Does “Science” Make You Moral? The Effects of Priming Science on Moral Judgments and Behavior

Background

Previous work has noted that science stands as an ideological force insofar as the answers it offers to a variety of fundamental questions and concerns; as such, those who pursue scientific inquiry have been shown to be concerned with the moral and social ramifications of their scientific endeavors. No studies to date have directly investigated the links between exposure to science and moral or prosocial behaviors.

Methodology/Principal Findings

Across four studies, both naturalistic measures of science exposure and experimental primes of science led to increased adherence to moral norms and more morally normative behaviors across domains. Study 1 (n = 36) tested the natural correlation between exposure to science and likelihood of enforcing moral norms. Studies 2 (n = 49), 3 (n = 52), and 4 (n = 43) manipulated thoughts about science and examined the causal impact of such thoughts on imagined and actual moral behavior. Across studies, thinking about science had a moralizing effect on a broad array of domains, including interpersonal violations (Studies 1, 2), prosocial intentions (Study 3), and economic exploitation (Study 4).

Conclusions/Significance

These studies demonstrated the morally normative effects of lay notions of science. Thinking about science leads individuals to endorse more stringent moral norms and exhibit more morally normative behavior. These studies are the first of their kind to systematically and empirically test the relationship between science and morality. The present findings speak to this question and elucidate the value-laden outcomes of the notion of science.     

Equity or equality? Moral judgments follow the money

Previous research emphasizes people''s dispositions as a source of differences in moral views. We investigate another source of moral disagreement, self-interest. In three experiments, participants played a simple economic game in which one player divides money with a partner according to the principle of equality (same payoffs) or the principle of equity (payoffs proportional to effort expended). We find, first, that people''s moral judgment of an allocation rule depends on their role in the game. People not only prefer the rule that most benefits them but also judge it to be more fair and moral. Second, we find that participants'' views about equality and equity change in a matter of minutes as they learn where their interests lie. Finally, we find limits to self-interest: when the justification for equity is removed, participants no longer show strategic advocacy of the unequal division. We discuss implications for understanding moral debate and disagreement.     

Moral Hypocrisy on the Basis of Construal Level: To Be a Utilitarian Personal Decision Maker or to Be a Moral Advisor?

BackgroundPeople encounter various moral issues that involve making decisions for others by giving advice.ObjectiveThis study investigated the characteristics of providing suggestions for oneself versus providing suggestions for others in ethical decision-making and the differences between them based on Construal Level Theory (CLT).MethodsA total of 768 undergraduate students from three universities in China were randomly assigned to eight groups on the basis of a grid of two Construal Levels (self or others) by two different numbers of people saved (5 people or 15 people) by two problem situations (trolley problem vs. footbridge problem). The investigation examined participants’ decisions to opt to take action or refrain from action that would have the consequence of saving more people.ResultsThe main effects of Construal Level (F_{1, 752} = 6.46, p = .011), saving number (F_{1, 752} = 35.81, p < .001), and problem situation type (F_{1, 752} = 330.55, p < .001) were all significant. The interaction of the problem situation and saving number (F_{1, 752} = 1.01, p = .31), and social distance and saving number (F_{1, 752} = 0.85, p = .36), and interaction of the three independent factors (F_{1, 752} = 0.47, p = .49) were not significant. However, the interaction of social distance and problem situation (F_{1, 752} = 9.46, p = .002) was significant. Results indicated the participants utilized a component of utilitarian reasoning in the decision-making, and their behaviors appeared more utilitarian at low Construal Levels (CLs) compared to high.ConclusionCLs, saving numbers, and problem situation significantly affected moral decision-making and exhibited significant interaction. Making decisions for oneself (low-construal) rather than giving advice to others (high-construal) was one important factor that determined whether the people were utilitarian or not. Utilitarian considerations are more relevant in impersonal dilemmas.     

Introduction to “Moral (and Other) Laboratories”

“Moral (and other) laboratories” is a special issue that draws on Cheryl Mattingly’s notion of the “moral laboratory” to explore the uncanny interface between laboratory ethnography and moral anthropology, and to examine the relationship between experience and experiment. We ask whether laboratory work may provoke new insights about experimental practices in other social spaces such as homes, clinics, and neighborhoods, and conversely, whether the study of morality may provoke new insights about laboratory practices as they unfold in the day-to-day interactions between test tubes, animals, apparatuses, scientists, and technicians. The papers in this collection examine issues unique to authors’ individual projects, but as a whole, they share a common theme: moral experimentation—the work of finding different ways of relating—occurs in relation to the suffering of something or someone, or in response to some kind of moral predicament that tests cultural and historically shaped “human values.” The collection as a whole intends to push for the theoretical status of not merely experience itself, but also of possibility, in exploring uncertain border zones of various kinds—between the human and the animal, between codified ethical rules and ordinary ethics, and between “real” and metaphorical laboratories.     

