Keeping the benefits of group cooperation: domain-specific responses to distinct causes of social exclusion

Some people are especially physically adept, others carry dangerous pathogens, some have valuable and rare knowledge, and still others cheat or deceive those around them. Because of these differences, and the costs and benefits they pose, natural selection has crafted mechanisms of partner choice that are selective: some people are chosen as social partners, others are not. When people are not chosen as partners—when they are socially excluded—they lose access to important fitness benefits. Thus, the mind should have adaptations to recapture these benefits by regaining inclusion. Is there one best way to regain inclusion? This is unlikely because there are multiple causes of exclusion; a single response is unlikely to be successful across all possible causes. Instead, distinct causes of exclusion might require adaptively tailored responses. We test whether there are tailored responses to five possible causes of exclusion from a cooperative group: inability to contribute, pathogen infection, free riding, disrupting group coordination, and exit from the group. Our results show that different causes of exclusion lead to distinct profiles of emotions and behavior. Each emotion and behavior profile is adaptively specialized to reverse or mitigate its specific cause of exclusion. Our research shows how taking an evolutionary view of human sociality can help map the psychology of cooperation and exclusion.     

Partner choice in human evolution: The role of cooperation,foraging ability,and culture in Hadza campmate preferences

The ability to choose the partners we interact with is thought to have been an important driver in the evolution of human social behavior, and in particular, our propensity to cooperate. Studies showing that humans prefer to interact with cooperative others is often cited as support for partner choice driving the evolution of cooperation. However, these studies are largely drawn from Western samples, where conditions for partner choice to operate may be especially favorable. Here, we investigate qualities associated with being a preferred partner (i.e., campmate) in Hadza hunter-gatherers of Tanzania in 2016 and 2019. A total of 156 Hadza participants from 17 camps ranked their campmates on generosity, foraging ability, and their preference for them as future campmates. In 2016, Hadza preferred more generous people and better hunters as campmates, with evidence suggesting a stronger preference for better hunters; however, the relationship between generosity and being a preferred campmate was greater in 2019 than in 2016, such that the preference for generous people was stronger than the preference for better foragers, suggesting that campmate preferences are changing. These new findings contrast with reports on data from nearly a decade ago, suggesting that the Hadza do not prefer more cooperative campmates. Further, in 2019, there was anecdotal evidence that Hadza with greater exposure to outside cultural institutions (e.g., schooling, having a job, or living in a village) had a stronger preference for generous campmates than those with less exposure. Taken together, the results suggest that preferences for social partners may, in part, be culturally shaped.     

Integrating cooperative breeding into theoretical concepts of cooperation

In cooperative breeding systems, some individuals help to raise offspring that are not their own. While early explanations for such altruistic behaviour were predominantly based on kin selection, recent evidence suggests that direct benefits may be important in the maintenance of cooperation. To date, however, discussions of cooperative breeding have made little reference to more general theories of cooperation between unrelated individuals (while these theories rarely address cooperative breeding). Here, we attempt to integrate the two fields. We identify four key questions that can be used to categorise different mechanisms for the maintenance of cooperative behaviour: (1) whether or not individuals invest in others; (2) whether or not this initial investment elicits a return investment by the beneficiary; (3) whether the interaction is direct, i.e. between two partners, or indirect (involving third parties) and (4) whether only actions that increase the fitness of the partner or also fitness reducing actions (punishment) are involved in the interaction. Asking these questions with regards to concepts in the literature on cooperative breeding, we found that (a) it is often straightforward to relate these concepts to general mechanisms of cooperation, but that (b) a single term (such as 'pay-to-stay', 'group augmentation' or 'prestige') may sometimes subsume two or more distinct mechanisms, and that (c) at least some mechanisms that are thought to be important in cooperative breeding systems have remained largely unexplored in the theoretical literature on the evolution of cooperation. Future theoretical models should incorporate asymmetries in power and pay off structure caused for instance by dominance hierarchies or partner choice, and the use of N-player games. The key challenges for both theoreticians and empiricists will be to integrate the hitherto disparate fields and to disentangle the parallel effects of kin and non-kin based mechanisms of cooperation.     

