Ethics and Embryo/Foetus Research

Research with embryos and foetuses raise moral problems. In this article the origins of these moral intuitions are analyzed and discussed at four levels: moral problems regarding the treatment of the foetus and the mother animal; ethical problems experienced by the moral actor (researcher); ethical problems related to a justification based upon a balance between means and goals; and ethical problems raised by society.     

MORAL EXPERTISE: A PROBLEM IN THE PROFESSIONAL ETHICS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICISTS

Philosophers, particularly moral philosophers, are increasingly being involved in public decision-making in areas which are seen to raise ethical issues. For example, Dame Mary Warnock chaired the ‘Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilization and Embryology’ in the UK in 1982–4; the Philosophy Department at Auckland was commissioned by the Auckland Regional Authority to report on the ethical aspects of fluoridating the public water supply in 1990; and many of us are serving on ethics committees of various sorts. Not only are philosophers actually being called on or consulted, but many of us would argue that a philosophical contribution in such areas is essential. The involvement of moral philosophers in public policy decisions raises a question of professional ethics, viz, what role should a philosopher's own moral perspective or judgements play in the advice s/he gives, or contribution s/he makes, to public decision-making on ethical issues. Like most problems in professional ethics, this prompts reflection on the nature of the profession, and in particular on the expertise we take moral philosophy to offer. It also prompts reflection on how processes of public decision making in ethically problematic areas should be understood. I explore these issues in this paper.     

Moral expertise: a problem in the professional ethics of professional ethicists

Philosophers, particularly moral philosophers, are increasingly being involved in public decision-making in areas which are seen to raise ethical issues. For example, Dame Mary Warnock chaired the 'Committee of Inquiry into Human Fertilization and Embryology' in the UK in 1982-4; the Philosophy Department at Auckland was commissioned by the Auckland Regional Authority to report on the ethical aspects of fluoridating the public water supply in 1990; and many of us are serving on ethics committees of various sorts. Not only are philosophers actually being called on or consulted, but many of us would argue that a philosophical contribution in such areas is essential. The involvement of moral philosophers in public policy decisions raises a question of professional ethics, viz, what role should a philosopher's own moral perspective or judgements play in the advice s/he gives, or contribution s/he makes, to public decision-making on ethical issues. Like most problems in professional ethics, this prompts reflection on the nature of the profession, and in particular on the expertise we take moral philosophy to offer. It also prompts reflection on how processes of public decision making in ethically problematic areas should be understood. I explore these issues in this paper.     

Psychiatric ethics

Psychiatric ethics spans several overlapping domains, including the guidelines for ethical research in psychiatry, the professional ethics required in the practice of psychiatry, and a broader set of moral and ethical problems and dilemmas distinctive to, or at least magnified by, the mental health care setting. Reviewed here are selected issues arising in the last two domains, some seemingly inevitable components of mental disorder and its cultural history and others resultant from recent changes and discoveries. Even as science explains and demystifies mental disorder, it is concluded, new ethical problems will continue to arise in psychiatry and certain recalcitrant problems will likely persist.     

Conceptual and Practical Problems of Moral Enhancement

Recently, the debate on human enhancement has shifted from familiar topics like cognitive enhancement and mood enhancement to a new and – to no one's surprise – controversial subject, namely moral enhancement. Some proponents from the transhumanist camp allude to the ‘urgent need’ of improving the moral conduct of humankind in the face of ever growing technological progress and the substantial dangers entailed in this enterprise. Other thinkers express more sceptical views about this proposal. As the debate has revealed so far, there is no shared opinion among philosophers (or scientists) about the meaning, prospects, and ethical evaluation of moral enhancement. In this article I will address several conceptual and practical problems of this issue, in order to encourage discussion about the prospects of (thinking about) moral enhancement in the future. My assumption is that (i) for the short term, there is little chance of arriving at an agreement on the proper understanding of morality and the appropriateness of one single (meta‐)ethical theory; (ii) apart from this, there are further philosophical puzzles loosely referred to in the debate which add to theoretical confusion; and (iii) even if these conceptual problems could be solved, there are still practical problems to be smoothed out if moral enhancement is ever to gain relevance apart from merely theoretical interest. My tentative conclusion, therefore, will be that moral enhancement is not very likely to be made sense of – let alone realized – in the medium‐term future.     

Current trends in teaching ethics of healthcare practices

The unprecedented progress in bio-medical sciences and technology during the last few decades has resulted in great transformations in the concepts of health and disease, health systems and healthcare organisation and practices. Those changes have been accompanied by the emergence of a broad range of ethical dilemmas that confront health professionals more frequently. The classical Hippocratic ethical principles, though still retaining their relevance and validity, have become insufficiently adequate in an increasing range of problems and situations. Healthcare that has been practised for centuries on the basis of a direct doctor-patient relationship has been increasingly transformed into a more complex process integrating the health-team, the patient (healthcare seeker) and the community. Systematic review of the specialised literatures revealed that Healthcare Ethics education has become a basic requirement for any training programme for health professionals, and should cover the different stages of undergraduate, postgraduate and continuing education. Both theoretical foundations and practical skills are required for the appropriate ethical reasoning, ethical attitude and decision-making abilities. There is growing evidence that physicians' professional and moral development is not only determined by the formal curriculum of ethics; rather more, it is determined by the moral environment of the professional practice, the 'hidden curriculum' which deserves serious consideration by medical education.     

