State and minority in Israel: the case of ethnic state and the predicament of its minority

The connection between ethnicity and democracy has been the subject of much debate among scholars in various disciplines. This article deals with the ethnic divisions and the debate over democracy in Israel. How Israel should be defined, with regard to the democracy-ethnic affiliation nexus, has long been debated by scholars in the field. Some present Israel as a consociational democracy. Some Israeli scholars consider Israel to be a liberal democracy. Others define it as an 'ethnic democracy' that balances the ethnic and democratic components in its dealings with its Arab-Palestinian citizen. In this article I claim that Israel, like many other countries (Romania, Slovakia, Estonia, Latvia, Canada until the sixties, Malaysia) is not a democracy, if our criterion is the ethnic preference it shows for Jews. It is, instead, a textbook example of an ethnic state, applying sophisticated policies of exclusion and discrimination towards the Arab minority. In principle, it invites its Arab citizens to participate in its life; but under no circumstances does it offer them equality. It maintains Jewish superiority in all fields and grants them preference symbolically, structurally and practically.     

Towards a redefinition of Jewish nationalism in Israel? The enigma of Shas

The electoral success of Shas, a mizrahi, religious political party in Israel is analysed with the help of the cultural division of labour model. Mizrahim (Jews originating in Muslim countries) are a semi-peripheral ethnic group in Israel, located between the dominant ashkenazim (Jews of European origin) and the Palestinians. While most mizrahim have been voting Likud for the past twenty-five years, increasingly the poorer among them have been shifting their vote to Shas. The key to Shas's success, where other efforts to organize mizrahi political parties have failed, is its integrative, rather than separatist, ideology. Shas seeks to replace secular Zionism with religious Judaism as the hegemonic ideology in Israeli society, and presents this as the remedy for both the socio-economic and the cultural grievances of its constituency. This integrative message, emphasizing the commonalities between mizrahim and ashkenazim, rather than their differences, is attractive to mizrahim because of their semi-peripheral position in the society.     

Speaking the conflict,or how the Druze became bilingual: a study of Druze translators in the Israeli military courts in the West Bank and Gaza

The Druze community occupies a distinctive niche in the broader context of Israel/Palestine, one which is located in the interstices of various socio-political cross-currents, notably Jewish/Arab and Israeli/Palestinian. Druze Israeli identity is built around a politics of difference and separation from all other population groups residing in this area, yet it is an ambivalent and contradictory designation. This article focuses on those Druze who, through their service in the army, have been used as translators in the military courts in the occupied territories. The preference of Druze for this role relates to the fact that they have both bilingual skills (Hebrew and Arabic) and a socio-political status as 'non-Arab Arabs'. Following a general discussion of the politicization of Druze identity, I analyse the state's uses of Druze bilingualism for the purposes of maintaining and legitimizing the occupation, and the effects that fulfilling such a role have had on those who have functioned in this capacity.     

Ethnic intermarriage in Britain

Hebrewism, Globalized Israeliness and Mizrakhiut are examined as three major variants of Israeliness that struggle between them over dominance in the Israeli field of national culture. By discussing typical styles of literature and popular music associated with each variant, it is demonstrated how each is committed, albeit in a different way, to the belief in the idea of 'one nation - one culture', and to the construction of one, unique 'Israeli Culture'. Israel serves as a case to support a general argument about contemporary national cultures being a 'Bourdieusian' field in which invented tradition, global culture and sub-national / 'ethnic' culture are the major types of positions, struggling between them to define the dominant national cultural capital.     

The idea is to change the state,not the 'conceptual' terminology

'Transnationalism', 'globalization', etc. have been adopted by the postmodern anthropologists as providing conceptual evidence for a world that defies understanding in historical, political economy, or structural, terms. Thus, for Dan Rabinowitz (2001) ERS 24(1) 'subjectivity' reigns, transnationalism displaces the state in analysis, and the Palestinian citizens of Israel are discussed as 'a trapped minority'. I critique Rabinowitz's essentialist subjectivity which denies the Palestinian citizens rational, objective, comprehension of their situation, while emphasizing the key role of Israeli statism, alongside the state's welfare and citizens' rights components, and show that our common future lies in our joint, Jewish-Arab, active opposition to Israeli external and internal militaristic-nationalistic policies.     

