CHEAP LISTENING? – REFLECTIONS ON THE CONCEPT OF WRONGFUL DISABILITY1

This paper investigates the concept of wrongful disability. That concept suggests that parents are morally obligated to prevent the genetic transmission of certain conditions and so, if they do not, any resulting disability is 'wrongful'. In their book From Chance to Choice, Buchanan, Brock, Daniels and Wikler defend the concept of wrongful disability using the principle of avoidability via substitution. That principle is scrutinised here. It is argued that the idea of avoidability via substitution is both conceptually problematic and rather insensitive. Instead, it is suggested that the question of whether or not bringing a particular disability about is wrongful does not simply hinge on whether or not substitution takes place. Rather, it involves an evaluation of parental aspirations and responsibilities. It is argued that the desire need not be responsible for creating challenges for others that lie outside what is perceived to be an acceptable range provides a justification for termination of pregnancy on the grounds of projected disability that neither commits one to wrongful life claim, nor requires that one substitute a non-disabled child instead. The ramifications of such an approach are explored. The paper concludes by suggesting that the question of what is considered to be an acceptable range of human capability is an increasingly important one. It is argued that, when addressing that question, we should be acutely aware of the social context that may go some way to define what we consider to be an acceptable range.     

Mouse class III myosins: kinase activity and phosphorylation sites

As class III unconventional myosins are motor proteins with an N-terminal kinase domain, it seems likely they play a role in both signaling and actin based transport. A growing body of evidence indicates that the motor functions of human class IIIA myosin, which has been implicated in progressive hearing loss, are modulated by intermolecular autophosphorylation. However, the phosphorylation sites have not been identified. We studied the kinase activity and phosphorylation sites of mouse class III myosins, mMyo3A and 3B, which are highly similar to their human orthologs. We demonstrate that the kinase domains of mMyo3A and 3B are active kinases, and that they have similar, if not identical, substrate specificities. We show that the kinase domains of these proteins autophosphorylate, and that they can phosphorylate sites within their myosin and tail domains. Using liquid chromatography-mass spectrometry, we identified phosphorylated sites in the kinase, myosin motor and tail domains of both mMyo3A and 3B. Most of the phosphorylated sites we identified and their consensus phosphorylation motifs are highly conserved among vertebrate class III myosins, including human class III myosins. Our findings are a major step toward understanding how the functions of class III myosins are regulated by phosphorylation.     

EXISTENCE: WHO NEEDS IT? THE NON‐IDENTITY PROBLEM AND MERELY POSSIBLE PEOPLE

In formulating procreative principles, it makes sense to begin by thinking about whose interests ought to matter to us. Obviously, we care about those who exist. Less obviously, but still uncontroversially, we care about those who will exist. Ought we to care about those who might possibly, but will not actually, exist? Recently, unusual positions have been taken regarding merely possible people and the non‐identity problem. David Velleman argues that what might have happened to you – an existent person – often doesn't merit moral consideration since the alternative person one would have been had what might have happened actually happened is a merely possible person about whom one has no reason to care. He argues that his way of thinking can eliminate the non‐identity problem. Caspar Hare argues that merely possible people have interests and are morally relevant. He argues that we can solve the non‐identity problem by rejecting the view that merely possible people are morally irrelevant. Both Hare and Velleman argue that focusing on one's de dicto rather than on one's de re children can help us avoid the non‐identity problem. I analyze the role that merely possible, nonexistent hypothetical entities ought to play in our moral reasoning, especially with regard to procreation. I refute both Velleman's and Hare's views and demonstrate the difficulties we encounter when we try to apply their views to common non‐identity cases. I conclude with the common‐sense view regarding who matters, morally: only those who do, did, or will exist.