Preservation for Science: The Ecological Society of America and the Campaign for Glacier Bay National Monument

Between 1917 and 1945, the Ecological Society of America (ESA) housed a Committee for the Preservation of Natural Conditions specifically charged with identifying and taking political action toward the preservation of wilderness sites for scientific study. While several historians have analyzed the social and political contexts of the Preservation Committee, none has addressed the scientific context that gave rise to the Committee and to political activism by ESA members. Among the Preservation Committee's lobbying efforts, the naming of Glacier Bay, Alaska, as a national monument in 1925 stands out as a unique success. I argue that the campaign for the preservation of Glacier Bay reveals the methodological ambitions ecologists had for their science in the 1920s and 1930s and demonstrates how ecologists understood the role of place in biological field studies. It represented preservation for science. Most of the political activities undertaken by the ESA in the interwar years, however, turned out to be science for conservation, which rarely involved lobbying for the protection of active research sites. In conjunction with changes in ecological methodology in the 1940s, the Committee's unclear scientific mission contributed to its being disbanded in 1945.     

Why do we need signs in biological systems?

This paper addresses a fundamental question: Why are there sign-mediated interactions in biology? According to Polanyi, biological hierarchies are constituted through boundary conditions. I argue that signs, or more accurately the processes of signification, function as these boundary conditions. Moreover, based on general insights from the physics of computation, I argue that the organism cannot be computed directly from the DNA without the loss of critical information. In this context, signs as boundary conditions mediate the biological construction in a way that prevents the loss of information and destabilization of the DNA.     

Explanatory pluralism in evolutionary biology

The ontological dependence of one domain on another is compatible with the explanatory autonomy of the less basic domain. That autonomy results from the fact that the relationship between two domains can be very complex. In this paper I distinguish two different types of complexity, two ways the relationship between domains can fail to be transparent, both of which are relevant to evolutionary biology. Sometimes high level explanations preserve a certain type of causal or counterfactual information which would be lost at the lower level; I argue that this is central to the proper understanding of the adaptationist program. Sometimes high level kinds are multiply realised by lower level kinds: I argue that this is central to the understanding of macroevolution.     

Our flawed approach to undue inducement in medical research

Some worry that offering too much money to participate in medical research can seduce people into participating against their better judgment. These overly attractive offers that impair judgment are often referred to as ‘undue inducements’. The current approach to prevent undue inducement is to limit the size of such offers. The hope is that smaller offers will not be attractive enough to impair judgment. Even if this is true, I argue that we should reject this solution. In Section 1, I go over the problem of undue inducement, and our current approach to preventing it, in more detail. In Section 2, I argue that, like money, therapeutic benefits of medical research may also unduly induce. In Section 3, I argue that the current approach to preventing undue inducement is absurd in the case of therapeutic inducements. In Section 4, I argue that our current approach is analogously problematic in the case of monetary inducements.     

Informed consent and the misattributed paternity problem in genetic counseling

When misattributed paternity is discovered in the course of genetic testing, a genetic counselor is presented with a dilemma concerning whether to reveal this information to the clients. She is committed to treating the clients equally and enabling informed decision making, but disclosing the information may carry consequences for the woman that the counselor cannot judge in advance. A frequent suggestion aimed at avoiding this problem is to include the risk of discovering nonpaternity in the informed consent process for counseling. In this paper I argue that such a move does not resolve the problem, because the conflict hinges on the interpretation of equality on which the counselor operates. Given the principles of genetic counseling, neither construal of equality yields a satisfactory solution to the conflict. In fact, I conclude that including nonpaternity in informed consent is not endorsed by either view, and we are still left with the question of what to do should nonpaternity be discovered. I suggest a compromise position concerning disclosure, involving revealing relevant genetic information but withholding nonpaternity when possible.     

Do Organisms Exist?

