The injustice of fat stigma

Fatness stigma is pervasive. Being fat is widely regarded a bad thing, and fat persons suffer numerous social and material disadvantages in virtue of their weight being regarded that way. Despite the seriousness of this problem, it has received relatively little attention from analytic philosophers. In this paper, I set out to explore whether there is a reasoned basis for stigmatizing fatness, and, if so, what forms of stigmatization could be justified. I consider two lines of reasoning that might be advanced to defend fat stigma. The first is broadly consequentialist. It seeks to justify stigmatizing fatness based on the public health benefits that might be produced by doing so. The second argument takes stigmatizing fatness to be a warranted response to the morally blameworthy failure to slim down exhibited by fat persons. Clarifying and assessing each of these two lines of reasoning is the main task of this paper. I argue that, upon careful examination, both these attempts to justify the stigmatization of fatness fail.     

Stigmatization and Denormalization as Public Health Policies: Some Kantian Thoughts

The stigmatization of some groups of people, whether for some characteristic they possess or some behavior they engage in, will initially strike most of us as wrong. For many years, academic work in public health, which focused mainly on the stigmatization of HIV‐positive individuals, reinforced this natural reaction to stigmatization, by pointing out the negative health effects of stigmatization. But more recently, the apparent success of anti‐smoking campaigns which employ stigmatization of smokers has raised questions about whether stigmatization may sometimes be justified, because of its positive effects on public health. Discussion of the issue so far has focused on consequences, and on some Kantian considerations regarding the status of the stigmatized. In this article, I argue that further Kantian considerations regarding the treatment of the general public (the potential stigmatizers) also count against any public health policy involving stigmatization. Attempts to encourage stigmatization are likely to fail to appeal to the rational decision‐making abilities of the general public, and the creation of stigmatized groups (even if they are stigmatized for their voluntary behavior) is an obstacle to the self‐improvement of members of the general public.     

Fair Innings

In many societies, the aging of the population is becoming a major problem. This raises difficult issues for ethics and public policy. On what is known as the fair innings view, it is not impermissible to give lower priority to policies that primarily benefit the elderly. Philosophers have tried to justify this view on various grounds. In this article, I look at a consequentialist, a fairness‐based, and a contractarian justification. I argue that all of them have implausible implications and fail to correspond to our moral intuitions. I end by outlining a different kind of consequentialist justification that avoids those implications and corresponds better to our considered moral judgments.     

Assisted Reproduction and Distributive Justice

The Canadian province of Quebec recently amended its Health Insurance Act to cover the costs of In Vitro Fertilization (IVF). The province of Ontario recently de‐insured IVF. Both provinces cited cost‐effectiveness as their grounds, but the question as to whether a public health insurance system ought to cover IVF raises the deeper question of how we should understand reproduction at the social level, and whether its costs should be a matter of individual or collective responsibility. In this article I examine three strategies for justifying collective provisions in a liberal society and assess whether public reproductive assistance can be defended on any of these accounts. I begin by considering, and rejecting, rights‐based and needs‐based approaches. I go on to argue that instead we ought to address assisted reproduction from the perspective of the contractarian insurance‐based model for public health coverage, according to which we select items for inclusion based on their unpredictability in nature and cost. I argue that infertility qualifies as an unpredictable incident against which rational agents would choose to insure under ideal conditions and that assisted reproduction is thereby a matter of collective responsibility, but only in cases of medical necessity or inability to pay. The policy I endorse by appeal to this approach is a means‐tested system of coverage resembling neither Ontario nor Quebec's, and I conclude that it constitutes a promising alternative worthy of serious consideration by bioethicists, political philosophers, and policy‐makers alike.     