European Stem Cell Patents: Taking the Moral High Road?

A European law that prevents the patenting of discoveries that contravene morality is causing confusion when it comes to human embryonic stem cells. The ensuing debate is markedly different from the one in the United States, where the scope of stem cell patents and their licensing are under challenge.     

Social Evaluation or Simple Association? Simple Associations May Explain Moral Reasoning in Infants

Are we born amoral or do we come into this world with a rudimentary moral compass? Hamlin and colleagues argue that at least one component of our moral system, the ability to evaluate other individuals as good or bad, is present from an early age. In their study, 6- and 10-month-old infants watched two social interactions - in one, infants observed the helper assist the climber achieve the goal of ascending a hill, while in the other, infants observed the hinderer prevent the climber from ascending the hill. When given a choice, the vast majority of infants picked the helper over the hinderer, suggesting that infants evaluated the helper as good and the hinderer as bad. Hamlin and colleagues concluded that the ability to evaluate individuals based on social interaction is innate. Here, we provide evidence that their findings reflect simple associations rather than social evaluations.     

Balad el-Ziblé (Country of Rubbish): Moral Geographies of Waste in Post-revolutionary Tunisia

ABSTRACT

Waste sullies, physically and morally, polluting people and places, and defining or altering their position within social and spatial hierarchies. Given this polluting quality and the moral charge of the idiom of pollution, waste and its distribution are indicative of how places are imbued with moral judgment and at the same time waste illustrates how places themselves can become morally polluting. In the context of a waste crisis that followed the Tunisian Revolution of 2011, it is argued here that an attention to waste as material and symbolic category demonstrates the recursive relationship between materials, people, their thoughts and actions, in the moralisation of place. Examining this waste crisis in terms of a Tunisian moral geography of waste, which was established under colonialism and labels certain people and places as clean and dirty, reveals the dynamic and historically contingent nature of moral spaces and depicts them as sites for socio-spatial struggles that in themselves illuminate the revolution in novel ways. Finally, it is concluded that the polluting quality of waste spilled over the boundaries of Tunisia’s moral geography to morally sully the whole time period and political process of Tunisia’s transition.     

Moral Distress Reexamined: A Feminist Interpretation of Nurses’ Identities, Relationships, and Responsibilites

Moral distress has been written about extensively in nursing and other fields. Often, however, it has not been used with much theoretical depth. This paper focuses on theorizing moral distress using feminist ethics, particularly the work of Margaret Urban Walker and Hilde Lindemann. Incorporating empirical findings, we argue that moral distress is the response to constraints experienced by nurses to their moral identities, responsibilities, and relationships. We recommend that health professionals get assistance in accounting for and communicating their values and responsibilities in situations of moral distress. We also discuss the importance of nurses creating “counterstories” of their work as knowledgeable and trustworthy professionals to repair their damaged moral identities, and, finally, we recommend that efforts toward shifting the goal of health care away from the prolongation of life at all costs to the relief of suffering to diminish the moral distress that is a common response to aggressive care at end-of-life.     

Justice For All? Children’s Moral Reasoning about the Welfare and Rights of Endangered Species

This study reports children’s developing moral concerns for endangered animals. Three questions were addressed: 1) Do children conceive of not harming an endangered animal as a moral obligation? 2) Do children use biocentric (nature-centered) moral reasoning? and 3) Does a developmental shift in biocentrism occur between the ages of 7and 10-years-old? Fifty-two urban children (gender balanced and evenly divided between two ages groups: 7 and 10-year-olds) from the Pacific Northwest were interviewed regarding their understanding of, and beliefs and values about, endangered animals, their moral obligatory concerns, and their conceptions of animal rights. Many questions focused on a single species—the gray wolf— as it presents a canonical example of a local, familiar, charismatic endangered animal. The semi-structured interview methodology and the coding procedures followed well-established methods in social-cognitive psychology. Results were that the 7 and 10-year-olds valued endangered animals, extended moral obligations to gray wolves, and endorsed animal rights. Quantitative analysis of the content responses revealed a typology of seven rights that children spontaneously offered when asked which rights animals have: food, companionship, reproduction, habitat, play/exercise, welfare, and autonomy. The 10-year-olds were significantly more likely to endorse autonomy rights than the 7-year-olds. The findings reveal the highest rates of biocentrism observed in young children, and the 10-year-olds endorsed biocentrism to a greater degree than the 7-year-olds. Children drew on their understanding of human moral concerns to extend these concerns to the animal. Sentiency and biological needs are salient features that allow children to take the perspective of the animal in ways that build upon and diverge from their own experiences. These findings provide a comparative baseline for extending our understanding of biocentrism across cultures, animal kinds, and in human–wildlife conflict scenarios.     

