Mutual benefit cooperation and ethnic cultural diversity

We show that mutual benefit cooperation can favor the evolution of a preference to interact with individuals that are similar to themselves with respect to one or several arbitrary cultural tags. One necessary requisite to obtain this result is an asymmetry between partners in such a way that one of them (actor) proposes the cooperation and elects the partner, whereas the other (receiver) never rejects the offer because cooperation always reports benefits. The advantage of individuals possessing allele for preferential assortment is due to receiving more offers of mutually beneficial cooperation when there is linkage disequilibrium between the assortment locus and the cultural tags. An especially favorable scenario for the evolution of such preference is a subdivided metapopulation. In this case, the homogeneity within populations and the divergence between populations is favored, facilitating the existence of ethnic groups.     

To be or not to be a good social partner?

Cooperation based in mutual benefit provides a perfect scenario to start selfish behaviors aimed to obtain greater benefit at the expense of the partner. Here we investigate if mutual benefit cooperation can be stable between individuals that cooperate with kindness (good partners) or if they will be displaced by other individuals that try to obtain more benefit with less cost (bad partners). Our model assumes an asymmetry between partners in such a way that one of them (actor) proposes the cooperation whereas the other (receiver) always accepts the offer. It also assumes that actors can choose the partner on the basis of their past experiences with the potential partners. With the help of a simple two-locus mathematical model we show that not only the gene that conditions the actor preference to choose good partners can increase in frequency but also the gene responsible of the good partner behavior.     

Charitable giving as a signal of trustworthiness: Disentangling the signaling benefits of altruistic acts

It has been shown that psychological predispositions to benefit others can motivate human cooperation and the evolution of such social preferences can be explained with kin or multi-level selection models. It has also been shown that cooperation can evolve as a costly signal of an unobservable quality that makes a person more attractive with regard to other types of social interactions. Here we show that if a proportion of individuals with social preferences is maintained in the population through kin or multi-level selection, cooperative acts that are truly altruistic can be a costly signal of social preferences and make altruistic individuals more trustworthy interaction partners in social exchange. In a computerized laboratory experiment, we test whether altruistic behavior in the form of charitable giving is indeed correlated with trustworthiness and whether a charitable donation increases the observing agents' trust in the donor. Our results support these hypotheses and show that, apart from trust, responses to altruistic acts can have a rewarding or outcome-equalizing purpose. Our findings corroborate that the signaling benefits of altruistic acts that accrue in social exchange can ease the conditions for the evolution of social preferences.     

Evolution of indirect reciprocity by social information: the role of trust and reputation in evolution of altruism

The complexity of human's cooperative behavior cannot be fully explained by theories of kin selection and group selection. If reciprocal altruism is to provide an explanation for altruistic behavior, it would have to depart from direct reciprocity, which requires dyads of individuals to interact repeatedly. For indirect reciprocity to rationalize cooperation among genetically unrelated or even culturally dissimilar individuals, information about the reputation of individuals must be assessed and propagated in a population. Here, we propose a new framework for the evolution of indirect reciprocity by social information: information selectively retrieved from and propagated through dynamically evolving networks of friends and acquaintances. We show that for indirect reciprocity to be evolutionarily stable, the differential probability of trusting and helping a reputable individual over a disreputable individual, at a point in time, must exceed the cost-to-benefit ratio of the altruistic act. In other words, the benefit received by the trustworthy must out-weigh the cost of helping the untrustworthy.     

Participation costs can suppress the evolution of upstream reciprocity

Indirect reciprocity, one of the many mechanisms proposed to explain the evolution of cooperation, is the idea that altruistic actions can be rewarded by third parties. Upstream or generalized reciprocity is one type of indirect reciprocity in which individuals help someone if they have been helped by somebody else in the past. Although empirically found to be at work in humans, the evolution of upstream reciprocity is difficult to explain from a theoretical point of view. A recent model of upstream reciprocity, first proposed by Nowak and Roch (2007) and further analyzed by Iwagami and Masuda (2010), shows that while upstream reciprocity alone does not lead to the evolution of cooperation, it can act in tandem with mechanisms such as network reciprocity and increase the total level of cooperativity in the population. We argue, however, that Nowak and Roch's model systematically leads to non-uniform interaction rates, where more cooperative individuals take part in more games than less cooperative ones. As a result, the critical benefit-to-cost ratios derived under this model in previous studies are not invariant with respect to the addition of participation costs. We show that accounting for these costs can hinder and even suppress the evolution of upstream reciprocity, both for populations with non-random encounters and graph-structured populations.     

