presuppose that the right to self‐determination implies a right to suicide, but laws that permit doctors to take co‐responsibility may have to appeal to a principle of mercy or beneficence. Actually this difference in justificatory structure can to some extent be found in existing regulatory systems, though far from consistently. Finally I argue that if one recognizes a right to suicide, as Oregon and other American states implicitly do, and as the European Court of Human Rights has recently done explicitly, one is committed to permit the first kind of ‘assistance’ under some conditions.     

Valuing Lives and Allocating Resources: A Defense of the Modified Youngest First Principle of Scarce Resource Distribution

In this paper, I argue that the ‘modified youngest first’ principle provides a morally appropriate criterion for making decisions regarding the distribution of scarce medical resources, and that it is morally preferable to the simple ‘youngest first’ principle. Based on the complete lives system's goal of maximizing complete lives rather than individual life episodes, I argue that essential to the value we see in complete lives is the first person value attributed by the experiencer of that life. For a life to be ‘complete’ or ‘incomplete,’ the subject of that life must be able to understand the concept of a complete life, to have started goals and projects, and to know what it would be for that life to be complete. As the very young are not able to do this, it can reasonably be said that their characteristically human lives have not yet begun, giving those accepting a complete lives approach good reason to accept the modified youngest first principle over a simple ‘youngest first’ approach.     

湖泊富营养化治理: 集中控磷, 或氮磷皆控?

关于湖泊富营养化的治理, 有充足的全生态系统实验和湖泊治理实践表明, 只控磷(P)就可使湖泊贫营养化。但也有不少人认为需要氮(N)和P皆控。由于N和P皆控的成本可达只控P的4—15倍, 故确定富营养化治理是否必须既控P又控N是一个重大而现实的科学问题。针对这个问题, 文章对所有相关观点及其证据的科学性进行了系统辨析。首先, 系统总结了关于富营养化营养驱动与控制的研究历史。其次, 对判定营养控制的主要依据——限制因子的概念发展及判定方法进行了全面回顾与分析, 明确指出该概念的目的是确定促进生物生长的因子。第三, 介绍了新概念——减控因子, 其定义是: 在生态系统管理中, 能够抑制生物个体、种群和群落过度繁盛的必需环境因子, 或直接减灭生物本身的物理(机械)、化学和生物因子, 且成本效益最大。随后, 举例说明了确定减控因子的五个步骤, 即必需性、可控性、可行性、成本分析及实验和应用验证, 证明非限制因子也可成为减控因子, 而限制因子不一定是减控因子。第四, 基于减控因子分析, 指出湖泊富营养化的减控因子是P; 进而, 总结了加拿大和中国的全生态系统实验及大量湖泊治理实践的系统证据。这些充分证明: 仅控P就可控制富营养化, 而减N无助于控制浮游藻类总量, 反而会诱导固氮蓝藻大量生长。第五, 对控N观点的逻辑和实验依据逐一批驳, 指出这些争论或将限制因子混同于减控因子, 或缺乏大尺度的实验证据。第六, 系统辨析了高N的生态效应, 初步确定: 只有总氮和氨氮>5 mg/L时, N才对水生植物等有一定的负面影响且可促进沉积物P的释放。建议先把地表水Ⅰ—Ⅴ类的总氮和氨氮标准限值均放宽至2 mg/L, 后逐步放宽至5 mg/L左右。最后, 指出富营养化治理必须采取系统对策, 以修复物理、化学、水文和生物完整性。在维护湖盆物理完整性的基础上, 最根本的措施是控制外源P负荷总量; 若内源P负荷较大, 则可采取钝化等方法。次之, 应开展水位调控, 以修复水生植被, 实现浊-清稳态转换。综上所述, 湖泊富营养化治理应采取“放宽控N、集中控P的策略”, 以大幅度降低治理成本。     

