Counterfactual Cognitive Operations in Dreams

We hypothesized that counterfactual (CF) thought occurs in dreams and that cognitive operations in dreams function to identify a norm violation or novel outcome (recorded in episodic memory) and then to integrate this new content into memory by generating counterfactuals to the violation. In study 1 we compared counterfactual content in 50 dream reports, 50 pain memory reports and 50 pleasant memory reports (equated for word length) and found a significantly greater number of CFs in dream and in pain memory reports relative to pleasant memory reports. In study 2 we used a more liberal method for scoring CF content and analyzed 34 dream reports obtained from elderly individuals engaged in an ongoing study of neuropsychologic, health and religiosity variables. Study 2 also examined neuropsychologic associations to CF content variables. In the elderly sample and with our more liberal scoring procedures we found that norm violations along with counterfactual-like attempts to correct the violations occurred in 97% of reports. In 47% of these cases (roughly half of all reports), attempts to undo the violation obeyed at least one constraint on mutability typically observed in laboratory studies of CF processing. Cognitive operations associated with attempts to undo the norm violation (e.g. transforming focal actors or the most recent causal antecedent of the violation) were significantly correlated with measures of right frontal function. We conclude that dreaming may involve a process of learning from novel outcomes (particularly negative outcomes) by simulating alternative ways of handling these outcomes through counterfactual cognitive processes.     

Post-Amputation Pain Is Associated with the Recall of an Impaired Body Representation in Dreams—Results from a Nation-Wide Survey on Limb Amputees

The experience of post-amputation pain such as phantom limb pain (PLP) and residual limb pain (RLP), is a common consequence of limb amputation, and its presence has negative effects on a person’s well-being. The continuity hypothesis of dreams suggests that the presence of such aversive experiences in the waking state should be reflected in dream content, with the recalled body representation reflecting a cognitive proxy of negative impact. In the present study, we epidemiologically assessed the presence of post-amputation pain and other amputation-related information as well as recalled body representation in dreams in a sample of 3,234 unilateral limb amputees. Data on the site and time of amputation, residual limb length, prosthesis use, lifetime prevalence of mental disorders, presence of post-amputation pain, and presence of non-painful phantom phenomena were included in logistic regression analyses using recalled body representation in dreams (impaired, intact, no memory) as dependent variable. The effects of age, sex, and frequency of dream recall were controlled for. About 22% of the subjects indicated that they were not able to remember their body representation in dreams, another 24% of the amputees recalled themselves as always intact, and only a minority of less than 3% recalled themselves as always impaired. Almost 35% of the amputees dreamed of themselves in a mixed fashion. We found that lower-limb amputation as well as the presence of PLP and RLP was positively associated with the recall of an impaired body representation in dreams. The presence of non-painful phantom phenomena, however, had no influence. These results complement previous findings and indicate complex interactions of physical body appearance and mental body representation, probably modulated by distress in the waking state. The findings are discussed against the background of alterations in cognitive processes after amputation and hypotheses suggesting an innate body model.     

Memory: enduring traces of perceptual and reflective attention

Attention and memory are typically studied as separate topics, but they are highly intertwined. Here we discuss the relation between memory and two fundamental types of attention: perceptual and reflective. Memory is the persisting consequence of cognitive activities initiated by and/or focused on external information from the environment (perceptual attention) and initiated by and/or focused on internal mental representations (reflective attention). We consider three key questions for advancing a cognitive neuroscience of attention and memory: to what extent do perception and reflection share representational areas? To what extent are the control processes that select, maintain, and manipulate perceptual and reflective information subserved by common areas and networks? During perception and reflection, to what extent are common areas responsible for binding features together to create complex, episodic memories and for reviving them later? Considering similarities and differences in perceptual and reflective attention helps integrate a broad range of findings and raises important unresolved issues.     