Stigmatizing attitudes toward obesity in a representative population-based sample

Objective: The aim of this study was to determine stigmatizing attitudes toward obesity in the population, and its related psychological and sociodemographic determinants. Methods and Procedures: In a representative population‐based survey (N = 1,000), computer‐assisted telephone interviewing was used to assess stigmatizing attitudes toward obesity, causal attributions of obesity, the labeling of obesity as an illness, perceptions about prevalence, severity, and chronicity of obesity, support of obesity prevention, and sociodemographic characteristics. Results: Of the 1,000 participants, 23.5% (n = 235) had stigmatizing attitudes toward obesity, 21.5% (n = 215) did not have stigmatizing attitudes toward obesity, and 55.0% (n = 550) had attitudes that were undetermined with respect to stigmatization. Predictors of greater stigmatization were more causal attributions of obesity to individual behavior, less education, and older age, while causal attributions of obesity to heredity and labeling obesity as an illness predicted less stigmatization. Stigmatizing attitudes were significantly associated with stronger overall support of obesity prevention, but less readiness to support prevention financially. Discussion: Our results indicate that stigmatizing attitudes toward obesity are prevalent in the population. Information about the etiology of obesity and the clinical relevance of this condition could prove useful for destigmatization efforts.     

Precaution,threshold risk and public deliberation

It has been argued that the precautionary principle is incoherent and thus useless as a guide for regulatory policy. In a recent paper in Bioethics, Wareham and Nardini propose a response to the ‘precautionary paradox’ according to which the precautionary principle's usefulness for decision making in policy and regulation contexts can be justified by appeal to a probability threshold discriminating between negligible and non‐negligible risks. It would be of great significance to debates about risk and precaution if there were a sound method for determining a minimum probability threshold of negligible risk. This is what Wareham and Nardini aim to do. The novelty of their approach is that they suggest that such a threshold should be determined by a method of public deliberation. In this article I discuss the merits of Wareham and Nardini’s public deliberation method for determining thresholds. I raise an epistemic worry about the public deliberation method they suggest, and argue that their proposal is inadequate due to a hidden assumption that the acceptability of a risk can be completely analysed in terms of its probability.     

Institutional refusal to offer assisted dying: A response to Shadd and Shadd

Ever since medical assistance in dying (MAID) became legal in Canada in 2016, controversy has enveloped the refusal by many faith‐based institutions to allow this service on their premises. In a recent article in this journal, Philip and Joshua Shadd have proposed ‘changing the conversation’ on this issue, reframing it as an exercise not of conscience but of an institutional right of self‐governance. This reframing, they claim, will serve to show how health‐care institutions may be justified in refusing to provide MAID on moral or religious grounds. I argue that it will not make it easier to justify institutional refusal, and is likely to make it harder.     

Health Security and Risk Aversion

Health security has become a popular way of justifying efforts to control catastrophic threats to public health. Unfortunately, there has been little analysis of the concept of health security, nor the relationship between health security and other potential aims of public health policy. In this paper I develop an account of health security as an aversion to risky policy options. I explore three reasons for thinking risk avoidance is a distinctly worthwhile aim of public health policy: (i) that security is intrinsically valuable, (ii) that it is necessary for social planning and (iii) that it is an appropriate response to decision‐making in contexts of very limited information. Striking the right balance between securing and maximizing population health thus requires a substantive, and hitherto unrecognized, value judgment. Finally, I critically evaluate the current health security agenda in light of this new account of the concept and its relationship to the other aims of public health policy.     

Primum Non Nocere: Obesity Stigma and Public Health

Several recent anti-obesity campaigns appear to embrace stigmatization of obese individuals as a public health strategy. These approaches seem to be based on the fundamental assumptions that (1) obesity is largely under an individual’s control and (2) stigmatizing obese individuals will motivate them to change their behavior and will also result in successful behavior change. The empirical evidence does not support these assumptions: Although body weight is, to some degree, under individuals’ personal control, there are a range of biopsychosocial barriers that make weight regulation difficult. Furthermore, there is accumulating evidence that stigmatizing obese individuals decreases their motivation to diet, exercise, and lose weight. Public health campaigns should focus on facilitating behavioral change, rather than stigmatizing obese people, and should be grounded in the available empirical evidence. Fundamentally, these campaigns should, first, do no harm.     