Nile perch and the transformation of Lake Victoria

The transformation of Lake Victoria that began in 1980 followed the population explosion of Nile perch Lates niloticus, causing the apparent extirpation of 500+ endemic haplochromine species and dramatic physico-chemical changes. Officially introduced in 1962–1963, but present earlier, the reasons for the long delay before its population exploded are discussed. The hypothesis that it occurred only after the haplochromine decline is evaluated, but haplochromines declined only after the Nile perch expansion began. The sudden eutrophication of the lake was attributed to Nile perch, but evidence of eutrophication from 1950 onwards led some researchers to conclude that it was the result of climatic changes. We conclude that the haplochromine destruction disrupted the complex food webs that existed prior to the upsurge of Nile perch. The depletion of fish biomass by Nile perch may have been the source of extra phosphorus responsible for the eutrophication of the lake. After the Nile perch explosion in 1980 the fish population came to be dominated by only three species, but fisheries productivity increased at least 10-fold. Fishing has caused demographic changes in Nile perch, which may have allowed some haplochromine species to recover. The condition of the lake appears to have stabilised since 2000, partly because the fish biomass has risen to at least 2 × 10⁶ t, replacing the ‘lost’ biomass and restoring some ecosystem functioning.     

Are species sets?

I construe the question ‘Are species sets?’ as a question about whether species can be conceived of as sets, as the term ‘set’ is understood by contemporary logicians. The question is distinct from the question ‘Are species classes?’: The conception of classes invoked by Hull and others differs from the logician's conception of a set. I argue that species can be conceived of as sets, insofar as one could identify a set with any given species and that identification would satisfy three desiderata: the set would be a set of organisms, the identification would be apposite, and the identification would permit the formulation of statements about species in set-theoretic terms. One cannot, however, identify a species with any given set. Understanding the claim that species are sets in this way enables one to understand better the dispute between some who accept the claim (e.g., Kitcher 1984, 1987) and some who apparently reject it (e.g., Mayr 1987).     

Ambiguities and Asymmetries in Consent and Refusal: Reply to Manson

John Harris claims that is it ‘palpable nonsense’ to suggest that ‘a child (or anyone) might competently consent to a treatment but not be competent to refuse it.’ In ‘Transitional Paternalism: How Shared Normative Powers Give Rise to the Asymmetry of Adolescent Consent and Refusal’ Neil Manson aims to explain away the apparent oddness of this asymmetry of consent and refusal, by appealing to the idea of shared normative powers, presenting joint bank accounts as an example. In this article, I will argue that Manson's account fails to explain away the oddness. Rather, I will argue that there are ambiguities to which Manson has not paid sufficient attention. In fact, as odd as it may sound, I argue that Manson actually agrees with Harris (at least in relation to the asymmetry of competence). He fails to recognize that he agrees with Harris because he is not careful enough to distinguish between different asymmetries, which I have labelled the asymmetries of choice, permissibility and competence.     

Centennial‐scale changes to the aquatic vegetation structure of a shallow eutrophic lake and implications for restoration

1. We investigate long‐term (>200 years) changes to the composition and spatial structure of macrophyte communities in a shallow, eutrophic lake (Barton Broad, eastern England) and consider the implications for lake restoration. 2. Historical macrophyte data were assembled from a variety of sources: existing plant databases, museum herbaria, journal articles, old photographs and eyewitness accounts. Additionally, two types of sediment core sample were analysed for plant macro‐remains and pollen; bulk basal samples from multiple core sites analysed to provide information on ‘pre‐disturbance’ macrophyte communities and two whole cores analysed to determine historical change. 3. Prior to the late 1800s, macrophyte communities were diverse and included a multilayered mosaic of short‐stature submerged taxa and taller submerged and floating‐leaved species. With the progression of eutrophication after around 1900, the former community was displaced by the latter. Diversity was maintained, however, since an encroaching Schoenoplectus–nymphaeid swamp generated extensive patches of low‐energy habitat affording refugia for several macrophytes otherwise unable to withstand the hydraulic forces associated with open water conditions. When this swamp vegetation disappeared in the 1950s, many of the ‘dependent’ aquatic macrophytes also declined leaving behind a sparse, species‐poor community (as today) resilient to both eutrophication and turbulent open waters. 4. The combination of historical and palaeolimnological data sources offers considerable benefits for reconstructing past changes to the aquatic vegetation of lakes and for setting restoration goals. In this respect, our study suggests that successful restoration might often be better judged by reinstatement of the characteristic structure of plant communities than the fine detail of species lists; when nutrients are low and the structure is right, the right species will follow.     