Dreams, Art and Virtual Worldmaking

This paper examines the possible role of dreams and other forms of virtual worldmaking (chiefly fictions) in forming and maintaining our adaptive systems. I posit no exclusive function for the dream. Rather, I treat it a an extension of fiction's preoccupation with our daily concerns, desires and fears. I suggest that narratives help us to enlarge and revise our perceptual and response systems, not by offering us moral or ethical propositions to live by but by increasing certain skills in our mental organization. Departing from John Paulos' idea that fictions and mathematics (narratives and numbers) work in similar ways, I further examine the role that probability ratios might play in dreams, despite the seeming bizarreness of many dreams. The overall idea is that narratives of all sorts are one cognitive means, among many, by which we accumulate sums of knowledge and expectation, and maintain and revise our notions of what goes with what in human experience. I also look briefly at fictional archetypes (Oedipus, Orestes/Hamlet, etc.) and universal dreams (falling, being lost or attacked, etc.) as master plots in our probability systems.     

Dream content and memory processing: Dream lag effects within a single night and across several nights: A pilot study.

Dream content may reflect elements of memory processing occurring within a single night and across several days or weeks. One 19-year-old healthy female college student kept a daily diary, a sleep diary, and recorded her dreams for 2 months. A preset alarm clock allowed her to sample dreams from both early NREM-rich and late REM-rich sleep. Dreams were examined for memory elements that were similar to diary entries. There were 55 scorable dreams obtained during 25 nights. Matches between dream elements and daytime events occurred quite frequently depending on dream element. Dream characters, actions, themes, and settings more often matched daytime memories than dream objects, emotions, or events. Matches were also time dependent. Emotions appeared in dreams after the subject experienced them sooner than all other elements (1.5 days), while objects took the longest to appear in dreams (3.5 days). With respect to within night cognitive processing, 42% of scorable nights contained the same memory elements in the first and last dreams and 8% of scorable nights contained the same emotion within the same context between an early and late dream. Selected dream elements appear to reflect memory processing occurring throughout the night and over the course of several days. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Assessing the dream-lag effect for REM and NREM stage 2 dreams

This study investigates evidence, from dream reports, for memory consolidation during sleep. It is well-known that events and memories from waking life can be incorporated into dreams. These incorporations can be a literal replication of what occurred in waking life, or, more often, they can be partial or indirect. Two types of temporal relationship have been found to characterize the time of occurrence of a daytime event and the reappearance or incorporation of its features in a dream. These temporal relationships are referred to as the day-residue or immediate incorporation effect, where there is the reappearance of features from events occurring on the immediately preceding day, and the dream-lag effect, where there is the reappearance of features from events occurring 5-7 days prior to the dream. Previous work on the dream-lag effect has used spontaneous home recalled dream reports, which can be from Rapid Eye Movement Sleep (REM) and from non-Rapid Eye Movement Sleep (NREM). This study addresses whether the dream-lag effect occurs only for REM sleep dreams, or for both REM and NREM stage 2 (N2) dreams. 20 participants kept a daily diary for over a week before sleeping in the sleep laboratory for 2 nights. REM and N2 dreams collected in the laboratory were transcribed and each participant rated the level of correspondence between every dream report and every diary record. The dream-lag effect was found for REM but not N2 dreams. Further analysis indicated that this result was not due to N2 dream reports being shorter, in terms of number of words, than the REM dream reports. These results provide evidence for a 7-day sleep-dependent non-linear memory consolidation process that is specific to REM sleep, and accord with proposals for the importance of REM sleep to emotional memory consolidation.     

Optimal path-finding through mental exploration based on neural energy field gradients

Rodent animal can accomplish self-locating and path-finding task by forming a cognitive map in the hippocampus representing the environment. In the classical model of the cognitive map, the system (artificial animal) needs large amounts of physical exploration to study spatial environment to solve path-finding problems, which costs too much time and energy. Although Hopfield’s mental exploration model makes up for the deficiency mentioned above, the path is still not efficient enough. Moreover, his model mainly focused on the artificial neural network, and clear physiological meanings has not been addressed. In this work, based on the concept of mental exploration, neural energy coding theory has been applied to the novel calculation model to solve the path-finding problem. Energy field is constructed on the basis of the firing power of place cell clusters, and the energy field gradient can be used in mental exploration to solve path-finding problems. The study shows that the new mental exploration model can efficiently find the optimal path, and present the learning process with biophysical meaning as well. We also analyzed the parameters of the model which affect the path efficiency. This new idea verifies the importance of place cell and synapse in spatial memory and proves that energy coding is effective to study cognitive activities. This may provide the theoretical basis for the neural dynamics mechanism of spatial memory.     