When (if ever) may doctors discuss religion with their patients?

There is ongoing debate within the bioethics literature regarding to what extent (if any) it is ethically justifiable for doctors to engage in religious discussion with their patients, in cases where patients cite religious considerations as influencing their medical decision-making. In this paper, we concede that certain forms of religious discussion between doctors and patients are morally permissible (though not necessarily morally obligatory), insofar as patients’ religious beliefs may comprise an important part of their overall wellbeing and can influence their medical decisions. However, we argue that it is not morally permissible for doctors to engage in substantive religious discussion with their patients, beyond simply inquiring about the patient's values (which may include their religious values) or referring patients to a chaplain or religious figure for further discussion. In support of this claim, we put forward two key arguments which have remained relatively unaddressed in the current debate. First, we argue that it is not practical for doctors to engage in substantive religious discussion with patients, and hence it cannot be morally obligatory for them to do so. Second, we argue that, while doctors might have a professional duty to ensure that their patient's religious interests (if any) are addressed, this does not entail that doctors themselves are the ones who should directly address these interests. Along the way, we anticipate and respond to some possible objections to these two key arguments.     

The claim from adoption

In this article several justifications of what I call 'the claim from adoption' are examined. The claim from adoption is that, instead of expending resources on bringing new children into the world using reproductive technology and then caring for these children, we ought to devote these resources to the adoption and care of existing destitute children.
Arguments trading on the idea that resources should be directed to adoption instead of assisted reproduction because already existing people can benefit from such a use of resources whereas we cannot benefit individuals by bringing them into existence are rejected. It is then argued that a utilitarian argument proposed by Christian Munthe that supports the claim from adoption in some situations should be rejected because the support it offers does not extend to certain situations in which it seems morally obvious that resources should be expended on adoption rather than assisted reproduction. A version of the Priority View improves upon Munthe's utilitarianism by supporting the claim from adoption in the cases in which Munthe's argument failed. Some allegedly counterintuitive implications of the Priority View are then discussed, and it is concluded that the Priority View is more plausible than utilitarianism.
n a concluding section on policy issues it is argued that, even though the claim from adoption can be justified in a variety of situations, it does not follow that, in these situations, governments should direct resources away from assisted reproduction and towards adoption.     

Arab football in Israel as an 'integrative enclave'

Over the last two decades, football (soccer) has become a major institution within the popular culture of the Arab-Palestinian citizens of Israel. The centrality of football has given different identity agents opportunities to impose different meanings on the sport, depending on the agents' definitions of collective identity. This article utilizes ethnographic observation in the football stadium and coverage by Arab and Hebrew sports media to illustrate and analyse this battle over meaning. The Hebrew sports media, the Arab sports press, and the Arab audience are three different agents that attach divergent meanings to the notable presence of Arab players in the Israeli football leagues. The article argues that the overlapping interests of the Hebrew sports media on the one hand and the Arab football fans, players, and bureaucrats on the other lead to the construction of the football sphere as an integrative enclave in the general Israeli public sphere. The article considers the relevance of Gramsci's theory of hegemony to explain the production of the integrative meaning of football, and it suggests integrating this explanation with other recent theories regarding the tensions between different discourses of citizenship.     

RESPECTING AUTONOMY WITHOUT DISCLOSING INFORMATION

There is widespread agreement that it would be both morally and legally wrong to treat a competent patient, or to carry out research with a competent participant, without the voluntary consent of that patient or research participant. Furthermore, in medical ethics it is generally taken that that consent must be informed. The most widely given reason for this has been that informed consent is needed to respect the patient's or research participant's autonomy. In this article I set out to challenge this claim by considering in detail each of the three most prominent ways in which ‘autonomy’ has been conceptualized in the medical ethics literature. I will argue that whilst these accounts support the claim that consent is needed if the treatment of competent patients, or research on competent individuals, is to respect their autonomy, they do not support the claim that informed consent is needed for this purpose.     

