Led into Temptation? Rewarding Brand Logos Bias the Neural Encoding of Incidental Economic Decisions

Human decision-making is driven by subjective values assigned to alternative choice options. These valuations are based on reward cues. It is unknown, however, whether complex reward cues, such as brand logos, may bias the neural encoding of subjective value in unrelated decisions. In this functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study, we subliminally presented brand logos preceding intertemporal choices. We demonstrated that priming biased participants' preferences towards more immediate rewards in the subsequent temporal discounting task. This was associated with modulations of the neural encoding of subjective values of choice options in a network of brain regions, including but not restricted to medial prefrontal cortex. Our findings demonstrate the general susceptibility of the human decision making system to apparently incidental contextual information. We conclude that the brain incorporates seemingly unrelated value information that modifies decision making outside the decision-maker's awareness.     

Economic principles motivating social attention in humans

We know little about the processes by which we evaluate the opportunity to look at another person. We propose that behavioural economics provides a powerful approach to understanding this basic aspect of social attention. We hypothesized that the decision process culminating in attention to another person follows the same economic principles that govern choices about rewards such as food, drinks and money. Specifically, such rewards are discounted as a function of time, are tradable for other rewards, and reinforce work. Behavioural and neurobiological evidence suggests that looking at other people can also be described as rewarding, but to what extent these economic principles apply to social orienting remains unknown. Here, we show that the opportunity to view pictures of the opposite sex is discounted by delay to viewing, substitutes for money and reinforces work. The reward value of photos of the opposite sex varied with physical attractiveness and was greater in men, suggesting differential utility of acquiring visual information about the opposite sex in men and women. Together, these results demonstrate that choosing whom to look at follows a general set of economic principles, implicating shared neural mechanisms in both social and non-social decision making.     

Competing demands of prosociality and equity in monkeys

Prosocial decisions may lead to unequal payoffs among group members. Although an aversion to inequity has been found in empirical studies of both human and nonhuman primates, the contexts previously studied typically do not involve a trade-off between prosociality and inequity. Here we investigate the apparent coexistence of these two factors, specifically the competing demands of prosociality and equity. We directly compare the responses of brown capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) among situations where prosocial preferences conflict with equality, using a paradigm comparable to other studies of cooperation and inequity in this species. By choosing to pull a tray towards themselves, subjects rewarded themselves and/or another in conditions in which the partner either received the same or different rewards, or the subject received no reward. In unequal payoff conditions, subjects could obtain equality by choosing not to pull in the tray, so that neither individual was rewarded. The monkeys showed prosocial preferences even in situations of moderate disadvantageous inequity, preferring to pull in the tray more often when a partner was present than absent. However, when the discrepancy between rewards increased, prosocial behavior ceased.     

Social Influences on Inequity Aversion in Children

Adults and children are willing to sacrifice personal gain to avoid both disadvantageous and advantageous inequity. These two forms of inequity aversion follow different developmental trajectories, with disadvantageous inequity aversion emerging around 4 years and advantageous inequity aversion emerging around 8 years. Although inequity aversion is assumed to be specific to situations where resources are distributed among individuals, the role of social context has not been tested in children. Here, we investigated the influence of two aspects of social context on inequity aversion in 4- to 9-year-old children: (1) the role of the experimenter distributing rewards and (2) the presence of a peer with whom rewards could be shared. Experiment 1 showed that children rejected inequity at the same rate, regardless of whether the experimenter had control over reward allocations. This indicates that children’s decisions are based upon reward allocations between themselves and a peer and are not attempts to elicit more favorable distributions from the experimenter. Experiment 2 compared rejections of unequal reward allocations in children interacting with or without a peer partner. When faced with a disadvantageous distribution, children frequently rejected a smaller reward when a larger reward was visible, even if no partner would obtain the larger reward. This suggests that nonsocial factors partly explain disadvantageous inequity rejections. However, rejections of disadvantageous distributions were higher when the larger amount would go to a peer, indicating that social context enhances disadvantageous inequity aversion. By contrast, children rejected advantageous distributions almost exclusively in the social context. Therefore, advantageous inequity aversion appears to be genuinely social, highlighting its potential relevance for the development of fairness concerns. By comparing social and nonsocial factors, this study provides a detailed picture of the expression of inequity aversion in human ontogeny and raises questions about the function and evolution of inequity aversion in humans.     

