The specificity of medical facts: the case of diabetology

The fact that Ludwik Fleck drew his inspiration from medicine has been largely overlooked, with the exception of a few scholars. Although Fleck considered his ideas applicable to all sciences, he always insisted on the specificity of medicine. To illustrate the usefulness of Fleck’s concepts for the history of medicine, three main ideas developed by Fleck are applied to the historical study of diabetes mellitus (DM): first, that different and often divergent pictures of disease coexist within a given culture; second, that scientific ideas circulate between ‘esoteric’ and ‘exoteric’ circles; and third, that scientific concepts are often incommensurable. The author also suggests that Fleck’s epistemology, like other scholars’, is loaded with ethical and political consequences. However, the link between an ‘open’ epistemology and political or ethical questions is more explicit in Georges Canguilhem’s pioneering work on the normal and the pathological (1943). Indeed, Canguilhem and Fleck’s conceptions of disease have much in common, so that we can use Canguilhem’s work to bring out the hidden ethical and political issues in Fleck’s work.     

The tribunal of philosophy and its norms: history and philosophy in Georges Canguilhem’s historical epistemology

In this article I assess Georges Canguilhem’s historical epistemology with both theoretical and historical questions in mind. From a theoretical point of view, I am concerned with the relation between history and philosophy, and in particular with the philosophical assumptions and external norms that are involved in history writing. Moreover, I am concerned with the role that history can play in the understanding and evaluation of philosophical concepts. From a historical point of view, I regard historical epistemology, as developed by Gaston Bachelard and Georges Canguilhem, as a conception and practice which came out of the project, elaborated in France from the 1920s to the 1940s, of combining history of science and philosophy. I analyse in particular Canguilhem’s epistemology in his theory and practice of history of science. What he called ‘normative history’ is the focus of my analysis. I evaluate the question of the nature and provenience of the norm employed in normative history, and I compare it with the norm as discussed by Canguilhem in Le normal et le pathologique. While I am critical of Canguilhem’s treatment of history, I conclude that his philosophical suggestion to analyse the formation of scientific concepts ‘from below’ represents a useful model for history and philosophy of science, and that it can be very profitably extended to philosophical concepts.     

Evolutionary Epistemology, Social Epistemology, and the Demic Structure of Science

One of the principal difficulties in assessing Science as aProcess (Hull 1988) is determining the relationship between the various elements of Hull's theory. In particular, it is hard to understand precisely how conceptual selection is related to Hull's account of the social dynamics of science. This essay aims to clarify the relation between these aspects of his theory by examining his discussion of the``demic structure' of science. I conclude that the social account cando significant explanatory work independently of the selectionistaccount. Further, I maintain that Hull's treatment of the demicstructure of science points us toward an important set of issues insocial epistemology. If my reading of Science as a Process iscorrect, then most of Hull's critics (e.g., those who focus solelyon his account of conceptual selection) have ignored promisingaspects of his theory.     

God is in the Data: Epistemologies of Knowledge at the Creation Museum

In contemporary American public culture, interest groups increasingly mobilise social constructionist arguments in order to discredit strains of scientific knowledge. According to Latour [2004. Why Has Critique Run out of Steam? From Matters of Fact to Matters of Concern. Critical Inquiry, 30:225–48], the field of science studies has contributed to this trend by exposing the ways that scientific facts are socially mediated. In this article, I examine how a narrative of social construction is articulated in the Creation Museum, a young earth creationist museum in Northern Kentucky, USA. I compare the epistemology of science in the Creation Museum with that of conspiracy theory and of social constructionist science studies. I examine how, in the Creation Museum, social constructionist critique is combined with a framing of the Bible as a source of factual data. It is argued that science studies, conspiracy theory and creationism overlap in their critiques of the transparency and objectivity of science. However, they diverge in terms of the degree of recursivity they allow.     

Epistemology, necessity, and evolution: a critical review of Michael Ruse��s Philosophy After Darwin

Michael Ruse??s new anthology Philosophy After Darwin provides great history and background in the major impacts Darwinism has had on philosophy, especially in ethics and epistemology. This review focuses on epistemology understood through the lens of evolution by natural selection. I focus on one of Ruse??s own articles in the collection, which responds to two classic articles by Konrad Lorenz and David Hull on the two major forms of evolutionary epistemology. I side with Ruse against Lorenz??s account of the necessity we think our principles of reasoning have, though I disagree with Ruse??s particular example. I also argue that Ruse??s alternative explanation is lacking. Against Hull, I side with Ruse in his doubts that a sociobiological approach to science will prove fruitful, though I point out that it has certain advantages other approaches do not have. Although I side with Ruse on the issue, I conclude that the two views do not really come into direct conflict and so one needs not reject either. Finally, I discuss Ruse??s positive view and raise questions for his conception of evolutionary epistemology. I conclude that his arguments are insufficient to overcome opposing views and his view has at least as many unintuitive conclusions as the alternatives.     

