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1.
Ben Saunders 《Bioethics》2015,29(7):499-506
There has been much argument over whether procreative selection is obligatory or wrong. Rebecca Bennett has recently challenged the assumption that procreative choices are properly moral choices, arguing that these views express mere preferences. This article challenges Bennett's view on two fronts. First, I argue that the Non‐Identity Problem does not show that there cannot be harmless wrongs – though this would require us to abandon the intuitively attractive ‘person‐affecting principle’, that may be a lesser cost than abandoning some more firmly‐held intuition. But, even if we accept Bennett's claim that these choices are not moral, that does not show them to be mere personal preferences. I argue that there is a class of non‐moral ‘categorical preferences’ that have much the same implications as moral preferences. If a moral preference for able‐bodied children is problematic (as Bennett claims), then so is a non‐moral categorical preference. Thus, showing that these preferences are not moral does not show that they are not problematic, since they may still be categorical. 相似文献
2.
Recent evidence of intergenerational epigenetic programming of disease risk broadens the scope of public health preventive interventions to future generations, i.e. non existing people. Due to the transmission of epigenetic predispositions, lifestyles such as smoking or unhealthy diet might affect the health of populations across several generations. While public policy for the health of future generations can be justified through impersonal considerations, such as maximizing aggregate well‐being, in this article we explore whether there are rights‐based obligations supervening on intergenerational epigenetic programming despite the non‐identity argument, which challenges this rationale in case of policies that affect the number and identity of future people. We propose that rights based obligations grounded in the interests of non‐existing people might fall upon existing people when generations overlap. In particular, if environmental exposure in F0 (i.e. existing people) will affect the health of F2 (i.e. non‐existing people) through epigenetic programming, then F1 (i.e. existing and overlapping with both F0 and F2) might face increased costs to address F2's condition in the future: this might generate obligations upon F0 from various distributive principles, such as the principle of equal opportunity for well being. 相似文献
3.
Expanded universal carrier screening (EUCS) entails a population‐wide screening offer for multiple disease‐causing mutations simultaneously. Although there is much debate about the conditions under which EUCS can responsibly be introduced, there seems to be little discussion about its aim: providing carrier couples with options for autonomous reproductive choice. While this links in with current accounts of the aim of foetal anomaly screening, it is different from how the aim of ancestry‐based carrier screening has traditionally been understood: reducing the disease burden in the population. The reasons why the aim of EUCS is presented in terms of ‘autonomy’ rather than ‘prevention’ have not been spelled out in the literature. This paper seeks to fill this gap by considering the morally relevant similarities and dissimilarities between foetal anomaly screening, ancestry‐based carrier screening and EUCS. When carrier screening is performed in the prenatal period, enhancing autonomy appears the most appropriate aim of EUCS, as the alternative of ‘prevention through selective abortion’ would urge women to terminate wanted pregnancies. However, when screening is conducted in the preconception period, carrier couples can avoid the birth of affected children by other means than selective abortion, for instance preimplantation genetic diagnosis. To the extent that this increased control over passing on a genetic disorder raises questions of parental responsibility, it seems necessary that the account of the aims of EUCS is wider than only in terms of enhancing reproductive autonomy. 相似文献
4.
Hull RJ 《Bioethics》2006,20(2):55-63
This paper investigates the concept of wrongful disability. That concept suggests that parents are morally obligated to prevent the genetic transmission of certain conditions and so, if they do not, any resulting disability is 'wrongful'. In their book From Chance to Choice, Buchanan, Brock, Daniels and Wikler defend the concept of wrongful disability using the principle of avoidability via substitution. That principle is scrutinised here. It is argued that the idea of avoidability via substitution is both conceptually problematic and rather insensitive. Instead, it is suggested that the question of whether or not bringing a particular disability about is wrongful does not simply hinge on whether or not substitution takes place. Rather, it involves an evaluation of parental aspirations and responsibilities. It is argued that the desire need not be responsible for creating challenges for others that lie outside what is perceived to be an acceptable range provides a justification for termination of pregnancy on the grounds of projected disability that neither commits one to wrongful life claim, nor requires that one substitute a non-disabled child instead. The ramifications of such an approach are explored. The paper concludes by suggesting that the question of what is considered to be an acceptable range of human capability is an increasingly important one. It is argued that, when addressing that question, we should be acutely aware of the social context that may go some way to define what we consider to be an acceptable range. 相似文献
5.
