I research,therefore I am?: A purely scientific understanding of consciousness remains elusive,but the search for its neurological foundation continues

The exploration of consciousness—the most elusive characteristic of human nature—has long been left to philosophers and artists. Using modern research tools, scientists have finally begun to subject the human mind to empirical analysis.Consciousness is the heart of human existence, yet it has proven to be an elusive subject for scientific research and analysis. Its study has largely been left to philosophers, writers and artists who have spent centuries exploring the meaning of life. Existential questions such as ‘why am I me?'' are, by their nature, difficult to answer with empirical analysis. It is therefore perhaps unsurprising that natural science has found it difficult to add detail to René Descartes general principle: cognito ergo sum. From some quarters—particularly religious ones—there has also been resistance to the ‘profane'' tools of science probing the ‘sacred heart'' of human consciousness; Pope John Paul II is reported to have proclaimed during a conference at the Vatican in the 1980s, that while scientists can have the brain, the mind belongs to God (Lane, 2009).Existential questions such as ‘why am I me?'' are, by their nature, difficult to answer with empirical analysisThe separation of mind and brain is fundamental to the study of consciousness, and requires elucidation of the relationship between the biological mechanisms of brain function and the higher-level processes—such as emotion or reason—that are enabled by them. Although the ultimate meaning of human existence remains elusive—assuming that there is one—research has begun to unravel the physical mechanisms that enable consciousness, by using brain imaging techniques together with an increasing understanding of the neuronal architecture of the brain. This approach has informed the quest to identify the neural correlates of consciousness (Crick & Koch, 1990) that were first defined by Christof Koch, Professor of Biology and Engineering at the California Institute of Technology, and Francis Crick, who is better known for his codiscovery of the DNA double helix. These correlates are defined as the minimal set of neuronal mechanisms required for a particular conscious function or ability. Their identification would be useful for assessing levels of consciousness in animals, infants and adults with brain damage or disease, who are unable to express what they are feeling in words.Koch explained that although neuronal mechanisms are necessary for consciousness, it is the information that they transmit and integrate that actually brings it into being; an idea that was first advanced by Giulio Tononi (2004), to which Koch has contributed. This theory, according to Koch, states that consciousness depends on the ability to coherently integrate information, irrespective of the information type. This has important implications: that consciousness is independent of language, vision or any other specific form of information, and can exist in any system with the required structure. From this, Koch has concluded that consciousness is not limited to humans, but could exist in a machine and many animals—a view that has led him to become a vegetarian. According to this theory, aspects of recent human evolution and culture—including language—are products of consciousness, rather than requirements for it.According to Naomi Eilan, Director of the Consciousness and Self-Consciousness Research Centre at the University of Warwick, UK, the information flows and synchronization that enable consciousness are nevertheless dependent on the physical structure of the brain. “It''s mad to think that consciousness and the brain are independent [of one another],” she said. The extent of their interdependence, however, is hotly debated. According to Eilan, scientists generally take one of three positions on the subject: “[O]ne view [is that] the brain will tell us what consciousness is, but at the other [extreme] there''s the view that it''s neither here nor there and that the brain is one thing and consciousness quite another. I''m in the middle, where the brain presupposes consciousness but does not explain it. The brain will not tell you what consciousness is, but it does tell us how various aspects of it work.”…consciousness is independent of language, vision or any other specific form of information, and can exist in any system with the required structureIn evolutionary terms, consciousness is a phenotype with an underlying genotype. It is therefore subject to the pressures of natural selection, which act at the level of the genes encoding neurological structures. These structures probably first emerged in animals for specific functions and only later became integrated into a universal continuous consciousness, according to Antonio Damasio, Director of the Brain and Creativity Institute at the University of Southern California, Los Angeles, USA. “I believe most of the phenomena of consciousness emerged as a result of specific brain complexities which were required by an improved life regulation,” he said. “But once basic consciousness emerged, its adaptive value was so remarkable that natural selection made it prevail.”​Open in a separate window© MedicalRF.com/CorbisIt is now almost universally agreed that consciousness is linked to the coherence of the electrical states of different groups of neurons, but the mechanisms underlying this are still disputed. Some researchers, such as the American psychologist Stuart Hameroff, argue that quantum mechanics must be involved through a phenomenon known as quantum coherence, which would correlate the states of subatomic particles across the brain (Hameroff, 1994). This hypothesis is questioned by others, but consciousness does seem to be generated by synchronized oscillations in the electrical states of neurons in different areas of the brain, as detected by electroencephalography.