Really taking Darwin seriously: An alternative to Michael Ruse's Darwinian metaethics

Michael Ruse has proposed in his recent book Taking Darwin Seriously and elsewhere a new Darwinian ethics distinct from traditional evolutionary ethics, one that avoids the latter's inadequate accounts of the nature of morality and its failed attempts to provide a naturalistic justification of morality. Ruse argues for a sociobiologically based account of moral sentiments, and an evolutionary based casual explanation of their function, rejecting the possibility of ultimate ethical justification. We find that Ruse's proposal distorts, overextends and weakens both Darwinism and naturalism. So we propose an alternative Darwinian metaethics that both remedies the problems in Ruse's proposal and shows how a Darwinian naturalistic account of the moral good in terms of human fitness avoids the naturalistic fallacy and can provide genuine, even if limited, justifications for substantive ethical claims. Thus, we propose to really take Darwin seriously.The authors are equally responsible for the writing of this paper.     

Public consultation in ethics an experiment in representative ethics

Genome Canada has funded a research project to evaluate the usefulness of different forms of ethical analysis for assessing the moral weight of public opinion in the governance of genomics. This paper will describe a role of public consultation for ethical analysis and a contribution of ethical analysis to public consultation and the governance of genomics/biotechnology. Public consultation increases the robustness of ethical analysis with a more diverse set of moral experiences. Consultation must be carefully and respectfully designed to generate sufficiently diverse and rich accounts of moral experiences. Since dominant groups tend to define ethical or policy issues in a manner that excludes some interests or perspectives, it is important to identify the range of interests that diverse publics hold before defining the issue and scope of the discussion and the premature foreclosure of ethical dialogue. Consequently, a significant contribution of ethical dialogue strengthened by social analysis is to consider the context and non-policy use of power to govern genomics and to sustain social debate on enduring ethical issues.     

PRINCIPLISM AND THE ETHICAL APPRAISAL OF CLINICAL TRIALS

For nearly two decades, the process of reviewing the ethical merit of research involving human subjects has been based on the application of principles initially described in the U.S. National Commission's Belmont Report, and later articulated more fully by Beauchamp and Childress in their Principles of Biomedical Ethics. Recently, the use of ethical principles for deliberating about moral problems in medicine and research, referred to in the pejorative sense as “principlism”, has come under scrutiny. In this paper we argue that these principles can provide a foundation for the source of ethical appraisal of human research, but are not themselves wholly adequate for this purpose. Therefore, we further propose that (1) principles should be understood as heuristics that can be “specified” as described by DeGrazia (1992), and (2) that the principle-based approach should be supplemented by formally incorporating “sensitivity to context” into the evaluation of clinical trials     

伦理管理在人类辅助生殖技术中的应用与价值

辅助生殖技术（assisted reproduction technique,ART）的飞速发展给社会带来了复杂伦理难题。因此,在ART全过程中加强伦理管理并对其后果进行评价,具有深刻的内涵价值和深远的社会意义。只有发挥生殖医学伦理委员会作为一个工作机构的职能,在医患人群中加强ART技术基本原理及相关伦理原则的宣传教育,强化医学伦理的监督机制,落实充分的知情同意等措施,才能促使医患人群都能够自觉遵守优良的医学伦理道德规范,保证人类辅助生殖技术的健康发展,使ART发挥积极的、革命性的意义。     

The ethical acceptability of animal experiments: a proposal for a system to support decision-making

We describe a system to support decision-making on the ethical acceptability of animal experiments for scientific researchers and others responsible for ethical decision-making in animal experiments. The system consists of eight steps. Each step contains a number of substantive questions or a computational rule, leading to a well-articulated moral judgment on specific animal experiments. The system comprises a number of moral assumptions and pre-emptive norms, but leaves enough room for moral discretion and personal responsibility. The general ethical ideas behind the moral choices and assumptions are sketched and potential objections to the overall approach are discussed.     

The coproduction of moral discourse in U.S. community psychiatry

Anthropologists often criticize the discipline of bioethics because its remote, abstract theories fail to capture how front-line clinicians experience and resolve moral uncertainty. The critique overlooks, however, the ways that everyday, emergent moral discourse is influenced—over time and through several mediations—by formal ethical notions. High-order ethical pronouncements become sedimented into the conditions of work, illustrated in this article by a two-year ethnographic study of Assertive Community Treatment (ACT), a popular mode of outpatient psychiatric services. ACT clinicians' moral unease when they break the confidentiality of patients is connected to high-order debates, dating back 35 years, about ensuring patients' autonomy without abandoning them. These debates originally spurred the invention of ACT, and they get braided into today's moral discourse through several mediations: regulatory paperwork, the mandates and micropolitics of staff–patient interactions, and the idealized self-image of front-line staff. This article shows how everyday moral talk is coproduced by both the immediate contexts of clinical work and the categories of formal bioethics.     

