Against homeopathy--a utilitarian perspective

I examine the positive and negative features of homeopathy from an ethical perspective. I consider: (a) several potentially beneficial features of homeopathy, including non-invasiveness, cost-effectiveness, holism, placebo benefits and agent autonomy; and (b) several potentially negative features of homeopathy, including failure to seek effective healthcare, wastage of resources, promulgation of false beliefs and a weakening of commitment to scientific medicine. A utilitarian analysis of the utilities and disutilities leads to the conclusion that homeopathy is ethically unacceptable and ought to be actively rejected by healthcare professionals.     

Explicit Mentalizing Mechanisms and Their Adaptive Role in Memory Conformity

Memory conformity occurs when an individual endorses what other individuals remember about past events. Research on memory conformity is currently dominated by a ‘forensic’ perspective, which views the phenomenon as inherently undesirable. This is because conformity not only distorts the accuracy of an individual''s memory, but also produces false corroboration between individuals, effects that act to undermine criminal justice systems. There is growing awareness, however, that memory conformity may be interpreted more generally as an adaptive social behavior regulated by explicit mentalizing mechanisms. Here, we provide novel evidence in support of this emerging alternative theoretical perspective. We carried out a memory conformity experiment which revealed that explicit belief-simulation (i.e. using one''s own beliefs to model what other people believe) systematically biases conformity towards like-minded individuals, even when there is no objective evidence that they have a more accurate memory than dissimilar individuals. We suggest that this bias is functional, i.e. adaptive, to the extent that it fosters trust, and hence cooperation, between in-group versus out-group individuals. We conclude that memory conformity is, in more fundamental terms, a highly desirable product of explicit mentalizing mechanisms that promote adaptive forms of social learning and cooperation.     

The evolutionary origins of tensed language and belief

I outline the debate in metaphysics between those who believe time is tensed and those who believe it is tenseless. I describe the terms in which this debate has been carried out, and the significance to it of ordinary tensed language and widespread common sense beliefs that time is tensed. I then outline a case for thinking that our intuitive beliefs about tense constitute an Adaptive Imaginary Representation (Wilson, in Biol Philos 5:37–62, 1990; Wilson, in Biol Philos 10:77–97, 1995). I also outline a case for thinking that our ordinary tensed beliefs and tensed language owe their tensed nature to its being adaptive to adopt a temporally self-locating perspective on reality. If these conclusions are right, then common sense intuitions and temporal language will be utterly misleading guides to the nature of temporal reality.     

On Reciprocal Causation in the Evolutionary Process

Recent calls for a revision of standard evolutionary theory (SET) are based partly on arguments about the reciprocal causation. Reciprocal causation means that cause–effect relationships are bi-directional, as a cause could later become an effect and vice versa. Such dynamic cause-effect relationships raise questions about the distinction between proximate and ultimate causes, as originally formulated by Ernst Mayr. They have also motivated some biologists and philosophers to argue for an Extended Evolutionary Synthesis (EES). The EES will supposedly expand the scope of the Modern Synthesis (MS) and SET, which has been characterized as gene-centred, relying primarily on natural selection and largely neglecting reciprocal causation. Here, I critically examine these claims, with a special focus on the last conjecture. I conclude that reciprocal causation has long been recognized as important by naturalists, ecologists and evolutionary biologists working in the in the MS tradition, although it it could be explored even further. Numerous empirical examples of reciprocal causation in the form of positive and negative feedback are now well known from both natural and laboratory systems. Reciprocal causation have also been explicitly incorporated in mathematical models of coevolutionary arms races, frequency-dependent selection, eco-evolutionary dynamics and sexual selection. Such dynamic feedback were already recognized by Richard Levins and Richard Lewontin in their bok The Dialectical Biologist. Reciprocal causation and dynamic feedback might also be one of the few contributions of dialectical thinking and Marxist philosophy in evolutionary theory. I discuss some promising empirical and analytical tools to study reciprocal causation and the implications for the EES. Finally, I briefly discuss how quantitative genetics can be adapated to studies of reciprocal causation, constructive inheritance and phenotypic plasticity and suggest that the flexibility of this approach might have been underestimated by critics of contemporary evolutionary biology.     