Herissone-Kelly P 《Bioethics》2012,26(8):447-454
Rebecca Bennett, in a recent paper dismissing Julian Savulescu's principle of procreative beneficence, advances both a negative and a positive thesis. The negative thesis holds that the principle's theoretical foundation - the notion of impersonal harm or non-person-affecting wrong - is indefensible. Therefore, there can be no obligations of the sort that the principle asserts. The positive thesis, on the other hand, attempts to plug an explanatory gap that arises once the principle has been rejected. That is, it holds that the intuitions of those who adhere to the principle are not genuine moral intuitions, but instead simply give voice to mere (non-moral) preferences. This paper, while agreeing that Savulescu's principle does not express a genuine moral obligation, takes issue with both of Bennett's theses. It is suggested that the argument for the negative thesis is either weak or question-begging, while there is insufficient reason to suppose the positive thesis true. 相似文献
6.
Mark Walker 《Bioethics》2014,28(5):214-224
The primary question to be addressed here is whether pre‐implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD), used for both negative and positive trait selection, benefits potential supernumerary embryos. The phrase ‘potential supernumerary embryos’ is used to indicate that PGD is typically performed on a set of embryos, only some of which will be implanted. Prior to any testing, each embryo in the set is potentially supernumerary in the sense that it may not be selected for implantation. Those embryos that are not selected, and hence destroyed or frozen, are ‘actually supernumerary’. The argument to be advanced is hypothetical: If embryos may be said to benefit or be harmed by our actions, then PGD used to select for an embryo or embryos with the highest expected Wellbeing benefits potential supernumerary embryos. The argument shows that the ‘non‐identity’ problem is not sufficient to show that eugenic selection does not benefit supernumerary embryos. 相似文献
7.
Rebecca Bennett 《Bioethics》2014,28(9):447-455
The Principle of Procreative Beneficence (PPB) claims that we have a moral obligation, where choice is possible, to choose to create the best child we can. The existence of this moral obligation has been proposed by John Harris and Julian Savulescu and has proved controversial on many levels, not least that it is eugenics, asking us to produce the best children we can, not for the sake of that child's welfare, but in order to make a better society. These are strong claims that require robust justification that can be open to scrutiny and debate. This article argues that robust justifications are currently lacking in the work of Savulescu and Harris. The justifications provided for their conclusions about this obligation to have the best child possible rely heavily on Derek Parfit's Non‐Identity Problem and the intuitive response this provokes in many of us. Unfortunately Harris and Savulescu do not embrace the entirety of the Non‐Identity Problem and the puzzle that it presents. The Non‐Identity Problem actually provides a refutation of PPB. In order to establish PPB as a credible and defendable principle, Harris and Savulescu need to find what has eluded Parfit and many others: a solution to the Non‐Identity Problem and thus an overturning of the refutation it provides for PPB. While Harris and Savulescu do hint at possible but highly problematic solutions to the Non‐Identity Problem, these are not developed or defended. As a result their controversial is left supported by little more than intuition. 相似文献
8.