Not only states but traits — Humans can identify permanent altruistic dispositions in 20 s

Humans behave altruistically in one-shot interactions under total anonymity. In search of explanations for such behavior, it has been argued that at least some individuals have a general tendency to behave altruistically independent of profitability. In fact, a stable altruistic trait would be adaptive if it were recognizable. Then, altruists could choose each other in order to retain benefits through mutual cooperation. Previous research has shown that individuals can predict the degree of altruistic behavior of strangers by reading signs of emotions evoked in significant social decisions. However, the identification of benevolent emotional states is no guarantee of the existence of permanent altruistic traits, though permanent traits are the preferable criterion for selection of good interaction partners. In this study, we tested whether individuals are able to identify altruistic traits. Judges watched 20-s silent video clips of unacquainted target persons and were asked to estimate the behavior of these target persons in a money-sharing task. As the videotapes of the target persons had been recorded in a setting unrelated to altruistic behavior, the judges could not base their estimates on situational cues related to the money-sharing task but instead had to draw on stable signals of altruism. Estimates were significantly better than chance, indicating that individuals can identify permanent altruistic traits in others. As this mechanism raises opportunities for selective interactions between altruists, our findings are discussed with respect to their relevance for explaining the evolution of altruism through assortment.     

Population viscosity can promote the evolution of altruistic sterile helpers and eusociality

Because it increases relatedness between interacting individuals, population viscosity has been proposed to favour the evolution of altruistic helping. However, because it increases local competition between relatives, population viscosity may also act as a brake for the evolution of helping behaviours. In simple models, the kin selected fecundity benefits of helping are exactly cancelled out by the cost of increased competition between relatives when helping occurs after dispersal. This result has lead to the widespread view, especially among people working with social organisms, that special conditions are required for the evolution of altruism. Here, we re-examine this result by constructing a simple population genetic model where we analyse whether the evolution of a sterile worker caste (i.e. an extreme case of altruism) can be selected for by limited dispersal. We show that a sterile worker caste can be selected for even under the simplest life-cycle assumptions. This has relevant consequences for our understanding of the evolution of altruism in social organisms, as many social insects are characterized by limited dispersal and significant genetic population structure.     

Partner choice creates competitive altruism in humans

Reciprocal altruism has been the backbone of research on the evolution of altruistic behaviour towards non-kin, but recent research has begun to apply costly signalling theory to this problem. In addition to signalling resources or abilities, public generosity could function as a costly signal of cooperative intent, benefiting altruists in terms of (i) better access to cooperative relationships and (ii) greater cooperation within those relationships. When future interaction partners can choose with whom they wish to interact, this could lead to competition to be more generous than others. Little empirical work has tested for the possible existence of this 'competitive altruism'. Using a cooperative monetary game with and without opportunities for partner choice and signalling cooperative intent, we show here that people actively compete to be more generous than others when they can benefit from being chosen for cooperative partnerships, and the most generous people are correspondingly chosen more often as cooperative partners. We also found evidence for increased scepticism of altruistic signals when the potential reputational benefits for dishonest signalling were high. Thus, this work supports the hypothesis that public generosity can be a signal of cooperative intent, which people sometimes 'fake' when conditions permit it.     

