fMRI技术在犬科动物认知领域研究的应用

家犬(Canis lupus familiaris)与人类社会生态高度融合,已成为人类解析认知进化理论、进行比较认知研究、开展人类认知功能障碍性疾病研究的一种自然模型动物。功能性磁共振成像(functional magnetic resonance imaging, fMRI)是一种非侵入式、安全的能反映生物体大脑神经活动时空分布的神经影像学技术,近年来被应用于家犬行为认知特征神经机制的研究。本文简介了fMRI技术;概述了部分研究者使用视觉、嗅觉、听觉等不同的实验范式对家犬大脑开展fMRI,定位不同实验范式下被激活的大脑功能区,从而揭示家犬认知的神经机制;总结了fMRI技术在犬认知研究中技术和方法上的挑战。以期为国内开展家犬等动物认知研究者提供新的技术方法。     

衰老过程中行为和认知功能退化的调控机制研究

随着人类预期寿命延长,人口老龄化问题越来越严重。过去几十年关于衰老的研究使人们对长寿的生物学机理有了一定的认识,然而延长寿命应以保持老年个体健康的行为和认知功能为前提,近期研究显示延长寿命不一定延缓衰老过程中的行为和认知功能退化。衰老相关行为退化的调控机制目前知道的还很少,如何实现老年人口健康的衰老是现代社会极具挑战也是迫切需要解决的问题。衰老过程伴随着明显的认知等行为功能的退化,过去的研究对这些功能的退化进行了比较详细的描述,包括情节记忆、工作记忆、信息处理速度等认知功能的衰退,运动能力降低,节律紊乱等。随着神经科学与技术的发展,越来越多的研究集中到大脑的结构和功能随衰老的改变。本文在简单描述衰老过程中行为功能退化现象的基础上,主要对大脑结构和网络连接、神经元形态和功能、大脑基因表达以及一些保守的生物学信号通路等方面在衰老过程中的改变的研究进展展开综述性介绍,重点关注这些变化与行为和认知功能退化之间的联系。目前大部分的研究结果还只建立了这些变化与行为和认知功能退化的相关关系,因果关系的确立还有待进一步的研究。相信更多对衰老过程中行为和认知功能退化的调控机制的研究将对改善老年人的生活质量有极大帮助,同时对寻找预防神经退行性疾病发生的方法也有指示作用。     

浅谈灵长类动物群体中的生物市场现象

在灵长类动物社会群体中,不具亲缘关系的个体存在着利他行为,如通过相互理毛换取互惠理毛、婴儿照顾、交配权、食物资源或攻击支持等．由此科学家提出了生物市场理论及逐步提高投资策略和等价回馈策略来解释这些行为。灵长类动物这些互惠利他的经济行为,为群体的生存发展提供了重要保证。通过对灵长类动物交换资源与服务的研究．可以更好地了解人类经济行为的演化史。     

视频暴力与攻击行为的神经成像研究进展

认知神经科学促进了心理学领域有关视频暴力与攻击行为的神经生理机制研究.近几年,国外研究者使用功能性磁共振成像研究了视频暴力与攻击行为的神经生理机制,并提出了新的攻击行为模型:神经发展模型.研究发现:长时间暴露在视频暴力下人类对暴力的威胁的脑反应是真实的并且可以察觉到的;能导致前额皮层、杏仁核、前扣带皮层、海马和海马回的激活;能增加潜在的攻击行为.文章介绍了认知神经科学领域中视频暴力和攻击行为神经成像研究的发展现状并展望了其前景.     

社会行为发育的行为神经内分泌效应

发育过程中行为神经内分泌环境能够调节解剖和生理的长期变化,产生深远的行为效应,所以神经内分泌环境在幼体发育及其行为生理特征的形成中起重要作用。本文综述了神经垂体激素、类固醇激素及它们的受体在社会行为发育中的行为神经内分泌效应;指出该领域有待解决的问题和进一步研究的方向;希望能使人们重视人类发育过程中双亲行为和激素作用对儿童社会行为及其相关神经内分泌特征的影响。     

多巴胺信号系统在衰老引起的行为和认知能力退化中的作用

衰老是生物体随时间推移各项生理功能逐渐发生改变的自然现象。动物的衰老伴随着行为和认知能力的降低,因此研究动物行为和认知功能退化的分子神经机制对于提高老年群体的生活质量具有重要意义。近年来,随着正电子发射断层扫描技术和功能性核磁共振脑成像技术在神经生物学上的广泛运用,越来越多证据表明多巴胺系统功能在衰老过程中显著降低,并且这是人类和动物行为和认知功能退化的重要原因。本文将概述自然衰老过程中多巴胺信号系统功能变化及机制和其在动物行为和认知退化中的作用等方面研究进展。     