A critique of the principle of ‘respect for autonomy’, grounded in African thought

I give an account how the principle of ‘respect for autonomy’ dominates the field of bioethics, and how it came to triumph over its competitors, ‘respect for persons’ and ‘respect for free power of choice’. I argue that ‘respect for autonomy’ is unsatisfactory as a basic principle of bioethics because it is grounded in too individualistic a worldview, citing concerns of African theorists and other communitarians who claim that the principle fails to acknowledge the fundamental importance of understanding persons within the nexus of their communal relationships. I defend the claim that ‘respect for persons’ is a more appropriate principle, as it is able to acknowledge both individual decision making and the essential relationality of persons. I acknowledge that my preference for ‘respect for persons’ is problematic because of the important debate around the definition of ‘personhood’ in bioethics discourse. Relying on Thaddeus Metz's conception of moral status, I propose a relational definition of personhood that distinguishes between persons with agency and persons without agency, arguing that we have different moral obligations to these distinct categories of persons. I claim that this conception of personhood is better able to accommodate our moral intuitions than conventional approaches, and that it is able to do so without being speciesist or question‐begging.     

Against ‘Saving Lives’: Equal Concern and Differential Impact

Bioethicists often present ‘saving lives’ as a goal distinct from, and competing with, that of extending lives by as much as possible. I argue that this usage of the term is misleading, and provides unwarranted rhetorical support for neglecting the magnitudes of the harms and benefits at stake in medical allocation decisions, often to the detriment of the young. Equal concern for all persons requires weighting equal interests equally, but not all individuals have an equal interest in ‘life‐saving’ treatment.     

The duplicity of diversity: Caribbean immigrants in Denmark

‘Diversity’ has become a key term in recent years, yet it has been criticized for being a vague concept with different and contradictory meanings. This article demonstrates that there are at least three inherent meanings of the term: (1) discerned difference attributed with positive or negative value; (2) diverting diversity providing pleasure and amusement; and (3) distracting diversity directing attention from something of greater importance. I argue that the concept of diversity can be a fruitful focus in ethnographic research, if its inherent multiplex and duplicitous character is recognized and actively employed. This is shown through an analysis of the ways in which immigrants from the English-speaking Caribbean to Denmark have been perceived and received as foreigners since the 1960s as representing different kinds of diversity.     

Human Rights Reasoning and Medical Law: A Sceptical Essay

I am sceptical as to the contribution that human rights can make to our evaluation of medical law. I will argue here that viewing medical law through a human rights framework provides no greater clarity, insight or focus. If anything, human rights reasoning clouds any bioethical or evaluative analysis. In Section 1 of this article, I outline the general structure of human rights reasoning. I will describe human rights reasoning as (a) reasoning from rights that each person has ‘by virtue of their humanity’, (b) reasoning from rights that provide ‘hard to defeat’ reasons for action and (c) reasoning from abstract norms to specified duties. I will then argue in Section 2 that, unless we (a) re‐conceive of human rights as narrow categories of liberties, it becomes (b) necessary for our human rights reasoning to gauge the normative force of each claim or liberty. When we apply this approach to disputes in medical law, we (in the best case scenario) end up (c) ‘looking straight through’ the human right to the (disagreement about) values and features that each person has by virtue of their humanity.     

A pluralist challenge to “integrative medicine”: Feyerabend and Popper on the cognitive value of alternative medicine

This paper is a critique of ‘integrative medicine’ as an ideal of medical progress on the grounds that it fails to realise the cognitive value of alternative medicine. After a brief account of the cognitive value of alternative medicine, I outline the form of ‘integrative medicine’ defended by the late Stephen Straus, former director of the US National Centre for Complementary and Alternative Medicine. Straus’ account is then considered in the light of Zuzana Parusnikova’s recent criticism of ‘integrative medicine’ and her distinction between ‘cognitive’ and ‘opportunistic’ engagement with alternative medicine. Parusnikova warns that the medical establishment is guilty of ‘dogmatism’ and proposes that one can usefully invoke Karl Popper’s ‘critical rationalism’ as an antidote. Using the example of Straus, I argue that an appeal to Popper is insufficient, on the grounds that ‘integrative medicine’ can class as a form of cognitively-productive, critical engagement. I suggest that Parusnikova’s appeal to Popper should be augmented with Paul Feyerabend’s emphasis upon the role of ‘radical alternatives’ in maximising criticism. ‘Integrative medicine’ fails to maximise criticism because it ‘translates’ alternative medicine into the theories and terminology of allopathic medicine and so erodes its capacity to provide cognitively-valuable ‘radical alternatives’. These claims are then illustrated with a discussion of ‘traditional’ and ‘medical’ acupuncture. I conclude that ‘integrative medicine’ fails to exploit the cognitive value of alternative medicine and so should be rejected as an ideal of medical progress.     