Antibiotic resistance as a tragedy of the commons: An ethical argument for a tax on antibiotic use in humans

To the extent that antibiotic resistance (ABR) is accelerated by antibiotic consumption and that it represents a serious public health emergency, it is imperative to drastically reduce antibiotic consumption, particularly in high‐income countries. I present the problem of ABR as an instance of the collective action problem known as ‘tragedy of the commons’. I propose that there is a strong ethical justification for taxing certain uses of antibiotics, namely when antibiotics are required to treat minor and self‐limiting infections, such as respiratory tract infections, in otherwise healthy individuals. Taxation would allow a reduction in consumption (given certain behavioural economics assumptions) and/or ensure that individuals internalize or compensate for their contribution to the erosion of the common good of antibiotic effectiveness. I suggest that revenue from the tax could be used to fund conservation and innovation strategies. Taxation might be a coercive policy, especially for certain individuals, but the ethical case for coercive policies is very strong when the good to be preserved is important enough and when they force individuals to do something they have a moral obligation to do anyway. I argue that, in the case of mild and self‐limiting infections, individuals have a moral duty of easy rescue and a moral duty of fairness to make their contribution to the preservation of the common good of antibiotic effectiveness by foregoing antibiotics. I also suggest that taxing antibiotics in such cases is an all things considered ethically justified policy even if it would introduce inequalities in access to healthcare.     

Surveillance and control of asymptomatic carriers of drug‐resistant bacteria

Drug‐resistant bacterial infections constitute a major threat to global public health. Several key bacteria that are becoming increasingly resistant are among those that are ubiquitously carried by human beings and usually cause no symptoms (i.e. individuals are asymptomatic carriers) until and/or unless a precipitating event leads to symptomatic infection (and thus disease). Carriers of drug‐resistant bacteria can also transmit resistant pathogens to others, thus putting the latter at risk of resistant infections. Accumulating evidence suggests that such transmission occurs not only in hospital settings but also in the general community, although considerably more data are needed to assess the extent of this problem. Asymptomatic carriage of drug‐resistant bacteria raises important ethical questions regarding the appropriate public health response, including the degree to which it would be justified to impose burdens on asymptomatic carriers (and others) in order to prevent transmission. In this paper, we (i) summarize current evidence regarding the carriage of key drug‐resistant bacteria, noting important knowledge gaps; and (ii) explore the particular implications of existing public health ethics frameworks for policy‐making regarding asymptomatic carriers. Inter alia, we argue that the relative burdens imposed by public health measures on healthy carriers (as opposed to sick individuals) warrant careful consideration and should be proportionate to the expected public health benefits in terms of risks averted. We conclude that more surveillance and research regarding community transmission will be needed in order to clarify relevant risks and design proportionate policies, although extensive community surveillance itself would also require careful ethical consideration.     

What Does Public Health Ethics Tell (Or Not Tell) Us About Intervening in Non-Communicable Diseases?

Obesity has been described as pandemic and a public health crisis. It has been argued that concerted research efforts are needed to enhance our understanding and develop effective interventions for the complex and multiple dimensions of the health challenges posed by obesity. This would provide a secure evidence base in order to justify clinical interventions and public policy. This paper critically examines these claims through the examination of models of public health and public health ethics. I argue that the concept of an effective public health intervention is unclear and underdeveloped and, as a consequence, normative frameworks reliant on meeting the effectiveness criterion may miss morally salient dimensions of the problems. I conclude by arguing for the need to consider both an ecological model of public health and inclusion of a critical public health ethics perspective for an adequate account of the public health challenges posed by obesity.     