Individual Differences and Decision Making: When the Lure Effect of Gain Is a Matter of Size

The Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) is widely used in investigations of decision making. A growing number of studies have linked performance on this task to personality differences, with the aim of explaining the large degree of variability in healthy individuals'' performance of the task. However, this line of research has yielded inconsistent results. In the present study, we tested whether increasing the conflict between short-term and long-term gains in the IGT can clarify personality-related modulations of decision making. We assessed performance on the original IGT as a function of the personality traits typically involved in risky decision making (i.e., impulsivity, sensation seeking, sensitivity to reward and punishment). The impact of these same personality traits was also evaluated on a modified version of the task in which the difference in immediate reward magnitude between disadvantageous and advantageous decks was increased, while keeping the net gain fixed. The results showed that only in this latter IGT variant were highly impulsive individuals and high sensation seekers lured into making disadvantageous choices. The opposite seems to be the case for participants who were highly sensitive to punishment, although further data are needed to corroborate this finding. The present preliminary results suggest that the IGT variant used in this study could be more effective than the original task at identifying personality effects in decision making. Implications for dispositional and situational effects on decision making are discussed.     

Time Devours Things: How Impulsivity and Time Affect Temporal Decisions in Pathological Gamblers

Impulsivity is associated with several psychiatric disorders in which the loss of control of a specific behavior determines the syndrome itself. One particularly interesting population characterized by reported high impulsivity and problematic decision-making are those diagnosed with pathological gambling. However the association between impulsivity and decision making in pathological gambling has been only partially confirmed until now. We tested 23 normal controls and 23 diagnosed pathological gamblers in an intertemporal choice task, as well as other personality trait measurements. Results showed that gamblers scored higher on impulsivity questionnaires, and selected a higher percentage of impatient choices (higher percentage of smaller, sooner rewards), when compared to normal controls. Moreover, gamblers were faster in terms of reaction times at selecting the smaller, sooner options and discounted rewards more rapidly over time. Importantly, regression analyses clarified that self-reported measures of impulsivity played a significant role in biasing decisions towards small but more rapidly available rewards. In the present study we found evidence for impulsivity in personality traits and decisions in pathological gamblers relative to controls. We conclude by speculating on the need to incorporate impulsivity and decision biases in the conceptualization of pathological gambling for a better understanding and treatment of this pathology.     

Attending to the outcome of others: disadvantageous inequity aversion in male capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella)

Brosnan and de Waal [Nature 425:297-299, 2003] reported that capuchin monkeys responded negatively to unequal reward distributions between themselves and another individual when comparing their own rewards with that of their partner. It was suggested that social emotions provided the underlying motivation for such behavior and that this inequity aversion is specific to the social domain. However, alternative hypotheses such as the "frustration effect" or the "food expectation hypothesis" may provide more parsimonious explanations for Brosnan and de Waal's [Nature 425:297-299] results, while others have argued that these findings are not congruent with the Fehr-Schmidt inequity aversion model cited by the authors. The claim that inequity aversion behavior is specific to the social domain has also been questioned, as primates also develop expectations about rewards in the absence of partners, and react negatively when those expectations are violated. In this study, a modified Dictator game was used to investigate whether capuchins would exhibit either disadvantageous inequity aversion behavior or reference-dependent expectancy violation in social and nonsocial conditions, respectively. When given the choice between an equitable and an inequitable outcome, the subjects showed disadvantageous inequity aversion behavior, choosing the equitable outcome significantly more in the social condition. In the nonsocial condition, however, subjects did not show negative expectancy violation resulting from the formation of reference-dependent expectations, choosing the equitable outcome at chance levels. These results suggest that capuchins attend to differential payoffs and that they are averse to inequity, which is disadvantageous to themselves.     

Theory of Choice in Bandit,Information Sampling and Foraging Tasks

Decision making has been studied with a wide array of tasks. Here we examine the theoretical structure of bandit, information sampling and foraging tasks. These tasks move beyond tasks where the choice in the current trial does not affect future expected rewards. We have modeled these tasks using Markov decision processes (MDPs). MDPs provide a general framework for modeling tasks in which decisions affect the information on which future choices will be made. Under the assumption that agents are maximizing expected rewards, MDPs provide normative solutions. We find that all three classes of tasks pose choices among actions which trade-off immediate and future expected rewards. The tasks drive these trade-offs in unique ways, however. For bandit and information sampling tasks, increasing uncertainty or the time horizon shifts value to actions that pay-off in the future. Correspondingly, decreasing uncertainty increases the relative value of actions that pay-off immediately. For foraging tasks the time-horizon plays the dominant role, as choices do not affect future uncertainty in these tasks.     

