WHAT CAN HISTORY DO FOR BIOETHICS?

This article details the relationship between history and bioethics. I argue that historians' reluctance to engage with bioethics rests on a misreading of the field as solely reducible to applied ethics, and overlooks previous enthusiasm for historical perspectives. I claim that seeing bioethics as its practitioners see it – as an interdisciplinary meeting ground – should encourage historians to collaborate in greater numbers. I conclude by outlining how bioethics might benefit from new histories of the field, and how historians can lend a fresh perspective to bioethical debates.     

Queer reproduction revisited and why race,class and citizenship still matters: A response to Cristina Richie

In the dialogue between Timothy F. Murphy and Cristina Richie about queer bioethics and queer reproduction in this journal, significant points of the emergent and extremely important discussions on lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender (LGBT) and queer bioethics are raised. Richie specifies correctly that queer bioethics can either complement or contradict LGBT bioethics and the queer standpoint against heteroconformity and heterofuturity is decisive here. As the field of queer bioethics is such a recent and essential part of consideration for bioethics and as it is still evolving, the objective of this intervention is to provide both an overview of important milestones of queer bioethics and to highlight that queer bioethics is not mono‐logic and monolithic. To exemplify queer bioethic's ‘many‐headed monsters’, queer reproduction is revisited and complemented by a European viewpoint. It is central to my argument and here I disagree with Richie that to be against heterofuturity does not necessarily mean to be against queer reproduction. However, I also argue that there are other reasons why queer reproduction should not be pursued at all costs. Finally, I discuss the most recent debates on race, class and citizenship, for example, queer necropolitics. These points still need to be addressed in queer bioethical agendas.     

Beyond the Sterility of a Distinct African Bioethics: Addressing the Conceptual Bioethics Lag in Africa

In the current debate on the future of bioethics in Africa, several authors have argued for a distinct communitarian African bioethics that can counter the dominancy of Western atomistic principlism in contemporary bioethics. In this article I examine this rather contentious argument and evaluate its validity and viability. Firstly, I trace the contextual origins of contemporary bioethics and highlight the rise and dominance of principlism. I particularly note that principlism was premised on a content‐thin notion of the common morality that is in need of enrichment. I also contend that bioethics is essentially two‐dimensional, being both conceptual and empirical, and indicate the lag in Africa with regard to conceptual bioethics. I then appeal for authentic engagement by 1) African health care professionals, 2) African health care training institutions, 3) Africa's bioethics development partners, and 4) African bioethicists and philosophers, towards addressing this critical lag. I underline the need to maintain the essential universality of bioethics as a discipline. I particularly argue against the pursuit of a distinct African bioethics, as it appears to be rooted in sterile African ethno‐philosophy. Rather, African bioethicists and philosophers would do well to elucidate the universalisability of insights from traditional African thought, for the benefit of bioethics as a whole. Thus we must engage beyond the sterility of a distinct African bioethics ‐ authentically reflecting on the essentially universal contemporary bioethical concerns ‐ to effectively articulate a viable trajectory for bioethics in Africa.     

A critique of the principle of ‘respect for autonomy’, grounded in African thought

I give an account how the principle of ‘respect for autonomy’ dominates the field of bioethics, and how it came to triumph over its competitors, ‘respect for persons’ and ‘respect for free power of choice’. I argue that ‘respect for autonomy’ is unsatisfactory as a basic principle of bioethics because it is grounded in too individualistic a worldview, citing concerns of African theorists and other communitarians who claim that the principle fails to acknowledge the fundamental importance of understanding persons within the nexus of their communal relationships. I defend the claim that ‘respect for persons’ is a more appropriate principle, as it is able to acknowledge both individual decision making and the essential relationality of persons. I acknowledge that my preference for ‘respect for persons’ is problematic because of the important debate around the definition of ‘personhood’ in bioethics discourse. Relying on Thaddeus Metz's conception of moral status, I propose a relational definition of personhood that distinguishes between persons with agency and persons without agency, arguing that we have different moral obligations to these distinct categories of persons. I claim that this conception of personhood is better able to accommodate our moral intuitions than conventional approaches, and that it is able to do so without being speciesist or question‐begging.     