Minority status in an ethnic democracy: The status of the Arab minority in Israel

It is commonly assumed that democracy in deeply divided societies takes either a majoritarian or consociational form. While the state in both types is ethnically neutral, there are some countries that combine viable democratic institutions with institutionalized ethnic dominance. The article introduces this third, so far not recognized, general type of ‘ethnic democracy’ and demonstrates its utility for Israel in treating its Arab minority. The tensions and contradictions in Israel's dual character as a Jewish democratic state give rise to five Arab demands that the Jewish majority reject: making Israel non‐Jewish and non‐Zionist, accepting Palestinian nationalism, lifting all restrictions on Arab individual rights, granting Arabs certain national collective rights and incorporating Arabs into the national power structure. Each Arab demand is discussed in detail and the rationale for Jewish objections is spelled out. The problem can be reduced, but not resolved, by establishing a separate Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip for the Palestinian people and by according Israeli Arabs the status of a Palestinian national minority within the Jewish state. These issues are not unique to Israel but rather common to ethnic democracies. It is concluded that the Israeli experience is becoming increasingly relevant to states which are democratizing but keeping appreciable ethnic dominance.     

White folks: race and identity in rural America

Abstract

Since the breakdown of the Middle East Peace Summit at Camp David in 2000 and the start of the second Palestinian Intifada there has been a voluminous literature that asserts that hostility to Israel and Zionism is a new form of anti-Semitism. This essay critiques the ‘new anti-Semitism’ view. Reversing the method that Plato uses in the Republic, the analysis moves from microcosm (an imaginary ride on a London bus) to macrocosm (the Middle East). In the process, the author argues that anti-Semitism is best defined not by an attitude to Jews but by the figure of ‘the Jew’. In the light of the analysis, and bearing in mind the variety of possible reasons for hostility to Israel or Zionism, it is difficult to see how the ‘new anti-Semitism’ view can be sustained.     

On Cognitive and Moral Enhancement: A Reply to Savulescu and Persson

In a series of recent works, Julian Savulescu and Ingmar Persson insist that, given the ease by which irreversible destruction is achievable by a morally wicked minority, (i) strictly cognitive bio‐enhancement is currently too risky, while (ii) moral bio‐enhancement is plausibly morally mandatory (and urgently so). This article aims to show that the proposal Savulescu and Persson advance relies on several problematic assumptions about the separability of cognitive and moral enhancement as distinct aims. Specifically, we propose that the underpinnings of Savulescu's and Persson's normative argument unravel once it is suitably clear how aiming to cognitively enhance an individual will in part require that one aim to bring about certain moral goods we show to be essential to cognitive flourishing; conversely, aiming to bring about moral enhancement in an individual must involve aiming to improve certain cognitive capacities we show to be essential to moral flourishing. After developing these points in some detail, and their implication for Savulescu's & Persson's proposal, we conclude by outlining some positive suggestions.     

Migrant deportability: Israel and Ireland as case studies

This article critiques policies of deportation and deportability – a technology emanating from three seemingly conflicting rationalities: states' obligations under international human rights regimes, capitalism's need to facilitate the movement of labour, and the need to reaffirm state sovereignty. After outlining the concept of deportability, we argue that although justified by state actors as an integral part of asylum and immigration policies, deportability epitomizes the paradox of immigration regimes at a point of crisis. We use Israel and Ireland as case studies to illustrate that migrant deportability circumvents human rights and domestic legislation that hinder the power of the state to deport unwanted migrants. Paradoxically, in both, policies that engender the deportability of asylum seekers are a response to their undeportability. Despite their differences, Israel and Ireland are unusual immigration destinations and quintessential diaspora nations, whose histories of dispersal configure Jewishness and Irishness in ethno-racially rigid yet spatially fluid terms, as illustrated by their citizenship regimes.     

