Thirty years after Brambell: whither animal welfare science?

It has been just over 30 years since the Brambell Committee issued its clarion call for research on the welfare of animals used in agriculture. What progress has farm animal welfare science made in those 30 years, and what challenges will it face in the next 30? In this article, I discuss the ways in which the Brambell report, with its emphasis on behavioral needs and suffering, both propelled and constrained the development of animal welfare science. The role that economic factors play and the ways in which they have imposed other kinds of constraints on scientists working with farm animals are also mentioned. Despite these constraints, animal welfare science has contributed to a number of significant improvements in the welfare of farm animals. There is, however, a growing sense that animal welfare science has reached an impasse and that ethical and scientific questions about animal welfare have become hopelessly entangled. In this context, I address what I view to be the principal challenge facing farm animal welfare science, namely to move the issue of beyond suffering to an evaluation of broader quality-of-life questions and their application to improvements in welfare.     

Ambiguous Mice,Speaking Rats: Crossing and Affirming the Great Divides in Scientific Practice

ABSTRACT

During 2009–10, I conducted ethnographic fieldwork with 31 immunologists, virologists, and neuroscientists working with either rats or mice. I encountered how the conceptual and physical bounds that have traditionally separated nature from culture, specie from specie, human from animal, are crossed, blurred, and reasserted. In this ambiguous zone, a scientific incuriosity about animals themselves persists, in the practice of inquiring into animal bodies and minds to produce insights into human health and its betterment. This privileging of human health bypasses animals themselves in favor of a view of them as human similars and prone objects, wholly available to persons, and affirms the Heideggarian thesis, that science occupies an arrogated position in modernity. Such incurious encounters with animals produced ideas and pronouncements about the close biological and genetic similarities that humans and animals share, that scientists in my study called “biokinship” and “genekinship.” These terms indicate both a close relation between animals and persons, but they also present the terms upon which hierarchical relations between humans and animals might be arrayed. Equally present among the scientists with whom I worked was a curiosity about animals themselves. This manifested in understandings and articulations of animals as beings with whom one might make a relationship in which mutually understood communication was possible. Attendant to this curiosity about animals themselves was an awareness scientists in my study had of what these relationships, or what I have called fleshy kinships with rats and mice, might mean for scientific practice, for good science, and for human–animal relatedness in the laboratory. This ambiguous situation calls for analytic attention to biotic materiality and process, but equally for attention to rodents as beings with whom scientists interact on an everyday basis, and with whom they form communicative relations.     

Advances in Applied Zoo Animal Welfare Science

ABSTRACT

Nonhuman animal welfare science is the scientific study of the welfare state of animals that attempts to make inferences about how animals feel from their behavior, endocrine function, and/or signs of physical health. These welfare measurements are applicable within zoos yet inherently more complex than in farms and laboratories. This complexity is due to the vast number of species housed, lack of fundamental biological information, and relatively lower sample sizes and levels of experimental control. This article summarizes the invited presentations on the topic of “Advances in Applied Animal Welfare Science,” given at the Fourth Global Animal Welfare Congress held jointly by the Detroit Zoological Society and the World Association of Zoos and Aquariums in 2017. The article focuses on current trends in research on zoo animal welfare under the following themes: (a) human–animal interactions and relationships, (b) anticipatory behavior, (c) cognitive enrichment, (d) behavioral biology, and (e) reproductive and population management. It highlights areas in which further advancements in zoo animal welfare science are needed and the challenges that may be faced in doing so.     

Competing Conceptions of Animal Welfare and Their Ethical Implications for the Treatment of Non-Human Animals

Animal welfare has been conceptualized in such a way that the use of animals in science and for food seems justified. I argue that those who have done this have appropriated the concept of animal welfare, claiming to give a scientific account that is more objective than the “sentimental” account given by animal liberationists. This strategy seems to play a major role in supporting merely limited reform in the use of animals and seems to support the assumption that there are conditions under which animals may be raised and slaughtered for food that are ethically acceptable. Reformists do not need to make this assumption, but they tend to conceptualize animal welfare is such a way that death does not count as harmful to the interests of animals, nor prolonged life a benefit. In addition to this prudential value assumption, some members of this community have developed strategies for defending suitably reformed farming practices as ethical even granting that death and some other forms of constraints are harms. One such strategy is the fiction of a domestic contract. However, if one accepts the conceptualization of human welfare give by L. W. Sumner, and applies it to animals in the way that I think is justified, an accurate conceptualization of animal welfare has different implications for which uses of animals should be regarded as ethically acceptable. In this paper I give an historical and philosophical account of animal welfare conceptulization and use this account to argue that animal breeders, as custodians of the animals they breed, have the ethical responsibility to help their animal wards achieve as much autonomy as possible in choosing the form of life made available to them and to provide that life. Attempts to avoid these implications by alluding to a contract model of the relationship between custodians and their wards fail to relieve custodians of their ethical responsibilities of care.     