…aspects of recent human evolution and culture—including language—are products of consciousness, rather than requirements for itFor electrical coherence to occur, structures that can synchronize disparate brain regions must have evolved at some stage. Prime candidates are the calcium-binding (calbindin) positive cells in the thalamus—a structure that relays signals relating to spatial and motor awareness between the cerebral cortex and midbrain, as well as regulating sleep and alertness. Calbindin proteins modulate the flow of calcium within neurons, affecting synaptic activity and neuronal activation. The calbindin positive cells in the thalamus can thereby facilitate high-frequency oscillations in different regions of the cortex (Joliot et al, 1994). According to Koch, such cells might be crucial messengers for consciousness, enabling effective interactions between different cortical regions. In support of this, when calbindin positive thalamic cells lose their ability to activate other neurons—as a result of injury or disease—these patients are in a vegetative state even when their cortical tissue is intact.The above observation is an example of how the study of brain-damaged patients can shed light on the underlying mechanisms of consciousness. It also led to the development of a possible treatment for such patients. Niko Schiff and colleagues found that deep-brain electrical stimulation of the central thalamus restored some behavioural responsiveness in a patient who had been minimally conscious for 6 years (Schiff et al, 2007).In evolutionary terms, consciousness is a phenotype with an underlying genotypeSudden recovery from prolonged states of minimal consciousness can also indicate which structures of the brain are required for normal states of awareness and activity. A study by Henning Voss and colleagues in New York and New Zealand found evidence that axonal regrowth led to the dramatic recovery of speech in a patient who had been in a minimally conscious state for 19 years after a road accident in 1984 (Voss et al, 2006). Axonal regrowth was shown by use of a new imaging technique, Diffusion Tensor Imaging (DTI), as the patient quickly regained the ability to talk with increasing fluency over a period of a few days. DTI is a form of magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) that forms images by observing the Brownian motion of water molecules. It showed axons sprouting from neurons in the intact part of the cortex. Further evidence came from positron emission tomography scans of the same brain areas, showing increased glucose metabolism that seemed to be linked with the neuronal regrowth, which would explain the patient''s recovery.Sudden recovery from prolonged states of minimal consciousness can also indicate which structures of the brain are required for normal states of awareness and activityKoch noted that this and other neuroimaging studies of vegetative state or minimally conscious patients have found that even a prolonged loss of consciousness can be reversed. Another important question is whether consciousness can be detected when patients are in a persistent vegetative state and cannot communicate verbally or by movement. Observing responses to stimuli in specific brain areas is not sufficient to assess the level of consciousness, as these reactions can occur without consciousness, as they do during sleep.To address this question, Adrian Owen and colleagues in the UK and Belgium conducted an ingenious experiment with a female patient who was incapable of responding to external stimuli. The researchers asked the patient to imagine playing tennis while they observed her in an MRI scanner. They found that the same cortical areas were activated as when normal individuals perform the same task (Owen et al, 2006). Koch points out that the task could not have been performed by unconscious processing of external stimuli, as the patient was only imagining the action.This result does not conclusively show that the patient was conscious, as the neural correlates of thought processes remain unclear. However, the above observation suggests that the patient might be more than minimally conscious, as she had been diagnosed. Owen''s colleague, Steven Laureys, has since been involved in several studies indicating that almost half of people with disorders of consciousness are wrongly diagnosed as being in a vegetative state. According to Laureys, these findings might indicate that some patients have had their life support turned off as a result of such misdiagnoses, even though they could have subsequently regained consciousness, to some extent.At present, this suggestion is controversial and does no more than provide a source of acute uncertainty for the families and doctors of such patients. In future, however, brain imaging could help clinicians to make more accurate diagnoses. In one of the most striking examples so far, Christine Ecker and colleagues at King''s College and University College, London, UK, have identified characteristic structural features of the brain that can be used to reliably diagnose autism spectrum disorder (ASD; Ecker et al, 2010). They used MRI to measure certain brain features in patients with ASD—such as the thickness and degree of folding in particular areas of the cortex—and combined this information to obtain a correlate picture of the brain changes that are unique to ASD. This was an important development, as ASD is complex and associated with many cortical features that have previously been difficult to categorize. By using this new approach, ASD can now be clearly distinguished from other conditions and accurate, rapid diagnosis in early life could make a notable difference for sufferers.“the study of consciousness is now moving from the domain of philosophy and metaphysics into the empirical domain of science”This work might also guide research on the genetic and neurological bases of ASD, by identifying the anatomical features and ultimately individual proteins that are implicated in the disorder. Some of the cortical regions involved seem to be unique, which resonates with more general research into various aspects of consciousness.This type of applied research into consciousness is at the opposite end of the spectrum to the ongoing attempts to unite the scientific and philosophical approaches to studying the subject. Indeed, as Koch noted, “the study of consciousness is now moving from the domain of philosophy and metaphysics into the empirical domain of science.”This move is creating the ultimate challenge for multidisciplinary research; it requires the interaction of two fields with little history or experience of collaboration. According to Bill Brewer, who specializes in the philosophy of perception at Warwick University, UK, “this is a massive philosophical question in itself: what is the relationship between philosophical and scientific approaches to mental phenomena in general and conscious experience in particular?” Brewer believes that such efforts will ultimately prove successful; “My own opinion, having been part of a number of interdisciplinary projects concerned with such matters, is that there is no general abstract recipe for fruitful collaboration. It requires long periods of open-minded mutual learning, teaching and open-ended discussion of very specific questions and issues in the various different fields until it eventually becomes clear that a good deal in the disciplinary boundaries is arbitrary and all parties are actually concerned with the same fundamental problems in ways that merge into a continuum of approaches.”Whether this will lead to a full understanding of consciousness and whether science has something to say about the ‘meaning'' of our existence remains to be seen.     

