Beyond the DP/DSS controversy

Paul Turke's “Which humans behave adaptively, and why does it matter?” shows, if he we are to take him as being representative of “Darwinian social science” in general, that his school of thought has moved surprisingly close to that of its “Darwinian psychology” critics in accepting the importance if not the primacy of the psychological level of explanation in applying evolutionary theory to human behavior. Disagreements continue over whether the adaptiveness of current behavior should be viewed as an occasionally interesting question because of the light it can shed on evolved psychological mechanisms, or whether, as Turke maintains, it is the central question for human sociobiology. In any event, the “vertically integrated approach,” utterly ignored by Turke, incorporates Darwinian Psychology and is far more powerful than is Turke's approach in explicating the relationship between genes and culture, thereby rendering the current debate pointless.     

The insufficience of supervenient explanations of moral actions: Really taking Darwin and the naturalistic fallacy seriously

In a recent paper in this journal (Rottschaefer and Martinsen 1990) we have proposed a view of Darwinian evolutionary metaethics that we believe improves upon Michael Ruse's (e.g., Ruse 1986) proposals by claiming that there are evolutionary based objective moral values and that a Darwinian naturalistic account of the moral good in terms of human fitness can be given that avoids the naturalistic fallacy in both its definitional and derivational forms while providing genuine, even if limited, justifications for substantive ethical claims. Jonathan Barrett (this issue) has objected to our proposal contending that we cannot hold for the reality of supervenient moral properties without either falling foul of the naturalistic fallacy or suffering the consequences of postulating inexplicable moral properties. In reply, we show that Barrett's explicit arguments that we commit either the definitional or derivational form of the naturalistic fallacy fail and that his naturalistic intuitions that supervenience explanations of moral properties by nonmoral properties force us into what we call the explanatory form of the naturalistic fallacy also fail. Positively, his objections help us to clarify the nature of the naturalistic fallacy within an evolutionary based naturalistic ethics and to point out the proper role of both supervenience explanations and moral explanations in such an ethics.     

Adaptive and Genomic Explanations of Human Behaviour: Might Evolutionary Psychology Contribute to Behavioural Genomics?

Evolutionary psychology and behavioural genomics are both approaches to explain human behaviour from a genetic point of view. Nonetheless, thus far the development of these disciplines is anything but interdependent. This paper examines the question whether evolutionary psychology can contribute to behavioural genomics. Firstly, a possible inconsistency between the two approaches is reviewed, viz. that evolutionary psychology focuses on the universal human nature and disregards the genetic variation studied by behavioural genomics. Secondly, we will discuss the structure of biological explanations. Some philosophers rightly acknowledge that explanations do not involve laws which are exceptionless and universal. Instead, generalisations that are invariant suffice for successful explanation as long as two other stipulations are recognised: the domain within which the generalisation has no exceptions as well as the distribution of the mechanism described by the generalisation should both be specified. It is argued that evolutionary psychology can contribute to behavioural genomic explanations by accounting for these two specifications.     

Evolutionary psychology’s moral implications

In this paper, I critically summarize John Cartwrtight’s Evolution and Human Behavior and evaluate what he says about certain moral implications of Darwinian views of human behavior. He takes a Darwinism-doesn’t-rock-the-boat approach and argues that Darwinism, even if it is allied with evolutionary psychology, does not give us reason to be worried about the alterability of our behavior, nor does it give us reason to think that we may have to change our ordinary practices and views concerning free-will and moral responsibility. In response, I contend that Darwinism, when it is allied with evolutionary psychology, makes for a more potent cocktail than Cartwright suspects.     

An evolutionary analysis of psychological pain following rape:: I. The effects of victim's age and marital status

The typical approach used to identify and characterize adaptations is discussed briefly, and then it is applied to psychological changes associated with the psychological pain experienced by rape victims. It has been hypothesized that mental pain may reflect psychological adaptation that is designed to detect and cope with the occurence of social problems that reduce an individual's inclusive fitness in human evolutionary history. According to the hypothesis, mental pain is brought about by social tragedies in the lives of individuals and focuses the attention of individuals on the events surrounding the pain, promoting correction of the pain-causing events and their avoidance in the future. The hypothesis applied to rape victims proposes that in human evolutionary history raped females had increased fitness as a result of mental pain, because the pain forced them to focus attention on the fitness-reducing circumstances surrounding rape, which are discussed. Some of the hypothesis' predictions about the psychological pain of rape victims are examined using a data set of 790 rape victims in Philadelphia (USA) who were interviewed about their psychological traumatization within five days after the assault. The analyses indicate that, as predicted, a victim's age and marital status are proximate causes of the magnitude of psychological pain following rape. Reproductive-aged women appear to be more severely traumatized by rape than older women or girls and married women more than unmarried women. The results presented suggest that the psychology that regulates mental pain processes information about age and mateship status in the event of a women's rape.     