Human male mating strategies: II. Moral codes of “quality” and “quantity” strategists

Men following quality and quantity strategies (pair bond with paternal investment/short-term sexual bonds) should have different, self-serving moral codes. If so, the different strategists should rate dating behaviors differently on ethical (honest and exploitative) and usage (by quality and quantity courters) scales. Quality strategists, who use honest advertisement, should promote their honest behavior by sharp distinctions between what is honest and exploitative and between what men like themselves and others (quantity strategists) do. Quantity strategists, who may exploit (e.g., verbal or physical coercion), should blur these distinctions. Their interests are served by the belief that all men are alike and not morally distinguishable. The companion study obtained men's ratings of quality-strategy behaviors (honest) and quantity-strategy behaviors (exploitative) on ethical and usage scales. Correlations were obtained between those ratings and the same men's scores on bipolar dimensions distinguishing quality from quantity strategists: sexual history, adult characteristics associated with female mate preference, and certain childhood experiences. The correlations supported the hypotheses with two exceptions. First, socioeconomic status and endorsement of a foraging tactic (leave if sexual relations do not start quickly) predicted ratings for quality-strategy behaviors, but did not predict ratings for quantity-strategy behaviors. Sexual history items and childhood experiences related to perceptions of relationships predicted only the ratings for quantity-strategy behaviors. Second, ratings of the lack of honesty in exploitative behavior and its lack of usage by quality courters did not distinguish the strategists. Three conclusions followed. One, there are two kinds of quantity strategists: commodifiers who trade resources for sex and predators who exploit. Two, quantity strategists are mixed strategists while some men follow only a quality strategy. Three, quantity strategists deceive themselves about the exploitative character of their behavior. The data fit evolutionary analyses of human morality and, with a few exceptions, current views of contextual factors governing adoption of different reproductive strategies.     

‘Straightening What’s Crooked’? Recognition as Moral Disruption in Indonesia’s Confucianist Revival

ABSTRACT

In 2006, the Indonesian state re-recognised Confucianism as an official religion, but this did not have the straightforwardly positive consequences that either Confucianist revivalists or some theorists of recognition might have predicted. Revivalists were often – but not always – gripped by feelings of outrage and moral torment, whilst the pace of the revival itself was very uneven. These varied outcomes reflect the complex politics pervading the lives of Indonesian Confucianists (and Chinese Indonesians more generally) as post-Suharto reforms force them to grapple with their diverse histories of accommodation and resistance to the New Order’s discriminatory policies. To fully understand such material, first-person moral perspectives must be incorporated into critical anthropological studies of recognition, as a complement to approaches focused on power and domination. Doing so reveals an important general truth about recognition – its capacity to be morally disruptive – and broadens our understanding of why recognition can hurt those it ostensibly stands to benefit.     

Medical Disease or Moral Defect? Stigma Attribution and Cultural Models of Addiction Causality in a University Population

This study examines the knowledge individuals use to make judgments about persons with substance use disorder. First, we show that there is a cultural model of addiction causality that is both shared and contested. Second, we examine how individuals’ understanding of that model is associated with stigma attribution. Research was conducted among undergraduate students at the University of Alabama. College students in the 18–25 age range are especially at risk for developing substance use disorder, and they are, perhaps more than any other population group, intensely targeted by drug education. The elicited cultural model includes different types of causes distributed across five distinct themes: Biological, Self-Medication, Familial, Social, and Hedonistic. Though there was cultural consensus among respondents overall, residual agreement analysis showed that the cultural model of addiction causality is a multicentric domain. Two centers of the model, the moral and the medical, were discovered. Differing adherence to these centers is associated with the level of stigma attributed towards individuals with substance use disorder. The results suggest that current approaches to substance use education could contribute to stigma attribution, which may or may not be inadvertent. The significance of these results for both theory and the treatment of addiction are discussed.     

