Relative Gains,Losses, and Reference Points in Probabilistic Choice in Rats

Theoretical reference points have been proposed to differentiate probabilistic gains from probabilistic losses in humans, but such a phenomenon in non-human animals has yet to be thoroughly elucidated. Three experiments evaluated the effect of reward magnitude on probabilistic choice in rats, seeking to determine reference point use by examining the effect of previous outcome magnitude(s) on subsequent choice behavior. Rats were trained to choose between an outcome that always delivered reward (low-uncertainty choice) and one that probabilistically delivered reward (high-uncertainty). The probability of high-uncertainty outcome receipt and the magnitudes of low-uncertainty and high-uncertainty outcomes were manipulated within and between experiments. Both the low- and high-uncertainty outcomes involved variable reward magnitudes, so that either a smaller or larger magnitude was probabilistically delivered, as well as reward omission following high-uncertainty choices. In Experiments 1 and 2, the between groups factor was the magnitude of the high-uncertainty-smaller (H-S) and high-uncertainty-larger (H-L) outcome, respectively. The H-S magnitude manipulation differentiated the groups, while the H-L magnitude manipulation did not. Experiment 3 showed that manipulating the probability of differential losses as well as the expected value of the low-uncertainty choice produced systematic effects on choice behavior. The results suggest that the reference point for probabilistic gains and losses was the expected value of the low-uncertainty choice. Current theories of probabilistic choice behavior have difficulty accounting for the present results, so an integrated theoretical framework is proposed. Overall, the present results have implications for understanding individual differences and corresponding underlying mechanisms of probabilistic choice behavior.     

Effect of delay and social distance on the perceived value of social interaction

Temporal discounting is a process by which the perceived value of an outcome decreases as delay increases. Social discounting is a process by which the perceived value of an outcome decreases as the social distance between the decision-maker and recipient increases. Both temporal and social discounting are well established for monetary outcomes. However, little is known regarding the effect of delay-to-occurrence or increased social distance on the perceived value of social interactions. The current study demonstrates that the decrease in perceived value for delayed social interactions is well described by the same hyperbola-like function used for monetary outcomes and that the rate of discounting decreases (indicating increased preference for larger, more delayed outcomes) as social distance increases. Conceptualizing the current discounting procedure as entailing both potential gains and losses, suggest that under certain circumstances, higher discount rates may not reflect increased preference.     

Male competition reverses female preference for male chemical cues

Females must choose among potential mates with different phenotypes in a variety of social contexts. Many male traits are inherent and unchanging, but others are labile to social context. Competition, for example, can cause physiological changes that reflect recent wins and losses that fluctuate throughout time. We may expect females to respond differently to males depending on the outcome of their most recent fight. In Bolitotherus cornutus (forked fungus beetles), males compete for access to females, but copulation requires female cooperation. In this study, we use behavioral trials to determine whether females use chemical cues to differentiate between males and whether the outcome of recent male competition alters female preference. We measured female association time with chemical cues of two size‐matched males both before and after male–male competition. Females in our study preferred to associate with future losers before males interacted, but changed their preference for realized winners following male competitive interactions. Our study provides the first evidence of change in female preference based solely on the outcome of male–male competition.     

Partner choice in human evolution: The role of cooperation,foraging ability,and culture in Hadza campmate preferences

The ability to choose the partners we interact with is thought to have been an important driver in the evolution of human social behavior, and in particular, our propensity to cooperate. Studies showing that humans prefer to interact with cooperative others is often cited as support for partner choice driving the evolution of cooperation. However, these studies are largely drawn from Western samples, where conditions for partner choice to operate may be especially favorable. Here, we investigate qualities associated with being a preferred partner (i.e., campmate) in Hadza hunter-gatherers of Tanzania in 2016 and 2019. A total of 156 Hadza participants from 17 camps ranked their campmates on generosity, foraging ability, and their preference for them as future campmates. In 2016, Hadza preferred more generous people and better hunters as campmates, with evidence suggesting a stronger preference for better hunters; however, the relationship between generosity and being a preferred campmate was greater in 2019 than in 2016, such that the preference for generous people was stronger than the preference for better foragers, suggesting that campmate preferences are changing. These new findings contrast with reports on data from nearly a decade ago, suggesting that the Hadza do not prefer more cooperative campmates. Further, in 2019, there was anecdotal evidence that Hadza with greater exposure to outside cultural institutions (e.g., schooling, having a job, or living in a village) had a stronger preference for generous campmates than those with less exposure. Taken together, the results suggest that preferences for social partners may, in part, be culturally shaped.     