Asymmetric interaction will facilitate the evolution of cooperation

Explaining the evolution of cooperation remains one of the greatest problems for both biology and social science. The classical theories of cooperation suggest that cooperation equilibrium or evolutionary stable strategy between partners can be maintained through genetic similarity or reciprocity relatedness. These classical theories are based on an assumption that partners interact symmetrically with equal payoffs in a game of cooperation interaction. However, the payoff between partners is usually not equal and therefore they often interact asymmetrically in real cooperative systems. With the Hawk-Dove model, we find that the probability of cooperation between cooperative partners will depend closely on the payoff ratio. The higher the payoff ratio between recipients and cooperative actors, the greater will be the probability of cooperation interaction between involved partners. The greatest probability of conflict between cooperative partners will occur when the payoff between partners is equal. The results show that this asymmetric relationship is one of the key dynamics of the evolution of cooperation, and that pure cooperation strategy (i.e., Nash equilibrium) does not exist in asymmetrical cooperation systems, which well explains the direct conflict observed in almost all of the well documented cooperation systems. The model developed here shows that the cost-to-benefit ratio of cooperation is also negatively correlated with the probability of cooperation interaction. A smaller cost-to-benefit ratio of cooperation might be created by the limited dispersal ability or exit cost of the partners involved, and it will make the punishment of the non-cooperative individuals by the recipient more credible, and therefore make it more possible to maintain stable cooperation interaction.     

Assortative mating through a mechanism of sexual selection

We propose that assortative mating can arise through a mechanism of sexual selection by active female choice of partners based on a 'self-seeking like' decision rule. Using a mathematical model, we show that a gene can be selected that make females to choose mates that are similar to themselves with respect to an arbitrary tag, even if two independent and unlinked genes determine the preference and the tag. The necessary requisite for this process to apply is an asymmetry between partners, such that the female can choose the male but this one must always accept to mate. The fitness advantage is due to linkage disequilibrium built up between both genes. Simulations have been run to check the algebraic results and to analyse the influence of several factors on the evolution of the system. Any factor that favors linkage disequilibrium also favors the evolution of the preference allele. Moreover, in a large population subdivided in small subpopulations connected by migration, the assortative mating homogenizes the population genotypic structure for the tags in contrast to random mating that maintains most of the variation.     

Kin recognition and the evolution of altruism

In 1964, Hamilton formalized the idea of kin selection to explain the evolution of altruistic behaviours. Since then, numerous examples from a diverse array of taxa have shown that seemingly altruistic actions towards close relatives are a common phenomenon. Although many species use kin recognition to direct altruistic behaviours preferentially towards relatives, this important aspect of social biology is less well understood theoretically. I extend Hamilton's classic work by defining the conditions for the evolution of kin-directed altruism when recognizers are permitted to make acceptance (type I) and rejection (type II) errors in the identification of social partners with respect to kinship. The effect of errors in recognition on the evolution of kin-directed altruism depends on whether the population initially consists of unconditional altruists or non-altruists (i.e. alternative forms of non-recognizers). Factors affecting the level of these error rates themselves, their evolution and their long-term stability are discussed.     

Pedigree relatedness, not greenbeard genes, explains eusociality

The evolution of eusociality, where some individuals altruistically forgo reproduction, poses a dilemma which can be solved by kin selection, i.e. by considering relatedness among cooperating individuals. Most often, such relatedness is caused by pedigree relationships between family members. However, an alternative explanation has recently emerged in an article by Wilson and Hölldobler (2005) . Wilson and Hölldobler see the ecological benefit of group living as the principal reason for sociality. In their scenario, individuals sharing the same altruistic allele (analogous to a greenbeard gene) preferentially interact with each other, regardless of pedigree relatedness. We argue that empirical evidence has the potential to answer the question of whether pedigree relatedness plays a role in the evolution of eusociality. We conclude that both phylogenetic studies and studies of intra-genomic conflict support the importance of pedigree relatedness in the evolution of eusociality.     

Classes of communication and the conditions for their evolution

Evolution of communication is conceptualized as a coevolutionary process in which evolution of signaler and that of receiver occur in an interdependent manner. Three classes of communication, mutualistic, altruistic, and exploiting, are distinguished depending on who gains a benefit or suffers a cost from successful communication. Communication is also dichotomized according to whether individuals are innately able to send and receive relevant signals or they have to acquire those signals culturally. We develop two-locus haploid models that represent the coevolutionary nature of the evolution of communication, and derive the conditions under which communicators can invade a population of non-communicators and those under which a population of communicators is evolutionarily stable against the invasion by non-communicators for each of the three classes of communication. Analysis of the models reveals that interaction among siblings enables the invasion of communication and that the optimal probability of interaction with siblings depends on the class of communication and the mode of signal transmission. In addition, cultural exploiting communication is more likely to invade a population of non-communicators than is genetic exploiting communication under certain circumstances.     

