Philosophical background of attitudes toward and treatment of invertebrates

People who interact with or make decisions about invertebrate animals have an attitude toward them, although they may not have consciously worked it out. Three philosophical approaches underlie this attitude. The first is the contractarian, which basically contends that animals are only automata and that we humans need not concern ourselves with their welfare except for our own good, because cruelty and neglect demean us. A second approach is the utilitarian, which focuses on gains versus losses in interactions between animals, including humans. Given the sheer numbers of invertebrates-they constitute 99% of the animals on the planet- this attitude implicitly requires concern for them and consideration in particular of whether they can feel pain. Third is the rights-based approach, which focuses on humans-treatment of animals by calling for an assessment of their quality of life in each human-animal interaction. Here scholars debate to what extent different animals have self-awareness or even consciousness, which may dictate our treatment of them. Regardless of the philosophical approach to invertebrates, information and education about their lives are critical to an understanding of how humans ought to treat them.     

Expanding the moral circle: farmed fish as objects of moral concern

Until recently fish welfare attracted little attention, but international and national legislation and standards of fish welfare are now emerging and an overview of these developments is presented in this study. Whereas animal welfare legislation is based on public morality, animal ethics does not automatically accept public morality as normative and elaborates arguments regarding the way humans should treat animals (referred to as moral standards). In this study we present the most common animal ethics theories. For most of these, sentience is considered a demarcation line for moral concern: if an animal is sentient, then it should be included in the moral circle, i.e. receive moral consideration in its own right and some basic welfare should be ensured. As for fish, research has revealed that the sensory system of teleosts can detect noxious stimuli, and that some kind of phenomenal consciousness, allowing the fish to feel pain, seems to be present. This raises the ethical question as to how much evidence we need in order to act on such indications of fish sentience. A simple risk analysis shows that the probability that fishes can feel pain is not negligible and that if they do indeed experience pain the consequences in terms of the number of suffering individuals are great. We conclude that farmed fish should be given the benefit of the doubt and we should make efforts that their welfare needs are met as well as possible. Finally, the way forward is briefly discussed: efforts must be made to understand what fish welfare means in practical fish farming. This will involve the development of research and education, greater accountability and transparency, compliance with and control of policies, and quality assurance schemes.     

Current issues in fish welfare

Human beings may affect the welfare of fish through fisheries, aquaculture and a number of other activities. There is no agreement on just how to weigh the concern for welfare of fish against the human interests involved, but ethical frameworks exist that suggest how this might be approached. Different definitions of animal welfare focus on an animal's condition, on its subjective experience of that condition and/or on whether it can lead a natural life. These provide different, legitimate, perspectives, but the approach taken in this paper is to focus on welfare as the absence of suffering. An unresolved and controversial issue in discussions about animal welfare is whether non‐human animals exposed to adverse experiences such as physical injury or confinement experience what humans would call suffering. The neocortex, which in humans is an important part of the neural mechanism that generates the subjective experience of suffering, is lacking in fish and non‐mammalian animals, and it has been argued that its absence in fish indicates that fish cannot suffer. A strong alternative view, however, is that complex animals with sophisticated behaviour, such as fish, probably have the capacity for suffering, though this may be different in degree and kind from the human experience of this state. Recent empirical studies support this view and show that painful stimuli are, at least, strongly aversive to fish. Consequently, injury or experience of other harmful conditions is a cause for concern in terms of welfare of individual fish. There is also growing evidence that fish can experience fear‐like states and that they avoid situations in which they have experienced adverse conditions. Human activities that potentially compromise fish welfare include anthropogenic changes to the environment, commercial fisheries, recreational angling, aquaculture, ornamental fish keeping and scientific research. The resulting harm to fish welfare is a cost that must be minimized and weighed against the benefits of the activity concerned. Wild fish naturally experience a variety of adverse conditions, from attack by predators or conspecifics to starvation or exposure to poor environmental conditions. This does not make it acceptable for humans to impose such conditions on fish, but it does suggest that fish will have mechanisms to cope with these conditions and reminds us that pain responses are in some cases adaptive (for example, suppressing feeding when injured). In common with all vertebrates, fish respond to environmental challenges with a series of adaptive neuro‐endocrine adjustments that are collectively termed the stress response. These in turn induce reversible metabolic and behavioural changes that make the fish better able to overcome or avoid the challenge and are undoubtedly beneficial, in the short‐term at least. In contrast, prolonged activation of the stress response is damaging and leads to immuno‐suppression, reduced growth and reproductive dysfunction. Indicators associated with the response to chronic stress (physiological endpoints, disease status and behaviour) provide a potential source of information on the welfare status of a fish. The most reliable assessment of well‐being will be obtained by examining a range of informative measures and statistical techniques are available that enable several such measures to be combined objectively. A growing body of evidence tells us that many human activities can harm fish welfare, but that the effects depend on the species and life‐history stage concerned and are also context‐dependent. For example, in aquaculture, adverse effects related to stocking density may be eliminated if good water quality is maintained. At low densities, bad water quality may be less likely to arise whereas social interactions may cause greater welfare problems. A number of key differences between fish and birds and mammals have important implications for their welfare. Fish do not need to fuel a high body temperature, so the effects of food deprivation on welfare are not so marked. For species that live naturally in large shoals, low rather than high densities may be harmful. On the other hand, fish are in intimate contact with their environment through the huge surface area of their gills, so they are vulnerable to poor water quality and water borne pollutants. Extrapolation between taxa is dangerous and general frameworks for ensuring welfare in other vertebrate animals need to be modified before they can be usefully applied to fish. The scientific study of fish welfare is at an early stage compared with work on other vertebrates and a great deal of what we need to know is yet to be discovered. It is clearly the case that fish, though different from birds and mammals, however, are sophisticated animals, far removed from unfeeling creatures with a 15 s memory of popular misconception. A heightened appreciation of these points in those who exploit fish and in those who seek to protect them would go a long way towards improving fish welfare.     