Integrative Pluralism

The `fact' of pluralism in science is nosurprise. Yet, if science is representing andexplaining the structure of the oneworld, why is there such a diversity ofrepresentations and explanations in somedomains? In this paper I consider severalphilosophical accounts of scientific pluralismthat explain the persistence of bothcompetitive and compatible alternatives. PaulSherman's `Levels of Analysis' account suggeststhat in biology competition betweenexplanations can be partitioned by the type ofquestion being investigated. I argue that thisaccount does not locate competition andcompatibility correctly. I then defend anintegrative model for understanding pluralism. This view is based on taking seriously both thecomplexity and contingency of biologicalorganization and the idealized character ofbiological models. On this view, explanationbecomes, among other things, the location forthe integration of diverse models. I explicatemy argument by an analysis of explanations ofdivision of labor in social insects.     

Sociology is an applied science,and the application is social change: a contribution to the discussion of Aldon Morris’ The Scholar Denied

I argue that W.E.B. Du Bois’ expulsion from academic sociology at the beginning of the twentieth century was not only animated by the gatekeepers’ desire to maintain academe as a whites-only domain. It also constituted an active effort to defend Social Darwinist dogma, which dominated (white) social science at that time, from the formidable challenge of a resourceful and scientifically superior perspective. The successful exclusion of Du Bois (and his growing legion of colleagues) allowed sociology to drift into functionalist dogma, with its immutable hierarchy and denial of sociology’s role in facilitating social change. The exclusion of Du Boisean analysis, which placed human agency – and especially subaltern groups – at the centre of social change – rendered sociological analysis irrelevant to addressing social problems and social justice, until the Civil Rights Movement in America broke down the walls of the sociological ghetto, allowing it to access the rich Du Boisean perspective.     

Methodology in Aristotle’s Theory of Spontaneous Generation

Aristotle’s theory of spontaneous generation offers many puzzles to those who wish to understand his theory both within the context of his biology and within the context of his more general philosophy of nature. In this paper, I approach the difficult and vague elements of Aristotle’s account of spontaneous generation not as weaknesses, but as opportunities for an interesting glimpse into the thought of an early scientist struggling to reconcile evidence and theory. The paper has two goals: (1) to give as charitable and full an account as possible of what Aristotle’s theory of spontaneous generation was, and to examine some of its consequences; and (2) to reflect on Aristotle as a scientist, and what his comments reveal about how he approached a difficult problem. In particular, I propose that the well-recognized problem of the incompatibility between Aristotle’s concept of spontaneity and his theory of spontaneous generation presents an opportunity for insight into his scientific methodology when approaching ill-understood phenomena.     

Marvelling at the Marvel: The Supposed Conversion of A.D. Darbishire to Mendelism

The so-called “biometric-Mendelian controversy” has received much attention from science studies scholars. This paper focuses on one scientist involved in this debate, Arthur Dukinfield Darbishire, who performed a series of hybridization experiments with mice beginning in 1901. Previous historical work on Darbishire’s experiments and his later attempt to reconcile Mendelian and biometric views describe Darbishire as eventually being “converted”' to Mendelism. I provide a new analysis of this episode in the context of Darbishire’s experimental results, his underlying epistemology, and his influence on the broader debate surrounding the rediscovery and acceptance of Mendelism. Iinvestigate various historiographical issues raised by this episode in order to reflect on the idea of “conversion” to a scientific theory. Darbishire was an influential figure who resisted strong forces compelling him to convert prematurely due to his requirements that the new theory account for particularly important anomalous facts and answer the most pressing questions in the field. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

The causal structure of mechanisms

Recently, a number of philosophers of science have claimed that much explanation in the sciences, especially in the biomedical and social sciences, is mechanistic explanation. I argue the account of mechanistic explanation provided in this tradition has not been entirely satisfactory, as it has neglected to describe in complete detail the crucial causal structure of mechanistic explanation. I show how the interventionist approach to causation, especially within a structural equations framework, provides a simple and elegant account of the causal structure of mechanisms. This account explains the many useful insights of traditional accounts of mechanism, such as Carl Craver’s account in his book Explaining the Brain (2007), but also helps to correct the omissions of such accounts. One of these omissions is the failure to provide an explicit formulation of a modularity constraint that plays a significant role in mechanistic explanation. One virtue of the interventionist/structural equations framework is that it allows for a simple formulation of a modularity constraint on mechanistic explanation. I illustrate the role of this constraint in the last section of the paper, which describes the form that mechanistic explanation takes in the computational, information-processing paradigm of cognitive psychology.     