What Is the Future for Zoos and Aquariums?

ABSTRACT

Animal welfare concerns have plagued the professional zoo and aquarium field for decades. Societal differences remain concerning the well-being of animals, but it appears a shift is emerging. Scientific studies of animal welfare have dramatically increased, establishing that many previous concerns were not misguided public empathy or anthropomorphism. As a result, both zoo and aquarium animal welfare policy and science are now at the center of attention within the world’s professional zoos and aquariums. It is now possible to view a future that embraces the well-being of individual captive exotic animals, as well as that of their species, and one in which professional zoos and aquariums are dedicated equally to advancing both. Though the ethics of keeping exotic animals and animals from the wild in captivity are still a contentious subject both outside and even within the profession, this study argues. We argue that this path forward will substantially improve most zoo and aquarium animals' welfare and could significantly reduce societal concerns. If animal welfare science and policy are strongly rooted in compassion and embedded in robust accreditation systems, the basic zoo/aquarium paradigm will move toward a more thoughtful approach to the interface between visitors and animals. It starts with a fundamental commitment to the welfare of individual animals.     

Ecological indicators: Between the two fires of science and policy

This article approaches the concept of ecological indicators from a social science perspective. By applying theoretical concepts from policy analysis and social studies of science about knowledge utilization, problem structuring and the boundaries between science and policy to the issue of ecological indicators, we aim to contribute to our understanding not only of the development but more importantly of the actual use of ecological indicators in policy processes and the importance of political context.Our interest is in those ecological indicators that attempt to measure the ecological quality of ecosystems and that can be or are specifically developed to be used as instruments to evaluate the effects of policies on nature. We claim that these indicators, although they are highly dependent on scientific knowledge, cannot be solely science-based, due to the complexity of ecosystems and the normative aspects involved in assessing ecosystem quality. As a result, we situate ecological indicators in a fuzzy area between science and policy and between the production and the use of scientific knowledge.We will argue that ecological indicators can be expected to be used or rejected strategically, dependent on policy context. Furthermore we will argue that ecological indicators cannot be evaluated with traditional scientific quality criteria alone. The article concludes with some lessons for future indicator development one of them being the inclusion of stakeholder perspectives.     

The Science of Animal Suffering

Can suffering in non‐human animals be studied scientifically? Apart from verbal reports of subjective feelings, which are uniquely human, I argue that it is possible to study the negative emotions we refer to as suffering by the same methods we use in ourselves. In particular, by asking animals what they find positively and negatively reinforcing (what they want and do not want), we can define positive and negative emotional states. Such emotional states may or may not be accompanied by subjective feelings but fortunately it is not necessary to solve the problem of consciousness to construct a scientific study of suffering and welfare. Improvements in animal welfare can be based on the answers to two questions: Q1: Will it improve animal health? and Q2: Will it give the animals something they want? This apparently simple formulation has the advantage of capturing what most people mean by ‘improving welfare’ and so halting a potentially dangerous split between scientific and non‐scientific definitions of welfare. It can also be used to validate other controversial approaches to welfare such as naturalness, stereotypies, physiological and biochemical measures. Health and what animals want are thus not just two of many measures of welfare. They provide the definition of welfare against which others can be validated. They also tell us what research we have to do and how we can judge whether welfare of animals has been genuinely improved. What is important, however, is for this research to be done in situ so that it is directly applicable to the real world of farming, the sea or an animal’s wild habitat. It is here that ethology can make major contributions.     