The Controversy on Fish Pain: A Veterinarian’s Perspective

Fish welfare is still a relatively new field. As such, regulations and protocols to ensure fish welfare are currently limited and vary considerably in different jurisdictions. This is in part because of the ongoing controversy as to whether or not fish feel pain. This controversy has persisted for several years, yet veterinarians have been mostly absent from the discussion so far. This essay aims to address this issue. Here, it is argued that while this controversy has its place, it is unlikely to be resolved in the near future. Fish welfare could instead be improved by pursuing more clinically applicable research to increase knowledge of fishes’ behavior and physiology. Such research would assist in learning the optimal environment for their specific needs, as well as compiling some verified indicators of pain in fish. This would then lead to improved studies that could help to determine if and when analgesic drugs can be beneficial in fish, as they are in many other species.     

Uncertainties about 'painless' animals

Macer explores whether it is possible to genetically alter animals to reduce or eliminate their capacity to feel pain, whether it would be ethical to do so, and how we would regard animals that do not feel pain. A possible use for such animals would be as subjects for laboratory research. Among the scientific, philosophical, and ethical uncertainties of pain that Macer considers are: can we define pain? how do we measure pain and anxiety? is pain always related to suffering? what is the minimum level of pain that a being must be able to feel before we reach the conclusion that it should not be used by other beings? are we justified in using beings that do not feel pain when we would not be if they did feel pain and suffer from it?     

Anthropomorphism and 'mental welfare' of fishes

Anthropomorphism, the use of human characteristics as a foundation for interpreting behavior and mental capacities of animals, is a bias undermining our understanding of other species, especially species as evolutionarily distant from humans as fishes. Anthropomorphism is not justified by allusions to evolutionary continuity among vertebrates, because no living vertebrate was ever a descendant of humans, so none could have inherited human traits. Nonetheless, it has recently been claimed that fishes are capable of conscious experiences of pain and emotional feelings and that mental welfare is an important issue for fishes. This paper shows that the evidence supporting claims for experiences of pain or conscious emotions by fishes is conceptually and methodologically flawed. In addition, the paper shows that the natural history and behavior of diverse fish species is inconsistent with a presumption of human-like awareness. This behavioral evidence is in accord with neurobiological observations showing that fishes are very different from us and are unlikely to have a capacity for awareness of pain or emotional feelings that meaningfully resemble our own. The factors that are detrimental to fish welfare have been well delineated by valid, objective indicators of physiological and behavioral well-being. This knowledge should guide welfare decisions. An empirical and non-anthropomorphic examination of diverse fishes and their adaptations should be the foundation for welfare decisions that would be truly beneficial to fishes and humans alike.     