Thinking and Ways of Investigating It

The thought process, of course, breaks down into different elements. Thus, in problem solving, analysis articulates what is given (known) and what unknown; and analysis of information in accordance with the requirements of the particular problem leads to identification of the conditions constituting what is known and what is unknown. Each element of the thought process, viewed from the perspective of the result achieved, is a unitary act (a mental action, an operation). However, in studying thought we must not forget that what makes each element a unitary act is the objectively determined and explicit end result of the thought process. What is initial and primary are not these operations, but the integral thought process of which they are discrete constituents.     

Research progress on Drosophila visual cognition in China

Visual cognition,as one of the fundamental aspects of cognitive neuroscience,is generally associated with high-order brain functions in animals and human.Drosophila,as a model organism,shares certain features of visual cognition in common with mammals at the genetic,molecular,cellular,and even higher behavioral levels.From learning and memory to decision making,Drosophila covers a broad spectrum of higher cognitive behaviors beyond what we had expected.Armed with powerful tools of genetic manipulation in Drosophila,an increasing number of studies have been conducted in order to elucidate the neural circuit mechanisms underlying these cognitive behaviors from a genes-brain-behavior perspective.The goal of this review is to integrate the most important studies on visual cognition in Drosophila carried out in mainland China during the last decade into a body of knowledge encompassing both the basic neural operations and circuitry of higher brain function in Drosophila.Here,we consider a series of the higher cognitive behaviors beyond learning and memory,such as visual pattern recognition,feature and context generalization,different feature memory traces,salience-based decision,attention-like behavior,and cross-modal leaning and memory.We discuss the possible general gain-gating mechanism implementing by dopamine-mushroom body circuit in fly's visual cognition.We hope that our brief review on this aspect will inspire further study on visual cognition in flies,or even beyond.     

Conditioned Salivation and Associated Dreams from REM Sleep

Although research has investigated the feasibility of establishing classically conditioned physiological responses during sleep, very few experimental studies have considered whether classically conditioned cognitive associations are possible. Since dreams have previously been described as a state of hyper-association, an experiment involving classical conditioning of the human salivary response and associated dream content was conducted. During wakefulness, repeated pairings of a conditioned stimulus (CS; a red light) with an unconditioned stimulus (UCS; citrus juice) yielded a conditioned autonomic response (CR; salivation) on presentation of the CS alone. After exposure to the CS during REM sleep, salivary excretion rates measured upon awakening were significantly higher than measures taken from baseline REM awakenings. However, no CR-related dreams were reported by the participants. This result could be interpreted as evidence that participants in this experiment did not experience higher-order memory associations to the external stimuli presented during REM. Alternatively, the lack of CR-related dreams could be explained by previous findings that the autonomic nervous system often works independently of higher-order cognitive activity. Therefore, if an autonomic association is formed, this does not necessarily imply a cognitive one.     

Dream Sharing as Social Interaction

A survey was administered to 241 individuals whose questionnaire responses were analyzed to determine if they told their dreams to others, to whom they told their dreams, for what purpose, and in what social contexts dreams were shared. Respondents were also asked whether there were types of dreams they would not tell and individuals with whom they would not share dreams. This exploratory study suggests that dream sharing is a part of everyday social interaction, with the primary purpose of entertainment. There are gender differences with regard to dream sharing, and this sharing involves the utilization of social practices whereby individuals may protect themselves and others through deciding whether or not to share a dream. The study describes dream sharing as a social act that is negotiated based on the social rules regarding what topics friends and other intimates share in public or private.     

Do we think dreams are in black and white due to memory problems?

The present study was designed to investigate whether memory processes play a role in why some persons say their dreams are black and white. The findings indicate that the percentages of black and white dreams are related negatively to color memory and dream recall frequency. When colors were recorded immediately after the dream was recorded, the percentage of black and white dream elements dropped to 2.7%. When participants were presented the option that dream colors might not be remembered, the percentage of explicit black and white dreams became very small, and the findings are thus in line with the continuity hypothesis of dreaming. Future studies might use extensive training of color memory and dream recall in order to investigate whether highly trained persons still have some dreams or dream elements that are in black and white. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