Using creation science to demonstrate evolution: application of a creationist method for visualizing gaps in the fossil record to a phylogenetic study of coelurosaurian dinosaurs

It is important to demonstrate evolutionary principles in such a way that they cannot be countered by creation science. One such way is to use creation science itself to demonstrate evolutionary principles. Some creation scientists use classic multidimensional scaling (CMDS) to quantify and visualize morphological gaps or continuity between taxa, accepting gaps as evidence of independent creation and accepting continuity as evidence of genetic relatedness. Here, I apply CMDS to a phylogenetic analysis of coelurosaurian dinosaurs and show that it reveals morphological continuity between Archaeopteryx, other early birds, and a wide range of nonavian coelurosaurs. Creation scientists who use CMDS must therefore accept that these animals are genetically related. Other uses of CMDS for evolutionary biologists include the identification of taxa with much missing evolutionary history and the tracing of the progressive filling of morphological gaps in the fossil record through successive years of discovery.     

Ecotoxicity testing: science, politics and ethics

Animal welfare organisations have long been concerned about the use of animals for ecotoxicity testing. Ecotoxicity testing is a necessary part of the statutory risk assessment of chemicals that may be released into the environment. It is sometimes also carried out during the development of new chemicals and in the investigation of pollution in the field. This review considers the existing requirements for ecotoxicity testing, with particular reference to practices in the European Union, including the recent REACH system proposals, before discussing criticisms that have been made of existing practices for environmental risk assessment. These criticisms have been made on scientific and ethical grounds, as well as on questions of cost. A case is made for greater investment in the development of alternative testing methods, which could improve the science, as well as serving the cause of animal welfare. It has frequently been suggested that the statutory requirements for environmental risk assessment are too rigid and bureaucratic. A case is made for flexibility and the greater involvement of scientists in the risk assessment procedure, in the interests of both improved science and improved animal welfare.     

Concepts of Animal Welfare in Relation to Positions in Animal Ethics

When animal ethicists deal with welfare they seem to face a dilemma: On the one hand, they recognize the necessity of welfare concepts for their ethical approaches. On the other hand, many animal ethicists do not want to be considered reformist welfarists. Moreover, animal welfare scientists may feel pressed by moral demands for a fundamental change in our attitude towards animals. The analysis of this conflict from the perspective of animal ethics shows that animal welfare science and animal ethics highly depend on each other. Welfare concepts are indispensable in the whole field of animal ethics. Evidence for this can be found by analyzing the structure of theories of animal ethics and the different ways in which these theories employ welfare concepts. Furthermore, the background of values underneath every welfare theory is essential to pursue animal welfare science. Animal ethics can make important contributions to the clarification of underlying normative assumptions with regard to the value of the animal, with regard to ideas about what is valuable for the animal, and with regard to the actions that should follow from the results of animal welfare science.     

Ethical considerations in fish research

Fishes are used in a wide range of scientific studies, from conservation research with potential benefits to the species used to biomedical research with potential human benefits. Fish research can take place in both laboratories and field environments and methods used represent a continuum from non-invasive observations, handling, through to experimental manipulation. While some countries have legislation or guidance regarding the use of fish in research, many do not and there exists a diversity of scientific opinions on the sentience of fish and how we determine welfare. Nevertheless, there is a growing pressure on the scientific community to take more responsibility for the animals they work with through maximising the benefits of their research to humans or animals while minimising welfare or survival costs to their study animals. In this review, we focus primarily on the refinement of common methods used in fish research based on emerging knowledge with the aim of improving the welfare of fish used in scientific studies. We consider the use of anaesthetics and analgesics and how we mark individuals for identification purposes. We highlight the main ethical concerns facing researchers in both laboratory and field environments and identify areas that need urgent future research. We hope that this review will help inform those who wish to refine their ethical practices and stimulate thought among fish researchers for further avenues of refinement. Improved ethics and welfare of fishes will inevitably lead to increased scientific rigour and is in the best interests of both fishes and scientists.     