Epigenetics and Future Generations

Recent evidence of intergenerational epigenetic programming of disease risk broadens the scope of public health preventive interventions to future generations, i.e. non existing people. Due to the transmission of epigenetic predispositions, lifestyles such as smoking or unhealthy diet might affect the health of populations across several generations. While public policy for the health of future generations can be justified through impersonal considerations, such as maximizing aggregate well‐being, in this article we explore whether there are rights‐based obligations supervening on intergenerational epigenetic programming despite the non‐identity argument, which challenges this rationale in case of policies that affect the number and identity of future people. We propose that rights based obligations grounded in the interests of non‐existing people might fall upon existing people when generations overlap. In particular, if environmental exposure in F0 (i.e. existing people) will affect the health of F2 (i.e. non‐existing people) through epigenetic programming, then F1 (i.e. existing and overlapping with both F0 and F2) might face increased costs to address F2's condition in the future: this might generate obligations upon F0 from various distributive principles, such as the principle of equal opportunity for well being.     

Responsibility and the limits of patient choice

Patients are generally assumed to have the right to choices about treatment, including the right to refuse treatment, which is constrained by considerations of cost-effectiveness. Independently, many people support the idea that patients who are responsible for their ill health should incur penalties that non-responsible patients do not face. Surprisingly, these two areas have not received much joint attention. This paper considers whether restricting the scope of responsibility to pre-treatment decisions can be justified, or whether a demand to hold people responsible for 'usual suspect' choices such as smoking or failure to exercise commits us to also holding people responsible for their treatment choices. I argue that there is no good reason to support this restriction: those who advocate responsibility for (some) pre-treatment choices should also advocate responsibility for (some) treatment choices. However, I also note that, as with pre-treatment choices, patients may sometimes have reason to choose in ways that do not optimize their health. As such, I also consider a process, based on the idea of public reasons, for deciding which treatment choices patients cannot legitimately be held responsible for, along with a method for considering proposed changes to this category.     

Quantifying Health Across Populations

In this article, I argue that as a theoretical matter, a population's health‐level is best quantified via averagism. Averagism asserts that the health of a population is the average of members’ health‐levels. This model is better because it does not fall prey to a number of objections, including the repugnant conclusion, and because it is not arbitrary. I also argue that as a practical matter, population health‐levels are best quantified via totalism. Totalism asserts that the health of a population is the sum of members’ health‐levels. Totalism is better here because it fits better with cost‐benefit analysis and such an analysis is the best practical way to value healthcare outcomes. The two results are compatible because the theoretical and practical need not always align, whether in general or in the context of population health.     

Obese Children,Adults and Senior Citizens in the Eyes of the General Public: Results of a Representative Study on Stigma and Causation of Obesity

Obese individuals are blamed for their excess weight based on causal attribution to the individual. It is unclear whether obese individuals of different age groups and gender are faced with the same amount of stigmatization. This information is important in order to identify groups of individuals at risk for higher stigmatization and discrimination. A telephone interview was conducted in a representative sample of 3,003 participants. Experimental manipulation was realized by vignettes describing obese and normal-weight children, adults and senior citizens. Stigmatizing attitudes were measured by semantic differential. Causal attribution was assessed. Internal factors were rated with highest agreement rates as a cause for the vignette''s obesity. Lack of activity behavior and eating too much are the most supported causes. Importance of causes differed for the different vignettes. For the child, external causes were considered more important. The overweight vignette was rated consistently more negatively. Higher educational attainment and personal obesity were associated with lower stigmatizing attitudes. The vignette of the obese child was rated more negatively compared to that of an adult or senior citizen. Obesity is seen as a controllable condition, but for children external factors are seen as well. Despite this finding, they are faced with higher stigmatizing attitudes in the general public, contradicting attribution theory assumptions. Internal and external attribution were found to be inter-correlated. Obese children are the population most at risk for being confronted with stigmatization, making them a target point in stigma-reduction campaigns.     