What Do I Want and When Do I Want It: Brain Correlates of Decisions Made for Self and Other

A number of recent functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) studies on intertemporal choice behavior have demonstrated that so-called emotion- and reward-related brain areas are preferentially activated by decisions involving immediately available (but smaller) rewards as compared to (larger) delayed rewards. This pattern of activation was not seen, however, when intertemporal choices were made for another (unknown) individual, which speaks to that activation having been triggered by self-relatedness. In the present fMRI study, we investigated the brain correlates of individuals who passively observed intertemporal choices being made either for themselves or for an unknown person. We found higher activation within the ventral striatum, medial prefrontal and orbitofrontal cortex, pregenual anterior cingulate cortex, and posterior cingulate cortex when an immediate reward was possible for the observer herself, which is in line with findings from studies in which individuals actively chose immediately available rewards. Additionally, activation in the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex, posterior cingulate cortex, and precuneus was higher for choices that included immediate options than for choices that offered only delayed options, irrespective of who was to be the beneficiary. These results indicate that (1) the activations found in active intertemporal decision making are also present when the same decisions are merely observed, thus supporting the assumption that a robust brain network is engaged in immediate gratification; and (2) with immediate rewards, certain brain areas are activated irrespective of whether the observer or another person is the beneficiary of a decision, suggesting that immediacy plays a more general role for neural activation. An explorative analysis of participants’ brain activation corresponding to chosen rewards, further indicates that activation in the aforementioned brain areas depends on the mere presence, availability, or actual reception of immediate rewards.     

Fixation patterns in simple choice reflect optimal information sampling

Simple choices (e.g., eating an apple vs. an orange) are made by integrating noisy evidence that is sampled over time and influenced by visual attention; as a result, fluctuations in visual attention can affect choices. But what determines what is fixated and when? To address this question, we model the decision process for simple choice as an information sampling problem, and approximate the optimal sampling policy. We find that it is optimal to sample from options whose value estimates are both high and uncertain. Furthermore, the optimal policy provides a reasonable account of fixations and choices in binary and trinary simple choice, as well as the differences between the two cases. Overall, the results show that the fixation process during simple choice is influenced dynamically by the value estimates computed during the decision process, in a manner consistent with optimal information sampling.     

Always Gamble on an Empty Stomach: Hunger Is Associated with Advantageous Decision Making

Three experimental studies examined the counterintuitive hypothesis that hunger improves strategic decision making, arguing that people in a hot state are better able to make favorable decisions involving uncertain outcomes. Studies 1 and 2 demonstrated that participants with more hunger or greater appetite made more advantageous choices in the Iowa Gambling Task compared to sated participants or participants with a smaller appetite. Study 3 revealed that hungry participants were better able to appreciate future big rewards in a delay discounting task; and that, in spite of their perception of increased rewarding value of both food and monetary objects, hungry participants were not more inclined to take risks to get the object of their desire. Together, these studies for the first time provide evidence that hot states improve decision making under uncertain conditions, challenging the conventional conception of the detrimental role of impulsivity in decision making.     

Evidence for social role in a dolphin social network

Social animals have to take into consideration the behaviour of conspecifics when making decisions to go by their daily lives. These decisions affect their fitness and there is therefore an evolutionary pressure to try making the right choices. In many instances individuals will make their own choices and the behaviour of the group will be a democratic integration of everyone’s decision. However, in some instances it can be advantageous to follow the choice of a few individuals in the group if they have more information regarding the situation that has arisen. Here I provide early evidence that decisions about shifts in activity states in a population of bottlenose dolphin follow such a decision-making process. This unshared consensus is mediated by a non-vocal signal, which can be communicated globally within the dolphin school. These signals are emitted by individuals that tend to have more information about the behaviour of potential competitors because of their position in the social network. I hypothesise that this decision-making process emerged from the social structure of the population and the need to maintain mixed-sex schools.     