S. Matthew Liao 《Bioethics》2019,33(1):98-104
Advances in genomic technologies such as CRISPR‐Cas9, mitochondrial replacement techniques, and in vitro gametogenesis may soon give us more precise and efficient tools to have children with certain traits such as beauty, intelligence, and athleticism. In this paper, I propose a new approach to the ethics of reproductive genetic engineering, a human rights approach. This approach relies on two claims that have certain, independent plausibility: (a) human beings have equal moral status, and (b) human beings have human rights to the fundamental conditions for pursuing a good life. I first argue that the human rights approach gives us a lower bound of when reproductive genetic engineering would be permissible. I then compare this approach with other approaches such as the libertarian, perfectionist, and life worth living approaches. Against these approaches, I argue that the human rights approach offers a novel, and more plausible, way of assessing the ethics of reproductive genetic engineering. 相似文献
9.
Bennett R 《Bioethics》2009,23(5):265-273
The claim that we have a moral obligation, where a choice can be made, to bring to birth the 'best' child possible, has been highly controversial for a number of decades. More recently Savulescu has labelled this claim the Principle of Procreative Beneficence. It has been argued that this Principle is problematic in both its reasoning and its implications, most notably in that it places lower moral value on the disabled. Relentless criticism of this proposed moral obligation, however, has been unable, thus far, to discredit this Principle convincingly and as a result its influence shows no sign of abating. I will argue that while criticisms of the implications and detail of the reasoning behind it are well founded, they are unlikely to produce an argument that will ultimately discredit the obligation that the Principle of Procreative Beneficence represents. I believe that what is needed finally and convincingly to reveal the fallacy of this Principle is a critique of its ultimate theoretical foundation, the notion of impersonal harm. In this paper I argue that while the notion of impersonal harm is intuitively very appealing, its plausibility is based entirely on this intuitive appeal and not on sound moral reasoning. I show that there is another plausible explanation for our intuitive response and I believe that this, in conjunction with the other theoretical criticisms that I and others have levelled at this Principle, shows that the Principle of Procreative Beneficence should be rejected. 相似文献
10.
Illicit rac‐MDPV (3,4‐methylenedioxypyrovalerone), manufactured in clandestine labs, has become widely abused for its cocaine‐like stimulant properties. It has recently been found as one of the toxic materials in the so‐called “bath salts,” producing, among other effects, psychosis and tachycardia in humans when introduced by any of the several routes of administration (e.g., intravenous, oral, etc.). The considerable toxicity of this “designer drug” probably resides in one of the enantiomers of the racemate. In order to obtain a sufficient amount of the enantiomers of rac‐MDPV to determine their activity, we improved the known synthesis of rac‐MDPV and found chemical resolving agents, (+)‐ and (–)‐2’‐bromotetranilic acid, that gave the MDPV enantiomers in >96% enantiomeric excess as determined by 1H nuclear magnetic resonance and chiral high‐performance liquid chromatography. The absolute stereochemistry of these enantiomers was determined by single‐crystal X‐ray diffraction studies. Chirality 27:287‐293, 2015. Published 2015. This article is a U.S. Government work and is in the public domain in the USA. 相似文献
11.
Tom Shakespeare 《Bioethics》2019,33(8):914-921
A discussion of the connection between activism and academia in bioethics, highlighting the author’s own trajectory, exploring the extent to which academics have an obliation to be ‘judges’ rather than ‘barristers’ (as explored by Jonathan Haidt) and asking questions about the relationship of disability to positions in bioethics. 相似文献
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Dalal JS Stevens SM Alvarez S Munoz N Kempler KE Dosé AC Burnside B Battelle BA 《Journal of neurochemistry》2011,119(4):772-784
As class III unconventional myosins are motor proteins with an N-terminal kinase domain, it seems likely they play a role in both signaling and actin based transport. A growing body of evidence indicates that the motor functions of human class IIIA myosin, which has been implicated in progressive hearing loss, are modulated by intermolecular autophosphorylation. However, the phosphorylation sites have not been identified. We studied the kinase activity and phosphorylation sites of mouse class III myosins, mMyo3A and 3B, which are highly similar to their human orthologs. We demonstrate that the kinase domains of mMyo3A and 3B are active kinases, and that they have similar, if not identical, substrate specificities. We show that the kinase domains of these proteins autophosphorylate, and that they can phosphorylate sites within their myosin and tail domains. Using liquid chromatography-mass spectrometry, we identified phosphorylated sites in the kinase, myosin motor and tail domains of both mMyo3A and 3B. Most of the phosphorylated sites we identified and their consensus phosphorylation motifs are highly conserved among vertebrate class III myosins, including human class III myosins. Our findings are a major step toward understanding how the functions of class III myosins are regulated by phosphorylation. 相似文献
14.