Is more choice always desirable? Evidence and arguments from leks,food selection,and environmental enrichment

Recent studies on humans show that too much choice can make subjects less likely to choose any item. I consider general adaptive and non‐adaptive explanations of why such choice aversion, or its converse, might occur in animals. There are three questions: is more choice always preferred, does it ever lead to less consumption (or a lower probability of consumption), and may it result in worse items being selected? A preference for choice is one of the main explanations for lek formation and I draw attention to previously unrecognised parallels with models of human shopping behaviour. There is indeed evidence of female preference for larger leks, although much of the observational data are open to other interpretations. Unfortunately nobody has looked for choice aversion where it is most to be expected, in leks larger than normally occur. Evidence that too much choice of males confuses females is strongest in acoustically advertising frogs, but the widespread decrease of mating skew in larger leks might also have this explanation. A model reanalyses data on skew in black grouse Tetrao tetrix and suggests that considering only a random subset of a large lek may increase the chances of selecting the better males: larger leks are more likely to include better males, but these are less likely to be selected. These opposing effects may lead to an optimum lek size, but only with a sufficient decline in choice accuracy with size. With food choice, very few studies have avoided confounding choice with food quality, by manipulating only flavour. The widespread phenomena of stimulus‐specific satiety and novelty seeking imply that monotonous diets are aversive, but no studies test whether animals choose sites where they know food diversity to be greater. Operant experiments that demonstrate mild preferences for free choice concern choice about the means to get food rather than the food itself. In some insect species even moderate choice of diet can be deleterious, and studies on search images and the confusion effect may be evidence of this in vertebrates. Environmental enrichment of captive animals often relies on increasing the options available, but it need not be the choice itself that is beneficial. I consider briefly further areas in biology where choice preference or aversion are potentially important.     

The Commonality of Loss Aversion across Procedures and Stimuli

Individuals tend to give losses approximately 2-fold the weight that they give gains. Such approximations of loss aversion (LA) are almost always measured in the stimulus domain of money, rather than objects or pictures. Recent work on preference-based decision-making with a schedule-less keypress task (relative preference theory, RPT) has provided a mathematical formulation for LA similar to that in prospect theory (PT), but makes no parametric assumptions in the computation of LA, uses a variable tied to communication theory (i.e., the Shannon entropy or information), and works readily with non-monetary stimuli. We evaluated if these distinct frameworks described similar LA in healthy subjects, and found that LA during the anticipation phase of the PT-based task correlated significantly with LA related to the RPT-based task. Given the ease with which non-monetary stimuli can be used on the Internet, or in animal studies, these findings open an extensive range of applications for the study of loss aversion. Furthermore, the emergence of methodology that can be used to measure preference for both social stimuli and money brings a common framework to the evaluation of preference in both social psychology and behavioral economics.     

The Value of Emotion: How Does Episodic Prospection Modulate Delay Discounting?

Background

Humans often show impatience when making intertemporal choice for monetary rewards, preferring small rewards delivered immediately to larger rewards delivered after a delay, which reflects a fundamental psychological principle: delay discounting. However, we propose that episodic prospection humans can vividly envisage exerts a strong and broad influence on individuals'' delay discounting. Specifically, episodic prospection may affect individuals'' intertemporal choice by the negative or positive emotion of prospection.