A perspective on Darwinian psychology: The importance of domain-general mechanisms,plasticity, and individual differences

In this paper a theory of Darwinian psychological adaptations as motive dispositions with an affective core is developed, and it is argued that 1) there is significant plasticity in these mechanisms; 2) in addition to domain-specific evolved motive dispositions, there are a variety of domain-general cognitive and emotional mechanisms; 3) humans are capable of developing motive dispositions which are not adaptations; 4) the relationship between evolved motive dispositions and behavior is very tenuous so that the explanatory power of Darwinian psychology is very weak; 5) individual differences in human psychological characteristics are evolutionarily meaningful and are linked to mechanisms which assess the resource value of intraspecific genetic and phenotypic diversity.     

Toward an evolutionary forensic psychology

Most theories of crime have not explored intensively biological and especially evolutionary explanations for criminal behavior. Ellis presents a valuable new perspective that proposes that attention to physiological mechanisms shaped by evolutionary forces can provide insights into the causes of crime and sex differences in the patterns of crime. We discuss other theories and research relevant to Ellis' theory. We also propose that an evolutionary psychological perspective of crime will help to invigorate research and lead to a better understanding of criminality. An integrated evolutionary forensic psychology will help to explain sources of conflict between individuals, situations in which conflict leads to victimization, and victim defenses and coping mechanisms.     

Evolution. A case of system dynamics

It is contended that the Darwinian theory of evolution is merely a special case of the obsolete Newtonian paradigm. A modern vision of reality, consistent with structuralism in biology, is presented. Some well-known neo-Darwinist explanations of the evolutionary process are quoted accompanied by structuralist interpretations of the same cases. These lead to a different 'mechanism' of evolution, based on internal factors, consistent with contemporary science. It is argued that a great number of specialists who dismiss the Darwinian theory of evolution share a common reason for rejecting it, but differ widely in guessing the motivating factor or factors of evolution.     

Darwinian fitness and the intensity of natural selection: studies in sensitivity analysis

Darwinian fitness, the capacity of a variant type to establish itself in competition with the resident population, is determined by evolutionary entropy, a measure of the uncertainty in age of the mother of a randomly chosen newborn. This article shows that the intensity of natural selection, as measured by the sensitivity of entropy with respect to changes in the age-specific fecundity and mortality variables, is a convex function of age, decreasing at early and increasing at later ages. We exploit this result to provide quantitative evolutionary explanations of the large variation in survivorship curves observed in natural populations. Previous studies to explain variation in survivorship curves have been based on the proposition that Darwinian fitness is determined by the Malthusian parameter. Hence the intensity of natural selection will be determined by the sensitivity of the Malthusian parameter with respect to changes in the age-specific fecundity and mortality variables. This measure of the selection gradient is known to be a decreasing function of age, with implications which are inconsistent with empirical observations of survivorship curves in human and animal populations. The analysis described in this paper point to the mitigated import of sensitivity studies based on the Malthusian parameter. Our analysis provides theoretical and empirical support for the ecological and evolutionary significance of sensitivity analysis based on entropy, which is the appropriate measure of Darwinian fitness.     

Really taking Darwin seriously: An alternative to Michael Ruse's Darwinian metaethics

Michael Ruse has proposed in his recent book Taking Darwin Seriously and elsewhere a new Darwinian ethics distinct from traditional evolutionary ethics, one that avoids the latter's inadequate accounts of the nature of morality and its failed attempts to provide a naturalistic justification of morality. Ruse argues for a sociobiologically based account of moral sentiments, and an evolutionary based casual explanation of their function, rejecting the possibility of ultimate ethical justification. We find that Ruse's proposal distorts, overextends and weakens both Darwinism and naturalism. So we propose an alternative Darwinian metaethics that both remedies the problems in Ruse's proposal and shows how a Darwinian naturalistic account of the moral good in terms of human fitness avoids the naturalistic fallacy and can provide genuine, even if limited, justifications for substantive ethical claims. Thus, we propose to really take Darwin seriously.The authors are equally responsible for the writing of this paper.     

Literary study and evolutionary theory

Several recent books have claimed to integrate literary study with evolutionary biology. All of the books here considered, except Robert Storey’s, adopt conceptions of evolutionary theory that are in some way marginal to the Darwinian adaptationist program. All the works attempt to connect evolutionary study with various other disciplines or methodologies: for example, with cultural anthropology, cognitive psychology, the psychology of emotion, neurobiology, chaos theory, or structuralist linguistics. No empirical paradigm has yet been established for this field, but important steps have been taken, especially by Storey, in formulating basic principles, identifying appropriate disciplinary connections, and marking out lines of inquiry. Reciprocal efforts are needed from biologists and social scientists.     