In pursuit of peak animal welfare; the need to prioritize the meaningful over the measurable

Despite the diversity of animal welfare definitions, most recognise the centrality of the feelings of animals which are currently impossible to measure directly. As a result, animal welfare assessment is heavily reliant upon the indirect measurement of factors that either affect what animals feel, or are effected by how they feel. Physiological and health orientated measures have emerged as popular metrics for assessing welfare because they are quantifiable, can effect and be affected by how animals feel and have merits regardless of their relationship to the feelings of animals. However, their popularity in animal welfare assessment has led to them having a disproportionate influence on animal management to the detriment of animal welfare in numerous instances. Here, the case is made that a tension exists between management that prioritizes aspects of care reflecting popular animal welfare metrics such as those relating to physical health, and management that emphasizes psychological wellbeing. By re‐examining the relative merits of physical and psychological priorities in animal management, an alternate animal welfare paradigm emerges less tied to traditional welfare metrics. This paradigm theorizes about the possibility for an optimal animal welfare state to exist where managed animal populations provided essential psychological outlets but protected from key physical stressors routinely experienced in the wild, might experience higher levels of welfare than wild populations would routinely experience. The proposition that optimal animal welfare could theoretically be achieved in well managed and well designed captive environments challenges a widely held ethical perspective that captivity is inherently bad for animal welfare.     

Ethical considerations in fish research

Fishes are used in a wide range of scientific studies, from conservation research with potential benefits to the species used to biomedical research with potential human benefits. Fish research can take place in both laboratories and field environments and methods used represent a continuum from non-invasive observations, handling, through to experimental manipulation. While some countries have legislation or guidance regarding the use of fish in research, many do not and there exists a diversity of scientific opinions on the sentience of fish and how we determine welfare. Nevertheless, there is a growing pressure on the scientific community to take more responsibility for the animals they work with through maximising the benefits of their research to humans or animals while minimising welfare or survival costs to their study animals. In this review, we focus primarily on the refinement of common methods used in fish research based on emerging knowledge with the aim of improving the welfare of fish used in scientific studies. We consider the use of anaesthetics and analgesics and how we mark individuals for identification purposes. We highlight the main ethical concerns facing researchers in both laboratory and field environments and identify areas that need urgent future research. We hope that this review will help inform those who wish to refine their ethical practices and stimulate thought among fish researchers for further avenues of refinement. Improved ethics and welfare of fishes will inevitably lead to increased scientific rigour and is in the best interests of both fishes and scientists.     

Genetic engineering and other factors that might affect human-animal interactions in the research setting

Evidence exists, particularly in the welfare literature of nonhuman animals on the farm, that the interaction between nonhuman animals and the personnel who care for them can have a strong effect on the animals' behavior, productivity, and welfare. Among species commonly used for biomedical research, mice appear to be the least-preferred species in animal care facilities. A review of the literature and observations of animal care staff interacting with mice indicated that the following factors may influence this: their small size, their particular behavioral characteristics, and husbandry constraints (such as housing in ventilated racks). In addition, this study questioned whether animal care personnel have a different perception of genetically engineered animals and whether this, in turn, has an effect on their interactions with these animals. The ability to carefully observe an animal's behavior is key in carrying out an animal-wellness assessment and in minimizing pain and distress. Attention to human-animal interactions in the research setting represents an opportunity for refinement for large numbers of animals and potentially for reduction of animal use.     

Genetic Engineering and Other Factors That Might Affect Human-Animal Interactions in the Research Setting

Evidence exists, particularly in the welfare literature of nonhuman animals on the farm, that the interaction between nonhuman animals and the personnel who care for them can have a strong effect on the animals' behavior, productivity, and welfare. Among species commonly used for biomedical research, mice appear to be the least-preferred species in animal care facilities. A review of the literature and observations of animal care staff interacting with mice indicated that the following factors may influence this: their small size, their particular behavioral characteristics, and husbandry constraints (such as housing in ventilated racks). In addition, this study questioned whether animal care personnel have a different perception of genetically engineered animals and whether this, in turn, has an effect on their interactions with these animals. The ability to carefully observe an animal's behavior is key in carrying out an animal-wellness assessment and in minimizing pain and distress. Attention to human-animal interactions in the research setting represents an opportunity for refinement for large numbers of animals and potentially for reduction of animal use.     

Aquatic animals, cognitive ethology, and ethics: questions about sentience and other troubling issues that lurk in turbid water

In this general, strongly pro-animal, and somewhat utopian and personal essay, I argue that we owe aquatic animals respect and moral consideration just as we owe respect and moral consideration to all other animal beings, regardless of the taxonomic group to which they belong. In many ways it is more difficult to convince some people of our ethical obligations to numerous aquatic animals because we do not identify or empathize with them as we do with animals with whom we are more familiar or to whom we are more closely related, including those species (usually terrestrial) to whom we refer as charismatic megafauna. Many of my examples come from animals that are more well studied but they can be used as models for aquatic animals. I follow Darwinian notions of evolutionary continuity to argue that if we feel pain, then so too do many other animals, including those that live in aquatic environs. Recent scientific data ('science sense') show clearly that many aquatic organisms, much to some people's surprise, likely suffer at our hands and feel their own sorts of pain. Throughout I discuss how cognitive ethology (the study of animal minds) is the unifying science for understanding the subjective, emotional, empathic, and moral lives of animals because it is essential to know what animals do, think, and feel as they go about their daily routines. Lastly, I argue that when we are uncertain if we are inflicting pain due to our incessant, annoying, and frequently unnecessary intrusions into the lives of other animals as we go about 'redecorating nature' (removing animals or moving them from place to place), we should err on the side of the animals and stop engaging in activities that cause pain and suffering.     