Catching the pulse: money and circulation in a Sri Lankan marketplace

This article traces the movement, management, and generation of money in a Sri Lankan wholesale vegetable market, pulling into focus certain local economic and moral logics. What traders do with cash is revealing. I argue that how traders use money – the way it is handled, risked, spent, and lent – exhibits skill, implies hierarchy, and cultivates social connections. Exploring idioms of economic activity such as ‘catching the pulse’ and ‘rolling the money’, the article examines relations between different kinds of trader. Moving money through businesses permits participation in the complex communication network of the market. This is central to existing in the social world of the trader. I argue that following money notes – rather than commodities – as they travel around the marketplace and between the hands of transactors renders ethnographically observable the formations of personhood and long‐term relations that take place in the market.     

Should ‘wetlands’ cover all aquatic ecosystems and do macrophytes make a difference to their ecosystem services?

The Ramsar Convention has gradually expanded the scope of the term ‘wetland’ to bring under its umbrella all kinds of inland freshwater (and saline) ecosystems as well as many marine ecosystems. It is not possible to develop a common framework for the study, management or policy of such a large and divergent assemblage of habitats with water being a single shared feature. In this paper, I argue that wetlands are distinct from deep open water systems such as rivers, lakes and reservoirs. The restriction of macrophytes (except the free floating plants like salvinia and water hyacinth) to shallow water habitats helps distinguish between wetlands and deep water systems. Following an ecosystem service approach, I discuss that wetlands are generally characterized by the occurrence of macrophytes, which critically contribute to their provisioning, regulating, supporting and cultural ecosystem services that differ significantly from those of the microphyte (phytoplankton)-dominated deep water habitats. I argue that wetlands do lie adjacent to deep and open water systems (including large rivers), which interact with them regularly and influence their biodiversity, hydrology, water quality and functioning, depending upon their relative areal extent and characteristics of the macrophyte community, but that only the littoral zones between the mean highest and lowest water levels (and stream banks and the floodplains beyond them in the case of rivers) should be treated as wetlands. Shallow lakes devoid of macrophytes because of eutrophication are degraded wetlands that need to be restored.     

Revolución o muerte: Self-Sacrifice and the Ontology of Cuban Revolution

With reference to the experience of the Cuban Revolution, this article addresses what may be called the ‘late revolutionary paradox’: How can so many people in countries such as Cuba continue to pledge visceral allegiance to their revolution while at the same time expressing deep disaffection with it? My main claim is that the paradox is a product of an undue analytical emphasis on the ideological content of revolutionary discourse, with its mantra-like evocations of ‘process’, ‘change’, ‘emancipation’ and other discursive projections into the future. Seen from the point of view of its form as a socio-political event, I argue, revolution turns on a deeper premise, namely the commitment to self-sacrifice, i.e. the assumption that revolutionary subjects are defined by their potential death in defence of the revolution. The premise of self-sacrifice, I argue, lends revolutionary politics a peculiar ontological foundation that makes it radically different to, broadly, ‘liberal’ understandings of politics. This difference, I show, dissolves the putative ‘paradox’ of later revolutionary societies such as Cuba, allowing revolutionary subjects to sustain a sense of revolutionary conviction in the face of the many historical contingencies that would seem otherwise to make such enduring convictions increasingly difficult to sustain.     