Two Agendas for Bioethics: Critique and Integration

Many bioethicists view the primary task of bioethics as ‘value clarification’. In this article, I argue that the field must embrace two more ambitious agendas that go beyond mere clarification. The first agenda, critique, involves unmasking, interrogating, and challenging the presuppositions that underlie bioethical discourse. These largely unarticulated premises establish the boundaries within which problems can be conceptualized and solutions can be imagined. The function of critique, then, is not merely to clarify these premises but to challenge them and the boundaries they define. The second agenda, integration, involves honoring and unifying what is right in competing values. Integration is the morally ideal response to value conflict, offering the potential for transcending win/lose outcomes. The function of integration, then, is to envision actions or policies that not only resolve conflicts, but that do so by jointly realizing many genuine values in deep and compelling ways. My argument proceeds in stages. After critically examining the role and dominant status of value clarification in bioethical discourse, I describe the nature and value of the two agendas, identify concrete examples of where each has been and could be successful, and explain why a critical integrative bioethics – one that appreciates the joint necessity and symbiotic potential of the two agendas – is crucial to the future of the field. The ultimate goal of all of this is to offer a more compelling vision for how bioethics might conduct itself within the larger intellectual and social world it seeks to understand and serve.     

Lessons from Queer Bioethics: A Response to Timothy F. Murphy

‘Bioethics still has important work to do in helping to secure status equality for LGBT people’ writes Timothy F. Murphy in a recent Bioethics editorial. The focus of his piece, however, is much narrower than human rights, medical care for LGBT people, or ending the HIV/AIDS pandemic. Rather, he is primarily concerned with sexuality and gender identity, and the medical intersections thereof (i.e. DSM diagnosis; access to SrS or ARTs). It is the objective of this response to provide an alternate account of bioethics from a Queer perspective. I will situate Queer bioethics within Queer studies, and offer three ‘lessons’ that bioethics can derive from this perspective. These are not definitive rules for Queer bioethics, since it is a field which fundamentally opposes categorizations, favoring pastiche over principles. These lessons are exploratory examples, which both complement and contradict LGBT bioethics. My latter two lessons – on environmental bioethics and disability – overlap with some of Murphy's concerns, as well as other conceptions of LGBT bioethics. However, the first lesson takes an antithetical stance to Murphy's primary focus by resisting all forms of heteroconformity and disavowing reproduction as consonant with Queer objectives and theory. The first lesson, which doubles as a primer in Queer theory, does heavy philosophical lifting for the remainder of the essay. This response to Timothy F. Murphy, whose work is certainly a legacy in bioethics, reveals the multiplicity of discourses in LGBT/Queer studies, many of which are advantageous – even essential – to other disciplines like bioethics.     

An African theory of bioethics: reply to MacPherson and Macklin

In a prior issue of Developing World Bioethics, Cheryl Macpherson and Ruth Macklin critically engaged with an article of mine, where I articulated a moral theory grounded on indigenous values salient in the sub-Saharan region, and then applied it to four major issues in bioethics, comparing and contrasting its implications with those of the dominant Western moral theories, utilitarianism and Kantianism. In response to my essay, Macpherson and Macklin have posed questions about: whether philosophical justifications are something with which bioethicists ought to be concerned; why something counts as 'African'; how medicine is a moral enterprise; whether an individual right to informed consent is consistent with sub-Saharan values; and when thought experiments help to establish firm conclusions about moral status. These are important issues for the field, and I use this reply to take discussion of them a step or two farther, defending my initial article from Macpherson's and Macklin's critical questions and objections.     

Was bioethics founded on historical and conceptual mistakes about medical paternalism?

Bioethics has a founding story in which medical paternalism, the interference with the autonomy of patients for their own clinical benefit, was an accepted ethical norm in the history of Western medical ethics and was widespread in clinical practice until bioethics changed the ethical norms and practice of medicine. In this paper I show that the founding story of bioethics misreads major texts in the history of Western medical ethics. I also show that a major source for empirical claims about the widespread practice of medical paternalism has been misread. I then show that that bioethics based on its founding story deprofessionalizes medical ethics. The result leaves the sick exposed to the predatory power of medical practitioners and healthcare organizations with only their autonomy-based rights to non-interference, expressed in contracts, to protect them. The sick are stripped of the protection afforded by a professional, fiduciary relationship of physicians to their patients. Bioethics based on its founding story reverts to the older model of a contractual relationship between the sick and medical practitioners not worthy of intellectual or moral trust (because such trust cannot be generated by what I call 'deprofessionalizing bioethics'). On closer examination, bioethics based on its founding story, ironically, eliminates paternalism as a moral category in bioethics, thus causing bioethics to collapse on itself because it denies one of the necessary conditions for medical paternalism. Bioethics based on its founding story should be abandoned.     