Error management,reliability and cognitive evolution

The paper offers a partial vindication of Sterelny’s view on the role of error rates and reliability in his theory of decoupled representation based on modelling techniques borrowed from the biological literature on evolution in stochastic environments. In the case of a tight link between tracking states and behaviour, I argue that in its full generality Sterelny’s account instantiates the base-rate fallacy. With regard to non-tightly linked behaviour, I show that Sterelny’s account can be vindicated subject to an adequate evolutionary model and a suitable notion of reliability.     

Where did language come from? Connecting sign,song, and speech in hominin evolution

Recently theorists have developed competing accounts of the origins and nature of protolanguage and the subsequent evolution of language. Debate over these accounts is lively. Participants ask: Is music a direct precursor of language? Were the first languages gestural? Or is language continuous with primate vocalizations, such as the alarm calls of vervets? In this article I survey the leading hypotheses and lines of evidence, favouring a largely gestural conception of protolanguage. However, the “sticking point” of gestural accounts, to use Robbins Burling’s phrase, is the need to explain how language shifted to a largely vocal medium. So with a critical eye I consider Michael Corballis’s most recent expression of his ideas about this transition (2017’s The Truth About Language: What It Is And Where It Came From). Corballis’s view is an excellent foil to mine and I present it as such. Contrary to Corballis’s account, and developing Burling’s conjecture that musicality played some role, I argue that the foundations of an evolving musicality (i.e., evolving largely independently of language) provided the means and medium for the shift from gestural to vocal dominance in language. In other words, I suggest that an independently evolving musicality prepared ancient hominins, morphologically and cognitively, for intentional articulate vocal production, enabling the evolution of speech.     

Representations of Nature on the Mongolian Steppe: An Investigation of Scientific Knowledge Construction

Extensive land degradation across the Mongolian steppe has prompted a variety of multinational and multidisciplinary research projects over recent years. The situation provides an important opportunity to investigate and illuminate some of the international, national, and local dimensions of scientific practice that critically condition the production of environmental knowledge. In this article I juxtapose the competing knowledge bases and assumptions of various relevant groups (including natural vs. social scientists, nationalist Chinese vs. ethnic Mongolians, and urban intellectuals vs. indigenous herders) to develop the argument that multiple ideological and institutional boundaries work together to circumscribe scientific inquiry and data collection. The situated construction of knowledge undermines prospects for improving incremental objectivity and impedes more comprehensive understanding of serious environmental problems. [Chinese grasslands, land degradation, indigenous knowledge, sociology of science, interdisciplinary research]     

How can we meet ‘the demands of the day’? Producing an affective,reflexive, interpretive,public sociology of ‘race’

This article argues for a public sociology of ‘race’ that can respond to Weber's injunction that sociology should ‘meet the demands of the day’. While the author's version of these demands – for a society of autonomous individuals and groups, living as equals – is utopian, the main argument offered here is that a sociology of ‘race’ should be a modified version of Burawoy's ‘public sociology’. Adopting Bauman's notion of a sociology of interpreters, a further suggestion is that this type of sociology needs to be reflexive and affective. Based on an analysis of his own sociological education in the late 1960s, his participation in social and political movements in which ‘race’ was key, and with brief reference to the sociology of ‘race’, the author argues that the emotions that circulated in each arena need to be examined, acknowledged and incorporated if theoretical and practical progress is to be made.     

Two puzzles for Marquis's conservative view on abortion

Don Marquis argues that abortion is morally wrong in most cases since it deprives the fetus of the value of its future. I criticize Marquis’s argument for the modified conservative view by adopting an argumentative strategy in which I work within his basic account: if it is granted that his fundamental idea is sound, what follows about the morality of abortion? I conclude that Marquis is faced with a dilemma: either his position must shift towards the extreme conservative view on which abortion is never morally permissible, or he must abandon any recognizably conservative view. This dilemma suggests that Marquis’s view is either deeply implausible or that he cannot use this argument to successfully support his preferred position.     

Social behavioural epistemology and the scientific community

The progress of science is influenced substantially by social behaviour of and social interactions within the scientific community. Similar to innovations in primate groups, the social acceptance of an innovation depends not only upon the relevance of the innovation but also on the social dominance and connectedness of the innovator. There are a number of parallels between many well-known phenomena in behavioural evolution and various behavioural traits observed in the scientific community. It would be useful, therefore, to use principles of behavioural evolution as hypotheses to study the social behaviour of the scientific community. I argue in this paper that a systematic study of social behavioural epistemology is likely to boost the progress of science by addressing several prevalent biases and other problems in scientific communication and by facilitating appropriate acceptance/rejection of novel concepts.