灵长类动作理解的镜像神经机制研究进展

灵长类动作理解(understanding of actions)的神经机制是认知神经科学研究的重要内容,它的阐明对于揭示灵长类特有的一些高级认知行为的本质和过程具有重要意义。就灵长类动物而言,个体对其同类做出动作的识别以及理解是其一切社会行为的基础,但是迄今为止我们对其动作理解的神经机制还知之甚少。随着镜像神经元成为近年来国外认知神经科学与认知人类学研究的热点,人们通过神经生理学和脑成像等技术,陆续发现和证明了其在灵长类动作理解过程中的重要作用。本文综述了近年来关于灵长类动作理解的镜像神经机制的研究成果,介绍了镜像神经元在灵长类动作理解过程中的一些新认识及其在该能力进化和发育等方面的作用,并对当前一些实验中遗留的问题与灵长类动作理解领域的未来研究方向作了反思与展望。     

综述与专论: 灵长类动物在人类神经系统疾病动物模型中的应用

灵长类动物遗传、行为、认知、生理、生化和解剖结构等生物学特性更接近人类,具有其他实验动物无法替代的高级脑功能结构及神经活动的优势,是研究人类神经系统疾病理想的模式动物,研究的结果更容易推广应用到人类。常被用来建立神经退行性疾病、精神性疾病等疾病的动物模型,研究其发病机制、病程的发生发展及治疗药物等,为人类神经科学及相关医学研究做出了不可替代的贡献。本文综述了近年来国内外灵长类动物在人类神经系统疾病动物模型研究中的应用进展,分析了该领域目前存在的困难和问题,探讨了未来的一些研究方向,以期为神系统经疾病的深入研究提供思路。     

时间选择性注意的认知神经机制

时间选择性注意是注意研究中开展较晚的一个领域,它是指通过有效的提示,将注意资源导向与即将到来的事件相关的时间点或时间窗的过程．回顾了时间选择性注意的行为及其认知神经机制的研究,并在与空间选择性注意比较的基础上,对热点问题和未来的研究趋势进行了分析．     

功能磁共振和脑电神经成像技术与大脑刺激相结合的研究进展

随着对神经机制问题阐述水平的迅速提高,所应用的神经成像技术、方法及各种工具的复杂程度也在不断提高．一方面是神经成像技术本身的不断发展,另一方面则是大脑直接刺激与神经成像技术同步记录方法的发展．经颅磁刺激-功能磁共振成像同步技术(TMS-fMRI)和经颅磁刺激-脑电技术(TMS-EEG)能为研究大脑网络的功能和有效连通性提供技术手段,该技术在多种认知领域的发展和应用,为神经科学、认知心理学、神经信息学等学科的研究者对人脑的研究开启了多条通道,更加有利于深入地理解人类大脑的工作机制．     

An economic experiment reveals that humans prefer pool punishment to maintain the commons

Punishment can stabilize costly cooperation and ensure the success of a common project that is threatened by free-riders. Punishment mechanisms can be classified into pool punishment, where the punishment act is carried out by a paid third party, (e.g. a police system or a sheriff), and peer punishment, where the punishment act is carried out by peers. Which punishment mechanism is preferred when both are concurrently available within a society? In an economic experiment, we show that the majority of subjects choose pool punishment, despite being costly even in the absence of defectors, when second-order free-riders, cooperators that do not punish, are also punished. Pool punishers are mutually enforcing their support for the punishment organization, stably trapping each other. Our experimental results show how organized punishment could have displaced individual punishment in human societies.     

