Adaptationism: Hypothesis or Heuristic?

Elliott Sober (1987, 1993) and Orzack and Sober (forthcoming) argue that adaptationism is a very general hypothesis that can be tested by testing various particular hypotheses that invoke natural selection to explain the presence of traits in populations of organisms. In this paper, I challenge Sobers claim that adaptationism is an hypothesis and I argue that it is best viewed as a heuristic (or research strategy). Biologists would still have good reasons for employing this research strategy even if it turns out that natural selection is not the most important cause of evolution.     

Paleolithic public goods games: why human culture and cooperation did not evolve in one step

It is widely agreed that humans have specific abilities for cooperation and culture that evolved since their split with their last common ancestor with chimpanzees. Many uncertainties remain, however, about the exact moment in the human lineage when these abilities evolved. This article argues that cooperation and culture did not evolve in one step in the human lineage and that the capacity to stick to long-term and risky cooperative arrangements evolved before properly modern culture. I present evidence that Homo heidelbergensis became increasingly able to secure contributions form others in two demanding Paleolithic public good games (PPGGs): cooperative feeding and cooperative breeding. I argue that the temptation to defect is high in these PPGGs and that the evolution of human cooperation in Homo heidelberngensis is best explained by the emergence of modern-like abilities for inhibitory control and goal maintenance. These executive functions are localized in the prefrontal cortex and allow humans to stick to social norms in the face of competing motivations. This scenario is consistent with data on brain evolution that indicate that the largest growth of the prefrontal cortex in human evolution occurred in Homo heidelbergensis and was followed by relative stasis in this part of the brain. One implication of this argument is that subsequent behavioral innovations, including the evolution of symbolism, art, and properly cumulative culture in modern Homo sapiens, are unlikely to be related to a reorganization of the prefrontal cortex, despite frequent claims to the contrary in the literature on the evolution of human culture and cognition.     

Sober &; Wilson’s evolutionary arguments for psychological altruism: a reassessment

In their book Unto Others, Sober and Wilson argue that various evolutionary considerations (based on the logic of natural selection) lend support to the truth of psychological altruism. However, recently, Stephen Stich has raised a number of challenges to their reasoning: in particular, he claims that three out of the four evolutionary arguments they give are internally unconvincing, and that the one that is initially plausible fails to take into account recent findings from cognitive science and thus leaves open a number of egoistic responses. These challenges make it necessary to reassess the plausibility of Sober & Wilson’s evolutionary account—which is what I aim to do in this paper. In particular, I try to show that, as a matter of fact, Sober & Wilson’s case remains compelling, as some of Stich’s concerns rest on a confusion, and those that do not are not sufficiently strong to establish all the conclusions he is after. The upshot is that no reason has been given to abandon the view that evolutionary theory has advanced the debate surrounding psychological altruism.     

Sober and Elgin on laws of biology: a critique

In this short discussion note, I discuss whether any of the generalizations made in biology should be construed as laws. Specifically, I examine a strategy offered by Elliot Sober (1997) and supported by Mehmet Elgin (2006) to reformulate certain biological generalizations so as to eliminate their contingency, thereby allowing them to count as laws. I argue that this strategy entails a conception of laws that is unacceptable on two counts: (1) Sober and Elgin’s approach allows the possibility of formulating laws describing any biological phenomenon whatsoever; and (2) on Sober and Elgin’s view, any interesting contrast between so-called laws and obviously accidental generalizations collapses. I conclude by offering suggestions to refine their view in order to avoid these theoretical problems.     

