The concept of mechanism in biology

The concept of mechanism in biology has three distinct meanings. It may refer to a philosophical thesis about the nature of life and biology ('mechanicism'), to the internal workings of a machine-like structure ('machine mechanism'), or to the causal explanation of a particular phenomenon ('causal mechanism'). In this paper I trace the conceptual evolution of 'mechanism' in the history of biology, and I examine how the three meanings of this term have come to be featured in the philosophy of biology, situating the new 'mechanismic program' in this context. I argue that the leading advocates of the mechanismic program (i.e., Craver, Darden, Bechtel, etc.) inadvertently conflate the different senses of 'mechanism'. Specifically, they all inappropriately endow causal mechanisms with the ontic status of machine mechanisms, and this invariably results in problematic accounts of the role played by mechanism-talk in scientific practice. I suggest that for effective analyses of the concept of mechanism, causal mechanisms need to be distinguished from machine mechanisms, and the new mechanismic program in the philosophy of biology needs to be demarcated from the traditional concerns of mechanistic biology.     

Okasha’s evolution and the levels of selection: toward a broader conception of theoretical biology

The debate about the levels of selection has been one of the most controversial both in evolutionary biology and in philosophy of science. Okasha’s book makes the sort of contribution that simply will not be able to be ignored by anyone interested in this field for many years to come. However, my interest here is in highlighting some examples of how Okasha goes about discussing his material to suggest that his book is part of an increasingly interesting trend that sees scientists and philosophers coming together to build a broadened concept of “theory” through a combination of standard mathematical treatments and conceptual analyses. Given the often contentious history of the relationship between philosophy and science, such trend cannot but be welcome.     

Samir Okasha: Evolution and the levels of selection

The debate about the levels of selection has been one of the most controversial both in evolutionary biology and in philosophy of science. Okasha’s book makes the sort of contribution that simply will not be able to be ignored by anyone interested in this field for many years to come. However, my interest here is in highlighting some examples of how Okasha goes about discussing his material to suggest that his book is part of an increasingly interesting trend that sees scientists and philosophers coming together to build a broadened concept of “theory” through a combination of standard mathematical treatments and conceptual analyses. Given the often contentious history of the relationship between philosophy and science, such trend cannot but be welcome.     

On the origin of the typological/population distinction in Ernst Mayr’s changing views of species, 1942–1959

Ernst Mayr’s typological/population distinction is a conceptual thread that runs throughout much of his work in systematics, evolutionary biology, and the history and philosophy of biology. Mayr himself claims that typological thinking originated in the philosophy of Plato and that population thinking was first introduced by Charles Darwin and field naturalists. A more proximate origin of the typological/population thinking, however, is found in Mayr’s own work on species. This paper traces the antecedents of the typological/population distinction by detailing Mayr’s changing views of species between 1942 and 1955. During this period, Mayr struggles to refine the biological species concept in the face of tensions that exist between studying species locally and studying them as geographically distributed collections of variable populations. The typological/population distinction is first formulated in 1955, when Mayr generalizes from the type concept versus the population concept in taxonomy to typological versus population thinking in biology more generally. Mayr’s appeal to the more general distinction between typological and population thinking coincides with the waning status of natural history and evolutionary biology that occurs in the early 1950s and the distinction plays an important role in Mayr’s efforts to legitimate the natural historical sciences.     

Ernst Mayr,naturalist: His contributions to systematics and evolution

Ernst Mayr's scientific career continues strongly 70 years after he published his first scientific paper in 1923. He is primarily a naturalist and ornithologist which has influenced his basic approach in science and later in philosophy and history of science. Mayr studied at the Natural History Museum in Berlin with Professor E. Stresemann, a leader in the most progressive school of avian systematics of the time. The contracts gained through Stresemann were central to Mayr's participation in a three year expedition to New Guinea and The Solomons, and the offer of a position in the Department of Ornithology, American Museum of Natural History, beginning in 1931. At the AMNH, Mayr was able to blend the best of the academic traditions of Europe with those of North America in developing a unified research program in biodiversity embracing systematics, biogeography and nomenclature. His tasks at the AMNH were to curate and study the huge collections amassed by the Whitney South Sea Expedition plus the just purchased Rothschild collection of birds. These studies provided Mayr with the empirical foundation essential for his 1942Systematics and the Origin of Species and his subsequent theoretical work in evolutionary biology as well as all his later work in the philosophy and history of science. Without a detailed understanding of Mayr's empirical systematic and biogeographic work, one cannot possibly comprehend fully his immense contributions to evolutionary biology and his later analyses in the philosophy and history of science.     