The Problem of Generalization in the Works of L. S. Vygotsky

An aspect of Vygotsky's psychological theory which is still meaningful as a genuine scientific problem today is the treatment he gave to the structure, function, and formation of generalization as a special means of reflecting reality in human consciousness. Many of the central propositions of the theory — concerning such questions as the role of symbols in the establishment of higher mental functions, the hierarchical structure of consciousness, and the connection between instruction and development — were refined, concentrated, and cast in a new light by the concept of generalization which Lev Semyonovich worked on so intensively in the last years of his life. The problem of generalization is the knot that ties together the fundamental strands of the whole conception. By carefully untying it one can avoid misunderstandings in evaluating some of Vygotsky's propositions, and, even more important, one can then correctly understand his fundamental ideas, which he clearly formulated but was not able to develop fully. The significance of these ideas is such that they belong in the arsenal of modern psychology to resolve burning theoretical and practical problems of the day.     

The sense of consciousness

I propose that consciousness might be understood as the property of a system that functions as a sense in the biological meaning of that term. The theory assumes that, as a complex system, the sense of consciousness is not a fixed structure but implies structure with variations and that it evolved, as many new functions do, through the integration of simpler systems. The recognized exteroceptive and enteroceptive senses provide information about the organism's environment and about the organism itself that are important to adaptation. The sense of consciousness provides information about the brain and thus about the organism and its environment. It senses other senses and processes in the brain, selecting and relating components into a form that "makes sense"-where making sense is defined as being useful to the organism in its adaptation to the environment. The theory argues that this highly adaptive organizing function evolved with the growing complexity of the brain and that it might have helped resolve discrepancies created at earlier stages. Neural energies in the brain that are the input to the sense of consciousness, along with the processing subsystem of which they are a part, constitute the base of consciousness. Consciousness itself is an emergent effect of an organizing process achieved through the sense of consciousness. The sense of consciousness thus serves an organizing function although it is not the only means of organization in the brain. Its uniqueness lies in the character of the organization it creates with consciousness as a property of that organization. The paper relates the theory to several general conceptions-interactionism, epiphenomenalism and identity theory-and illustrates a number of testable hypotheses. Viewing consciousness as a property of a sense provides a degree of conceptual integration. Much of what we know about the evolution and role of the conventionally recognized senses should help us understand the evolution and role of the sense of consciousness, and of consciousness itself.     