Gene mobility and the concept of relatedness

Cooperation is rife in the microbial world, yet our best current theories of the evolution of cooperation were developed with multicellular animals in mind. Hamilton’s theory of inclusive fitness is an important case in point: applying the theory in a microbial setting is far from straightforward, as social evolution in microbes has a number of distinctive features that the theory was never intended to capture. In this article, I focus on the conceptual challenges posed by the project of extending Hamilton’s theory to accommodate the effects of gene mobility. I begin by outlining the basics of the theory of inclusive fitness, emphasizing the role that the concept of relatedness is intended to play. I then provide a brief history of this concept, showing how, over the past fifty years, it has departed from the intuitive notion of genealogical kinship to encompass a range of generalized measures of genetic similarity. I proceed to argue that gene mobility forces a further revision of the concept. The reason in short is that, when the genes implicated in producing social behaviour are mobile, we cannot talk of an organism’s genotype simpliciter; we can talk only of an organism’s genotype at a particular stage in its life cycle. We must therefore ask: with respect to which stage(s) in the life cycle should relatedness be evaluated? For instance: is it genetic similarity at the time of social interaction that matters to the evolution of social behaviour, or is it genetic similarity at the time of reproduction? I argue that, strictly speaking, it is neither of these: what really matters to the evolution of social behaviour is diachronic genetic similarity between the producers of fitness benefits at the time they produce them and the recipients of those benefits at the end of their life-cycle. I close by discussing the implications of this result. The main payoff is that it makes room for a possible new mechanism for the evolution of altruism in microbes that does not require correlated interaction among bearers of the genes for altruism. The importance of this mechanism in nature remains an open empirical question.     

Genetic drift as a directional factor: biasing effects and a priori predictions

The adequacy of Elliott Sober’s analogy between classical mechanics and evolutionary theory—according to which both theories explain via a zero-force law and a set of forces that alter the zero-force state—has been criticized from various points of view. I focus here on McShea and Brandon’s claim that drift shouldn’t be considered a force because it is not directional. I argue that there are a number of different theses that could be meant by this, and show that one of those theses—the idea that drift cannot bias populations to be taken somewhere in the evolutionary space from one generation to the next—is actually false. Not only has this thesis been implicitly assumed in the discussion of the force analogy thus far, but it is also commonly found in a wider range of philosophical and biological texts. I argue that correcting this view, and the usual images associated with it, will thereby bring heuristic benefits that impact the force analogy discussion, but that also go beyond it.     

Population Level Causation and a Unified Theory of Natural Selection

Sober (1984) presents an account of selection motivated by the view that one property can causally explain the occurrence of another only if the first plays a unique role in the causal production of the second. Sober holds that a causal property will play such a unique role if it is a population level cause of its effect, and on this basis argues that there is selection for a trait T only if T is a population level cause of survival and reproductive success. Sterelny and Kitcher (1988) claim against Sober that some traits directly subject to selection will not satisfy the probabilistic condition on population level causation. In this paper I show that Sober has the resources to resist the Sterelny-Kitcher complaint, but I argue that not all traits that satisfy the probabilistic condition play the required unique role in the production of their effects.     

THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIAL SIGNALS: MORPHOLOGICAL,FUNCTIONAL, AND GENETIC INTEGRATION OF THE SEX PHEROMONE IN NAUPHOETA CINEREA

Social signals that mediate intraspecific interactions can be complex, conveying considerable information concerning the probable behavior of individuals and minimizing overt aggression and wasted energy. In the cockroach Nauphoeta cinerea, male-male competition and female mate choice are mediated by a multicomponent male-produced sex pheromone. In this study, I examine variation in this pheromone. First I measure differences among males in both individual pheromone compounds and the overall composition of the pheromone. Principal component analysis is used to quantify and describe pheromone composition. Next, I explore some of the causes and consequences of this variation by examining the pheromone of males with different social experiences. Compared to subordinate males, dominant males have significantly less variable quantities of the individual pheromone compounds and are significantly less variable in the composition of their pheromone. Because of an association between status and mating success, male-male competition can result in stabilizing sexual selection on the sex pheromone. Finally, I test the hypothesis that the pheromone compounds evolve in a manner consistent with their function. As predicted for morphologically integrated characters, the patterns of phenotypic, genetic, and environmental correlations among my measures of pheromone compounds and composition match functional patterns suggested by this study and the developmental patterns demonstrated in my previous studies. Based on these studies of the N. cinerea sex pheromone, I argue that stabilizing sexual selection shapes the evolution of pheromonal communication involved in social interactions among male N. cinerea. Further, I argue that coordinated evolution of social signals may be possible due to the morphological integration of their multiple compounds.     