Objectivity and Illusion in Evolutionary Ethics: Comments on Waller

In this paper I argue that any adequate evolutionary ethical theory needs to account for moral belief as well as for dispositions to behave altruistically. It also needs to be clear whether it is offering us an account of the motivating reasons behind human behaviour or whether it is giving justifying reasons for a particular set of behaviours or, if both, to distinguish them clearly. I also argue that, unless there are some objective moral truths, the evolutionary ethicist cannot offer justifying reasons for a set of behaviours. I use these points to refute Waller's claims that the illusion of objectivity plays a dispensable role in Ruse's theory, that my critique of Ruse's Darwinian metaethics is built on a false dilemma, that there is nothing to be distressed about if morality is not objective, and that ethical beliefs are subject to a kind of causal explanation that undermines their objectivity in a way that scientific beliefs are not.     

A computable expression of closure to efficient causation

In this paper, we propose a mathematical expression of closure to efficient causation in terms of λ-calculus; we argue that this opens up the perspective of developing principled computer simulations of systems closed to efficient causation in an appropriate programming language. An important implication of our formulation is that, by exhibiting an expression in λ-calculus, which is a paradigmatic formalism for computability and programming, we show that there are no conceptual or principled problems in realizing a computer simulation or model of closure to efficient causation. We conclude with a brief discussion of the question whether closure to efficient causation captures all relevant properties of living systems. We suggest that it might not be the case, and that more complex definitions could indeed create crucial some obstacles to computability.     

Fork-tailed drongos use deceptive mimicked alarm calls to steal food

Despite the prevalence of vocal mimicry in animals, few functions for this behaviour have been shown. I propose a novel hypothesis that false mimicked alarm calls could be used deceptively to scare other species and steal their food. Studies have previously suggested that animals use their own species-specific alarm calls to steal food. However none have shown conclusively that these false alarms are deceptive, or that mimicked alarm calls are used in this manner. Here, I show that wild fork-tailed drongos (Dicrurus adsimilis) make both drongo-specific and mimicked false alarm calls when watching target species handling food, in response to which targets flee to cover abandoning their food. The drongo-specific and mimicked calls made in false alarms were structurally indistinguishable from calls made during true alarms at predators by drongos and other species. Furthermore, I demonstrate by playback experiments that two of these species, meerkats (Suricata suricatta) and pied babblers (Turdoides bicolor), are deceived by both drongo-specific and mimicked false alarm calls. These results provide the first conclusive evidence that false alarm calls are deceptive and demonstrate a novel function for vocal mimicry. This work also provides valuable insight into the benefits of deploying variable mimetic signals in deceptive communication.     

Measuring and modeling dispersal of adult zooplankton

Habitat fragmentation poses an inherent problem for metacommunity dynamics, as dispersal among communities is hindered by increasing isolation and the loss of patches. Wetlands are one such system that have undergone excessive destruction and fragmentation in recent years. Zooplankton within these communities have historically been considered frequent and widespread dispersers, but direct, quantitative measures of zooplankton dispersal are rare. In this study, I performed two experiments to quantify zooplankton dispersal and to identify the primary dispersal vectors. I first set up an array of traps at 10, 30, 60, 120 and 180 m around an isolated pond to collect dispersing individuals. Nearly 1,500 adult zooplankton were captured in traps up to 180 m from the pond, with approximately 60% of dispersers being captured in traps at 10 m from the pond. A second experiment using open and animal-excluded traps suggested that large animals were the primary dispersal vector for these zooplankton. Using a subset of these data, I fit four models to describe the shape and magnitude of adult cladoceran dispersal at this site. All models showed the majority of cladocerans were deposited very close to the source pond, with three models suggesting that the trapping area encompassed 67% or more of the dispersal distances. These results suggest that adult zooplankton movement among ponds may be significant in areas where aquatic habitats are plentiful. Yet, in recent years climate change and anthropogenic disturbances have reduced the number and size of aquatic habitats in many regions of the world, likely curtailing effective transport of individuals in many cases. As a result, fragmented zooplankton metacommunities may experience increased dispersal limitation, stronger priority effects, higher levels of inbreeding and selection against traits engendering high dispersability. Electronic supplementary material The online version of this article (doi:) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.     