What is the status of organisms in modern evolutionary biology?I argue that this is a question which centers on the questionof reduction, and towards a complete answer, I pursue issuesthrough three different senses of the term: ontological, methodological,and epistemological. The first sense refers to the ultimatestatus of the entities of the organic world, and in this senseI argue that organisms have no special status. The second senserefers to the question of organization, and I argue that inthe light of modern evolutionary biology organisms do have adistinctive "design-like" organization. The third sense refersto the relationship between theories, in particular to whetherthe theories of the biological sciences can be shown to be logicalconsequences of the theories of the physical sciences. I arguethat such reduction may be possible in principle but difficultin practice. However, from the perspective of the working scientist,this hardly matters. In conclusion, I argue that in some respectsorganisms are not distinctive and in other respects they are.Certainly biologists need not worry for the autonomy of theirsubject.     

Cluster randomization and political philosophy

In this paper, I will argue that, while the ethical issues raised by cluster randomization can be challenging, they are not new. My thesis divides neatly into two parts. In the first, easier part I argue that many of the ethical challenges posed by cluster randomized human subjects research are clearly present in other types of human subjects research, and so are not novel. In the second, more difficult part I discuss the thorniest ethical challenge for cluster randomized research--cases where consent is genuinely impractical to obtain. I argue that once again these cases require no new analytic insight; instead, we should look to political philosophy for guidance. In other words, the most serious ethical problem that arises in cluster randomized research also arises in political philosophy.     

Against the inalienable right to withdraw from research

In this paper I argue, against the current consensus, that the right to withdraw from research is sometimes alienable. In other words, research subjects are sometimes morally permitted to waive their right to withdraw. The argument proceeds in three major steps. In the first step, I argue that rights typically should be presumed alienable, both because that is not illegitimately coercive and because the general paternalistic motivation for keeping them inalienable is untenable. In the second step of the argument, I consider three special characteristics of the right to withdraw, first that its waiver might be exploitative, second that research involves intimate bodily access, and third that it is irreversible. I argue that none of these characteristics justify an inalienable right to withdraw. In the third step, I examine four considerations often taken to justify various other allegedly inalienable rights: concerns about treating yourself merely as a means as might be the case in suicide, concerns about revoking all your future freedoms in slavery contracts, the resolution of coordination problems, and public interest. I argue that the motivations involved in these four types of situations do not apply to the right to withdraw from research.     

Against Harmful Research on Non‐Agreeing Children

The Code of Federal Regulations permits harmful research on children who have not agreed to participate, but I will argue that it should be no more permissive of harmful research on such children than of harmful research on adults who have not agreed to participate. Of course, the Code permits harmful research on adults. Such research is not morally problematic, however, because adults must agree to participate. And, of course, the Code also permits beneficial research on children without needing their explicit agreement. This sort of research is also not problematic, this time because paternalism towards children may be justifiable. The moral problem at the center of this paper arises from the combination of two potential properties of pediatric research, first that it might be harmful and second that its subjects might not agree to participate. In Section 2 of this article I explain how the Code permits harmful research on non‐agreeing children. Section 3 contains my argument that we should no more permit harmful research on non‐agreeing children than on non‐agreeing adults. In Section 4, I argue that my thesis does not presuppose that pediatric assent has the same moral force that adult consent does. In Section 5, I argue that the distinction between non‐voluntary and involuntary research is irrelevant to my thesis. In Section 6, I rebut an objection based on the power of parental permission. In Section 7 I suggest how the Code of Federal Regulations might be changed.     