In search for neurophysiological criteria of altered consciousness

Neurophysiological approaches to brain mechanisms of consciousness are discussed. The concept of spatial synchronization of nervous processes developed by M.N. Livanov is applied to neurophysiological analysis of higher brain functions. However, the spatial synchronization of brain potentials is only a condition for information processing and does not represent it as such. This imposes restrictions on conclusions about the neural mechanisms of consciousness. It is more adequate to use the concept of spatial synchronization in views of consciousness as a psychophysiological level along with sub- and superconsciousness in three-level structure of mind according to P.V. Simonov. Forms of consciousness interaction with other levels concern the problem of altered consciousness and may be reflected in various patterns of spatial organization of brain potentials.     

意识与麻醉

<正>意识可以定义为"个体觉察自我与环境存在的脑功能状态"也就是说,意识是脑对"存在"的觉察,感知"存在"就是对真实自我和环境的觉察、发生在清醒状态下,对"存在"的觉察是脑的基本功能,也是注意、学习、认知、思维等功能的前提.国际上许多实验室,研究麻醉导致的意识丧失以及麻醉后意识的重启动,来揭示意识的神经基础.最近,Solovey等(J Neurosci,2015,35(30):10866)发现,不同麻醉药物诱导的脑活动模式不同,如果忽略那些具体活动的特征,意识丧失与     

Differential effects of propofol and ketamine on critical brain dynamics

Whether the brain operates at a critical “tipping” point is a long standing scientific question, with evidence from both cellular and systems-scale studies suggesting that the brain does sit in, or near, a critical regime. Neuroimaging studies of humans in altered states of consciousness have prompted the suggestion that maintenance of critical dynamics is necessary for the emergence of consciousness and complex cognition, and that reduced or disorganized consciousness may be associated with deviations from criticality. Unfortunately, many of the cellular-level studies reporting signs of criticality were performed in non-conscious systems (in vitro neuronal cultures) or unconscious animals (e.g. anaesthetized rats). Here we attempted to address this knowledge gap by exploring critical brain dynamics in invasive ECoG recordings from multiple sessions with a single macaque as the animal transitioned from consciousness to unconsciousness under different anaesthetics (ketamine and propofol). We use a previously-validated test of criticality: avalanche dynamics to assess the differences in brain dynamics between normal consciousness and both drug-states. Propofol and ketamine were selected due to their differential effects on consciousness (ketamine, but not propofol, is known to induce an unusual state known as “dissociative anaesthesia”). Our analyses indicate that propofol dramatically restricted the size and duration of avalanches, while ketamine allowed for more awake-like dynamics to persist. In addition, propofol, but not ketamine, triggered a large reduction in the complexity of brain dynamics. All states, however, showed some signs of persistent criticality when testing for exponent relations and universal shape-collapse. Further, maintenance of critical brain dynamics may be important for regulation and control of conscious awareness.     

Toward a cross-species neuroscientific understanding of the affective mind: do animals have emotional feelings?