The sex chromosome system can influence the evolution of sex‐biased dispersal

Sex‐biased dispersal is a much‐discussed feature in literature on dispersal. Diverse hypotheses have been proposed to explain the evolution of sex‐biased dispersal, a difference in dispersal rate or dispersal distance between males and females. An early hypothesis has indicated that it may rely on the difference in sex chromosomes between males and females. However, this proposal was quickly rejected without a real assessment. We propose a new perspective on this hypothesis by investigating the evolution of sex‐biased dispersal when dispersal genes are sex‐linked, that is when they are located on the sex chromosomes. We show that individuals of the heterogametic sex disperse relatively more than do individuals of the homogametic sex when dispersal genes are sex‐linked rather than autosomal. Although such a sex‐biased dispersal towards the heterogametic sex is always observed in monogamous species, the mating system and the location of dispersal genes interact to modulate sex‐biased dispersal in monandry and polyandry. In the context of the multicausality of dispersal, we suggest that sex‐linked dispersal genes can influence the evolution of sex‐biased dispersal.     

The evolution of generalized reciprocity on social interaction networks

Generalized reciprocity (help anyone, if helped by someone) is a minimal strategy capable of supporting cooperation between unrelated individuals. Its simplicity makes it an attractive model to explain the evolution of reciprocal altruism in animals that lack the information or cognitive skills needed for other types of reciprocity. Yet, generalized reciprocity is anonymous and thus defenseless against exploitation by defectors. Recognizing that animals hardly ever interact randomly, we investigate whether social network structure can mitigate this vulnerability. Our results show that heterogeneous interaction patterns strongly support the evolution of generalized reciprocity. The future probability of being rewarded for an altruistic act is inversely proportional to the average connectivity of the social network when cooperators are rare. Accordingly, sparse networks are conducive to the invasion of reciprocal altruism. Moreover, the evolutionary stability of cooperation is enhanced by a modular network structure. Communities of reciprocal altruists are protected against exploitation, because modularity increases the mean access time, that is, the average number of steps that it takes for a random walk on the network to reach a defector. Sparseness and community structure are characteristic properties of vertebrate social interaction patterns, as illustrated by network data from natural populations ranging from fish to primates.     

Cannibalism can drive the evolution of behavioural phase polyphenism in locusts

During outbreaks, locust swarms can contain millions of insects travelling thousands of kilometers while devastating vegetation and crops. Such large-scale spatial organization is preceded locally by a dramatic density-dependent phenotypic transition in multiple traits. Behaviourally, low-density 'solitarious' individuals avoid contact with one another; above a critical local density, they undergo a rapid behavioural transition to the 'gregarious phase' whereby they exhibit mutual attraction. Although proximate causes of this phase polyphenism have been widely studied, the ultimate driving factors remain unclear. Using an individual-based evolutionary model, we reveal that cannibalism, a striking feature of locust ecology, could lead to the evolution of density-dependent behavioural phase-change in juvenile locusts. We show that this behavioural strategy minimizes risk associated with cannibalistic interactions and may account for the empirically observed persistence of locust groups during outbreaks. Our results provide a parsimonious explanation for the evolution of behavioural plasticity in locusts.     

The evolution of trans-generational altruism: kin selection meets niche construction

A cornerstone result of sociobiology states that limited dispersal can induce kin competition to offset the kin selected benefits of altruism. Several mechanisms have been proposed to circumvent this dilemma but all assume that actors and recipients of altruism interact during the same time period. Here, this assumption is relaxed and a model is developed where individuals express an altruistic act, which results in posthumously helping relatives living in the future. The analysis of this model suggests that kin selected benefits can then feedback on the evolution of the trait in a way that promotes altruistic helping at high rates under limited dispersal. The decoupling of kin competition and kin selected benefits results from the fact that by helping relatives living in the future, an actor is helping individuals that are not in direct competition with itself. A direct consequence is that behaviours which actors gain by reducing the common good of present and future generations can be opposed by kin selection. The present model integrates niche-constructing traits with kin selection theory and delineates demographic and ecological conditions under which altruism can be selected for; and conditions where the 'tragedy of the commons' can be reduced.     