The evolution of punishment through reputation

Punishment of non-cooperators has been observed to promote cooperation. Such punishment is an evolutionary puzzle because it is costly to the punisher while beneficial to others, for example, through increased social cohesion. Recent studies have concluded that punishing strategies usually pay less than some non-punishing strategies. These findings suggest that punishment could not have directly evolved to promote cooperation. However, while it is well established that reputation plays a key role in human cooperation, the simple threat from a reputation of being a punisher may not have been sufficiently explored yet in order to explain the evolution of costly punishment. Here, we first show analytically that punishment can lead to long-term benefits if it influences one''s reputation and thereby makes the punisher more likely to receive help in future interactions. Then, in computer simulations, we incorporate up to 40 more complex strategies that use different kinds of reputations (e.g. from generous actions), or strategies that not only include punitive behaviours directed towards defectors but also towards cooperators for example. Our findings demonstrate that punishment can directly evolve through a simple reputation system. We conclude that reputation is crucial for the evolution of punishment by making a punisher more likely to receive help in future interactions, and that experiments investigating the beneficial effects of punishment in humans should include reputation as an explicit feature.     

Costly punishment prevails in intergroup conflict

Understanding how societies resolve conflicts between individual and common interests remains one of the most fundamental issues across disciplines. The observation that humans readily incur costs to sanction uncooperative individuals without tangible individual benefits has attracted considerable attention as a proximate cause as to why cooperative behaviours might evolve. However, the proliferation of individually costly punishment has been difficult to explain. Several studies over the last decade employing experimental designs with isolated groups have found clear evidence that the costs of punishment often nullify the benefits of increased cooperation, rendering the strong human tendency to punish a thorny evolutionary puzzle. Here, we show that group competition enhances the effectiveness of punishment so that when groups are in direct competition, individuals belonging to a group with punishment opportunity prevail over individuals in a group without this opportunity. In addition to competitive superiority in between-group competition, punishment reduces within-group variation in success, creating circumstances that are highly favourable for the evolution of accompanying group-functional behaviours. We find that the individual willingness to engage in costly punishment increases with tightening competitive pressure between groups. Our results suggest the importance of intergroup conflict behind the emergence of costly punishment and human cooperation.     

The economics of altruistic punishment and the maintenance of cooperation

Explaining the evolution and maintenance of cooperation among unrelated individuals is one of the fundamental problems in biology and the social sciences. Recent findings suggest that altruistic punishment is an important mechanism maintaining cooperation among humans. We experimentally explore the boundaries of altruistic punishment to maintain cooperation by varying both the cost and the impact of punishment, using an exceptionally extensive subject pool. Our results show that cooperation is only maintained if conditions for altruistic punishment are relatively favourable: low cost for the punisher and high impact on the punished. Our results indicate that punishment is strongly governed by its cost-to-impact ratio and that its effect on cooperation can be pinned down to one single variable: the threshold level of free-riding that goes unpunished. Additionally, actual pay-offs are the lowest when altruistic punishment maintains cooperation, because the pay-off destroyed through punishment exceeds the gains from increased cooperation. Our results are consistent with the interpretation that punishment decisions come from an amalgam of emotional response and cognitive cost-impact analysis and suggest that altruistic punishment alone can hardly maintain cooperation under multi-level natural selection. Uncovering the workings of altruistic punishment as has been done here is important because it helps predicting under which conditions altruistic punishment is expected to maintain cooperation.     

Outsourcing punishment to God: beliefs in divine control reduce earthly punishment

The sanctioning of norm-transgressors is a necessary--though often costly--task for maintaining a well-functioning society. Prior to effective and reliable secular institutions for punishment, large-scale societies depended on individuals engaging in 'altruistic punishment'--bearing the costs of punishment individually, for the benefit of society. Evolutionary approaches to religion suggest that beliefs in powerful, moralizing Gods, who can distribute rewards and punishments, emerged as a way to augment earthly punishment in large societies that could not effectively monitor norm violations. In five studies, we investigate whether such beliefs in God can replace people's motivation to engage in altruistic punishment, and their support for state-sponsored punishment. Results show that, although religiosity generally predicts higher levels of punishment, the specific belief in powerful, intervening Gods reduces altruistic punishment and support for state-sponsored punishment. Moreover, these effects are specifically owing to differences in people's perceptions that humans are responsible for punishing wrongdoers.     

Wrath of God: religious primes and punishment

Recent evidence indicates that priming participants with religious concepts promotes prosocial sharing behaviour. In the present study, we investigated whether religious priming also promotes the costly punishment of unfair behaviour. A total of 304 participants played a punishment game. Before the punishment stage began, participants were subliminally primed with religion primes, secular punishment primes or control primes. We found that religious primes strongly increased the costly punishment of unfair behaviours for a subset of our participants--those who had previously donated to a religious organization. We discuss two proximate mechanisms potentially underpinning this effect. The first is a 'supernatural watcher' mechanism, whereby religious participants punish unfair behaviours when primed because they sense that not doing so will enrage or disappoint an observing supernatural agent. The second is a 'behavioural priming' mechanism, whereby religious primes activate cultural norms pertaining to fairness and its enforcement and occasion behaviour consistent with those norms. We conclude that our results are consistent with dual inheritance proposals about religion and cooperation, whereby religions harness the byproducts of genetically inherited cognitive mechanisms in ways that enhance the survival prospects of their adherents.     