Methodology/Principal Findings

The present study explored how episodic prospection modulated delay discounting by emotion. Study 1 showed that participants were more inclined to choose the delayed but larger rewards when they imaged positive future events than when they did not image events; Study 2 showed that participants were more inclined to choose the immediate but smaller rewards when they imaged negative future events than when they did not image events; In contrast, study 3 showed that choice preferences of participants when they imaged neutral future events were the same as when they did not image events.

Conclusions/Significance

By manipulating the emotion valence of episodic prospection, our findings suggested that positive emotion made individuals tend to choose delayed rewards, while negative emotion made individuals tend to choose immediate rewards. Only imaging events with neutral emotion did not affect individuals'' choice preference. Thus, the valence of imaged future events'' emotion might play an important role in individuals'' intertemporal choice. It is possible that the valence of emotion may affect the changed direction (promote or inhibit) of individuals'' delay discounting, while the ability to image future events affects the changed degree of individuals'' delay discounting.     

Counterfactual thinking and emotions: regret and envy learning

Emotions like regret and envy share a common origin: they are motivated by the counterfactual thinking of what would have happened had we made a different choice. When we contemplate the outcome of a choice we made, we may use the information on the outcome of a choice we did not make. Regret is the purely private comparison between two choices that we could have taken, envy adds to this the information on outcome of choices of others. However, envy has a distinct social component, in that it adds the change in the social ranking that follows a difference in the outcomes. We study the theoretical foundation and the experimental test of this view.     

Risk ON / Risk OFF: Risk-Taking Varies with Subjectively Preferred and Disliked Music

In this paper we conduct a within-subjects experiment in which teenagers go over 256 gambles with real money gains and losses. For each risky gamble they choose whether to participate in it, or pass. Prior to this main experiment subjects identify specific songs belonging to their favorite musical genre, as well as songs representing a style they dislike. In the main experiment we vary the music playing in the background, so that each subject hears some of their favorite music, and some disliked music, alternating in blocks of 16 gambles. We find that favorite music increases risk-taking (‘risk on’), and disliked music suppresses risk-taking (‘risk off’), compared to a baseline of no music. Literature in psychology proposes several mechanisms by which mood affects risk-taking, but none of them fully explain the results in our setting. The results are, however, consistent with the economics notion of preference complementarity, extended to the domain of risk preference. The preference structure implied by our results is more complex than previously thought, yet realistic, and consistent with recent theoretical models. More generally, this mechanism offers a potential explanation to why risk-taking is known to change over time and across contexts.     

Reversal of female mate choice by copying in the guppy (Poecilia reticulata).

Ever since Fisher (1958) formalized models of sexual selection, female mate choice has been assumed to be a genetically determined trait. Females, however, may also use social cues to select mates. One such cue might be the mate choice of conspecifics. Here we report the first direct evidence that a female's preference for a particular male can in fact be reversed by social cues. In our experiments using the Trinidadian guppy (Poecilia reticulata), this reversal was mediated by mate-copying opportunities, such that a female (the 'focal' female) is given the opportunity to choose between two males, followed by a period in which she observes a second female (the 'model' female) displaying a preference for the male she herself did not prefer initially. When allowed to choose between the same males a second time, compared with control tests, a significant proportion of focal females reversed their mate choice and copied the preference of the model female. These results provide strong evidence for the role of non-genetic factors in sexual selection and underlie the need for new models of sexual selection that explicitly incorporate both genetic and cultural aspects of mate choice.     

The attention–aversion gap: how allocation of attention relates to loss aversion

Loss aversion is often assumed to be a basic and far-reaching psychological regularity in behavior. Yet empirical evidence is accumulating to challenge the assumption of widespread loss aversion in choice. We suggest that a key reason for the apparently elusive nature of loss aversion may be that its manifestation in choice is state-dependent and distinct from a more state-independent principle of heightened attention to losses relative to gains. Using data from process-tracing studies, we show that people invest more attentional resources when evaluating losses than when evaluating gains, even when their choices do not reflect loss aversion. Our evidence converges with previous findings on how losses influence exploratory search as well as physiological, hormonal, and neural responses. Increased attention to losses relative to gains seems to be a necessary but not a sufficient condition for loss aversion in choice.     