Do we need to consider mental processes in our analysis of brain functions in other animals? Obviously we do, if such BrainMind functions exist in the animals we wish to understand. If so, how do we proceed, while still retaining materialistic-mechanistic perspectives? This essay outlines the historical forces that led to emotional feelings in animals being marginalized in behavioristic scientific discussions of why animals behave the way they do, and why mental constructs are generally disregarded in modern neuroscientific analyses. The roots of this problem go back to Cartesian dualism and the attempt of 19th century physician-scientists to ground a new type of medical curriculum on a completely materialistic approach to body functions. Thereby all vitalistic principles were discarded from the lexicon of science, and subjective experience in animals was put in that category and discarded as an invalid approach to animal behavior. This led to forms of rigid operationalism during the era of behaviorism and subsequently ruthless reductionism in brain research, leaving little room for mentalistic concepts such as emotional feelings in animal research. However, modern studies of the brain clearly indicate that artificially induced arousals of emotional networks, as with localized electrical and chemical brain stimulation, can serve as "rewards" and "punishments" in various learning tasks. This strongly indicates that animal brains elaborate various experienced states, with those having affective contents being easiest to study rigorously. However, in approaching emotional feelings empirically we must pay special attention to the difficulties and vagaries of human language and evolutionary levels of control in the brain. We need distinct nomenclatures from primary (unconditioned phenomenal experiences) to tertiary (reflective) levels of mind. The scientific pursuit of affective brain processes in other mammals can now reveal general BrainMind principles that also apply to human feelings, as with neurochemical predictions from preclinical animal models to self-reports of corresponding human experiences. In short, brain research has now repeatedly verified the existence of affective experience-various reward and punishment functions-during artificial arousal of emotional networks in our fellow animals. The implications for new conceptual schema for understanding human/primate affective feelings and how such knowledge can impact scientific advances in biological psychiatry are also addressed.     

Measures of entropy and complexity in altered states of consciousness

Quantification of complexity in neurophysiological signals has been studied using different methods, especially those from information or dynamical system theory. These studies have revealed a dependence on different states of consciousness, and in particular that wakefulness is characterized by a greater complexity of brain signals, perhaps due to the necessity for the brain to handle varied sensorimotor information. Thus, these frameworks are very useful in attempts to quantify cognitive states. We set out to analyze different types of signals obtained from scalp electroencephalography (EEG), intracranial EEG and magnetoencephalography recording in subjects during different states of consciousness: resting wakefulness, different sleep stages and epileptic seizures. The signals were analyzed using a statistical (permutation entropy) and a deterministic (permutation Lempel–Ziv complexity) analytical method. The results are presented in complexity versus entropy graphs, showing that the values of entropy and complexity of the signals tend to be greatest when the subjects are in fully alert states, falling in states with loss of awareness or consciousness. These findings were robust for all three types of recordings. We propose that the investigation of the structure of cognition using the frameworks of complexity will reveal mechanistic aspects of brain dynamics associated not only with altered states of consciousness but also with normal and pathological conditions.     

Consciousness enigma: the "hard problem"--binding problem entanglement, "extra ingredient" and field principle

The "Hard problem" of consciousness relates to the perplexing emergence of consciousness as a result of the brain activity. The binding problem concerns separate processing of perceived data in functionally and topographically segregated cortical areas and functional integration of such locally disjoined operations into coherently perceived images and events. The existing field-grounded theories of consciousness fall into two groups: (i) those based on the physical (electromagnetic) field, and (ii) those grounded on autonomous fields irreducible to the established physical fundamentals. The critical analysis of the existing theories results in formulation of the extra ingredient and a novel irreducible field-based theory of consciousness.     

The emergence of consciousness: Research on animals yields insights into how,when and why consciousness evolved

Whether some animal species possess consciousness is no longer the question; rather how their environment and evolution shaped species‐specific forms of self‐awareness Subject Categories: Ecology, Neuroscience

Ever since humans acknowledged consciousness in themselves, they speculated whether animals could have a similar sentience or awareness of their internal and external existence. But although human philosophers had pondered on consciousness for centuries, it was not until 1927 when the American psychologist Harvey Carr laid the foundations for research on animal consciousness. He argued that awareness in animals could be only understood and measured when we had developed “an accurate and complete knowledge of its essential conditions in man” (Carr, 1927).This may have provided a springboard for the field, but a definition of the essential conditions of consciousness in Homo sapiens has proved elusive to this day—hence, research on animal consciousness has struggled to achieve a sound basis for formulating and evaluating testable hypotheses. However, there has been some progress in developing correlates of human consciousness that can be applied to study animals, while brain scanning and imaging has recently allowed comparative studies of human and animal neurological activity while performing mental tasks. It has also become possible to observe animal behaviour and communication in much greater depth and identify examples of activities—such as advance planning, or recognition of individuals through their vocalization—that can be associated with human consciousness. Overall, there is a growing consensus that this research has moved beyond merely questioning whether animals can be conscious or aware of themselves to defining different dimensions along which this can be assessed.