A conceptual framework for understanding the perspectives on the causes of the science–practice gap in ecology and conservation

Applying scientific knowledge to confront societal challenges is a difficult task, an issue known as the science–practice gap. In Ecology and Conservation, scientific evidence has been seldom used directly to support decision‐making, despite calls for an increasing role of ecological science in developing solutions for a sustainable future. To date, multiple causes of the science–practice gap and diverse approaches to link science and practice in Ecology and Conservation have been proposed. To foster a transparent debate and broaden our understanding of the difficulties of using scientific knowledge, we reviewed the perceived causes of the science–practice gap, aiming to: (i) identify the perspectives of ecologists and conservation scientists on this problem, (ii) evaluate the predominance of these perspectives over time and across journals, and (iii) assess them in light of disciplines studying the role of science in decision‐making. We based our review on 1563 sentences describing causes of the science–practice gap extracted from 122 articles and on discussions with eight scientists on how to classify these sentences. The resulting process‐based framework describes three distinct perspectives on the relevant processes, knowledge and actors in the science–practice interface. The most common perspective assumes only scientific knowledge should support practice, perceiving a one‐way knowledge flow from science to practice and recognizing flaws in knowledge generation, communication, and/or use. The second assumes that both scientists and decision‐makers should contribute to support practice, perceiving a two‐way knowledge flow between science and practice through joint knowledge‐production/integration processes, which, for several reasons, are perceived to occur infrequently. The last perspective was very rare, and assumes scientists should put their results into practice, but they rarely do. Some causes (e.g. cultural differences between scientists and decision‐makers) are shared with other disciplines, while others seem specific to Ecology and Conservation (e.g. inadequate research scales). All identified causes require one of three general types of solutions, depending on whether the causal factor can (e.g. inadequate research questions) or cannot (e.g. scientific uncertainty) be changed, or if misconceptions (e.g. undervaluing abstract knowledge) should be solved. The unchanged predominance of the one‐way perspective over time may be associated with the prestige of evidence‐based conservation and suggests that debates in Ecology and Conservation lag behind trends in other disciplines towards bidirectional views ascribing larger roles to decision‐makers. In turn, the two‐way perspective seems primarily restricted to research traditions historically isolated from mainstream conservation biology. All perspectives represented superficial views of decision‐making by not accounting for limits to human rationality, complexity of decision‐making contexts, fuzzy science–practice boundaries, ambiguity brought about by science, and different types of knowledge use. However, joint knowledge‐production processes from the two‐way perspective can potentially allow for democratic decision‐making processes, explicit discussions of values and multiple types of science use. To broaden our understanding of the interface and foster productive science–practice linkages, we argue for dialogue among different research traditions within Ecology and Conservation, joint knowledge‐production processes between scientists and decision‐makers and interdisciplinarity across Ecology, Conservation and Political Science in both research and education.     

We're Going on a Fossil Hunt!

Scientists understand that scientific ideas are subject to change and improvement. Fourth- through eighth- graders develop this understanding about the nature of science as they gather and examine fossil evidence from the Paleozoic era, record their findings, and read and write about science for authentic purposes as scientists do. Students recognize the tentative nature of science and experience differences in interpretation of evidence. Students also learn that scientists use writing and sketching as tools of inquiry.     

Introduction

Abstrat

In this paper we discuss genetic discourses and practices in stem cell science. We report on how biomedical scientists, in both the UK and the USA, view the scientific literature and their own experimental research in the emerging field of human embryonic stem (hES) cells. We focus on the genetic manipulation of stem cells to make specialized (beta) cells as a potential cure for diabetes. We draw on Gieryn's notion of boundary work as an analytical motif, and suggest this is a productive way to theorize boundary crossings in the shifting landscapes of expectations in the field of new medical technologies. We argue that initial expectations of a revolution in regenerative medicine have been damped down by the difficulties of making insulin producing pancreatic beta cells from stem cells. We contend the consequent shifts in expectations have led to the emergence of other more radical experimental strategies (such as using oncogenes) in the search for potential cures for Type 1 diabetes. In conclusion, we argue that regenerative medicine is a fruitful example of the shaping of contested biomedical landscapes and we contend that embryonic stem cells are a productive case study of the interactions between genetics, science and society.     

Interpreting evidence: why values can matter as much as science

Despite increasing awareness of the ways in which non-epistemic values play roles in science, many scientists remain reluctant to acknowledge values at stake in their own work. Even when research clearly relates to risk assessment and establishing public policy, contexts in which the presence of values is less likely to be contentious, scientists tend to present such research as merely involving empirical questions about what the evidence is. As a result, debates over policy-related science tend to be framed as purely epistemic debates over the state of the evidence. We argue that this neglects the important ways that ethical and social values play legitimate roles in judgments about what we take to be evidence for a particular policy. Using the case of recent disputes about the relative safety of home birth, we argue that although the debate has been framed as a purely scientific one about the empirical evidence for home birth, it actually involves disagreements about underlying value assumptions. If our claims are correct, then in order to move the debate forward, scientists will need to engage in a critical discussion about the values at stake.     