Probabilistic discounting in “certain gain-uncertain loss” and “certain loss-uncertain gain” conditions

Studies on probabilistic discounting typically involve choosing between two outcomes of the same sign (i.e., positive or negative). Commonly, participants are given a choice between a smaller, certain gain and a larger, but uncertain gain, or (less commonly) the options may be a certain, smaller loss and an uncertain, but larger loss. In contrast, participants in this study had to make yes/no decisions as to whether they would accept a financial offer involving a combination of both a gain and a loss. This offer could be either a certain gain which, when accepted, could bring an uncertain larger loss, or a certain loss which, when accepted, could bring an uncertain larger gain. Despite the substantial differences between the alternatives posed in the present study and those in typical discounting studies, the same hyperboloid discounting function that describes the choice between certain and uncertain gains also accurately described choice in the situations presented in the present study. In addition, steeper discounting was observed with a larger uncertain gain than with a smaller uncertain gain. No amount effect was revealed with uncertain losses.     

Size-assortative nest preference in a paternal brooding blenny Rhabdoblennius ellipes (Jordan & Starks)

Field and laboratory studies were conducted to clarify the processes contributing to the size-assortative nest use by males of a paternal brooding blenny Rhabdoblennius ellipes . The use of natural and artificial nests by males in the field was highly size-assortative; males used smaller nests even when larger nests were available. Aquarium nest choice experiments without a competitive male strongly suggested that the size-assortative nest use by males is not the result of male–male competition for larger nests, but male preference for size-matched nests. Males were likely to choose nests on the basis of the nest entrance size rather than nest length and volume, suggesting that the size-assortative nest preference in this species is an adaptation to predation pressure against eggs and resident males.     

Motivational state and reward content determine choice behavior under risk in mice

Risk is a ubiquitous feature of the environment for most organisms, who must often choose between a small and certain reward and a larger but less certain reward. To study choice behavior under risk in a genetically well characterized species, we trained mice (C57BL/6) on a discrete trial, concurrent-choice task in which they must choose between two levers. Pressing one lever (safe choice) is always followed by a small reward. Pressing the other lever (risky choice) is followed by a larger reward, but only on some of the trials. The overall payoff is the same on both levers. When mice were not food deprived, they were indifferent to risk, choosing both levers with equal probability regardless of the level of risk. In contrast, following food or water deprivation, mice earning 10% sucrose solution were risk-averse, though the addition of alcohol to the sucrose solution dose-dependently reduced risk aversion, even before the mice became intoxicated. Our results falsify the budget rule in optimal foraging theory often used to explain behavior under risk. Instead, they suggest that the overall demand or desired amount for a particular reward determines risk preference. Changes in motivational state or reward identity affect risk preference by changing demand. Any manipulation that increases the demand for a reward also increases risk aversion, by selectively increasing the frequency of safe choices without affecting frequency of risky choices.     

How People Use Social Information to Find out What to Want in the Paradigmatic Case of Inter-temporal Preferences

The weight with which a specific outcome feature contributes to preference quantifies a person’s ‘taste’ for that feature. However, far from being fixed personality characteristics, tastes are plastic. They tend to align, for example, with those of others even if such conformity is not rewarded. We hypothesised that people can be uncertain about their tastes. Personal tastes are therefore uncertain beliefs. People can thus learn about them by considering evidence, such as the preferences of relevant others, and then performing Bayesian updating. If a person’s choice variability reflects uncertainty, as in random-preference models, then a signature of Bayesian updating is that the degree of taste change should correlate with that person’s choice variability. Temporal discounting coefficients are an important example of taste–for patience. These coefficients quantify impulsivity, have good psychometric properties and can change upon observing others’ choices. We examined discounting preferences in a novel, large community study of 14–24 year olds. We assessed discounting behaviour, including decision variability, before and after participants observed another person’s choices. We found good evidence for taste uncertainty and for Bayesian taste updating. First, participants displayed decision variability which was better accounted for by a random-taste than by a response-noise model. Second, apparent taste shifts were well described by a Bayesian model taking into account taste uncertainty and the relevance of social information. Our findings have important neuroscientific, clinical and developmental significance.     