Taking the ‘Error’ Out of Ruse‘s Error Theory

Michael Ruses Darwinian metaethics has come under just criticism from Peter Woolcock (1993). But with modification it remains defensible. Ruse (1986) holds that people ordinarily have a false belief that there are objective moral obligations. He argues that the evolutionary story should be taken as an error theory, i.e., as a theory which explains the belief that there are obligations as arising from non-rational causes, rather than from inference or evidential reasons. Woolcock quite rightly objects that this position entails moral nihilism. However, I argue here that people generally have justified true beliefs about which acts promote their most coherent set of moral values, and hence, by definition, about which acts are right. What the evolutionary story explains is the existence of these values, but it is not an error theory for moral beliefs. Ordinary beliefs correspond to real moral properties, though these are not objective or absolute properties independent of anyones subjective states. On its best footing, therefore, a Darwinian metaethics of the type Ruse offers is not an error theory and does not entail moral nihilism.     

Tropical ant communities are in long-term equilibrium

Communities change with time. Studying long-term change in community structure permits deeper understanding of community dynamics, and allows us to forecast community responses to perturbations at local (e.g. fire, secondary succession) and global (e.g. desertification, global warming) spatial scales. Monitoring efforts exploring the temporal dynamics of indicator taxa are therefore a critical part of conservation agendas. Here, the temporal dynamics of the Otongachi leaf litter ant community, occurring in a cloud forest in coastal Ecuador, were explored. By sampling this community six times over eleven years, I assessed how the ant fauna caught by Winkler traps (more diverse and cryptic fauna) and caught by pitfall traps (larger, more mobile fauna) changed over time. The Otongachi leaf litter ant community was dynamic. Although species richness in the community remained constant, temporal turnover of species was high: on average, 51% of the ant species in Winkler traps, and 56% of those in pitfall traps, were replaced with other ant species from one year to the other. Shifts in the rank abundance of species in the community were also large across the eleven years and, on average, shifts in the rank abundance of species collected by Winkler traps doubled those occurring in pitfall traps from one census to the other. In spite of these trends, the Otongachi ant fauna showed no (Winkler) or weak (pitfall) evidence of directional change (towards a new community). Thus, this tropical ant community can be divided in two community compartments. The Winkler compartment composed by a more diverse and cryptic ant fauna appears to be resilient and stable in time. The pitfall compartment composed by larger and more mobile ants may be prone to respond to disturbance. This study suggests that 1) species appearing/disappearing from a site may be rather the rule, difficult to separate from responses to ecological stress. 2) Conclusions made in short-term studies, or studies comparing two (e.g. before and after) snapshots of a community, should thus be revisited. Finally, 3) the ant fauna caught by pitfall traps (a rather simple and cheap survey method) is the most likely community compartment to indicate ecological perturbation. This study adds to the growing evidence that using ants as ecological indicators should incorporate long-term temporal dynamics.     

A comparison of camera trap and permanent recording video camera efficiency in wildlife underpasses

In the current context of biodiversity loss through habitat fragmentation, the effectiveness of wildlife crossings, installed at great expense as compensatory measures, is of vital importance for ecological and socio‐economic actors. The evaluation of these structures is directly impacted by the efficiency of monitoring tools (camera traps…), which are used to assess the effectiveness of these crossings by observing the animals that use them. The aim of this study was to quantify the efficiency of camera traps in a wildlife crossing evaluation. Six permanent recording video systems sharing the same field of view as six Reconyx HC600 camera traps installed in three wildlife underpasses were used to assess the exact proportion of missed events (event being the presence of an animal within the field of view), and the error rate concerning underpass crossing behavior (defined as either Entry or Refusal). A sequence of photographs was triggered by either animals (true trigger) or artefacts (false trigger). We quantified the number of false triggers that had actually been caused by animals that were not visible on the images (“false” false triggers). Camera traps failed to record 43.6% of small mammal events (voles, mice, shrews, etc.) and 17% of medium‐sized mammal events. The type of crossing behavior (Entry or Refusal) was incorrectly assessed in 40.1% of events, with a higher error rate for entries than for refusals. Among the 3.8% of false triggers, 85% of them were “false” false triggers. This study indicates a global underestimation of the effectiveness of wildlife crossings for small mammals. Means to improve the efficiency are discussed.     