Explicit neural signals reflecting reward uncertainty

The acknowledged importance of uncertainty in economic decision making has stimulated the search for neural signals that could influence learning and inform decision mechanisms. Current views distinguish two forms of uncertainty, namely risk and ambiguity, depending on whether the probability distributions of outcomes are known or unknown. Behavioural neurophysiological studies on dopamine neurons revealed a risk signal, which covaried with the standard deviation or variance of the magnitude of juice rewards and occurred separately from reward value coding. Human imaging studies identified similarly distinct risk signals for monetary rewards in the striatum and orbitofrontal cortex (OFC), thus fulfilling a requirement for the mean variance approach of economic decision theory. The orbitofrontal risk signal covaried with individual risk attitudes, possibly explaining individual differences in risk perception and risky decision making. Ambiguous gambles with incomplete probabilistic information induced stronger brain signals than risky gambles in OFC and amygdala, suggesting that the brain's reward system signals the partial lack of information. The brain can use the uncertainty signals to assess the uncertainty of rewards, influence learning, modulate the value of uncertain rewards and make appropriate behavioural choices between only partly known options.     

Potential vulnerabilities of neuronal reward, risk, and decision mechanisms to addictive drugs

How do addictive drugs hijack the brain's reward system? This review speculates how normal, physiological reward processes may be affected by addictive drugs. Addictive drugs affect acute responses and plasticity in dopamine neurons and postsynaptic structures. These effects reduce reward discrimination, increase the effects of reward prediction error signals, and enhance neuronal responses to reward-predicting stimuli, which may contribute to compulsion. Addictive drugs steepen neuronal temporal reward discounting and create temporal myopia that impairs the control of drug taking. Tonically enhanced dopamine levels may disturb working memory mechanisms necessary for assessing background rewards and thus may generate inaccurate neuronal reward predictions. Drug-induced working memory deficits may impair neuronal risk signaling, promote risky behaviors, and facilitate preaddictive drug use. Malfunctioning adaptive reward coding may lead to overvaluation of drug rewards. Many of these malfunctions may result in inadequate neuronal decision mechanisms and lead to choices biased toward drug rewards.     

Behavioral and physiological response to inequity in bonobos (Pan paniscus)

Inequity aversion (IA), the affective, cognitive, and behavioral response to inequitable outcomes, allows individuals to avoid exploitation and therefore stabilizes cooperation. The presence of IA varies across animal species, which has stimulated research to investigate factors that might explain this variation, and to investigate underlying affective responses. Among great apes, IA is most often studied in chimpanzees. Here, we investigate IA in bonobos, a reputedly tolerant and cooperative species for which few IA studies are available. We describe how bonobos respond to receiving less preferred rewards than a partner in a token exchange task. We show that bonobos respond to receiving less preferred rewards by refusing tokens and rewards, and by leaving the experimental area. Bonobos never refused a trial when receiving preferred rewards, and thus showed no advantageous IA. We also investigate the variability in the disadvantageous IA response on a dyadic level, because the level of IA is expected to vary, depending on characteristics of the dyad. Like in humans and chimpanzees, we show that the tolerance towards inequity was higher in bonobo dyads with more valuable relationships. To study the affective component of IA, we included behavioral and physiological measures of arousal: a displacement behavior (rough self-scratching) and changes in salivary cortisol levels. Both measures of arousal showed large variability, and while analyses on rough self-scratching showed no significant effects, salivary cortisol levels seemed to be lower in subjects that received less than their partner, but higher in subjects that received more than their partner, albeit that both were not significantly different from the equity condition. This suggests that although overcompensated bonobos showed no behavioral response, they might be more aroused. Our data support the cooperation hypothesis on an interspecific and intraspecific level. They show inequity aversion in bonobos, a reputedly cooperative species, and suggest that the variability in IA in bonobos can be explained by their socioecology. Most successful cooperative interactions happen between mothers and their sons and among closely bonded females. The limited need to monitor the partners' investment within these dyads can result in a higher tolerance towards inequity. We therefore suggest future studies to consider relevant socioecological characteristics of the species when designing and analyzing IA studies.     