JUSTICE, STIGMA, AND THE NEW EPIDEMIOLOGY OF HEALTH DISPARITIES

Recent research in epidemiology has identified a number of factors beyond access to medical care that contribute to health disparities. Among the so-called socioeconomic determinants of health are income, education, and the distribution of social capital. One factor that has been overlooked in this discussion is the effect that stigmatization can have on health. In this paper, I identify two ways that social stigma can create health disparities: directly by impacting health-care seeking behaviour and indirectly through the internalization of negative interpersonal judgments. I then argue that social arrangements that foster self-respect can reduce the impact of stigmatization on health disparities. I conclude by showing how John Rawls' conception of justice can be used to address the intersection of stigma, health, and self-respect, in contrast to critics of his position, who have seen him as excessively focused on the allocation of material goods.     

Weight Stigmatization and Ideological Beliefs: Relation to Psychological Functioning in Obese Adults

Objective: This study evaluated the relation among weight‐based stigmatization, ideological beliefs about weight, and psychological functioning in an obese, treatment‐seeking sample. Research Methods and Procedure: Ninety‐three obese, treatment‐seeking adults (24 men and 69 women) completed a battery of self‐report questionnaires measuring psychological adjustment, attitudes about weight, belief in the controllability of weight, and the frequency of weight‐based stigmatization. Results: Weight‐based stigmatization was a common experience for participants. Frequency of stigmatizing experiences was positively associated with depression, general psychiatric symptoms, and body image disturbance, and negatively associated with self‐esteem. Further, participants’ own negative attitudes about weight problems were associated with their psychological distress and moderated the relation between the experience of stigmatization and body image. Discussion: Weight‐based stigmatization is a common experience for obese individuals seeking weight loss treatment and appears to contribute to poor mental health adjustment. The negative effects of these experiences are particularly damaging for those who hold strong antifat beliefs.     

Mass immunisation programmes: some philosophical issues

Most countries promote mass immunisation programmes. The varying policy details raise a raft of philosophical issues. I have two broad aims in this paper. First, I hope to begin to remedy a rather curious philosophical neglect of immunisation. With this in mind, I take a broad approach to the topic hoping to introduce rather than settle a range of philosophical issues. My second aim has two aspects: I argue that the states should have pro-immunisation policies, and I advance a view on the subsequent and more specific question as to which sorts of pro-immunisation policies they should prefer. I use the immunisation policies of the United States and New Zealand to frame my discussion of these substantive questions. Immunisation is effectively compulsory in the United States. New Zealand, by contrast, requires evidence not of immunisation but of immunisation status upon school enrolment: New Zealand's policy effectively makes immunisation choice compulsory. I argue that, as between the pro-immunisation policies of the United States and New Zealand, the latter should be preferred. Though the threshold question as to whether states should have pro-immunisation policies should be answered affirmatively, the move to compulsory immunisation cannot be justified.     

THE DEAD DONOR RULE,VOLUNTARY ACTIVE EUTHANASIA,AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT

We argue that the dead donor rule, which states that multiple vital organs should only be taken from dead patients, is justified neither in principle nor in practice. We use a thought experiment and a guiding assumption in the literature about the justification of moral principles to undermine the theoretical justification for the rule. We then offer two real world analogues to this thought experiment, voluntary active euthanasia and capital punishment, and argue that the moral permissibility of terminating any patient through the removal of vital organs cannot turn on whether or not the practice violates the dead donor rule. Next, we consider practical justifications for the dead donor rule. Specifically, we consider whether there are compelling reasons to promulgate the rule even though its corresponding moral principle is not theoretically justified. We argue that there are no such reasons. In fact, we argue that promulgating the rule may actually decrease public trust in organ procurement procedures and medical institutions generally – even in states that do not permit capital punishment or voluntary active euthanasia. Finally, we examine our case against the dead donor rule in the light of common arguments for it. We find that these arguments are often misplaced – they do not support the dead donor rule. Instead, they support the quite different rule that patients should not be killed for their vital organs.