Correlated pay-offs are key to cooperation

The general belief that cooperation and altruism in social groups result primarily from kin selection has recently been challenged, not least because results from cooperatively breeding insects and vertebrates have shown that groups may be composed mainly of non-relatives. This allows testing predictions of reciprocity theory without the confounding effect of relatedness. Here, we review complementary and alternative evolutionary mechanisms to kin selection theory and provide empirical examples of cooperative behaviour among unrelated individuals in a wide range of taxa. In particular, we focus on the different forms of reciprocity and on their underlying decision rules, asking about evolutionary stability, the conditions selecting for reciprocity and the factors constraining reciprocal cooperation. We find that neither the cognitive requirements of reciprocal cooperation nor the often sequential nature of interactions are insuperable stumbling blocks for the evolution of reciprocity. We argue that simple decision rules such as ‘help anyone if helped by someone’ should get more attention in future research, because empirical studies show that animals apply such rules, and theoretical models find that they can create stable levels of cooperation under a wide range of conditions. Owing to its simplicity, behaviour based on such a heuristic may in fact be ubiquitous. Finally, we argue that the evolution of exchange and trading of service and commodities among social partners needs greater scientific focus.     

The other cooperation problem: generating benefit

Understanding how cooperation evolves is central to explaining some core features of our biological world. Many important evolutionary events, such as the arrival of multicellularity or the origins of eusociality, are cooperative ventures between formerly solitary individuals. Explanations of the evolution of cooperation have primarily involved showing how cooperation can be maintained in the face of free-riding individuals whose success gradually undermines cooperation. In this paper I argue that there is a second, distinct, and less well explored, problem of cooperation that I call the generation of benefit. Focusing on how benefit is generated within a group poses a different problem: how is it that individuals in a group can (at least in principle) do better than those who remain solitary? I present several different ways that benefit may be generated, each with different implications for how cooperation might be initiated, how it might further evolve, and how it might interact with different ways of maintaining cooperation. I argue that in some cases of cooperation, the most important underlying “problem” of cooperation may be how to generate benefit, rather than how to reduce conflict or prevent free-riding.     

Dynamic social behaviour in a bacterium: Pseudomonas aeruginosa partially compensates for siderophore loss to cheats

Cooperation underlies diverse phenomena including the origins of multicellular life, human behaviour in economic markets and the mechanisms by which pathogenic bacteria cause disease. Experiments with microorganisms have advanced our understanding of how, when and why cooperation evolves, but the extent to which microbial cooperation can recapitulate aspects of animal behaviour is debated. For instance, understanding the evolution of behavioural response rules (how should one individual respond to another's decision to cooperate or defect?) is a key part of social evolution theory, but the possible existence of such rules in social microbes has not been explored. In one specific context (biparental care in animals), cooperation is maintained if individuals respond to a partner's defection by increasing their own investment into cooperation, but not so much that this fully compensates for the defector's lack of investment. This is termed ‘partial compensation’. Here, I show that partial compensation for the presence of noncooperating ‘cheats’ is also observed in a microbial social behaviour: the cooperative production of iron‐scavenging siderophores by the bacterium Pseudomonas aeruginosa. A period of evolution in the presence of cheats maintains this response, whereas evolution in the absence of cheats leads to a loss of compensatory behaviour. These results demonstrate (i) the remarkable flexibility of bacterial social behaviour, (ii) the potential generality of partial compensation as a social response rule and (iii) the need for mathematical models to explore the evolution of response rules in multi‐player social interactions.     

Wild justice and fair play: cooperation,forgiveness, and morality in animals

In this paper I argue that we can learn much about ‘wild justice’ and the evolutionary origins of social morality – behaving fairly – by studying social play behavior in group-living animals, and that interdisciplinary cooperation will help immensely. In our efforts to learn more about the evolution of morality we need to broaden our comparative research to include animals other than non-human primates. If one is a good Darwinian, it is premature to claim that only humans can be empathic and moral beings. By asking the question ‘What is it like to be another animal?’ we can discover rules of engagement that guide animals in their social encounters. When I study dogs, for example, I try to be a ‘dogocentrist’ and practice ‘dogomorphism.’ My major arguments center on the following ‘big’ questions: Can animals be moral beings or do they merely act as if they are? What are the evolutionary roots of cooperation, fairness, trust, forgiveness, and morality? What do animals do when they engage in social play? How do animals negotiate agreements to cooperate, to forgive, to behave fairly, to develop trust? Can animals forgive? Why cooperate and play fairly? Why did play evolve as it has? Does ‘being fair’ mean being more fit – do individual variations in play influence an individual's reproductive fitness, are more virtuous individuals more fit than less virtuous individuals? What is the taxonomic distribution of cognitive skills and emotional capacities necessary for individuals to be able to behave fairly, to empathize, to behave morally? Can we use information about moral behavior in animals to help us understand ourselves? I conclude that there is strong selection for cooperative fair play in which individuals establish and maintain a social contract to play because there are mutual benefits when individuals adopt this strategy and group stability may be also be fostered. Numerous mechanisms have evolved to facilitate the initiation and maintenance of social play to keep others engaged, so that agreeing to play fairly and the resulting benefits of doing so can be readily achieved. I also claim that the ability to make accurate predictions about what an individual is likely to do in a given social situation is a useful litmus test for explaining what might be happening in an individual's brain during social encounters, and that intentional or representational explanations are often important for making these predictions.     