Evolving intentions for social interaction: from entrainment to joint action

This article discusses four different scenarios to specify increasingly complex mechanisms that enable increasingly flexible social interactions. The key dimension on which these mechanisms differ is the extent to which organisms are able to process other organisms' intentions and to keep them apart from their own. Drawing on findings from ecological psychology, scenario 1 focuses on entrainment and simultaneous affordance in 'intentionally blind' individuals. Scenario 2 discusses how an interface between perception and action allows observers to simulate intentional action in others. Scenario 3 is concerned with shared perceptions, arising through joint attention and the ability to distinguish between self and other. Scenario 4 illustrates how people could form intentions to act together while simultaneously distinguishing between their own and the other's part of a joint action. The final part focuses on how combining the functionality of the four mechanisms can explain different forms of social interactions. It is proposed that basic interpersonal processes are put to service by more advanced functions that support the type of intentionality required to engage in joint action, cultural learning, and communication.     

Sex differences in political leadership in an egalitarian society

We test the contribution of sex differences in physical formidability, education, and cooperation to the acquisition of political leadership in a small-scale society. Among forager-farmers from the Bolivian Amazon, we find that men are more likely to exercise different forms of political leadership, including verbal influence during community meetings, coordination of community projects, and dispute resolution. We show that these differences in leadership are not due to gender per se but are associated with men's greater number of cooperation partners, greater access to schooling, and greater body size and physical strength. Men's advantage in cooperation partner number is tied to their participation in larger groups and to the opportunity costs of women's intrahousehold labor. We argue these results highlight the mutual influence of sexual selection and the sexual division of labor in shaping how women and men acquire leadership.     

No Short‐Term Contingency Between Grooming and Food Tolerance in Barbary Macaques (Macaca sylvanus)

The exchange of services such as allo‐grooming, allo‐preening, food tolerance and agonistic support has been observed in a range of species. Two proximate mechanisms have been proposed to explain the exchanges of services in animals. First, an animal can give a service to a partner depending on how the partner behaved towards it in the recent past. This mechanism is usually tested by examining the within‐dyad temporal relation between events given and received over short time periods. Second, the partner choice mechanism assumes that animals give favours towards specific partners but not others, by comparing how each partner behaved towards them over longer time frames. As such, the partner choice mechanism does not make specific predictions on a temporal contingency between services received and given over short time frames. While there is evidence for a long‐term positive correlation between services exchanged in animals, results for short‐term contingencies between services given and received are mixed. Our study investigated the exchange of grooming for food tolerance in a partially provisioned group of Barbary macaques, by analysing the short‐term contingency between these events. Tolerance over food was compared immediately after grooming and in control condition, using food of different shareability. We found no evidence that grooming increases food tolerance or decrease aggression around food in the short term. Food tolerance was affected by the shareability of the food and the sex of the partners. The exchanges of grooming and food tolerance in non‐human primates may be little affected by recent single events. We suggest that long‐term exchanges between services given and received and social partner choice may play a more important role in explaining social interactions than short‐term contingent events.     

Partner choice creates fairness in humans

Many studies demonstrate that partner choice has played an important role in the evolution of human cooperation, but little work has tested its impact on the evolution of human fairness. In experiments involving divisions of money, people become either over-generous or over-selfish when they are in competition to be chosen as cooperative partners. Hence, it is difficult to see how partner choice could result in the evolution of fair, equal divisions. Here, we show that this puzzle can be solved if we consider the outside options on which partner choice operates. We conduct a behavioural experiment, run agent-based simulations and analyse a game-theoretic model to understand how outside options affect partner choice and fairness. All support the conclusion that partner choice leads to fairness only when individuals have equal outside options. We discuss how this condition has been met in our evolutionary history, and the implications of these findings for our understanding of other aspects of fairness less specific than preferences for equal divisions of resources.     

Cooperation creates selection for tactical deception

Conditional social behaviours such as partner choice and reciprocity are held to be key mechanisms facilitating the evolution of cooperation, particularly in humans. Although how these mechanisms select for cooperation has been explored extensively, their potential to select simultaneously for complex cheating strategies has been largely overlooked. Tactical deception, the misrepresentation of the state of the world to another individual, may allow cheaters to exploit conditional cooperation by tactically misrepresenting their past actions and/or current intentions. Here we first use a simple game-theoretic model to show that the evolution of cooperation can create selection pressures favouring the evolution of tactical deception. This effect is driven by deception weakening cheater detection in conditional cooperators, allowing tactical deceivers to elicit cooperation at lower costs, while simple cheats are recognized and discriminated against. We then provide support for our theoretical predictions using a comparative analysis of deception across primate species. Our results suggest that the evolution of conditional strategies may, in addition to promoting cooperation, select for astute cheating and associated psychological abilities. Ultimately, our ability to convincingly lie to each other may have evolved as a direct result of our cooperative nature.     