Cognitive ability and sentience: which aquatic animals should be protected?

It is of scientific and practical interest to consider the levels of cognitive ability in animals, which animals are sentient, which animals have feelings such as pain and which animals should be protected. A sentient being is one that has some ability to evaluate the actions of others in relation to itself and third parties, to remember some of its own actions and their consequences, to assess risk, to have some feelings and to have some degree of awareness. These abilities can be taken into account when evaluating welfare. There is evidence from some species of fish, cephalopods and decapod crustaceans of substantial perceptual ability, pain and adrenal systems, emotional responses, long- and short-term memory, complex cognition, individual differences, deception, tool use, and social learning. The case for protecting these animals would appear to be substantial. A range of causes of poor welfare in farmed aquatic animals is summarised.     

Long-term and trans-generational effects of neonatal experience on sheep behaviour

Early life experiences can have profound long-term, and sometimes trans-generational, effects on individual phenotypes. However, there is a relative paucity of knowledge about effects on pain sensitivity, even though these may impact on an individual''s health and welfare, particularly in farm animals exposed to painful husbandry procedures. Here, we tested in sheep whether neonatal painful and non-painful challenges can alter pain sensitivity in adult life, and also in the next generation. Ewes exposed to tail-docking or a simulated mild infection (lipopolysaccharide (LPS)) on days 3–4 of life showed higher levels of pain-related behaviour when giving birth as adults compared with control animals. LPS-treated ewes also gave birth to lambs who showed decreased pain sensitivity in standardized tests during days 2–3 of life. Our results demonstrate long-term and trans-generational effects of neonatal experience on pain responses in a commercially important species and suggest that variations in early life management can have important implications for animal health and welfare.     

Identifying and monitoring pain in farm animals: a review

One important objective for animal welfare is to maintain animals free from pain, injury or disease. Therefore, detecting and evaluating the intensity of animal pain is crucial. As animals cannot directly communicate their feelings, it is necessary to identify sensitive and specific indicators that can be easily used. The aim of the present paper is to review relevant indicators to assess pain in several farm species. The term pain is used for mammals, birds and fish, even though the abilities of the various species to experience the emotional component of pain may be different. Numerous behavioural changes are associated with pain and many of them could be used on farms to assess the degree of pain being experienced by an animal. Pain, as a stressor, is associated with variations in the hypothalamic–pituitary–adrenal axis as well as in the sympathetic and immune systems that can be used to identify the presence of pain rapidly after it started. However, most of these measures need sophisticated equipment for their assessment. Therefore, they are mainly adapted to experimental situations. Injuries and other lesional indicators give information on the sources of pain and are convenient to use in all types of situations. Histopathological analyses can identify sources of pain in experimental studies. When pronounced and/or long lasting, the pain-induced behavioural and physiological changes can decrease production performance. Some indicators are very specific and sensitive to pain, whereas others are more generally related to stressful situations. The latter can be used to indicate that animals are suffering from something, which may be pain. Overall, this literature review shows that several indicators exist to assess pain in mammals, a few in birds and very few in fish. Even if in some cases, a single indicator, usually a behavioural indicator, may be sufficient to detect pain, combining various types of indicators increases sensitivity and specificity of pain assessment. Research is needed to build and validate new indicators and to develop systems of pain assessment adapted to each type of situation and each species.     