We created genecap to facilitate analysis of multilocus genotype data for use in non‐invasive DNA sampling and genetic capture‐recapture studies. genecap is a Microsoft excel macro that uses multilocus genetic data to match samples with identical genotypes, calculate frequency of alleles, identify sample genotypes that differ by one and two alleles, calculate probabilities of identity, and match probabilities for matching samples. genecap allows the user to include background data and samples with missing genotypes for multiple loci. Capture histories for each user‐defined sampling period are output in formats consistent with commonly employed population estimation programs. 相似文献
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JOYCE C. HAVSTAD 《Bioethics》2010,24(2):71-77
Proponents of human reproductive cloning do not dispute that cloning may lead to violations of clones' right to self-determination, or that these violations could cause psychological harms. But they proceed with their endorsement of human reproductive cloning by dismissing these psychological harms, mainly in two ways. The first tactic is to point out that to commit the genetic fallacy is indeed a mistake; the second is to invoke Parfit's non-identity problem. The argument of this paper is that neither approach succeeds in removing our moral responsibility to consider and to prevent psychological harms to cloned individuals. In fact, the same commitment to personal liberty that generates the right to reproduce by means of cloning also creates the need to limit that right appropriately. Discussion of human reproductive cloning ought to involve a careful and balanced consideration of both the relevant aspects of personal liberty – the parents' right to reproductive freedom and the cloned child's right to self-determination. 相似文献
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RIVKA WEINBERG 《Bioethics》2013,27(9):471-484
In formulating procreative principles, it makes sense to begin by thinking about whose interests ought to matter to us. Obviously, we care about those who exist. Less obviously, but still uncontroversially, we care about those who will exist. Ought we to care about those who might possibly, but will not actually, exist? Recently, unusual positions have been taken regarding merely possible people and the non‐identity problem. David Velleman argues that what might have happened to you – an existent person – often doesn't merit moral consideration since the alternative person one would have been had what might have happened actually happened is a merely possible person about whom one has no reason to care. He argues that his way of thinking can eliminate the non‐identity problem. Caspar Hare argues that merely possible people have interests and are morally relevant. He argues that we can solve the non‐identity problem by rejecting the view that merely possible people are morally irrelevant. Both Hare and Velleman argue that focusing on one's de dicto rather than on one's de re children can help us avoid the non‐identity problem. I analyze the role that merely possible, nonexistent hypothetical entities ought to play in our moral reasoning, especially with regard to procreation. I refute both Velleman's and Hare's views and demonstrate the difficulties we encounter when we try to apply their views to common non‐identity cases. I conclude with the common‐sense view regarding who matters, morally: only those who do, did, or will exist. 相似文献
19.
Erik Magnusson 《Bioethics》2019,33(6):674-683
In this article I reconsider David Benatar's primary argument for anti‐natalism—the asymmetry argument—and outline a three‐step process for rejecting it. I begin in Part 2 by reconstructing the asymmetry argument into three main premises. I then turn in Parts 3–5 to explain how each of these premises is in fact false. Finally, I conclude in Part 6 by considering the relationship between the asymmetry argument and the quality of life argument in Benatar's overall case for anti‐natalism and argue that it is the latter argument that is actually doing the work. In this sense, the asymmetry argument is not only unsuccessful in generating Benatar's anti‐natalist conclusion, it is also unnecessary as well. 相似文献