Children’s Use of Communicative Intent in the Selection of Cooperative Partners

Within the animal kingdom, human cooperation represents an outlier. As such, there has been great interest across a number of fields in identifying the factors that support the complex and flexible variety of cooperation that is uniquely human. The ability to identify and preferentially interact with better social partners (partner choice) is proposed to be a major factor in maintaining costly cooperation between individuals. Here we show that the ability to engage in flexible and effective partner choice behavior can be traced back to early childhood. Specifically, across two studies, we demonstrate that by 3 years of age, children identify effective communication as “helpful” (Experiments 1 & 2), reward good communicators with information (Experiment 1), and selectively reciprocate communication with diverse cooperative acts (Experiment 2). Taken together, these results suggest that even in early childhood, humans take advantage of cooperative benefits, while mitigating free-rider risks, through appropriate partner choice behavior.     

Reputation-based partner choice is an effective alternative to indirect reciprocity in solving social dilemmas

When group interests clash with individual ones, maintaining cooperation poses a problem. However, cooperation can be facilitated by introducing reputational incentives. Through indirect reciprocity, people who cooperate in a social dilemma are more likely to receive cooperative acts from others. Another mechanism that enhances group cooperation is reputation-based partner choice, or competitive altruism. According to this framework, cooperators benefit via increased access to cooperative partners. Our study compared the effectiveness of indirect reciprocity and competitive altruism in re-establishing cooperation after the typical decline found during repeated public goods games. Twenty groups of four participants first played a series of public goods games, which confirmed the expected decline. Subsequently, public goods games were alternated with either indirect reciprocity games (in which participants had an opportunity to give to another individual from whom they would never receive a direct return) or competitive altruism games (in which they could choose partners for directly reciprocal interactions). We found that public goods game contributions increased when interspersed with competitive altruism games; they were also higher than in public goods games interspersed with indirect reciprocity games. Investing in reputation by increasing contributions to public goods was a profitable strategy in that it increased returns in subsequent competitive altruism and indirect reciprocity games. There was also some evidence that these returns were greater under competitive altruism than indirect reciprocity. Our findings indicate that strategic reputation building through competitive altruism provides an effective alternative to indirect reciprocity as a means for restoring cooperation in social dilemmas.     

When to diversify,and with whom? Choosing partners among out-group strangers in lowland Bolivia

Evidence from the ethnographic and archaeological records reveals that humans often rely on out-group relationships for access to non-local resources and resource buffering. However, little is known about how actors choose out-group cooperative partners. The existing literature suggests that (in-group) partner choice is based on characteristics associated with greater cooperation (e.g., trustworthiness and productivity). Is out-group partner choice based on the same criteria as in-group? Because out-groups may be unique sources of resource access, we suggest that out-group partner choice should track characteristics of both the candidate partner and the partner's group that are associated with benefits for the actor. To assess partner choice, we employed a non-anonymous, one-shot economic game where participants could allocate money towards in-group and out-group strangers. Participants were from three populations of Bolivian horticulturalists (n = 200) that range in their market integration and their mobility, thus capturing variation in potential benefits to out-group cooperation. We find that individual-level qualities of prospective partners, such as wealth and trustworthiness, affect allocation behavior differently for in-group vs out-group prospective partners. While we find no consistent effects of perceived group qualities on a donor's giving to in-group and out-group members, the relevance of out-group market resource access for Tsimane' donors' allocations suggests that, at least when it comes to dividing a limited resource, qualities associated with a group can affect partner preference. Taken together, results provide insight into patterns of intergroup relationship building that have been crucial in the human lineage.     

Selection for cheating across disparate environments in the legume‐rhizobium mutualism

The primary dilemma in evolutionarily stable mutualisms is that natural selection for cheating could overwhelm selection for cooperation. Cheating need not entail parasitism; selection favours cheating as a quantitative trait whenever less‐cooperative partners are more fit than more‐cooperative partners. Mutualisms might be stabilised by mechanisms that direct benefits to more‐cooperative individuals, which counter selection for cheating; however, empirical evidence that natural selection favours cheating in mutualisms is sparse. We measured selection on cheating in single‐partner pairings of wild legume and rhizobium lineages, which prevented legume choice. Across contrasting environments, selection consistently favoured cheating by rhizobia, but did not favour legumes that provided less benefit to rhizobium partners. This is the first simultaneous measurement of selection on cheating across both host and symbiont lineages from a natural population. We empirically confirm selection for cheating as a source of antagonistic coevolutionary pressure in mutualism and a biological dilemma for models of cooperation.     

Factors affecting genetic transformation of Neisseria gonorrhoeae.