Arab sounds in a contested space: life quality,cultural hierarchies and national silencing

Sounds and sonic norms and regimes characterize both spaces/territories and individual bodies. This article explores the meanings of and reactions to Arab sounds in Israel – political struggles over muezzins, stereotypical representations of Israeli Palestinians as loud, and so on – in order to offer general insights into the role of the sonic (both actual sounds and their discursive representations) in the new ‘cultural’ racism, in the everyday ethnicized experience of one's body, and in shaping relations between ethnic and national groups.     

Medicine Among New Immigrants and Arab Minorities in Israel

The reaction to modern medicine and the general health of the new immigrants and Arab populations of Israel are described. The material was gathered during a threemonth visit to Israel where the author participated in the medical care of these persons. While these peoples still share many of the traditional medical superstitions and practices, the new immigrants have progressed much more during the 16 years of Israel''s existence. At present over 99% of Jewish women give birth in hospital, whereas only 65% of Israeli Arabs do. The infant mortality rate among the Jews in 1963 was about 21 deaths per 1000 live births, about one-half the rate for Arabs. The importance of understanding the cultural background and social conflicts of these people as a preliminary to the provision of proper medical care is stressed.     

Covert moral bioenhancement,public health,and autonomy

In a recent article in this journal, Parker Crutchfield argues that if moral bioenhancement ought to be compulsory, as some authors claim, then it ought to be covert, i.e., performed without the knowledge of the population that is being morally enhanced. Crutchfield argues that since the aim of compulsory moral bioenhancement is to prevent ultimate harm to the population, compulsory moral bioenhancement is best categorized as a public health issue, and should therefore be governed by the norms and values that apply in public health settings. In this article, I argue for two related claims. First, I question the extent to which compulsory moral enhancement should be considered a public health issue that ought to be governed by the norms and values that apply in public health settings. Second, I argue that Crutchfield's argument that covert moral bioenhancement would better respect people's autonomy than an overt program overlooks two important autonomy‐based reasons that, in fact, favor an overt moral enhancement program over a covert one.     

Corrective conversion: unsettling citizens and the politics of inclusion in Israel

Gauri Viswanathan's notion of religious conversion as an ‘unsettling’ political event has recently figured prominently in the scholarship on conversion. However, although numerous scholars have productively applied Viswanathan's understanding in their work, primarily in the context of conversion to religious minorities within the nation‐state, to focus too heavily on conversion's unsettling effects risks overlooking political constellations in which it might have rather settling effects. In contrast to the scholarly focus on conversion's disruptive qualities, this article offers an ethnographic account of the ‘settling’ ambitions and logics that underwrite the state politics of Jewish conversion (giur) in contemporary Israel. By looking ethnographically into the mundane discursive, pedagogic, and bureaucratic processes through which the Jewish state converts non‐Jewish immigrants from the former Soviet Union, I demonstrate how religious conversion works to restore the bureaucratic logic of Israeli nationalism, thereby reinstating unambiguous forms of Jewish belonging. Religious conversion can also be an act of taxonomic repair.     

A moral argument for frozen human embryo adoption

Some people (e.g., Drs. Paul and Susan Lim) and, with them, organizations (e.g., the National Embryo Donation Center) believe that, morally speaking, the death of a frozen human embryo is a very bad thing. With such people and organizations in mind, the question to be addressed here is as follows: if one believes that the death of a frozen embryo is a very bad thing, ought, morally speaking, one prevent the death of at least one frozen embryo via embryo adoption? By way of a three-premise argument, one of which is a moral principle first introduced by Peter Singer, my answer to this question is: at least some of those who believe this ought to. (Just who the “some” are is identified in the paper.) If this is correct, then, for said people, preventing the death of a frozen embryo via embryo adoption is not a morally neutral matter; it is, instead, a morally laden one. Specifically, their intentional refusal to prevent the death of a frozen embryo via embryo adoption is, at a minimum, morally criticizable and, arguably, morally forbidden. Either way, it is, to one extent or another, a moral failing.