Scientists’ Prioritization of Communication Objectives for Public Engagement

Amid calls from scientific leaders for their colleagues to become more effective public communicators, this study examines the objectives that scientists’ report drive their public engagement behaviors. We explore how scientists evaluate five specific communication objectives, which include informing the public about science, exciting the public about science, strengthening the public’s trust in science, tailoring messages about science, and defending science from misinformation. We use insights from extant research, the theory of planned behavior, and procedural justice theory to identify likely predictors of scientists'' views about these communication objectives. Results show that scientists most prioritize communication designed to defend science from misinformation and educate the public about science, and least prioritize communication that seeks to build trust and establish resonance with the public. Regression analyses reveal factors associated with scientists who prioritize each of the five specific communication objectives. Our findings highlight the need for communication trainers to help scientists select specific communication objectives for particular contexts and audiences.     

Subjectivity and flexibility in invasion terminology: too much of a good thing?

Invasions biologists have frequently debated whether the definition of invasive should include ecological and economic impacts. More recent criticisms posit that objective definitions are impossible in any absolute sense, while subjectivity is desirable for its flexibility and motivational qualities. We argue that such criticisms underestimate the extent of subjectivity already present in invasion biology. Ecological questions may be methodological if they relate directly to other ecological theories and models, or motivational if they focus on issues important to society as a whole. Motivational questions are important for engaging scientists, improving public understanding of science, and often have applied benefits. In contrast, methodological questions are constrained by established scientific theories, and are therefore more efficient for the development of scientific knowledge. Contrary to recent critiques, we suggest that greater objectivity is both achievable and desirable for the discipline of invasion biology and ecology generally.     

In the trenches: lessons for scientists from California's Proposition 71 campaign

I describe a number of valuable lessons I learned from participating in California's Proposition 71 effort about the role that scientists and rigorous scientific advice can play in a public political process. I describe how scientists can provide valuable information and advice and how they can also gain a great deal from the experience that is valuable to a practicing research scientist. Finally, I argue that in the future, building similar broad coalitions to support biomedical and other areas of scientific research will be essential to protect publicly funded science. Thus, a key lesson from the Proposition 71 experience is that engagement of scientists with diverse nonscientific groups can make a big difference and that scientists must actively engage with the public in the future if we are to contribute robustly to the medical and economic health of our communities.     

Animal welfare and the refinement of neuroscience research methods--a case study of Huntington's disease models

The use of animals in biomedical and other research presents an ethical dilemma: we do not want to lose scientific benefits, nor do we want to cause laboratory animals to suffer. Scientists often refer to the potential human benefits of animal models to justify their use. However, even if this is accepted, it still needs to be argued that the same benefits could not have been achieved with a mitigated impact on animal welfare. Reducing the adverse effects of scientific protocols ('refinement') is therefore crucial in animal-based research. It is especially important that researchers share knowledge on how to avoid causing unnecessary suffering. We have previously demonstrated that even in studies in which animal use leads to spontaneous death, scientists often fail to report measures to minimize animal distress (Olsson et al. 2007). In this paper, we present the full results of a case study examining reports, published in peer-reviewed journals between 2003 and 2004, of experiments employing animal models to study the neurodegenerative disorder Huntington's disease. In 51 references, experiments in which animals were expected to develop motor deficits so severe that they would have difficulty eating and drinking normally were conducted, yet only three references were made to housing adaptation to facilitate food and water intake. Experiments including end-stages of the disease were reported in 14 papers, yet of these only six referred to the euthanasia of moribund animals. If the reference in scientific publications reflects the actual application of refinement, researchers do not follow the 3Rs (replacement, reduction, refinement) principle. While in some cases, it is clear that less-than-optimal techniques were used, we recognize that scientists may apply refinement without referring to it; however, if they do not include such information in publications, it suggests they find it less relevant. Journal publishing policy could play an important role: first, in ensuring that referees seriously consider whether submitted studies were indeed carried out with the smallest achievable negative impact on the animals and, secondly, in encouraging scientists to share refinements through the inclusion of a 3Rs section in papers publishing the results of animal-based research.