Dynamic integration of reward and stimulus information in perceptual decision-making

In perceptual decision-making, ideal decision-makers should bias their choices toward alternatives associated with larger rewards, and the extent of the bias should decrease as stimulus sensitivity increases. When responses must be made at different times after stimulus onset, stimulus sensitivity grows with time from zero to a final asymptotic level. Are decision makers able to produce responses that are more biased if they are made soon after stimulus onset, but less biased if they are made after more evidence has been accumulated? If so, how close to optimal can they come in doing this, and how might their performance be achieved mechanistically? We report an experiment in which the payoff for each alternative is indicated before stimulus onset. Processing time is controlled by a “go” cue occurring at different times post stimulus onset, requiring a response within msec. Reward bias does start high when processing time is short and decreases as sensitivity increases, leveling off at a non-zero value. However, the degree of bias is sub-optimal for shorter processing times. We present a mechanistic account of participants'' performance within the framework of the leaky competing accumulator model [1], in which accumulators for each alternative accumulate noisy information subject to leakage and mutual inhibition. The leveling off of accuracy is attributed to mutual inhibition between the accumulators, allowing the accumulator that gathers the most evidence early in a trial to suppress the alternative. Three ways reward might affect decision making in this framework are considered. One of the three, in which reward affects the starting point of the evidence accumulation process, is consistent with the qualitative pattern of the observed reward bias effect, while the other two are not. Incorporating this assumption into the leaky competing accumulator model, we are able to provide close quantitative fits to individual participant data.     

Decisions reduce sensitivity to subsequent information

Behavioural studies over half a century indicate that making categorical choices alters beliefs about the state of the world. People seem biased to confirm previous choices, and to suppress contradicting information. These choice-dependent biases imply a fundamental bound of human rationality. However, it remains unclear whether these effects extend to lower level decisions, and only little is known about the computational mechanisms underlying them. Building on the framework of sequential-sampling models of decision-making, we developed novel psychophysical protocols that enable us to dissect quantitatively how choices affect the way decision-makers accumulate additional noisy evidence. We find robust choice-induced biases in the accumulation of abstract numerical (experiment 1) and low-level perceptual (experiment 2) evidence. These biases deteriorate estimations of the mean value of the numerical sequence (experiment 1) and reduce the likelihood to revise decisions (experiment 2). Computational modelling reveals that choices trigger a reduction of sensitivity to subsequent evidence via multiplicative gain modulation, rather than shifting the decision variable towards the chosen alternative in an additive fashion. Our results thus show that categorical choices alter the evidence accumulation mechanism itself, rather than just its outcome, rendering the decision-maker less sensitive to new information.     

Neural Correlates of Advantageous and Disadvantageous Inequity in Sharing Decisions

Humans have a strong preference for fair distributions of resources. Neuroimaging studies have shown that being treated unfairly coincides with activation in brain regions involved in signaling conflict and negative affect. Less is known about neural responses involved in violating a fairness norm ourselves. Here, we investigated the neural patterns associated with inequity, where participants were asked to choose between an equal split of money and an unequal split that could either maximize their own (advantageous inequity) or another person’s (disadvantageous inequity) earnings. Choosing to divide money unequally, irrespective who benefited from the unequal distribution, was associated with activity in the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex, anterior insula and the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. Inequity choices that maximized another person’s profits were further associated with activity in the ventral striatum and ventromedial prefrontal cortex. Taken together, our findings show evidence of a common neural pattern associated with both advantageous and disadvantageous inequity in sharing decisions and additional recruitment of neural circuitry previously linked to the computation of subjective value and reward when violating a fairness norm at the benefit of someone else.     

Neural Correlates of Successful and Unsuccessful Strategical Mechanisms Involved in Uncertain Decision-Making

The ability to develop successful long-term strategies in uncertain situations relies on complex neural mechanisms. Although lesion studies have shown some of the mechanisms involved, it is still unknown why some healthy subjects are able to make the right decision whereas others are not. The aim of our study was to investigate neurophysiological differences underlying this ability to develop a successful strategy in a group of healthy subjects playing a monetary card game called the Iowa Gambling Task (IGT). In this task, subjects have to win and earn money by choosing between four decks of cards, two were advantageous in the long term and two disadvantageous. Twenty healthy right-handed subjects performed the IGT while their cerebral activity was recorded by electroencephalography. Based on their behavioral performances, two groups of subjects could clearly be distinguished: one who selected the good decks and thus succeeded in developing a Favorable strategy (9 subjects) and one who remained Undecided (11 subjects). No neural difference was found between each group before the selection of a deck, but in both groups a greater negativity was found emerging from the right superior frontal gyrus 600 ms before a disadvantageous selection. During the processing of the feedback, an attenuation of the P200 and P300 waveforms was found for the Undecided group, and a P300 originating from the medial frontal gyrus was found in response to a loss only in the Favorable group. Our results suggest that undecided subjects are hyposensitive to the valence of the cards during gambling, which affects the feedback processing.