Medicare prospective payment--the ethical implications of converging clinical and financial decisions in long-term care

The principles of bioethics indicate that Prospective Payment has a moral dimension. Because Prospective Payment unifies clinical and financial decisions, it poses problems for long-term care facilities, especially those motivated by a humanitarian mission rather than financial considerations. This article outlines how Prospective Payment conflicts with the ethical principles of respect for persons, autonomy, justice, promise keeping, and fidelity.     

Does benefit justify research with children?

The inclusion of children in research gives rise to a difficult ethical question: What justifies children's research participation and exposure to research risks when they cannot provide informed consent? This question arises out of the tension between the moral requirement to obtain a subject's informed consent for research participation, on the one hand, and the limited capacity of most children to provide informed consent, on the other. Most agree that children's participation in clinical research can be justified. But the ethical justification for exposing children to research risks in the absence of consent remains unclear. One prevalent group of arguments aims to justify children's risk exposure by appealing to the concept of benefit. I call these ‘benefit arguments’. Prominent versions of this argument defend the idea that broadening our understanding of the notion of benefit to include non‐medical benefits (such as the benefit of a moral education) helps to justify children's research participation. I argue that existing benefit arguments are not persuasive and raise problems with the strategy of appealing to broader notions of benefit to justify children's exposure to research risk.     

The moral challenge of natality: towards a post-traditional concept of family and privacy in repro-genetics

Modern repro-genetics is going to change the way we conceive our children, and will have a substantial influence on the family. Two concepts of the family have been present in the ethical debate: the traditional model and the care model of the family. The first one has been rightly criticized because it privileges form over function. I will show that the second model is also insufficient and does not answer to the moral challenge of human natality, particularly from a child's point of view. Instead, I will suggest a third, kinship model of the family as moral agent. In post-traditional and post-patriarchal societies, the family must be reconsidered as actor in the ethical debates. This poses a challenge for ethical theory. The family's interests are best protected by a concept of relational privacy.     

On fun and freedom: young women's moral learning in Indonesian Islamic boarding schools

This article analyses the role of fun and freedom in the moral learning of young women students in two Indonesian Islamic boarding schools. Recent debates about Islam and ethical subject formation have centred on the assumed tension between Islam and freedom. I examine decisions about television viewing and dress to illustrate both the flexibility and fixity of moral values and evaluation in girls’ lives. I argue that anthropologists of morality and Islam should take seriously moments of fun as important instances for ‘moral ludus’ or ‘moral play’ – the testing, shifting, and reshaping of the boundaries of moral behaviours that involve balancing the demands of various social fields and the larger ethical community in which a person is embedded. I suggest that these moments be viewed not as ruptures or instances of hypocrisy but as everyday occurrences of embedded agency in the lives of piety-minded individuals.     

EMPIRICAL ETHICS AS DIALOGICAL PRACTICE

In this article, we present a dialogical approach to empirical ethics, based upon hermeneutic ethics and responsive evaluation. Hermeneutic ethics regards experience as the concrete source of moral wisdom. In order to gain a good understanding of moral issues, concrete detailed experiences and perspectives need to be exchanged. Within hermeneutic ethics dialogue is seen as a vehicle for moral learning and developing normative conclusions. Dialogue stands for a specific view on moral epistemology and methodological criteria for moral inquiry. Responsive evaluation involves a structured way of setting up dialogical learning processes, by eliciting stories of participants, exchanging experiences in (homogeneous and heterogeneous) groups and drawing normative conclusions for practice. By combining these traditions we develop both a theoretical and a practical approach to empirical ethics, in which ethical issues are addressed and shaped together with stakeholders in practice. Stakeholders' experiences are not only used as a source for reflection by the ethicist; stakeholders are involved in the process of reflection and analysis, which takes place in a dialogue between participants in practice, facilitated by the ethicist. This dialogical approach to empirical ethics may give rise to questions such as: What contribution does the ethicist make? What role does ethical theory play? What is the relationship between empirical research and ethical theory in the dialogical process? In this article, these questions will be addressed by reflecting upon a project in empirical ethics that was set up in a dialogical way. The aim of this project was to develop and implement normative guidelines with and within practice, in order to improve the practice concerning coercion and compulsion in psychiatry.     

Decoding the genetics debate: hype and hope in Icelandic news media in 2000 and 2004

The attraction of human genetics is rooted in optimistic projections of possible futures, where present-day problems are to be solved by technologies-to-come. But hyperbolic optimism with its consequent cycles of expectations, investment and disappointment is a threat to users, investors, and the ethical reputation of the biotechnology field. We report a study of the entire news coverage of genetics in Icelandic mass media in 2000 and 2004. All media promoted optimistic industry-based information largely without critical questions concerning scientific uncertainty, health benefits, or ethical challenges. Criticism and deliberation were thematically narrowed down, in 2000 to the issue of “presumed consent” for nationwide participation in a database proposed by the company Decode genetics, and in 2004 to topics concerning Decode's finances. In a discourse of monetary gain and loss, sustained exploration of scientific, moral and cultural issues has little appeal.