… research has moved beyond merely questioning whether animals can be conscious or aware of themselves to defining different dimensions along which this can be assessed.

     

Chimpanzee vocal signaling points to a multimodal origin of human language

The evolutionary origin of human language and its neurobiological foundations has long been the object of intense scientific debate. Although a number of theories have been proposed, one particularly contentious model suggests that human language evolved from a manual gestural communication system in a common ape-human ancestor. Consistent with a gestural origins theory are data indicating that chimpanzees intentionally and referentially communicate via manual gestures, and the production of manual gestures, in conjunction with vocalizations, activates the chimpanzee Broca's area homologue--a region in the human brain that is critical for the planning and execution of language. However, it is not known if this activity observed in the chimpanzee Broca's area is the result of the chimpanzees producing manual communicative gestures, communicative sounds, or both. This information is critical for evaluating the theory that human language evolved from a strictly manual gestural system. To this end, we used positron emission tomography (PET) to examine the neural metabolic activity in the chimpanzee brain. We collected PET data in 4 subjects, all of whom produced manual communicative gestures. However, 2 of these subjects also produced so-called attention-getting vocalizations directed towards a human experimenter. Interestingly, only the two subjects that produced these attention-getting sounds showed greater mean metabolic activity in the Broca's area homologue as compared to a baseline scan. The two subjects that did not produce attention-getting sounds did not. These data contradict an exclusive "gestural origins" theory for they suggest that it is vocal signaling that selectively activates the Broca's area homologue in chimpanzees. In other words, the activity observed in the Broca's area homologue reflects the production of vocal signals by the chimpanzees, suggesting that this critical human language region was involved in vocal signaling in the common ancestor of both modern humans and chimpanzees.     

Quantum physics in neuroscience and psychology: a neurophysical model of mind-brain interaction

Neuropsychological research on the neural basis of behaviour generally posits that brain mechanisms will ultimately suffice to explain all psychologically described phenomena. This assumption stems from the idea that the brain is made up entirely of material particles and fields, and that all causal mechanisms relevant to neuroscience can therefore be formulated solely in terms of properties of these elements. Thus, terms having intrinsic mentalistic and/or experiential content (e.g. 'feeling', 'knowing' and 'effort') are not included as primary causal factors. This theoretical restriction is motivated primarily by ideas about the natural world that have been known to be fundamentally incorrect for more than three-quarters of a century. Contemporary basic physical theory differs profoundly from classic physics on the important matter of how the consciousness of human agents enters into the structure of empirical phenomena. The new principles contradict the older idea that local mechanical processes alone can account for the structure of all observed empirical data. Contemporary physical theory brings directly and irreducibly into the overall causal structure certain psychologically described choices made by human agents about how they will act. This key development in basic physical theory is applicable to neuroscience, and it provides neuroscientists and psychologists with an alternative conceptual framework for describing neural processes. Indeed, owing to certain structural features of ion channels critical to synaptic function, contemporary physical theory must in principle be used when analysing human brain dynamics. The new framework, unlike its classic-physics-based predecessor, is erected directly upon, and is compatible with, the prevailing principles of physics. It is able to represent more adequately than classic concepts the neuroplastic mechanisms relevant to the growing number of empirical studies of the capacity of directed attention and mental effort to systematically alter brain function.     