Mate-search efficiency can determine the evolution of separate sexes and the stability of hermaphroditism in animals

Limited availability of mating partners has been proposed as an explanation for the occurrence of simultaneous hermaphroditism in animals with pair mating. When low population density or low mobility of a species limits the number of potential mates, simultaneous hermaphrodites may have a selective advantage because, first, they are able to adjust the allocation of resources between male and female functions in order to maximize fitness; second, in a hermaphroditic population the likelihood of meeting a partner is higher because all individuals are potential mates; and, third, in the absence of mating partners, many simultaneously hermaphroditic animals have the option of reproducing through self-fertilization. Recognizing that mate availability is central to the existing theory of hermaphroditism in animals, it is important to examine the effects of mate search on predictions of the stability of hermaphroditism. Many hermaphroditic animals can increase the number of potential mates they contact by active searching. However, since mate search has costs in terms of time and energy, the increased number of potential mates will be traded off against the amount of resources that can be allocated to the production of gametes. We explore the consequences of this trade-off to the evolution of mating strategies and to the selective advantage of self-fertilization. We show that in low and moderate population densities, poor mate-search efficiency and high costs of searching stabilize hermaphroditism and bias sex allocation toward female function. In addition, in very low population densities, there is strong selective advantage for self-fertilization, but this advantage decreases considerably in species with high mate-search efficiency. Most important, however, we present a novel evolutionary prediction: when mate search is efficient, disruptive frequency-dependent selection on time allocation to mate search leads to the evolution of searching and nonsearching phenotypes and, ultimately, to the evolution of males and females.     

Altruism can evolve when relatedness is low: evidence from bacteria committing suicide upon phage infection

High relatedness among interacting individuals has generally been considered a precondition for the evolution of altruism. However, kin-selection theory also predicts the evolution of altruism when relatedness is low, as long as the cost of the altruistic act is minor compared with its benefit. Here, we demonstrate evidence for a low-cost altruistic act in bacteria. We investigated Escherichia coli responding to the attack of an obligately lytic phage by committing suicide in order to prevent parasite transmission to nearby relatives. We found that bacterial suicide provides large benefits to survivors at marginal costs to committers. The cost of suicide was low, because infected cells are moribund, rapidly dying upon phage infection, such that no more opportunity for reproduction remains. As a consequence of its marginal cost, host suicide was selectively favoured even when relatedness between committers and survivors approached zero. Altogether, our findings demonstrate that low-cost suicide can evolve with ease, represents an effective host-defence strategy, and seems to be widespread among microbes. Moreover, low-cost suicide might also occur in higher organisms as exemplified by infected social insect workers leaving the colony to die in isolation.     

Bet hedging based cooperation can limit kin selection and form a basis for mutualism

Mutualism is a mechanism of cooperation in which partners that differ help each other. As such, mutualism opposes mechanisms of kin selection and tag-based selection (for example the green beard mechanism), which are based on giving exclusive help to partners that are related or carry the same tag. In contrast to kin selection, which is a basis for parochialism and intergroup warfare, mutualism can therefore be regarded as a mechanism that drives peaceful coexistence between different groups and individuals. Here the competition between mutualism and kin (tag) selection is studied. In a model where kin selection and tag-based selection are dominant, mutualism is promoted by introducing environmental fluctuations. These fluctuations cause reduction in reproductive success by the mechanism of variance discount. The best strategy to counter variance discount is to share with agents who experience the most anticorrelated fluctuations, a strategy called bet hedging. In this way, bet hedging stimulates cooperation with the most unrelated partners, which is a basis for mutualism. Analytic results and simulations reveal that, if this effect is large enough, mutualistic strategies can dominate kin selective strategies. In addition, mutants of these mutualistic strategies that experience fluctuations that are more anticorrelated to their partner, can outcompete wild type, which can lead to the evolution of specialization. In this way, the evolutionary success of mutualistic strategies can be explained by bet hedging-based cooperation.