Reminiscences from the first curator of the whitney-rothschild collection

Dr Ernst Mayr has been one of the seminal figures of 20th century biology. His essential contributions were in the development of the Modern Synthesis in evolutionary biology. His landmark book Systematics and the Origin of Species, was published in 1942 and has long been acknowledged as one of the key foundations of 20th century evolutionary biology. In many subsequent articles and books on evolution and the history and philosophy of biology during the past half century, he has continued to be a key contributor of ideas and inspiration to successive generations of evolutionary biologists. In the first of two ‘Roots’ articles, he describes the early stages of his career and the serendipitous events that furthered it. This article was first presented as a talk, on October 27, 1993, at the 50 year Jubilee celebration of the founding of the Whitney wing, the ornithological section, of the American Museum of Natural History in New York City. In next month's ‘Roots’ article, Dr Mayr will describe the events that led to the founding of the Society for the Study of Evolution in 1946, in St Louis, Missouri.     

The Philosophy of Donald T. Campbell: A Short Review and Critical Appraisal

Aside from his remarkable studies in psychology and the social sciences, Donald Thomas Campbell (1916–1996) made significant contributions to philosophy, particularly philosophy of science,epistemology, and ethics. His name and his work are inseparably linked with the evolutionary approach to explaining human knowledge (evolutionary epistemology). He was an indefatigable supporter of the naturalistic turn in philosophy and has strongly influenced the discussion of moral issues (evolutionary ethics). The aim of this paper is to briefly characterize Campbells work and to discuss its philosophical implications. In particular, I show its relevance to some current debates in the intersection of biology and philosophy. In fact, philosophy of biology would look poorer without Campbells influence. The present paper is not a hagiography but an attempt to evaluate and critically discuss the meaning of Campbells work for philosophy of biology and to encourage scholars working in this field to read and re-read this work which is both challenging and inspiring.     

The Maturation of Ethnoprimatology: Theoretical and Methodological Pluralism

Most remaining populations of primates live in environments that have been influenced in some way by humans (e.g., protected forests bisected by major roads, forest–farm edges, and urban centers). The field of ethnoprimatology has made these environments where humans and other primates interface its primary concern, recognizing that to fully understand primate behavior, our research objectives and practice cannot be disengaged from the human dimension. During the field’s initial years, scholars drew largely from theory and technique in primate ecology and sociocultural anthropology. The contributions to this Special Issue, which include empirical research and review papers, exemplify how the ethnoprimatologist’s toolkit has since expanded to include concepts, frameworks, and methods from the natural sciences (evolutionary biology, conservation ecology, epidemiology), and the social sciences and humanities (anthropology, geography, philosophy, and science studies). Moreover, the settings in which to examine the human–primate interface have diversified to include rural, urban, mixed-landscape, and captive spaces. In this introduction, I review the emergence and scope of ethnoprimatology. I then challenge some of the critiques leveled against ethnoprimatology and highlight its broader conceptual contributions, key elements of the field’s maturation, and recent trends in theoretically and methodologically integrative scholarship in ethnoprimatology. I conclude by offering a set of postulates to guide future ethnoprimatological work that is theoretically and methodological pluralistic and positioned to advance effective primate conservation efforts and facilitate sustainable human–primate coexistence.     

Again,What the Philosophy of Biology is not

There are many things that philosophy of biology might be. But, given the existence of a professional philosophy of biology that is arguably a progressive research program and, as such, unrivaled, it makes sense to define philosophy of biology more narrowly than the totality of intersecting concerns biologists and philosophers (let alone other scholars) might have. The reasons for the success of the “new” philosophy of biology remain poorly understood. I reflect on what Dutch and Flemish, and, more generally, European philosophers of biology could do to improve the situation of their discipline locally, regionally, and internationally, paying particular attention to the lessons to be learned from the “Science Wars.” This paper grew out of my contribution to the symposium Philosophy of Biology in the Netherlands and Flanders organized by Thomas Reydon and Sabina Leonelli in Amsterdam in February 2004. It is a rather personal reaction to many of the opinions voiced in the quite heated atmosphere of the Symposium. My main concern is to convey an idea of what, according to me, is required to turn “our” philosophy of biology into a more successful enterprise than it currently is. This is motivated by a disconcerting discovery I made at the Symposium: Contrary to my expectations, a sensitivity for the sorts of things that make possible philosophy of biology of the best kind available today seems to be largely lacking in our part of the world. I wish to stress from the outset that although I will be quite polemical at times, this is always intended in the spirit of constructive dialogue.     