The vicissitudes of evolutionary theory

Conclusion I have referrred to the data-generating capacity of the alternative research program, that it should stimulate fruitful hypotheses. Conversely, static theory (i.e., analysis dependent on mathematical logic to impose regularities on non-linear processes) is vulnerable to serendipitous data which violates its deductive structure. In that spirit, Jerison cautions: Where hints are found in brain structure, for example, of asymmetries in the brain, we can exploit them as a basis for good hypothesis, but we should also recognize that hypotheses created in this way are likely to be weak.Brain asymmetry data, surely among the least linear evidence available — topological irregularities of convoluted space — have been integrated in Holloway's program as but one phenotypic window on the evolution of complex cognitive functioning. There are no a priori methodological nor theoretical exclusions of this kind of data, for they complement an open-ended research program.Furthermore, asymmetry evidence may yet satisfy a test for phyletic evolution (gradualism) demanded by the punctuational model — the provision of data for gradual character change, especially if the character is complex, appears to have functional significance and can be shown to be associated with palaeoenvironmental change. Finally, these new considerations have stimulated additional questions for students of brain evolution. Among the more interesting of these is whether the growing evidence of asymmetry, its sexual dimorphism and other kinds of population distribution, and its functional lateralization in general, suggest ongoing foci for selection pressures in our continuing evolution.Evolutionary study, in its reliance on positivistic technique and conformance to standards of scientific proof, is being assimilated within the general tendency of all science, toward more and more mathematical modeling. Mathematical simulations are not more isomorphic with evolutionary processes than are other kinds of syntheses. In fact, models incorporating extremely limited fossil data mislead us with their inferential chains of necessity. Projected into an inevitable future, they are ironic equations of social processes born in evolutionary times.A science which seeks to manipulate nature nevertheless cannot undo what happened in evolution. The errors and indeterminateness of human evolution are constraints on the species no longer embedded in nature. Their scientific status is not the issue. They can be interpreted, however. We can rationalize an ideological mastery of generalized biological processes which debases our own history. Or we can achieve an authentic understanding of its originality as part of our own making. That would be a beginning, for evolution has not ended, in realizing the creative possibilities of human consciousness. But, then again, over all of these natural constraints and cultural possibilities lies the shadow of genetic engineering. The clash between Western science and universal humanity will be fought on that ground, should we survive the nuclear age.Bernard Belasco is an Associate Professor at Baruch College of the City University of New York.     

On consciousness,resting state fMRI,and neurodynamics

Background

During the last years, functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) of the brain has been introduced as a new tool to measure consciousness, both in a clinical setting and in a basic neurocognitive research. Moreover, advanced mathematical methods and theories have arrived the field of fMRI (e.g. computational neuroimaging), and functional and structural brain connectivity can now be assessed non-invasively.

Results

The present work deals with a pluralistic approach to "consciousness'', where we connect theory and tools from three quite different disciplines: (1) philosophy of mind (emergentism and global workspace theory), (2) functional neuroimaging acquisitions, and (3) theory of deterministic and statistical neurodynamics – in particular the Wilson-Cowan model and stochastic resonance.

Conclusions

Based on recent experimental and theoretical work, we believe that the study of large-scale neuronal processes (activity fluctuations, state transitions) that goes on in the living human brain while examined with functional MRI during "resting state", can deepen our understanding of graded consciousness in a clinical setting, and clarify the concept of "consiousness" in neurocognitive and neurophilosophy research.

     

The interface of natural theology and science in the ethology of W. H. Thorpe

Conclusion It should be clear by now the extent to which many features of Thorpe's interpretation of animal behavior and of the animal mind rested, at bottom, not simply on conventional scientific proofs but on interpretive inferences, which in turn rested on a willingress to make extensions of human experience to animals. This, in turn, rested on his view of evolution and his view of reality. And these were governed by his natural theology, which was the fundamental stratum of his intellectual experience.Contrary to the scientific ethos, which restricts theory choice to scientific issues alone, Thorpe's career suggests that the actual reasons for theory choice among scientists often are not limited to science, but are multiple and may sometimes be difficult to discover. It is largely because Thorpe took a public part in the natural theology enterprise that we can know something about his religious beliefs and so can see their probable influence on his scientific decisions. Similar beliefs of other scientists are sometimes harder to get at. Most may be practically beyond discovery, for the ethos of science has discouraged public professions of personal belief in relation to scientific work.¹⁰¹ Yet does it seem plausible that, for example, the restriction of self-consciousness to humans by some scientists is a purely scientific decision?¹⁰² Surely not, any more than that the strong influence of natural theology on Thorpe's thought means that he was not a good scientist. His natural theology may have led him into incautious enthusiasms regarding the animal mind — such as the potential if unrealizable linguistic ability of chimpanzees — through a bias in favor of the continuity of emergents in a progressive evolutionary system, just as it led him to advocate animal consciousness long before the recent upsurge of interest, but the scientific integrity of his work overall is unimpeachable. And yet, that work is not comprehensible historically as science alone. Personal philosophy must not be discounted in writing the history of recent science. This somewhat obvious conclusion (obvious to historians of science) needs emphasis, for we are still prone to think that the sciences of our own time provide their own internal dynamic that is in itself sufficient to account for their content and development.     