Omissions, Causation, and Responsibility

In this paper I discuss a recent exchange of articles between Hugh McLachlan and John Coggon on the relationship between omissions, causation, and moral responsibility. My aim is to contribute to their debate by isolating a presupposition I believe they both share and by questioning that presupposition. The presupposition is that, at any given moment, there are countless things that I am omitting to do. This leads both McLachlan and Coggon to give a distorted account of the relationship between causation and moral or (as the case may be) legal responsibility and, in the case of Coggon, to claim that the law??s conception of causation is a fiction based on policy. Once it is seen that this presupposition is faulty, we can attain a more accurate view of the logical relationship between causation and moral responsibility in the case of omissions. This is important because it will enable us, in turn, to understand why the law continues to regard omissions as different, both logically and morally, from acts, and why the law seeks to track that logical and moral difference in the legal distinction it draws between withholding life-sustaining measures and euthanasia.     

Making sense of downward causation in manipulationism: illustrations from cancer research

Many researchers consider cancer to have molecular causes, namely mutated genes that result in abnormal cell proliferation (e.g. Weinberg 1998). For others, the causes of cancer are to be found not at the molecular level but at the tissue level where carcinogenesis consists of disrupted tissue organization with downward causation effects on cells and cellular components (e.g. Sonnenschein and Soto 2008). In this contribution, I ponder how to make sense of such downward causation claims. Adopting a manipulationist account of causation (Woodward 2003), I propose a formal definition of downward causation and discuss further requirements (in light of Baumgartner 2009). I then show that such an account cannot be mobilized in support of non-reductive physicalism (contrary to Raatikainen 2010). However, I also argue that such downward causation claims might point at particularly interesting dynamic properties of causal relationships that might prove salient in characterizing causal relationships (following Woodward 2010).     

The neural basis of hallucinations and delusions

Schizophrenia is a biologically based disorder characterised by false perceptions (hallucinations) and false beliefs (delusions). The underlying physiological cause of these mental abnormalities remains unknown. There is increasing evidence that one class of symptom, the 'made experiences' including delusions of alien control and thought insertion, is associated with abnormalities in the mechanism that predicts the outcome of intended actions (the forward model). For these patients active movements feel like passive movements. As a result these patients do not feel in control of their actions. However, comparison with various neurological disorders, such as those associated with parietal lobe lesions, suggest that this abnormal experience is not sufficient to explain the feeling that some other agent is controlling is one's actions. Preliminary evidence suggests that patients with schizophrenia have an exaggerated sense of agency. In combination with the feeling of not being in control, this exaggerated sense of agency could explain delusions of alien control in which the patient attributes his own actions to another agent. Little is yet know about the neural basis of the predictive mechanisms that create the feeling that we are in control of our movements. Such prediction requires integration of information about intended movements generated in frontal cortex with sensory processing in posterior regions of the brain. Measures of functional connectivity suggest that long-range interactions between frontal and posterior regions are abnormally reduced in patients with schizophrenia. Further research is needed to explore the precise involvement of long-range connections in the mechanisms of forward modelling.     

Teaching critical thinking in a developmental biology course at an American liberal arts college

We all expect our students to learn facts and concepts, but more importantly, we want them to learn how to evaluate new information from an educated and skeptical perspective; that is, we want them to become critical thinkers. For many of us who are scientists and teachers, critical thought is either intuitive or we learned it so long ago that it is not at all obvious how to pass on the skills to our students. Explicitly discussing the logic that underlies the experimental basis of developmental biology is an easy and very successful way to teach critical thinking skills. Here, I describe some simple changes to a lecture course that turn the practice of critical thinking into the centerpiece of the learning process. My starting point is the "Evidence and Antibodies" sidelight in Gilbert's Developmental Biology (2000), which I use as an introduction to the ideas of correlation, necessity and sufficiency, and to the kinds of experiments required to gather each type of evidence: observation ("show it"), loss of function ("block it") and gain of function ("move it"). Thereafter, every experiment can be understood quickly by the class and discussed intelligently with a common vocabulary. Both verbal and written reinforcement of these ideas dramatically improve the students' ability to evaluate new information. In particular, they are able to evaluate claims about cause and effect; they become experts at distinguishing between correlation and causation. Because the intellectual techniques are so powerful and the logic so satisfying, the students come to view the critical assessment of knowledge as a fun puzzle and the rigorous thinking behind formulating a question as an exciting challenge.     