A History of Animal Welfare Science

Human attitudes to animals have changed as non-humans have become more widely incorporated in the category of moral agents who deserve some respect. Parallels between the functioning of humans and non-humans have been made for thousands of years but the idea that the animals that we keep can suffer has spread recently. An improved understanding of motivation, cognition and the complexity of social behaviour in animals has led in the last 30 years to the rapid development of animal welfare science. Early attempts to define welfare referred to individuals being in harmony with nature but the first usable definition incorporated feelings and health as part of attempts to cope with the environment. Others considered that welfare is only about feelings but it is argued that as feelings are mechanisms that have evolved they are a part of welfare rather than all of it. Most reviews of welfare now start with listing the needs of the animal, including needs to show certain behaviours. This approach has used sophisticated studies of what is important to animals and has replaced the earlier general guidelines described as freedoms. Many measures of welfare are now used and indicate how good or how poor the welfare is. Naturalness is not a part of the definition of welfare but explains why some needs exist. In recent years, welfare has become established as one of various criteria used to decide on whether a system is sustainable because members of the public will not accept systems that cause poor welfare. The study of welfare has become part of the scientific basis upon which important political decisions are made.     

Agitated honeybees exhibit pessimistic cognitive biases

Whether animals experience human-like emotions is controversial and of immense societal concern [1-3]. Because animals cannot provide subjective reports of how they feel, emotional state can only be inferred using physiological, cognitive, and behavioral measures [4-8]. In humans, negative feelings are reliably correlated with pessimistic cognitive biases, defined as the increased expectation of bad outcomes [9-11]. Recently, mammals [12-16] and birds [17-20] with poor welfare have also been found to display pessimistic-like decision making, but cognitive biases have not thus far been explored in invertebrates. Here, we ask whether honeybees display a pessimistic cognitive bias when they are subjected to an anxiety-like state induced by vigorous shaking designed to simulate a predatory attack. We show for the first time that agitated bees are more likely to classify ambiguous stimuli as predicting punishment. Shaken bees also have lower levels of hemolymph dopamine, octopamine, and serotonin. In demonstrating state-dependent modulation of categorization in bees, and thereby a cognitive component of emotion, we show that the bees' response to a negatively valenced event has more in common with that of vertebrates than previously thought. This finding reinforces the use of cognitive bias as a measure of negative emotional states across species and suggests that honeybees could be regarded as exhibiting emotions.     

The ethics of fish welfare

The topic of fish welfare in the context of commercial fisheries is a difficult one. From traditionally anthropocentric or human‐centred perspectives, fishes are simply objects for humans to use as they see fit. When it is argued that anthropocentrism is arbitrary, it may appear that a strong animal rights position is the only recourse, with the result that humans ought not to use animals in the first place, if it is at all possible. It can be argued that both positions fail to view human beings as part of the natural world. If human beings are viewed as part of the world from which they live, then it has to be asked what it means to be respectful of the animals which humans use and from which they live. From this perspective, concern for the welfare of the fishes humans eat is simply what should be expected from humans as good citizens in the community of living creatures.     

The highs and lows of theoretical interpretation in animal-metacognition research

Humans feel uncertain. They know when they do not know. These feelings and the responses to them ground the research literature on metacognition. It is a natural question whether animals share this cognitive capacity, and thus animal metacognition has become an influential research area within comparative psychology. Researchers have explored this question by testing many species using perception and memory paradigms. There is an emerging consensus that animals share functional parallels with humans' conscious metacognition. Of course, this research area poses difficult issues of scientific inference. How firmly should we hold the line in insisting that animals' performances are low-level and associative? How high should we set the bar for concluding that animals share metacognitive capacities with humans? This area offers a constructive case study for considering theoretical problems that often confront comparative psychologists. The authors present this case study and address diverse issues of scientific judgement and interpretation within comparative psychology.     

Reflecting on ethical and legal issues in wildlife disease

Disease in wildlife raises a number of issues that have not been widely considered in the bioethical literature. However, wildlife disease has major implications for human welfare. The majority of emerging human infectious diseases are zoonotic: that is, they occur in humans by cross‐species transmission from animal hosts. Managing these diseases often involves balancing concerns with human health against animal welfare and conservation concerns. Many infectious diseases of domestic animals are shared with wild animals, although it is often unclear whether the infection spills over from wild animals to domestic animals or vice versa. Culling is the standard means of managing such diseases, bringing economic considerations, animal welfare and conservation into conflict. Infectious diseases are also major threatening processes in conservation biology and their appropriate management by culling, vaccination or treatment raises substantial animal ethics issues. One particular issue of great significance in Australia is an ongoing research program to develop genetically modified pathogens to control vertebrate pests including rabbits, foxes and house mice. Release of any self‐replicating GMO vertebrate pathogen gives rise to a whole series of ethical questions. We briefly review current Australian legal responses to these problems. Finally, we present two unresolved problems of general importance that are exemplified by wildlife disease. First, to what extent can or should ‘bioethics’ be broadened beyond direct concerns with human welfare to animal welfare and environmental welfare? Second, how should the irreducible uncertainty of ecological systems be accounted for in ethical decision making?