From ‘ecologist’ to ‘conceptual ecologist’: the utility of the conceptual ecology analogy for teachers of biology

This paper advocates the application of established teaching models to the professional development of biology teachers. This is achieved by using the analogy of conceptual ecologies, made explicit through concept mapping. The approach is designed to support teachers' developing understanding of pupils' conceptual change by using familiar terminology and biological analogies. Monitoring of students' understanding at an ecosystemic level may also help distinguish between instances of conceptual change and contextual switching (described here with reference to photosynthesis).     

Developmental constraints on fin diversity

The fish fin is a breathtaking repository full of evolutionary diversity, novelty, and convergence. Over 500 million years, the adaptation to novel habitats has provided landscapes of fin diversity. Although comparative anatomy of evolutionarily divergent patterns over centuries has highlighted the fundamental architectures and evolutionary trends of fins, including convergent evolution, the developmental constraints on fin evolution, which bias the evolutionary trajectories of fin morphology, largely remain elusive. Here, we review the evolutionary history, developmental mechanisms, and evolutionary underpinnings of paired fins, illuminating possible developmental constraints on fin evolution. Our compilation of anatomical and genetic knowledge of fin development sheds light on the canalized and the unpredictable aspects of fin shape in evolution. Leveraged by an arsenal of genomic and genetic tools within the working arena of spectacular fin diversity, evolutionary developmental biology embarks on the establishment of conceptual framework for developmental constraints, previously enigmatic properties of evolution.     

Ernst Mayr: Biologist-historian

Ernst Mayr's historical writings began in 1935 with his essay Bernard Altum and the territory theory and have continued up through his monumentalGrowth of Biological Thought (1982) and hisOne Long Argument: Charles Darwin and the Genesis of Modern Evolutionary Thought (1991). Sweeping in their scope, forceful in their interpretation, enlisted on behalf of the clarification of modern concepts and of a broad view of biology, these writings provide both insights and challenges for the historian of biology. Mayr's general intellectual formation was guided by the GermanBildung ideal, with its emphasis on synthetic and comprehensive knowledge. His understanding of how to write history was inspired further by the example of the historian of ideas Arthur Lovejoy. Some strengths and limitations of this approach are explored here through attention to Mayr's treatment of the French biologist J.-B. Lamarck. It is contended that Mayr's contributions to the history of biology are not restricted to his own very substantial historical writings but also include his encouragement of other scholars, his development of an invaluable archive of scientific correspondence, and his insistence that historians who write about evolution and related subjects acquire an adequate understanding of the principles of Darwinian biology.This paper was originally delivered at the biennial meeting of the International Society for the History, Philosophy, and Social Studies of Biology, held in Brandeis in July 1993, in the special session organized by John Greene on Ernst Mayr's contributions to systematics, evolutionary theory, and the history and philosophy of biology. The paper is presented here with only slight modifications of the original, oral presentation. As indicated in the text, a full assessment of Mayr's historical work, including situating that work in the context of Mayr's other work and contemporary developments in the history of science, would require a much more extensive study than I have been able to undertake here.     

The many faces of biological individuality

Biological individuality is a major topic of discussion in biology and philosophy of biology. Recently, several objections have been raised against traditional accounts of biological individuality, including the objections of monism (the tendency to focus on a single individuality criterion and/or a single biological field), theory-centrism (the tendency to discuss only theory-based individuation), ahistoricity (the tendency to neglect what biologists of the past and historians of biology have said about biological individuality), disciplinary isolationism (the tendency to isolate biological individuality from other scientific and philosophical domains that have investigated individuality), and the multiplication of conceptual uncertainties (the lack of a precise definition of “biological individual” and related terms). In this introduction, I will examine the current philosophical landscape about biological individuality, and show how the contributions gathered in this special issue address these five objections. Overall, the aim of this issue is to offer a more diverse, unifying, and scientifically informed conception of what a biological individual is.     

Assembly of proteins into biological membranes--a brief history lesson based on 10 key papers

Research dealing with the mechanism by which proteins are secreted and assembled into membranes has a long history. This article highlights 10 papers that have made important contributions to our understanding of this area of cell biology over the past 30 years.     

Yeast: an experimental organism for 21st Century biology

In this essay, we revisit the status of yeast as a model system for biology. We first summarize important contributions of yeast to eukaryotic biology that we anticipated in 1988 in our first article on the subject. We then describe transformative developments that we did not anticipate, most of which followed the publication of the complete genomic sequence of Saccharomyces cerevisiae in 1996. In the intervening 23 years it appears to us that yeast has graduated from a position as the premier model for eukaryotic cell biology to become the pioneer organism that has facilitated the establishment of the entirely new fields of study called "functional genomics" and "systems biology." These new fields look beyond the functions of individual genes and proteins, focusing on how these interact and work together to determine the properties of living cells and organisms.     