Piliated gonococci were competent in genetic transformation in all stages of growth in minimal and enriched media, but nonpiliated cells were almost totally incompetent. Uptake of deoxyribonucleic acid into a deoxyribonuclease-insensitive state was observed only in competent piliated cells. Competence was not affected by washing of competent cells or treatment of competent cells with proteolytic enzymes. Expression of competence required presence of any of several different monovalent or divalent cations, as well as a utilizable source of energy. Efforts to produce genotypically or phenotypically competent derivatives of nonpiliated cells were unsuccessful. These experiments are consistent with the idea that pili may play a role in the irreversible uptake of transforming deoxyribonucleic acid by the gonococcus, but fail to provide evidence for other types of competence factors.     

To Punish or to Leave: Distinct Cognitive Processes Underlie Partner Control and Partner Choice Behaviors

When a cooperative partner defects, at least two types of response are available: Punishment, aimed at modifying behavior, and ostracism, aimed at avoiding further social interaction with the partner. These options, termed partner control and partner choice, have been distinguished at behavioral and evolutionary levels. However, little work has compared their cognitive bases. Do these disparate behaviors depend on common processes of moral evaluation? Specifically, we assess whether they show identical patterns of dependence on two key dimensions of moral evaluation: A person’s intentions, and the outcomes that they cause. We address this issue in a “trembling hand” economic game. In this game, an allocator divides a monetary stake between themselves and a responder based on a stochastic mechanism. This allows for dissociations between the allocator’s intent and the actual outcome. Responders were either given the opportunity to punish or reward the allocator (partner control) or to switch to a different partner for a subsequent round of play (partner choice). Our results suggest that partner control and partner choice behaviors are supported by distinct underlying cognitive processes: Partner control exhibits greater sensitivity to the outcomes a partner causes, while partner choice is influenced almost exclusively by a partner’s intentions. This cognitive dissociation can be understood in light of the unique adaptive functions of partner control and partner choice.     

Centrosome phosphorylation and the developmental expression of meiotic competence in mouse oocytes.

Previous studies suggested that the transition from an incompetent to a competent meiotic state during the course of oogenesis in the mouse involved a G2/M-like cell cycle transition (Wickramasinghe et al, 1991. Dev. Biol. 143, 162). The present studies tested the hypothesis that centrosome phosphorylation, an event normally induced by MPF, is required for this developmental transition and the expression of meiotic competence in cultured growing mouse oocytes. Multiple fluorescence labeling techniques were used to evaluate centrosome number, phosphorylation status, and microtubule nucleating capacity in competent and incompetent oocytes. Experimental conditions were established for reversibly altering the phosphorylation status of the centrosomes and the effects of these treatments on meiotic resumption were examined. Phosphorylated centrosomes nucleating short microtubules were observed in competent oocytes, whereas nonphosphorylated centrosomes and interphase microtubule arrays were found in incompetent oocytes. Upon recovery from nocodazole-induced microtubule depolymerization, short microtubules formed from centrosomes in competent oocytes, whereas long microtubules reappear in the cytoplasm of incompetent oocytes. Perturbation of the phosphorylation state of oocytes with activators of protein kinase A or protein kinase C resulted in the formation of long interphase microtubules in competent oocytes while centrosome phosphorylation was maintained. Treatment of competent oocytes with the phosphorylation inhibitor 6-dimethylaminopurine also led to formation of long microtubules, although under these conditions centrosomes were dephosphorylated. When competent oocytes were treated simultaneously with puromycin and the phosphodiesterase inhibitor isobutyl methylxanthine (IBMX) for 6 hr, centrosomes became dephosphorylated; centrosomes were rephosphorylated when competent oocytes were further cultured in IBMX without puromycin. Conditions that induced centrosome dephosphorylation in competent oocytes resulted in the loss of the ability to express meiotic competence in culture, whereas maintenance of centrosome phosphorylation in these oocytes was correlated with the ability to resume meiosis. These results suggest that the G2/M transition that occurs when mouse oocytes progress from an incompetent to a competent state in vivo involves the phosphorylation of centrosomes and that the maintenance of centrosome phosphorylation is required for the in vitro expression of meiotic competence.     

Regulation by the precompetent cell culture of the appearance of spontaneous and induced competence

Biochemical and biophysical changes in the precompetent cell culture, rather than merely the cell size, regulate the appearance of competence. The more physiologically mature the incompetent cell culture is, the less competence substance is required for maximal induction of competence. The kinetics of induction of competence as the function of the physiological state of the incompetent culture and as the function of the concentration of the competence substance seems to support the idea that the competent cell is a temporary spheroplast.     