Too much of a good thing? Variety is confusing in mate choice

Choice variety is supposed to increase the likelihood that a chooser's preferences are satisfied. To assess the effects of variety on real-world mate choice, we analysed human dating decisions across 84 speed-dating events (events in which people go on a series of sequential 'mini-dates'). Results showed that choosers made fewer proposals (positive dating decisions) at events in which the available dates showed greater variety across such attributes as age, height, occupation and education, and this effect was particularly strong when choosers were confronted with a larger number of opposite-sex speed daters. Additionally, participants attending events in which the available options showed greater variety across these attributes were less likely to choose the consensually preferred mate option and more likely to choose no one at all. In contexts in which time is a limited resource, choice variety-rather than facilitating choice quality or increasing choosiness-is confusing and potentially detrimental to choice quality.     

Social Influences in Sequential Decision Making

People often make decisions in a social environment. The present work examines social influence on people’s decisions in a sequential decision-making situation. In the first experimental study, we implemented an information cascade paradigm, illustrating that people infer information from decisions of others and use this information to make their own decisions. We followed a cognitive modeling approach to elicit the weight people give to social as compared to private individual information. The proposed social influence model shows that participants overweight their own private information relative to social information, contrary to the normative Bayesian account. In our second study, we embedded the abstract decision problem of Study 1 in a medical decision-making problem. We examined whether in a medical situation people also take others’ authority into account in addition to the information that their decisions convey. The social influence model illustrates that people weight social information differentially according to the authority of other decision makers. The influence of authority was strongest when an authority''s decision contrasted with private information. Both studies illustrate how the social environment provides sources of information that people integrate differently for their decisions.     

Experience Matters: Females Use Smell to Select Experienced Males for Paternal Care

Mate choice and mating preferences often rely on the information content of signals exchanged between potential partners. In species where a female''s reproduction is the terminal event in life it is to be expected that females choose high quality males and assess males using some honest indicator of male quality. The Nereidid polychaete, Neanthes acuminata, exhibits monogamous pairing and the release of eggs by females terminates her life and larval success relies entirely on a male''s ability to provide paternal care. As such females should have developed reliable, condition-dependent criteria to choose mates to guarantee survival and care for offspring. We show that females actively chose males experienced in fatherhood over others. In the absence of experienced males dominance, as evident from male-male fights, is utilized for mate selection. The preference for experienced males is not affected by previous social interactions between the individuals. We show that the choice of the partner is based on chemical signals demonstrating a ‘scent of experience’ to females providing evidence for the role of chemical signals in sexual selection for paternal care adding to our understanding of the mechanisms regulating condition-dependent mate choice.     

Decision-Making for Risky Gains and Losses among College Students with Internet Gaming Disorder

Individuals with Internet gaming disorder (IGD) tend to exhibit disadvantageous risky decision-making not only in their real life but also in laboratory tasks. Decision-making is a complex multifaceted function and different cognitive processes are involved in decision-making for gains and losses. However, the relationship between impaired decision-making and gain versus loss processing in the context of IGD is poorly understood. The main aim of the present study was to separately evaluate decision-making for risky gains and losses among college students with IGD using the Cups task. Additionally, we further examined the effects of outcome magnitude and probability level on decision-making related to risky gains and losses respectively. Sixty college students with IGD and 42 matched healthy controls (HCs) participated. Results indicated that IGD subjects exhibited generally greater risk taking tendencies than HCs. In comparison to HCs, IGD subjects made more disadvantageous risky choices in the loss domain (but not in the gain domain). Follow-up analyses indicated that the impairment was associated to insensitivity to changes in outcome magnitude and probability level for risky losses among IGD subjects. In addition, higher Internet addiction severity scores were associated with percentage of disadvantageous risky options in the loss domain. These findings emphasize the effect of insensitivity to losses on disadvantageous decisions under risk in the context of IGD, which has implications for future intervention studies.