Reading Morgan's Canon: Reduction and Unification in the Forging of a Science of the Mind

Lloyd Morgan's advisory "Canon" on ascribing mental phenomenahad an historically unusual and deep impact. It became a dictumdefining true psychological science, praised for providing thefoundation of a mature, hard science. Seen as a corrective tonaive methodology and excessive speculation, it appeared todemand removal of mental qualities in the name of parsimonyand rigor. Thus it is also disparaged for illegitimately limitinginquiry. Viewing Morgan's method and reasoning as the reactionsof a Darwinian to the problems of psychology provides insightfor a science of animal mind. The Canon should be seen as methodologicaladvice for a science caught in the tensions between materialismand subjective mental experience, having to place human mindwithin phylogenetic continuity. Faced with irresolvable difficulties,behavioral science has oscillated between reduction and unifyingintegration, typical of debates over broad conceptual issuesin evolutionary biology. The reasoning behind Morgan's Canonprovides a strategy for balancing these twin pulls of scientificpractice.     

Culture evolves

Culture pervades human lives and has allowed our species to create niches all around the world and its oceans, in ways quite unlike any other primate. Indeed, our cultural nature appears so distinctive that it is often thought to separate humanity from the rest of nature and the Darwinian forces that shape it. A contrary view arises through the recent discoveries of a diverse range of disciplines, here brought together to illustrate the scope of a burgeoning field of cultural evolution and to facilitate cross-disciplinary fertilization. Each approach emphasizes important linkages between culture and evolutionary biology rather than quarantining one from the other. Recent studies reveal that processes important in cultural transmission are more widespread and significant across the animal kingdom than earlier recognized, with important implications for evolutionary theory. Recent archaeological discoveries have pushed back the origins of human culture to much more ancient times than traditionally thought. These developments suggest previously unidentified continuities between animal and human culture. A third new array of discoveries concerns the later diversification of human cultures, where the operations of Darwinian-like processes are identified, in part, through scientific methods borrowed from biology. Finally, surprising discoveries have been made about the imprint of cultural evolution in the predispositions of human minds for cultural transmission.     

Rationality Wars and the War on Terror: Explaining Terrorism and Social Unrest

Terrorism is problematic at multiple levels. Social scientists debate its cause; policymakers debate what to do about it; many debate the meaning and political use of the term; and many live in fear of it. Current explanations of terrorism hinge on competing models of decision making. Anthropologists are increasingly influential in decision theory as issues of rationality, culture, and evolutionary psychology are invoked to explain patterns in human decision making. In this article, I review and critique current explanations of terrorism, I relate these explanations to larger debates in decision theory and anthropology, and I present an example of how current schisms may be transcended.     

Levels of selection, altruism, and primate behavior.

Altruistic behaviors seem anomalous from a traditional view of Darwinian natural selection, and evolutionary explanations for them have generated much discussion. The debate centers around four major explanations: classic individual-level selection, reciprocity and game theory, kin selection, and trait-group selection. The historical context and defining criteria of each model must be reviewed before its validity can be assessed. Of these proposed mechanisms, group selection historically has been the most controversial. Although the extent to which empirical data support group selection hypotheses is uncertain, there is evidence for group-level selection among avirulent virus strains and foraging ant queens. Researchers studying mammalian behavior, particularly primatologists, have largely dismissed models of group-level selection. Most discussion of altruism among primates has focused on differences in fitness among individuals within a single group, but students of altruistic behaviors exhibited by primates also need to investigate intergroup variation with respect to these behaviors. Various altruistic behaviors are likely to have evolved through different forms of selection, and each example of apparent altruism therefore needs to be evaluated separately.     

Patterns of characterization in folktales across geographic regions and levels of cultural complexity

Literary scholars are generally suspicious of the concept of universals: there are presently no candidates for literary universals that a high proportion of literary scholars would accept as valid. This paper reports results from a content analysis of patterns of characterization in folktales from 48 culture areas, aimed at identifying patterns of characterization that apply across regions of the world and levels of cultural complexity. The search for these patterns was guided by evolutionary theory and the findings are consistent with previous research on patterns of altruism, sex differences in mate preferences, sex differences in reproductive strategy, and differing emphases on male and female physical attractiveness. World literature, especially originally oral literature, represents a vast and neglected repository of information that researchers can use to more precisely map the contours of human nature. Jonathan Gottschall received his Ph.D. in English from Binghamton University and now teaches at St. Lawrence University in Canton, New York. His research focuses on integrating Darwinian approaches to human behavior and psychology with literary studies. The other authors are undergraduate students at St. Lawrence University.     