A unitary hypothesis of mind-brain interaction in the cerebral cortex

A brief introduction to the brain-mind problem leads on to a survey of the neuronal structure of the cerebral cortex. It is proposed that the basic receptive units are the bundles or clusters of apical dendrites of the pyramidal cells of laminae V and III-II as described by Fleischhauer and Peters and their associates. There are up to 100 apical dendrites in these receptive units, named dendrons. Each dendron would have an input of up to 100,000 spine synapses. There are about 40 million dendrons in the human cerebral cortex. A study of the influence of mental events on the brain leads to the hypothesis that all mental events, the whole of the World 2 of Popper, are composed of mental units, each carrying its own characteristic mental experience. It is further proposed that each mental unit, named psychon, is uniquely linked to a dendron. So the mind-brain problem reduces to the interaction between a dendron and its psychon for all the 40 million linked units. In my 1986 paper (Proc. R. Soc. Lond. B 227, 411-428) on the mind-brain problem, there was developed the concept that the operation of the synaptic microsites involved displacement of particles so small that they were within range of the uncertainty principle of Heisenberg. The psychon-dendron interaction provides a much improved basis for effective selection by a process analogous to a quantal probability field. In the fully developed hypothesis psychons act on dendrons in the whole world of conscious experiences and dendrons act on psychons in all perceptions and memories. It is shown how these interactions involve no violation of the conservation laws. There are great potentialities of these unitary concepts, for example as an explanation of the global nature of a visual experience from moment to moment. It would seem that there can be psychons not linked to dendrons, but only to other psychons, creating what we may call a psychon world.     

Language and learning: the cognitive revolution at 60-odd

Around the middle of the last century, the prevailing psychological paradigm of behaviourism was challenged by what is now known as the cognitive revolution. Behaviourists viewed learning as changes in patterns of behaviour through reinforcement. By contrast, advocates of the cognitive approach argued that such behavioural changes were outward manifestations of computational operations on mental representations. Here we consider the current state of the cognitive revolution, focusing on the two most contentious issues in the debate: language and learning. The cognitive approach has proved to be extremely fruitful in both fields. Although contemporary learning theory has almost completely embraced the cognitive approach, the study of language has witnessed a clear empiricist trend to revert back to a kind of neo-behaviourism. Many contemporary authors contend that language is a means of communication that is learned solely through the observation of external events, and culturally transmitted to successive generations. Here, we argue that learning and language can only be properly understood from a cognitive perspective, where the mind is conceived of as a biologically underpinned computational system. As is the case in learning theory, there is abundant evidence showing that language is subserved by an autonomous cognitive system in the mind. We conclude that the cognitive revolution has fundamentally changed our understanding of the mind.     

The home range fractal: From random walk to memory-dependent space use

We present theoretical developments of the multi-scaled random walk (MRW) model for cognitive map-influenced space use by animals. The extensions include a unified space–time scaling function, and further details with respect to statistical properties of the spatial distribution of a set of locations. Supported by numeric simulations we show how memory effects may open for a complex, multi-scaled and self-organized – i.e., intrinsically driven – habitat utilization pattern with fractal dimensional properties. These properties allow for testing for MRW compliance by using parameters from classic movement models like Brownian motion, correlated random walk and Levy walks as null models. In terms of applied ecology, empirical confirmation of memory-influenced space use by individuals will have consequences for interpretation and statistical analyses of habitat utilization. For example, under memory map influence, re-visits to intra-home range locations do not represent independent events. Further, the MRW formulation specifically implies home range movements over a continuum of process rates, spanning a range of spatio-temporal scales in parallel, in violation of the traditional low order Markovian (scale-specific) model architecture. The MRW approach requires an extension of classic Boltzmann–Gibbs statistical mechanics, which rests on the premise that spatio-temporal memory effects are averaged out beyond micro-scales. We suggest that the emergent coherence between spatial and temporal scaling from the MRW approach may open for a more realistic statistical mechanics theory for population processes under terms of memory-influenced space use by individuals.     