Everyone Will Be Jealous For That Mutika

In this paper I describe a phenomenon I refer to by its Aboriginal English name — ‘humbugging’ — in a western Arnhem Land Aboriginal settlement. By discussing the focal object in this phenomenon — the ‘mutika’ (car)¹ — I argue that a most interesting process of de-commoditization is occurring in this settlement. I use examples of humbugging to illustrate how the car in this community has tremendous symbolic as well as practical significance. I use. in particular, the work of Douglas and Isherwood (1979) and Appadurai et al. (1986), and argue that their ‘social life of things’ theoretical framework is appropriate for interpreting the importance of the ‘mutika’. I also suggest, however, that this framework needs to be re-thought in order to incorporate the challenge which de-commoditization presents to it.     

Clear,crashing, turbid and back – long‐term changes in macrophyte assemblages in a shallow lake

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Combining limnological and palaeolimnological data to disentangle the effects of nutrient pollution and climate change on lake ecosystems: problems and potential

1. As long‐term observational lake records continue to lengthen, the historical overlap with lake sediment records grows, providing increasing opportunities for placing the contemporary ecological status of lakes in a temporal perspective. 2. Comparisons between long‐term data sets and sediment records, however, require lake sediments to be accurately dated and for sediment accumulation rates to be sufficiently rapid to allow precise matching with observational data. 3. The critical role of the sediment record in this context is its value in tracking the changing impact of human activity on a lake from a pre‐disturbance reference through to the present day. 4. Here, we use data from a range of lakes across Europe presented as case studies in this Special Section. The seven sites considered all possess both long‐term observational records and high‐quality sediment records. Our objective is to assess whether recent climate change is having an impact on their trophic status and in particular whether that impact can be disentangled from the changes associated with nutrient pollution. 5. The palaeo‐data show clear evidence for the beginning of nutrient pollution varying from the mid‐nineteenth century at Loch Leven to the early and middle twentieth century at other sites. The monitoring data show different degrees of recovery when judged against the palaeo‐reference. 6. The reason for limited recovery is attributed to continuing high nutrient concentrations related to an increase in diffuse nutrient loading or to internal P recycling, but there is some evidence that climate change may be playing a role in offsetting recovery at some sites. If this is the case, then lake ecosystems suffering from eutrophication may not necessarily return to their pre‐eutrophication reference status despite the measures that have been taken to reduce external nutrient loading. 7. The extent to which future warming might further limit such recovery can be evaluated only by continued monitoring combined with the use of palaeo‐records that set the pre‐eutrophication reference.     

Flexible kinship: shaping transnational families among the Chinese in Tahiti

This article examines the practices of ‘flexible kinship’ used by Chinese migrants in colonial Tahiti. ‘Flexible kinship’ draws attention to the strategic uses that are made of kinship in the context of migration and diaspora: the adjustments to cultural, political, and legal borders that lead to changes in family forms and in the relations between kin. Using a multi‐generational perspective, I examine how families were shaped by successive changes and reversals in legal‐political and economic events and conjunctures over the long twentieth century. I argue for the importance of addressing transnational border‐crossing practices that involve not just a spatial extension of networks but also legal strategies within the host locality. I further show that if it is true that the Confucian hierarchical order has conditioned transnational practices of flexible kinship, then this hierarchy has not only bent to the circumstances, it has to a great extent been weakened. Finally, I argue that the history of familial adjustments has shaped a habitus that maximizes economic and legal security, especially among women.     

Equivocal locations: being ‘red’ in ‘Red Bologna’

This article addresses a classic ethnographic problem in the study of Italy: how is it that people can subscribe simultaneously to seemingly contradictory ideologies, such as Catholicism and Communism? It does so by describing examples from Italy's ‘showcase city’ of the left, ‘Red Bologna’, in which to be ‘red’ is ubiquitous but each person's ‘red’ is a different thing: being ‘red’ (differently) is the idiom in which real political distinctions are expressed over issues like religion or immigration. In parallel, I discuss the relationship between the ‘field’ as a location and the ‘field’ as a conceptual topic. My account replicates internal ethnographic differences at the analytical level by highlighting the differences between being left‐wing in Bologna and its meaning as a concept in anthropology. Hence the ‘equivocal location’: a field‐site that is productively different, from what an inexperienced ethnographer expected from it, from conceptual discussions in anthropology, and from itself.