Information,influence, and the causal-explanatory role of content in understanding receiver responses

Sceptics of informational terminology argue that by attributing content to signals, we fail to address nonhuman animal communication on its own terms. Primarily, we ignore that communication is sender driven: i.e. driven by the intrinsic physical properties of signals, themselves the result of selection pressures acting on signals to influence receivers in ways beneficial for senders. In contrast, information proponents argue that this ignores the degree to which communication is, in fact, receiver driven. The latter argue that an exclusive focus on the intrinsic mechanical properties of signals cannot explain why receivers respond as they do. This is because receivers are not prisoners of sender influence. They possess response flexibility, and so we can only explain why receivers respond to signals as they do by positing that receivers ‘derive information’ from signals. I argue that, while basically true, this response flexibility can take one of two forms depending on the causal-explanatory role of information in understanding the response of the receiver: diachronic, on the one hand; and synchronic, on the other. In species with diachronic response flexibility only, information is derived by receivers from signals in a minimal sense. In such cases, information is an ultimate explanatory construct: one underpinned by historical facts at the population level. Alternatively, in species with synchronic response flexibility, information is derived by receivers from signals in a richer sense. Here, information is a proximate explanatory construct: one underpinned by cognitive-mechanistic facts at the level of the individual organism. Without recognising the different ways information can be derived from signals, and the different causal-explanatory roles (ultimate vs proximate) information can play in understanding alternate kinds of receiver flexibility (diachronic vs synchronic), proponents of information leave themselves open to the charge of anthropomorphising some signalling systems.     

Ambiguities and Asymmetries in Consent and Refusal: Reply to Manson

John Harris claims that is it ‘palpable nonsense’ to suggest that ‘a child (or anyone) might competently consent to a treatment but not be competent to refuse it.’ In ‘Transitional Paternalism: How Shared Normative Powers Give Rise to the Asymmetry of Adolescent Consent and Refusal’ Neil Manson aims to explain away the apparent oddness of this asymmetry of consent and refusal, by appealing to the idea of shared normative powers, presenting joint bank accounts as an example. In this article, I will argue that Manson's account fails to explain away the oddness. Rather, I will argue that there are ambiguities to which Manson has not paid sufficient attention. In fact, as odd as it may sound, I argue that Manson actually agrees with Harris (at least in relation to the asymmetry of competence). He fails to recognize that he agrees with Harris because he is not careful enough to distinguish between different asymmetries, which I have labelled the asymmetries of choice, permissibility and competence.     

Should we use Commitment Contracts to Regulate Student use of Cognitive Enhancing Drugs?

Are universities justified in trying to regulate student use of cognitive enhancing drugs? In this article I argue that they can be, but that the most appropriate kind of regulatory intervention is likely to be voluntary in nature. To be precise, I argue that universities could justifiably adopt a commitment contract system of regulation wherein students are encouraged to voluntarily commit to not using cognitive enhancing drugs (or to using them in a specific way). If they are found to breach that commitment, they should be penalized by, for example, forfeiting a number of marks on their assessments. To defend this model of regulation, I adopt a recently‐proposed evaluative framework for determining the appropriateness of enhancement in specific domains of activity, and I focus on particular existing types of cognitive enhancement drugs, not hypothetical or potential forms. In this way, my argument is tailored to the specific features of university education, and common patterns of usage among students. It is not concerned with the general ethical propriety of using cognitive enhancing drugs.     

Behavioral Epiphenomena Revisited: Reply to Skok and Škorjanc

In a recent article in this journal, Ethology, 2014 present arguments as to why fighting in piglets during suckling may not be an epiphenomenon as we had previously suggested Ethology, 119, 2013, 353 and provide several alternative explanations. Although the new information Skok and ?korjanc bring to this debate is carefully considered and important, I argue here that it is not sufficient to counter our original claim that fighting among piglets (and kittens) during suckling may be an epiphenomenon, a largely inconsequential by‐product, of developmental processes anticipating the use of these behaviors and associated anatomical structures in later functional contexts. However, the points Skok and ?korjanc raise contribute importantly to identifying areas where further information and experimental work are needed to resolve this and related behavioral issues. I therefore conclude that this debate, independent of any particular final outcome, constructively points to the general difficulty and need for caution in interpreting behavior in seemingly ‘obvious’ functional terms, and particularly during development.     

Do junior academic bioethicists have an obligation to be activists?