Social intelligence, human intelligence and niche construction

This paper is about the evolution of hominin intelligence. I agree with defenders of the social intelligence hypothesis in thinking that externalist models of hominin intelligence are not plausible: such models cannot explain the unique cognition and cooperation explosion in our lineage, for changes in the external environment (e.g. increasing environmental unpredictability) affect many lineages. Both the social intelligence hypothesis and the social intelligence-ecological complexity hybrid I outline here are niche construction models. Hominin evolution is hominin response to selective environments that earlier hominins have made. In contrast to social intelligence models, I argue that hominins have both created and responded to a unique foraging mode; a mode that is both social in itself and which has further effects on hominin social environments. In contrast to some social intelligence models, on this view, hominin encounters with their ecological environments continue to have profound selective effects. However, though the ecological environment selects, it does not select on its own. Accidents and their consequences, differential success and failure, result from the combination of the ecological environment an agent faces and the social features that enhance some opportunities and suppress others and that exacerbate some dangers and lessen others. Individuals do not face the ecological filters on their environment alone, but with others, and with the technology, information and misinformation that their social world provides.     

Multilevel selection analysis of a microbial social trait

The study of microbial communities often leads to arguments for the evolution of cooperation due to group benefits. However, multilevel selection models caution against the uncritical assumption that group benefits will lead to the evolution of cooperation. We analyze a microbial social trait to precisely define the conditions favoring cooperation. We combine the multilevel partition of the Price equation with a laboratory model system: swarming in Pseudomonas aeruginosa. We parameterize a population dynamics model using competition experiments where we manipulate expression, and therefore the cost‐to‐benefit ratio of swarming cooperation. Our analysis shows that multilevel selection can favor costly swarming cooperation because it causes population expansion. However, due to high costs and diminishing returns constitutive cooperation can only be favored by natural selection when relatedness is high. Regulated expression of cooperative genes is a more robust strategy because it provides the benefits of swarming expansion without the high cost or the diminishing returns. Our analysis supports the key prediction that strong group selection does not necessarily mean that microbial cooperation will always emerge.     

Hume and the argument for biological design

There seems to be a widespread conviction — evidenced, for example, in the work of Mackie, Dawkins and Sober — that it is Darwinian rather than Humean considerations which deal the fatal logical blow to arguments for intelligent design. I argue that this conviction cannot be well-founded. If there are current logically decisive objections to design arguments, they must be Humean — for Darwinian considerations count not at all against design arguments based upon apparent cosmological fine-tuning. I argue, further, that there are good Humean reasons for atheists and agnostics to resist the suggestion that apparent design — apparent biological design and/or apparent cosmological fine-tuning — establishes (or even strongly supports) the hypothesis of intelligent design.     

Ecological succession,patch age and the evolution of social behaviour and terminal investment

Recent years have witnessed a growing interest in understanding the evolution of social behaviour in heterogeneous spatially structured populations. These studies, however, have neglected the impact of extinction–colonisation dynamics and ecological succession on the dynamical expression of social behaviour over time. Here, I present a kin‐selection model in which patches are structured into age‐classes. I show that ecological succession and patch age lead to highly plastic social phenotypes that vary dramatically as societies age since their initial establishment until their ultimate collapse. I find that the mode of colonisation following dispersal strongly influences the patch age‐dependent trajectories of social phenotypes. When patches are colonised by a random collection of immigrants, aggression is favoured during the build‐up of a society, but it slowly subsides until it eventually gives place to cooperation throughout the later stages of a society's lifespan. When newly established societies are formed by collectives of close relatives, cooperation is favoured during the build‐up of the society as well as when the society nears its eventual collapse. At intermediate societal ages, the genetic structure of the society is sufficiently resilient to the influx of immigrants such that cooperation remains relatively high. Moreover, I report a novel form of social terminal investment, whereby cooperative effort rises when patches approach their collapse. When dispersal is allowed to co‐evolve with cooperation, we observe a sudden rise in dispersal phenotypes before a patch's collapse, and the surprising result that clonal colonisation does not yield significantly higher levels of cooperation than the individual mode of colonisation. More generally, my results show that ecological succession strongly determines the dynamics of kin selection after colonisation, and therefore I expect that these findings will be valuable for understanding behavioural syndromes during range expansion or biological invasions.     