High strength-of-ties and low mobility enable the evolution of third-party punishment

As punishment can be essential to cooperation and norm maintenance but costly to the punisher, many evolutionary game-theoretic studies have explored how direct punishment can evolve in populations. Compared to direct punishment, in which an agent acts to punish another for an interaction in which both parties were involved, the evolution of third-party punishment (3PP) is even more puzzling, because the punishing agent itself was not involved in the original interaction. Despite significant empirical studies of 3PP, little is known about the conditions under which it can evolve. We find that punishment reputation is not, by itself, sufficient for the evolution of 3PP. Drawing on research streams in sociology and psychology, we implement a structured population model and show that high strength-of-ties and low mobility are critical for the evolution of responsible 3PP. Only in such settings of high social-structural constraint are punishers able to induce self-interested agents toward cooperation, making responsible 3PP ultimately beneficial to individuals as well as the collective. Our results illuminate the conditions under which 3PP is evolutionarily adaptive in populations. Responsible 3PP can evolve and induce cooperation in cases where other mechanisms alone fail to do so.     

The 'spiteful' origins of human cooperation

We analyse generosity, second-party ('spiteful') punishment (2PP), and third-party ('altruistic') punishment (3PP) in a cross-cultural experimental economics project. We show that smaller societies are less generous in the Dictator Game but no less prone to 2PP in the Ultimatum Game. We might assume people everywhere would be more willing to punish someone who hurt them directly (2PP) than someone who hurt an anonymous third person (3PP). While this is true of small societies, people in large societies are actually more likely to engage in 3PP than 2PP. Strong reciprocity, including generous offers and 3PP, exists mostly in large, complex societies that face numerous challenging collective action problems. We argue that 'spiteful' 2PP, motivated by the basic emotion of anger, is more universal than 3PP and sufficient to explain the origins of human cooperation.     

Morningness-eveningness and social anxiety symptoms: the influence of depression symptoms on the indirect effect through punishment sensitivity and experiential avoidance

Social anxiety has recently been linked to morningness-eveningness; however, the psychological mechanisms underlying this relationship are not well known. As such, the purpose of the current study is to propose a model by which morningness-eveningness is related to social anxiety symptoms through punishment sensitivity and experiential avoidance within an adult American, community sample recruited via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk). It was hypothesized that experiential avoidance and punishment sensitivity would be associated with increased social anxiety symptoms and that morningness-eveningness would be negatively related to social anxiety symptoms. Furthermore, eveningness was hypothesized to be associated with increased punishment sensitivity and in turn, greater experiential avoidance. Lastly, the relationship between morningness-eveningness and social anxiety was hypothesized to be mediated by punishment sensitivity among the group with high depression levels, but not among the group with lesser depression symptoms. The results indicated that eveningness was related to social anxiety symptoms through experiential avoidance, and that depression symptoms influenced the relationship between morningness-eveningness and punishment sensitivity such that, in those high in depression symptoms, there was a significant association between eveningness and punishment sensitivity, but not among those with lower depression levels. The study findings build upon existing chronobiological research and addresses inconsistencies in previous literature.     

Does dishonesty really invite third-party punishment? Results of a more stringent test

Many experiments have demonstrated that people are willing to incur cost to punish norm violators even when they are not directly harmed by the violation. Such altruistic third-party punishment is often considered an evolutionary underpinning of large-scale human cooperation. However, some scholars argue that previously demonstrated altruistic third-party punishment against fairness-norm violations may be an experimental artefact. For example, envy-driven retaliatory behaviour (i.e. spite) towards better-off unfair game players may be misidentified as altruistic punishment. Indeed, a recent experiment demonstrated that participants ceased to inflict third-party punishment against an unfair player once a series of key methodological problems were systematically controlled for. Noticing that a previous finding regarding apparently altruistic third-party punishment against honesty-norm violations may have been subject to methodological issues, we used a different and what we consider to be a more sound design to evaluate these findings. Third-party punishment against dishonest players withstood this more stringent test.