Cellular events in tolerance. II. Thymus-bone marrow cell cooperation in the immune response to BSA in Wistar Furth rats

Normal bone marrow cells from Wistar Furth rats were competent to transfer immune responsiveness to bovine serum albumin to thymectomised, irradiated, syngeneic recipients. When the bone marrow cells were taken from donors thymectomised early in life they were incompetent, but competence was restored by addition of normal thymus cells. It was concluded that normal Wistar Furth bone marrow cells contain some thymus-derived cells. Thymus cells from tolerant donors were less effective in cooperation with bone marrow cells, however the thymus cells appeared less tolerant than their donors.     

Oxytocin Effect on Collective Decision Making: A Randomized Placebo Controlled Study

Collective decision making often benefits both the individuals and the group in a variety of contexts. However, for the group to be successful, individuals should be able to strike a balance between their level of competence and their influence on the collective decisions. The hormone oxytocin has been shown to promote trust, conformism and attention to social cues. We wondered if this hormone may increase participants’ (unwarranted) reliance on their partners’ opinion, resulting in a reduction in collective benefit by disturbing the balance between influence and competence. To test this hypothesis we employed a randomized double-blind placebo-controlled design in which male dyads self-administered intranasal oxytocin or placebo and then performed a visual search task together. Compared to placebo, collective benefit did not decrease under oxytocin. Using an exploratory time dependent analysis, we observed increase in collective benefit over time under oxytocin. Moreover, trial-by-trial analysis showed that under oxytocin the more competent member of each dyad was less likely to change his mind during disagreements, while the less competent member showed a greater willingness to change his mind and conform to the opinion of his more reliable partner. This role-dependent effect may be mediated by enhanced monitoring of own and other’s performance level under oxytocin. Such enhanced social learning could improve the balance between influence and competence and lead to efficient and beneficial collaboration.     

Avoiding the bullies: The resilience of cooperation among unequals

Can egalitarian norms or conventions survive the presence of dominant individuals who are ensured of victory in conflicts? We investigate the interaction of power asymmetry and partner choice in games of conflict over a contested resource. Previous models of cooperation do not include both power inequality and partner choice. Furthermore, models that do include power inequalities assume a static game where a bully’s advantage does not change. They have therefore not attempted to model complex and realistic properties of social interaction. Here, we introduce three models to study the emergence and resilience of cooperation among unequals when interaction is random, when individuals can choose their partners, and where power asymmetries dynamically depend on accumulated payoffs. We find that the ability to avoid bullies with higher competitive ability afforded by partner choice mostly restores cooperative conventions and that the competitive hierarchy never forms. Partner choice counteracts the hyper dominance of bullies who are isolated in the network and eliminates the need for others to coordinate in a coalition. When competitive ability dynamically depends on cumulative payoffs, complex cycles of coupled network-strategy-rank changes emerge. Effective collaborators gain popularity (and thus power), adopt aggressive behavior, get isolated, and ultimately lose power. Neither the network nor behavior converge to a stable equilibrium. Despite the instability of power dynamics, the cooperative convention in the population remains stable overall and long-term inequality is completely eliminated. The interaction between partner choice and dynamic power asymmetry is crucial for these results: without partner choice, bullies cannot be isolated, and without dynamic power asymmetry, bullies do not lose their power even when isolated. We analytically identify a single critical point that marks a phase transition in all three iterations of our models. This critical point is where the first individual breaks from the convention and cycles start to emerge.     

Let the right one in: a microeconomic approach to partner choice in mutualisms

One of the main problems impeding the evolution of cooperation is partner choice. When information is asymmetric (the quality of a potential partner is known only to himself), it may seem that partner choice is not possible without signaling. Many mutualisms, however, exist without signaling, and the mechanisms by which hosts might select the right partners are unclear. Here we propose a general mechanism of partner choice, "screening," that is similar to the economic theory of mechanism design. Imposing the appropriate costs and rewards may induce the informed individuals to screen themselves according to their types and therefore allow a noninformed individual to establish associations with the correct partners in the absence of signaling. Several types of biological symbioses are good candidates for screening, including bobtail squid, ant-plants, gut microbiomes, and many animal and plant species that produce reactive oxygen species. We describe a series of diagnostic tests for screening. Screening games can apply to the cases where by-products, partner fidelity feedback, or host sanctions do not apply, therefore explaining the evolution of mutualism in systems where it is impossible for potential symbionts to signal their cooperativeness beforehand and where the host does not punish symbiont misbehavior.