In Defense of Some `Cartesian' Assumptions Concerning the Brain and Its Operation

I argue against a growing radical trend in current theoretical cognitive science that moves from the premises of embedded cognition, embodied cognition, dynamical systems theory and/or situated robotics to conclusions either to the effect that the mind is not in the brain or that cognition does not require representation, or both. I unearth the considerations at the foundation of this view: Haugeland's bandwidth-component argument to the effect that the brain is not a component in cognitive activity, and arguments inspired by dynamical systems theory and situated robotics to the effect that cognitive activity does not involve representations. Both of these strands depend not only on a shift of emphasis from higher cognitive functions to things like sensorimotor processes, but also depend on a certain understanding of how sensorimotor processes are implemented - as closed-loop control systems. I describe a much more sophisticated model of sensorimotor processing that is not only more powerful and robust than simple closed-loop control, but for which there is great evidence that it is implemented in the nervous system. The is the emulation theory of representation, according to which the brain constructs inner dynamical models, or emulators, of the body and environment which are used in parallel with the body and environment to enhance motor control and perception and to provide faster feedback during motor processes, and can be run off-line to produce imagery and evaluate sensorimotor counterfactuals. I then show that the emulation framework is immune to the radical arguments, and makes apparent why the brain is a component in the cognitive activity, and exactly what the representations are in sensorimotor control.     

Conflict Nightmares and Trauma in Aceh

In both the Acehnese and Indonesian languages, there is no single lexical term for “nightmare.” And yet findings from a large field research project in Aceh that examined post traumatic experience during Aceh’s nearly 30-year rebellion against the Indonesian state and current mental distress revealed a rich variety of dream narratives that connect directly and indirectly to respondents’ past traumatic experiences. The results reported below suggest that even in a society that has a very different cultural ideology about dreams, where “nightmares” as such are not considered dreams but rather the work of mischievous spirits called jin, they are still a significant part of the trauma process. We argue that it is productive to distinguish between terrifying and repetitive dreams that recreate the traumatic moment and the more ordinary varieties of dreams that Acehnese reported to their interviewers. Nightmares that refer back to conflict events do not appear as an elaborated feature of trauma as the condition is understood by people in Aceh, but when asked further about their dreams, respondents who reported symptoms suggestive of PTSD were more likely to report PTSD-like dreams, memory intrusions that repeat the political violence of the past.

Quantitative trait loci analysis of human event-related brain potentials: P3 voltage

The P3 event-related brain potential (ERP) is a positive-going voltage change of scalp-recorded electroencephalographic activity that occurs between 300–500 ms after stimulus onset. It is elicited when a stimulus is perceived, memory operations are engaged, and attentional resources are allocated toward its processing. Because this ERP component reflects fundamental cognitive processing, it has found wide utility as an assessment of human mental function in basic and clinical studies. In particular, P3 attributes are heritable and have demonstrated considerable promise as a means to identify individuals at genetic risk for alcoholism. We have conducted a quantitative linkage analysis on a large sample from families with a high density of affected individuals. The analyses suggest that several regions of the human genome contain genetic loci related to the generation of the P3 component of the ERP, which are possible candidate loci underlying the functional organization of human neuroelectric activity.     

Using dreams in cognitive behavioral psychotherapy: Theory, method, and examples.

Dream analysis can be a fruitful complementary technique in cognitive–behavioral therapy, providing it is based on a theoretical conception of dreaming and an interpretation method that are both compatible with the principles and methodology of CBT. The present paper first presents some aspects of a cognitive conception of dreaming explaining the occurrence and specificities of dream representations by their production processes. The next section describes an interpretation method that gives the patients the opportunity to find some sources and meanings of their dreams. Finally examples are given of the different ways in which the result of a dream interpretation contributed to therapy. Thanks to their condensed and often exaggerated treatment of a theme, dreams often facilitate becoming aware of cognitive distortions and schemas and help to proceed to cognitive restructuring. They also give to the therapists an opportunity to underline the patient’s resources. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2010 APA, all rights reserved)     

Differential neural activation for updating rule versus stimulus information in working memory

Establishing what information is actively maintained in working memory (WM) and how it is represented and controlled is essential to understanding how such information guides future behavior. WM has traditionally been investigated in terms of the maintenance of stimulus-specific information, such as locations or words. More recently, investigators have emphasized the importance of rules that establish relationships between those stimuli and the pending response. The current study used a mental arithmetic task with fMRI to test whether updating of numbers (i.e., stimuli) and updating of mathematical operations (i.e., rules) in WM relies on the same neural system. Results indicate that, while a common network is activated by both types of updating, rule updating preferentially activates prefrontal cortex while number updating preferentially activates parietal cortex. The results suggest that both numbers and rules are maintained in WM but that they are different types of information that are controlled independently.