Reviewing Literature in Bioethics Research: Increasing Rigour in Non‐Systematic Reviews

The recent interest in systematic review methods in bioethics has highlighted the need for greater transparency in all literature review processes undertaken in bioethics projects. In this article, I articulate features of a good bioethics literature review that does not aim to be systematic, but rather to capture and analyse the key ideas relevant to a research question. I call this a critical interpretive literature review. I begin by sketching and comparing three different types of literature review conducted in bioethics scholarship. Then, drawing on Dixon‐Wood's concept of critical interpretive synthesis, I put forward six features of a good critical interpretive literature review in bioethics: answering a research question, capturing the key ideas relevant to the research question, analysing the literature as a whole, generating theory, not excluding papers based on rigid quality assessment criteria, and reporting the search strategy.     

What has bioethics to offer the developing countries

My paper consists of three parts. In the first part I try to explain the intellectual basis of bioethics in developing countries. In the second part I describe the bioethical dilemmas facing these countries. In the third part I shall discuss the changes that have to be made in bioethics if it is to take root in these countries, and thereby help them to improve the human existence.     

THE FUTURE OF BIOETHICS: THREE DOGMAS AND A CUP OF HEMLOCK

In this paper I argue that bioethics is in crisis and that it will not have a future unless it begins to embrace a more Socratic approach to its leading assumptions. The absence of a critical and sceptical spirit has resulted in little more than a dominant ideology. I focus on three key issues. First, that too often bioethics collapses into medical ethics. Second, that medical ethics itself is beset by a lack of self‐reflection that I characterize here as a commitment to three dogmas. Third, I offer a more positive perspective by suggesting how bioethics may benefit from looking towards public health ethics as a new source of inspiration and direction.     

The presence and influence of religion in American bioethics

From the inception of the relatively short history of American bioethics in the mid-to-late 1960s, the place of religion in this field has been complex and controversial. It has also been a subject of more than casual interest and concern to bioethicists, and to an array of medical and non-medical groups in U.S. society for whom the activities and issues in which bioethics is engaged have ongoing import. The questions and the tensions linked to the status and influence of religion in the sphere of bioethics have ramifications that extend beyond bioethics and biomedicine into matters involving the relationship of religion to the institutional structure of American society--most particularly its political, legal foundations, and realm of public affairs--and to its cultural attributes and tradition. It is within this larger perspective that we will consider the association between American bioethics and religion. Our analysis includes two case studies: (1) how, in the early years of bioethics, a pioneering organization in the field dealt with the "redefinition of death" in its discussions and in a major medical journal publication; and (2) the way in which the most recently appointed federal bioethics commission, the National Bioethics Advisory Commission, involved religion in its work on cloning and stem cell research.     

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS: THE ETHICS OF RECOGNITION, RESPONSIBILITY, AND RESPECT

Ethics can be understood as a code of behaviour or as the study of codes of behaviour. While the mission of the International Association of Bioethics is a scholarly examination of moral issues in health care and the biological sciences, many people in the field believe that it is also their task to create new and better codes of practice. Both ways of doing bioethics are sound, but it is important to be aware of the distinction. In this paper, I will study the sources and aims of ethics and suggest a code of conduct for bioethicists based on recognition, responsibility, and respect.     

Is an account of identity necessary for bioethics? What post-genomic biomedicine can teach us

Is a theory of identity necessary for bioethics? In this paper I investigate that question starting from an empirical explication of identity based on post-genomics, in particular on epigenetics. After analysing whether the classic problems a theory of identity has to cope with (fictional transplants; conjoined twins; and definition of death) also affect the proposed epigenetic account of identity, I deal with three topics (the assumption of moral responsibility; decision maintenance in the case of advance directives; and the attribution of value to human beings at given developmental stages) to offer an insight on the relationship between that account and bioethics.     