The adaptive legacy of human evolution: A search for the environment of evolutionary adaptedness

The growth of evolutionary psychology has led to renewed interest in what might be the significant evolutionary heritage of people living today, and in the extent to which humans are suited to a particular adaptive environment—the EEA. The EEA, though, is a new tool in the battery of evolutionary concepts, and it is important both that it is scrutinized for its utility, and that the actual reconstructions of the environments in which humans and hominids evolved are based on sound palaeobiological inference and an appropriate use of the phylogenetic context of primate evolution.     

Male Homosexual Preference: Where,When, Why?

Male homosexual preference (MHP) has long been of interest to scholars studying the evolution of human sexuality. Indeed, MHP is partially heritable, induces a reproductive cost and is common. MHP has thus been considered a Darwinian paradox. Several questions arise when MHP is considered in an evolutionary context. At what point did MHP appear in the human evolutionary history? Is MHP present in all human groups? How has MHP evolved, given that MHP is a reproductively costly trait? These questions were addressed here, using data from the anthropological and archaeological literature. Our detailed analysis of the available data challenges the common view of MHP being a “virtually universal” trait present in humans since prehistory. The conditions under which it is possible to affirm that MHP was present in past societies are discussed. Furthermore, using anthropological reports, the presence or absence of MHP was documented for 107 societies, allowing us to conclude that evidence of the absence of MHP is available for some societies. A recent evolutionary hypothesis has argued that social stratification together with hypergyny (the hypergyny hypothesis) are necessary conditions for the evolution of MHP. Here, the link between the level of stratification and the probability of observing MHP was tested using an unprecedented large dataset. Furthermore, the test was performed for the first time by controlling for the phylogenetic non-independence between societies. A positive relationship was observed between the level of social stratification and the probability of observing MHP, supporting the hypergyny hypothesis.     

Evolutionary developmental biology and the problem of variation

Abstract. One of the oldest problems in evolutionary biology remains largely unsolved. Which mutations generate evolutionarily relevant phenotypic variation? What kinds of molecular changes do they entail? What are the phenotypic magnitudes, frequencies of origin, and pleiotropic effects of such mutations? How is the genome constructed to allow the observed abundance of phenotypic diversity? Historically, the neo‐Darwinian synthesizers stressed the predominance of micromutations in evolution, whereas others noted the similarities between some dramatic mutations and evolutionary transitions to argue for macromutationism. Arguments on both sides have been biased by misconceptions of the developmental effects of mutations. For example, the traditional view that mutations of important developmental genes always have large pleiotropic effects can now be seen to be a conclusion drawn from observations of a small class of mutations with dramatic effects. It is possible that some mutations, for example, those in cis‐regulatory DNA, have few or no pleiotropic effects and may be the predominant source of morphological evolution. In contrast, mutations causing dramatic phenotypic effects, although superficially similar to hypothesized evolutionary transitions, are unlikely to fairly represent the true path of evolution. Recent developmental studies of gene function provide a new way of conceptualizing and studying variation that contrasts with the traditional genetic view that was incorporated into neo‐Darwinian theory and population genetics. This new approach in developmental biology is as important for micro‐evolutionary studies as the actual results from recent evolutionary developmental studies. In particular, this approach will assist in the task of identifying the specific mutations generating phenotypic variation and elucidating how they alter gene function. These data will provide the current missing link between molecular and phenotypic variation in natural populations.     

Why don't zebras have machine guns? Adaptation, selection, and constraints in evolutionary theory

In an influential paper, Stephen Jay Gould and Richard Lewontin (1979) contrasted selection-driven adaptation with phylogenetic, architectural, and developmental constraints as distinct causes of phenotypic evolution. In subsequent publications Gould (e.g., 1997a,b, 2002) has elaborated this distinction into one between a narrow "Darwinian Fundamentalist" emphasis on "external functionalist" processes, and a more inclusive "pluralist" emphasis on "internal structuralist" principles. Although theoretical integration of functionalist and structuralist explanations is the ultimate aim, natural selection and internal constraints are treated as distinct causes of evolutionary change. This distinction is now routinely taken for granted in the literature in evolutionary biology. I argue that this distinction is problematic because the effects attributed to non-selective constraints are more parsimoniously explained as the ordinary effects of selection itself. Although it may still be a useful shorthand to speak of phylogenetic, architectural, and developmental constraints on phenotypic evolution, it is important to understand that such "constraints" do not constitute an alternative set of causes of evolutionary change. The result of this analysis is a clearer understanding of the relationship between adaptation, selection and constraints as explanatory concepts in evolutionary theory.