Why Do You Believe in God? Relationships between Religious Belief,Analytic Thinking,Mentalizing and Moral Concern

Prior work has established that analytic thinking is associated with disbelief in God, whereas religious and spiritual beliefs have been positively linked to social and emotional cognition. However, social and emotional cognition can be subdivided into a number of distinct dimensions, and some work suggests that analytic thinking is in tension with some aspects of social-emotional cognition. This leaves open two questions. First, is belief linked to social and emotional cognition in general, or a specific dimension in particular? Second, does the negative relationship between belief and analytic thinking still hold after relationships with social and emotional cognition are taken into account? We report eight hypothesis-driven studies which examine these questions. These studies are guided by a theoretical model which focuses on the distinct social and emotional processing deficits associated with autism spectrum disorders (mentalizing) and psychopathy (moral concern). To our knowledge no other study has investigated both of these dimensions of social and emotion cognition alongside analytic thinking. We find that religious belief is robustly positively associated with moral concern (4 measures), and that at least part of the negative association between belief and analytic thinking (2 measures) can be explained by a negative correlation between moral concern and analytic thinking. Using nine different measures of mentalizing, we found no evidence of a relationship between mentalizing and religious or spiritual belief. These findings challenge the theoretical view that religious and spiritual beliefs are linked to the perception of agency, and suggest that gender differences in religious belief can be explained by differences in moral concern. These findings are consistent with the opposing domains hypothesis, according to which brain areas associated with moral concern and analytic thinking are in tension.     

Between “Science” and “Superstition”: Moral Perceptions of Induced Abortion Among Young Adults in Vietnam

Despite the increasing use ofreproductive technologies the world over,anthropological studies have paid remarkablylimited attention to the ethical dilemmasinvolved in people's choices of suchtechnologies. Against this background, theauthor analyzes moral perceptions of inducedabortion among unmarried young adults in urbanNorth Vietnam. While the ethical aspects ofabortion are shrouded in silence in public lifein Vietnam, the young people participating inthe study expressed strong moral scepticismtowards the practice of abortion, even whileundergoing it themselves. Through the analysisof young people's experiences and perceptions,the paper demonstrates how moral ideas are tiedto particular social situations and structuredby larger socio-political circumstances. It isargued that moral notions which are dominant ina society's public sphere may not berepresentative of the moral sentiments that arelived in practice and felt in private.     

Out of Control!? How Loss of Self-Control Influences Prosocial Behavior: The Role of Power and Moral Values

Lack of self-control has been suggested to facilitate norm-transgressing behaviors because of the operation of automatic selfish impulses. Previous research, however, has shown that people having a high moral identity may not show such selfish impulses when their self-control resources are depleted. In the present research, we extended this effect to prosocial behavior. Moreover, we investigated the role of power in the interaction between moral identity and self-control depletion. More specifically, we expected that power facilitates the externalization of internal states, which implies that for people who feel powerful, rather than powerless, depletion decreases prosocial behavior especially for those low in moral identity. A laboratory experiment and a multisource field study supported our predictions. The present finding that the interaction between self-control depletion and moral identity is contingent upon people’s level of power suggests that power may enable people to refrain from helping behavior. Moreover, the findings suggest that if organizations want to improve prosocial behaviors, it may be effective to situationally induce moral values in their employees.     

The Tipping of the Big Stone—And Life itself. Obesity,Moral Work and Responsive Selves Over Time

Why is “everything I know is the right thing to do a million miles removed from what I do in reality?” This question posed by Rita, my main interlocutor and friend in a fieldwork that started in 2001–2003 and was taken up again in 2014–2015, opens up an exploration of moral work and moral selves in the context of the obesity epidemic and weight loss processes. I address these questions through the notion of “moral laboratories” taking up Mattingly’s argument that moral cultivation over time cannot be disconnected from a notion of self. Mattingly has consistently argued for a biographical and narrative self, which is processual and created in community. Along these lines, and by recourse to the German philosopher Bernhard Waldenfels’ phenomenology, I will propose the notion of a responsive self. The responsive self highlights the eventness of ongoing experimentation against the odds and captures equally pathic and agentive dimensions of a self that both persists and is transformed over time.