The concurrent evolution of cooperation and the population structures that support it

The evolution of cooperation often depends upon population structure, yet nearly all models of cooperation implicitly assume that this structure remains static. This is a simplifying assumption, because most organisms possess genetic traits that affect their population structure to some degree. These traits, such as a group size preference, affect the relatedness of interacting individuals and hence the opportunity for kin or group selection. We argue that models that do not explicitly consider their evolution cannot provide a satisfactory account of the origin of cooperation, because they cannot explain how the prerequisite population structures arise. Here, we consider the concurrent evolution of genetic traits that affect population structure, with those that affect social behavior. We show that not only does population structure drive social evolution, as in previous models, but that the opportunity for cooperation can in turn drive the creation of population structures that support it. This occurs through the generation of linkage disequilibrium between socio-behavioral and population-structuring traits, such that direct kin selection on social behavior creates indirect selection pressure on population structure. We illustrate our argument with a model of the concurrent evolution of group size preference and social behavior.     

A chemically triggered transition from conflict to cooperation in burying beetles

Although interspecific competition has long been recognised as a major driver of trait divergence and adaptive evolution, relatively little effort has focused on how it influences the evolution of intraspecific cooperation. Here we identify the mechanism by which the perceived pressure of interspecific competition influences the transition from intraspecific conflict to cooperation in a facultative cooperatively breeding species, the Asian burying beetle Nicrophorus nepalensis. We not only found that beetles are more cooperative at carcasses when blowfly maggots have begun to digest the tissue, but that this social cooperation appears to be triggered by a single chemical cue – dimethyl disulfide (DMDS) – emitted from carcasses consumed by blowflies, but not from control carcasses lacking blowflies. Our results provide experimental evidence that interspecific competition promotes the transition from intraspecific conflict to cooperation in N. nepalensis via a surprisingly simple social chemical cue that is a reliable indicator of resource competition between species.     

THE ENFORCEMENT OF COOPERATION BY POLICING

Policing is regarded as an important mechanism for maintaining cooperation in human and animal social groups. A simple model providing a theoretical overview of the coevolution of policing and cooperation has been analyzed by Frank (1995, 1996b, 2003, 2009) , and this suggests that policing will evolve to fully suppress cheating within social groups when relatedness is low. Here, we relax some of the assumptions made by Frank, and investigate the consequences for policing and cooperation. First, we address the implicit assumption that the individual cost of investment into policing is reduced when selfishness dominates. We find that relaxing this assumption leads to policing being favored only at intermediate relatedness. Second, we address the assumption that policing fully recovers the loss of fitness incurred by the group owing to selfishness. We find that relaxing this assumption prohibits the evolution of full policing. Finally, we consider the impact of demography on the coevolution of policing and cooperation, in particular the role for kin competition to disfavor the evolution of policing, using both a heuristic “open” model and a “closed” island model. We find that large groups and increased kin competition disfavor policing, and that policing is maintained more readily than it invades. Policing may be harder to evolve than previously thought.     

Evolution and the classification of social behavior

Recent studies in the evolution of cooperation have shifted focus from altruistic to mutualistic cooperation. This change in focus is purported to reveal new explanations for the evolution of prosocial behavior. We argue that the common classification scheme for social behavior used to distinguish between altruistic and mutualistic cooperation is flawed because it fails to take into account dynamically relevant game-theoretic features. This leads some arguments about the evolution of cooperation to conflate dynamical scenarios that differ regarding the basic conditions on the emergence and maintenance of cooperation. We use the tools of evolutionary game theory to increase the resolution of the classification scheme and analyze what evolutionary inferences classifying social behavior can license.