WHAT DOES RESPECT FOR THE PATIENT'S AUTONOMY REQUIRE?

Personal autonomy presupposes the notion of rationality. What is not so clear is whether, and how, a compromise of rationality to various degrees will diminish a person's autonomy. In bioethical literature, three major types of threat to the rationality of a patient's medical decision are identified: insufficient information, irrational beliefs/desires, and influence of different framing effects. To overcome the first problem, it is suggested that patients be provided with information about their diseases and treatment choices according to the objective standard. I shall explain how this should be finessed. Regarding the negative impact of irrational beliefs/desires, some philosophers have argued that holding irrational beliefs can still be an expression of autonomy. I reject this argument because the degree of autonomy of a decision depends on the degree of rationality of the beliefs or desires on which the decision is based. Hence, to promote patient autonomy, we need to eliminate irrational beliefs by the provision of evidence and good arguments. Finally, I argue that the way to smooth out the framing effects is to present the same information in different perspectives: it is too often assumed that medical information can always be given in a complete and unadorned manner. This article concludes with a cautionary note that the protection of patient autonomy requires much more time and effort than the current practice usually allows.     

Selecting "significant" differentially expressed genes from the combined perspective of the null and the alternative.

In the search for genes associated with disease, statistical analysis yields a key towards reproducible results. To avoid a plethora of type I errors, classical gene selection procedures strike a balance between magnitude and precision of observed effects in terms of p-values. Protecting false discovery rates recovers some power but still ranks genes according to classical p-values. In contrast, we propose a selection procedure driven by the concern to detect well-specified important alternatives. By summarizing evidence from the perspective of both the null and such an alternative hypothesis, genes line up in a substantially different order with different genes yielding powerful signals. A cutoff point for a measure of relative evidence which balances the standard p-value, p0, with its counterpart, p1, derived from the perspective of the target alternative, determines our gene selection. We find the cutoff point that maximizes an expected specific gain. This yields an optimal decision which exploits gene-specific variances and thus involves different type I and type II errors across genes. We show the dramatic impact of this alternative perspective on the detection of differentially expressed genes in hereditary breast cancer. Our analysis does not rely on parametric assumptions on the data.     

Microhabitat Selection by Antlion Larvae, Myrmeleon Crudelis: Effect of Soil Particle Size on Pit-Trap Design and Prey Capture

Selective pressure for choosing an adequate habitat should be strong in semisedentary animals because they have limited mobility once established. I examined microhabitat preferences and the adaptive value of these preferences in the antlion larva Myrmeloen crudelis, a semisedentary insect that digs pit traps in soils to capture small arthropods. I tested the habitat preferences of M. crudelis between two soil types in a tropical dry forest of Costa Rica. Specifically, I compared the soil particle composition size within and outside antlion aggregations and manipulated the availability of fine- and coarse-grained soil to assess how differences in soil grain size affect the design and performance of larval traps. Adjacent to antlion pits the soil was composed of a greater proportion of fine-grained particles (2 mm) than soil 1 m away from the pits. A set of experiments demonstrated that (1) in the presence of equal availability of fine- and coarse-grained soils, all larvae built their pits in fine-grained soil; (2) the larvae required less time to start and finish traps in fine-grained soil; (3) the larvae constructed larger and deeper pits in fine-grained soil; and (4) prey capture increased greatly in fine-grained traps compared with coarse-grained traps. Antlion larvae respond to variations in the proportion of fine particles in the soil, suggesting that antlion aggregations result from an active microhabitat selection. The preference for fine-grained soils is adaptive since pits constructed in such substrate are functional for longer periods and much more successful in trapping prey than pits in coarse-grained soil. Sit-and-wait predators that use sessile traps are spatially constrained to track prey abundance. Therefore, the ability to detect and select microhabitats with better conditions that enhance capture success may be under strong selection for this type of organism.