Rethinking Woodger’s Legacy in the Philosophy of Biology

The writings of Joseph Henry Woodger (1894–1981) are often taken to exemplify everything that was wrongheaded, misguided, and just plain wrong with early twentieth-century philosophy of biology. Over the years, commentators have said of Woodger: (a) that he was a fervent logical empiricist who tried to impose the explanatory gold standards of physics onto biology, (b) that his philosophical work was completely disconnected from biological science, (c) that he possessed no scientific or philosophical credentials, and (d) that his work was disparaged – if not altogether ignored – by the biologists and philosophers of his era. In this paper, we provide the first systematic examination of Woodger’s oeuvre, and use it to demonstrate that the four preceding claims are false. We argue that Woodger’s ideas have exerted an important influence on biology and philosophy, and submit that the current consensus on his legacy stems from a highly selective reading of his works. By rehabilitating Woodger, we hope to show that there is no good reason to continue to disregard the numerous contributions to the philosophy of biology produced in the decades prior to the professionalization of the discipline.     

Biological atomism and cell theory

Biological atomism postulates that all life is composed of elementary and indivisible vital units. The activity of a living organism is thus conceived as the result of the activities and interactions of its elementary constituents, each of which individually already exhibits all the attributes proper to life. This paper surveys some of the key episodes in the history of biological atomism, and situates cell theory within this tradition. The atomistic foundations of cell theory are subsequently dissected and discussed, together with the theory's conceptual development and eventual consolidation. This paper then examines the major criticisms that have been waged against cell theory, and argues that these too can be interpreted through the prism of biological atomism as attempts to relocate the true biological atom away from the cell to a level of organization above or below it. Overall, biological atomism provides a useful perspective through which to examine the history and philosophy of cell theory, and it also opens up a new way of thinking about the epistemic decomposition of living organisms that significantly departs from the physicochemical reductionism of mechanistic biology.     

Pattern Cladistics and the ‘Realism–Antirealism Debate’ in the Philosophy of Biology

Despite the amount of work that has been produced on the subject over the years, the ‘transformation of cladistics’ is still a misunderstood episode in the history of comparative biology. Here, I analyze two outstanding, highly contrasting historiographic accounts on the matter, under the perspective of an influential dichotomy in the philosophy of science: the opposition between Scientific Realism and Empiricism. Placing special emphasis on the notion of ‘causal grounding’ of morphological characters (sensu Olivier Rieppel) in modern developmental biology’s (mechanistic) theories, I arrive at the conclusion that a ‘new transformation of cladistics’ is philosophically plausible. This ‘reformed’ understanding of ‘pattern cladistics’ entails retaining the interpretation of cladograms as ‘schemes of synapomorphies’, but in association to construing cladogram nodes as ‘developmental-genetic taxic homologies’, instead of ‘standard Darwinian ancestors’. The reinterpretation of pattern cladistics presented here additionally proposes to take Bas Van Fraassen’s ‘constructive empiricism’ as a philosophical stance that could properly support such analysis of developmental-genetic data for systematic purposes. The latter suggestion is justified through a reappraisal of previous ideas developed by prominent pattern cladists (mainly, Colin Patterson), which concerned a scientifically efficient ‘observable/non-observable distinction’ linked to the conceptual pair ‘ontogeny and phylogeny’. Finally, I argue that a robust articulation of Antirealist alternatives in systematics may provide a rational basis for its disciplinary separation from evolutionary biology, as well as for a critical reconsideration of the proper role of certain Scientific Realist positions, currently popular in comparative biology.     

Towards disciplinary disintegration in biology

Interdisciplinary integration has fundamental limitations. This is not sufficiently realized in science and in philosophy. Concerning scientific theories there are many examples of pseudo-integration which should be unmasked by elementary philosophical analysis. For example, allegedly over-arching theories of stress which are meant to unite biology and psychology, upon analysis, turn out to represent terminological rather than substantive unity. They should be replaced by more specific, local theories. Theories of animal orientation, likewise, have been formulated in unduly general terms. A natural history approach is more suitable for the study of animal orientation. The tendency to formulate overgeneral theories is also present in evolutionary biology. Philosophy of biology can only deal with these matters if it takes a normative turn. Undue emphasis on interdisciplinary integration is a modern variant of the old unity of science ideal. The replacement of the ideal by a better one is an important challenge for the philosophy of science.