The structural basis of inter-individual differences in human behaviour and cognition

Inter-individual variability in perception, thought and action is frequently treated as a source of 'noise' in scientific investigations of the neural mechanisms that underlie these processes, and discarded by averaging data from a group of participants. However, recent MRI studies in the human brain show that inter-individual variability in a wide range of basic and higher cognitive functions - including perception, motor control, memory, aspects of consciousness and the ability to introspect - can be predicted from the local structure of grey and white matter as assessed by voxel-based morphometry or diffusion tensor imaging. We propose that inter-individual differences can be used as a source of information to link human behaviour and cognition to brain anatomy.     

Improved reproducibility in preparing precision-cut liver tissue slices

More than 35 years ago double Nobel laureate Linus Carl Pauling published a powerful model of the molecular mechanism of general anesthesia, generally referred to as the hydrate-microcrystal (aqueous-phase) theory. This hypothesis, based on the molecular behavior of water molecules, did not receive serious attention during Pauling’s life time, when scientific tools for examining complex systems such as the brain were still in their infancy. The situation has since drastically changed, and, now, in the twenty first century, many scientific tools are available for examining different types of complex systems. The discovery of aquaporin-4, a subtype of water channel abundantly expressed in glial systems, further highlighted the concept that the dynamics of water molecules in the cerebral cortex play an important role in important physiological brain functions including consciousness and information processing.     

How to study consciousness scientifically.

The neurosciences have advanced to the point that we can now treat consciousness as a scientific problem like any other. The problem is to explain how brain processes cause consciousness and how consciousness is realized in the brain. Progress is impeded by a number of philosophical mistakes, and the aim of this paper is to remove nine of those mistakes: (i) consciousness cannot be defined; (ii) consciousness is subjective but science is objective; (iii) brain processes cannot explain consciousness; (iv) the problem of ''qualia'' should be set aside; (v) consciousness is epiphenomenal; (vi) consciousness has no evolutionary function; (vii) a causal account of consciousness is necessarily dualistic; (viii) science is reductionistic, so a scientific account of consciousness would show it reducible to something else; and (ix) an account of consciousness must be an information processing account.     

Human death--a view from the beginning of life

This paper presents a simple argument against definitions of the death of a human being in terms of death, or the cessation of functioning, of its brain: a human being is alive, and so is capable of dying, before it acquires a brain. Although a more accurate definition is sketched, it is stressed that it should not be taken for granted that it is ethically urgent to work out such a definition. What morally matters more than the death of a human being may be something for which its death is sufficient, but not necessary, namely the irreversible loss of its capacity for consciousness. It is when we lose this capacity that we lose our moral standing, as subjects who can be benefited and harmed, and who can have rights. But, as is also suggested, the loss of this capacity is ill suited to be what the death of a human being definitionally consists of.     

The remote roots of consciousness in fruit‐fly selective attention?

A mechanistic study of consciousness need not be confined to human complexity. Other animals also display key behaviors and responses that have long been intimately tied to the measure of consciousness in humans. Among them are some very well-defined and measurable endpoints: selective attention, sleep and general anesthesia. That these three variables associated with changes in consciousness might exist even in a fruit-fly does not necessarily imply that a fly is "conscious", but it does suggest that some of the problems central to the field of consciousness studies could be investigated in a model organism such as Drosophila melanogaster. Demonstrating suppression of unattended stimuli, which is central to attention studies in humans, is now possible in Drosophila by measuring neural correlates of visual selection. By combining such studies with an eventual understanding of suppression in other arousal states in the fly, such as sleep and general anesthesia, we might be unraveling mechanisms relevant to consciousness as well.