Activism and bioethics have enjoyed a somewhat strained relationship. In this paper, I consider activism specifically from the perspective of junior academics. I will argue that although there may be a prima facie duty for bioethicists to be activists, countervailing considerations for junior academics may mean that they, in particular, should refrain from undertaking activist activities. I will argue this on the basis of two key claims. First, I argue that activism may come at a potential cost to the academics who undertake it, and that these costs are potentially of greatest detriment to junior academics undertaking activism. Second, I argue that junior academics are likely to be less effective activists than established academics. Moreover, undertaking activism as a junior academic may prevent one from becoming an effective activist later. Finally, I will discuss the implications of this argument for activist commitments later in one’s career.     

Justice for children: the child as organ donor

I argue that parents ought to be allowed to authorize their child's participation as an organ donor for another family member. I introduce a model of decisionmaking for children in intimate families which I call Constrained Parental Autonomy. This model permits wide parental discretion which is constrained absolutely by a broadly defined principle of respect for persons. In general, parental authorization alone is sufficient but I argue that the respect for persons constraint prevents certain donations and requires the child's assent for other donations. I also consider two controversial implications of the application of this model: the objection that the model does not respect the child's right to bodily integrity, and the objection that the model does not and is unable to address intrafamilial disgreement.     

Coding and consent: moral challenges of the database project in Iceland

A major moral problem in relation to the deCODE genetics database project in Iceland is that the heavy emphasis placed on technical security of healthcare information has precluded discussion about the issue of consent for participation in the database. On the other hand, critics who have emphasised the issue of consent have most often demanded that informed consent for participation in research be obtained. While I think that individual consent is of major significance, I argue that this demand for informed consent is neither suitable nor desirable in this case. I distinguish between three aspects of the database and show that different types of consent are appropriate for each. In particular, I describe the idea of a written authorisation based on general information about the database as an alternative to informed consent and presumed consent in database research.     

Moral bioenhancement and agential risks: Good and bad outcomes

In Unfit for the Future, Ingmar Persson and Julian Savulescu argue that our collective existetial predicment is unprecedentedly dangerous due to climate change and terrorism. Given these global risks to human prosperity and survival, Persson and Savulescu argue that we should explore the radical possibility of moral bioenhancement in addition to cognitive enhancement. In this article, I argue that moral bioenhancements could nontrivially exacerbate the threat posed by certain kinds of malicious agents, while reducing the threat of other kinds. This introduces a previously undiscussed complication to Persson and Savulescu's proposal. In the final section, I present a novel argument for why moral bioenhancement should either be compulsory or not be made available to the public at all.     

Constitution and common law in bioethics

The use of rights based arguments to justify claims that donor offspring should have access to information identifying their gamete donor has become increasingly widespread. In this paper, I do not intend to revisit the debate about the validity of such rights. Rather, the purpose is to examine the way that such alleged rights have been implemented by those legislatures that have allowed access to identifying information. I will argue that serious inconsistencies exist between the claim that donor offspring have a right to know the identity of their gamete donor and the way such a right is currently met in practice. I hope to show that in systems where non-anonymous donation is practised, an understanding of the proclaimed right of donor offspring to know their genetic identity is one composed of two different rights – the right to know the circumstances of their conception and the right to information identifying the gamete donor – can provide important insights into this important area of public policy.     

Beneath the rhetoric: the role of rights in the practice of non-anonymous gamete donation

The use of rights based arguments to justify claims that donor offspring should have access to information identifying their gamete donor has become increasingly widespread. In this paper, I do not intend to revisit the debate about the validity of such rights. Rather, the purpose is to examine the way that such alleged rights have been implemented by those legislatures that have allowed access to identifying information. I will argue that serious inconsistencies exist between the claim that donor offspring have a right to know the identity of their gamete donor and the way such a right is currently met in practice. I hope to show that in systems where non-anonymous donation is practised, an understanding of the proclaimed right of donor offspring to know their genetic identity is one composed of two different rights – the right to know the circumstances of their conception and the right to information identifying the gamete donor – can provide important insights into this important area of public policy.