Ecoethics: Now Central to All Ethics

A few years ago, I wrote on the need for expansion of the environmental areas of bioethics, and covered some of the topics touched on here. Sadly, although it is possible to find some notable exceptions, bioethics does not provide much of an ethical base for considering human-nature relationships. Here I’m not going to deal with these philosophical issues or others about the nature of ethical decision-making. The rapid worsening of the human predicament means that applied ethical issues with a significant environmental connection (what I call “ecoethics”), must be dealt with without waiting for the more interesting theoretical issues to be resolved. I define ecoethics very broadly to deal with dilemmas over a vast range of scales, and believe they now should penetrate virtually all areas of human activities. Ecoethics must struggle with issues of intra-generational (and interperson/group/nation) equity and the dilemmas of discounting by distance (valuing distant persons/events/costs/benefits less than those closer to the observer in physical or mental distance). Ecoethics also deals with the difficult dilemma of inter-generational equity—of discounting the future. That is especially troublesome when actions today can have significant environmental consequences 50 or more generations from now. Here I would like to highlight the ubiquity of those questions and the importance of seeking answers.     

The intellectual basis of bioethics in Southern European countries

Today the Western world harbors, at least, three very different ethical traditions, each with its own characteristics: the Anglo-Saxon, the Northern (or Central) European, and the Mediterranean. Because modern bioethics made its appearance in the Anglo-American culture, Europeans in general, and Mediterraneans in particular, have attempted not simply to "import" or "translate" bioethics, but rather to "recreate" or "remake" the discipline according to their own cultural and ethical traditions. In my presentation, I would like to explain the peculiarities of Mediterranean bioethics, analyzing the following seven points: First, how they think bioethics should be philosophically founded; Second, the Mediterranean ethics of virtue and the doctor-patient relationship; Third, the relationship between Ethics and Law; Fourth, Health Care Systems and Ethics, Fifth, the problems concerning patient rights; Sixth, ethics by Committees; and finally, some general conclusions.     

Bioethics for human geneticists: models for reasoning and methods for teaching.

The ethical issues raised by the Human Genome Project (HGP) and by human genetics in general are not entirely novel. In fact, the ethical issues surrounding genetic research and the provision of genetic services fit into the evolution of bioethics, a field of inquiry which has its roots in concerns of the 1970s, concerns about the dignity and self-determination of individuals and about the development of medical technologies. Although bioethics has been largely occupied with patient-centered concerns, attention is currently shifting toward socially oriented issues, such as the justice of the existing health-care system. Genetic counseling has already incorporated many of the lessons of early bioethics and, as a profession, adheres to a consultand-centered ethic which reflects the values incorporated into the doctrine of informed consent, which is a cornerstone of bioethics. The mandate of the Ethical, Legal, and Social Implications Program of the HGP--to anticipate ethical problems arising from advances in genetics and to educate the public about genetics--reflects not only the nonpaternalistic approach of early bioethics but also bioethics' increasing attention to the ethical import of systemic and institutional factors, as well as an anticipatory and preventive approach to dealing with ethical concerns. Because bioethics has so much to contribute to current consideration of ethical issues in human genetics, it is important to provide training in ethics to those working in the field. Guidelines for using a case-oriented approach are suggested.     

Biothics in Brazil

In this article the authors briefly sketch the nature of Brazilian bioethics. Bioethics emerged in Brazil later than in other Western countries and the 1990's were the most important period for the spread of the discipline in the country. It is in this period that some structural elements of bioethics were established, such as research groups, regulation of Local Research Ethics Committees (Comitês Locais de Ética em Pesquisa – CEP), the creation of the National Commission of Ethics in Research with Human Beings (Comissão Nacional de Ética em Pesquisa com Seres Humanos – CONEP) and the Brazilian Bioethics Society (Sociedade Brasileira de Bioética – SBB). With regard to theoretical work, Brazilian bioethics is clearly an importer of theories from countries central to the studies of bioethics, or, in another words, countries where bioethics first emerged and was established. The most commonly used theory among Brazilian researchers is principlism     

Bioethics and activism: A natural fit?

Bioethics is a practically oriented discipline that developed to address pressing ethical issues arising from developments in the life sciences. Given this inherent practical bent, some form of advocacy or activism seems inherent to the nature of bioethics. However, there are potential tensions between being a bioethics activist, and academic ideals. In academic bioethics, scholarship involves reflection, rigour and the embrace of complexity and uncertainty. These values of scholarship seem to be in tension with being an activist, which requires pragmatism, simplicity, certainty and, above all, action. In this paper I explore this apparent dichotomy, using the case example of my own involvement in international efforts to end forced organ harvesting from prisoners of conscience in China. I conclude that these tensions can be managed and that academic bioethics requires a willingness to be activist.