Organismic sets: Outline of a general theory of biological and social organisms

The discussion as to whether societies are organisms andvice versa has been going on for a long time. The question is meaningless unless a clear definition of the term “organism” is made. Once such a definition is made, the question may be answered by studying whether there exists any relational isomorphism between what the biologist calls an organism and what the sociologist calls society. Such a study should also include animal societies studied by ecologists. Both human and animal societies are sets of individuals together with certain other objects which are the products of their activities. A multicellular organism is a set of cells together with some products of their activities. A cell itself may be regarded as a set of genes together with the products of their activities because every component of the cell is either directly or indirectly the result of the activities of the genes. Thus it is natural to define both biological and social organisms as special kinds of sets. A number of definitions are given in this paper which define what we call here organismic sets. Postulates are introduced which characterize such sets, and a number of conclusions are drawn. It is shown that an organismic set, as defined here, does represent some basic relational aspects of both biological organisms and societies. In particular a clarification and a sharpening of the Postulate of Relational Forces given previously (Bull. Math. Biophysics,28, 283–308, 1966) is presented. It is shown that from the basic definitions and postulates of the theory of organismic sets, it folows that only such elements of those sets will aggregate spontaneously, which are not completely “specialized” in the performance of only one activity. It is further shown that such “non-specialized” elements undergo a process of specialization, and as a result of it their spontaneous aggregation into organismic sets becomes impossible. This throws light on the problem of the origin of life on Earth and the present absence of the appearance of life by spontaneous generation. Some applications to problems of ontogenesis and philogenesis are made. Finally the relation between physics, biology, and sociology is discussed in the light of the theory of organismic sets.     

The not so universal tree of life or the place of viruses in the living world

Darwin provided a great unifying theory for biology; its visual expression is the universal tree of life. The tree concept is challenged by the occurrence of horizontal gene transfer and—as summarized in this review—by the omission of viruses. Microbial ecologists have demonstrated that viruses are the most numerous biological entities on earth, outnumbering cells by a factor of 10. Viral genomics have revealed an unexpected size and distinctness of the viral DNA sequence space. Comparative genomics has shown elements of vertical evolution in some groups of viruses. Furthermore, structural biology has demonstrated links between viruses infecting the three domains of life pointing to a very ancient origin of viruses. However, presently viruses do not find a place on the universal tree of life, which is thus only a tree of cellular life. In view of the polythetic nature of current life definitions, viruses cannot be dismissed as non-living material. On earth we have therefore at least two large DNA sequence spaces, one represented by capsid-encoding viruses and another by ribosome-encoding cells. Despite their probable distinct evolutionary origin, both spheres were and are connected by intensive two-way gene transfers.     

On What It is to Fly Can Tell Us Something About What It is to Live

The plurality of definitions of life is often perceived as an unsatisfying situation stemming from still incomplete knowledge about ‘what it is to live’ as well as from the existence of a variety of methods for reaching a definition. For many, such plurality is to be remedied and the search for a unique and fully satisfactory definition of life pursued. In this contribution on the contrary, it is argued that the existence of such a variety of definitions of life undermines the very feasibility of ever reaching a unique unambiguous definition. It is argued that focusing on the definitions of specific types of ‘living systems’—somehow in the same way that one can define specific types of ‘flying systems’—could be more fruitful from a heuristic point of view than looking for ‘the’ right definition of life, and probably more accurate in terms of carving Nature at its joints.     

What are definitions of life good for? Transdisciplinary and other definitions in astrobiology

The attempt to define life has gained new momentum in the wake of novel fields such as synthetic biology, astrobiology, and artificial life. In a series of articles, Cleland, Chyba, and Machery claim that definitions of life seek to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for applying the concept of life—something that such definitions cannot, and should not do. We argue that this criticism is largely unwarranted. Cleland, Chyba, and Machery approach definitions of life as classifying devices, thereby neglecting their other epistemic roles. We identify within the discussions of the nature and origin of life three other types of definitions: theoretical, transdisciplinary, and diagnostic definitions. The primary aim of these definitions is not to distinguish life from nonlife, although they can also be used for classificatory purposes. We focus on the definitions of life within the budding field of astrobiology, paying particular attention to transdisciplinary definitions, and diagnostic definitions in the search for biosignatures from other planets.     

Defining Life: Synthesis and Conclusions

The first part of the paper offers philosophical landmarks on the general issue of defining life. §1 defends that the recognition of “life” has always been and remains primarily an intuitive process, for the scientist as for the layperson. However we should not expect, then, to be able to draw a definition from this original experience, because our cognitive apparatus has not been primarily designed for this. §2 is about definitions in general. Two kinds of definition should be carefully distinguished: lexical definitions (based upon current uses of a word), and stipulative or legislative definitions, which deliberately assign a meaning to a word, for the purpose of clarifying scientific or philosophical arguments. The present volume provides examples of these two kinds of definitions. §3 examines three traditional philosophical definitions of life, all of which have been elaborated prior to the emergence of biology as a specific scientific discipline: life as animation (Aristotle), life as mechanism, and life as organization (Kant). All three concepts constitute a common heritage that structures in depth a good deal of our cultural intuitions and vocabulary any time we try to think about “life”. The present volume offers examples of these three concepts in contemporary scientific discourse. The second part of the paper proposes a synthesis of the major debates developed in this volume. Three major questions have been discussed. A first issue (§4) is whether we should define life or not, and why. Most authors are skeptical about the possibility of defining life in a strong way, although all admit that criteria are useful in contexts such as exobiology, artificial life and the origins of life. §5 examines the possible kinds of definitions of life presented in the volume. Those authors who have explicitly defended that a definition of life is needed, can be classified into two categories. The first category (or standard view) refers to two conditions: individual self-maintenance and the open-ended evolution of a collection of similar entities. The other category refuse to include reproduction and evolution, and take a sort of psychic view of the living. §6 examines the relationship between the question of the definition of life and that of the origins of life. There is a close parallel between the general conceptions of the origins of life and the definitions of life.     

Defining Life: The Virus Viewpoint

Are viruses alive? Until very recently, answering this question was often negative and viruses were not considered in discussions on the origin and definition of life. This situation is rapidly changing, following several discoveries that have modified our vision of viruses. It has been recognized that viruses have played (and still play) a major innovative role in the evolution of cellular organisms. New definitions of viruses have been proposed and their position in the universal tree of life is actively discussed. Viruses are no more confused with their virions, but can be viewed as complex living entities that transform the infected cell into a novel organism—the virus—producing virions. I suggest here to define life (an historical process) as the mode of existence of ribosome encoding organisms (cells) and capsid encoding organisms (viruses) and their ancestors. I propose to define an organism as an ensemble of integrated organs (molecular or cellular) producing individuals evolving through natural selection. The origin of life on our planet would correspond to the establishment of the first organism corresponding to this definition.     

Scaling and jumping: gravity loses grip on small jumpers

There are several ways to quantify jumping performance, a common definition being the height gained by the body's centre of mass (CM) in the airborne phase. Under this definition, jump height is determined by take-off velocity. According to the existing literature on jumping and scaling, take-off velocity, and hence jumping performance is independent of size because the energy that differently sized geometrically scaled jumpers can generate with their muscles is proportional to their mass. In this article it is shown, based on a simple energy balance, that it is incorrect to presume that jump height does not depend on size. Contrary to common belief, size as such has does have an effect on take-off velocity, putting small jumpers at a mechanical advantage, as is shown analytically. To quantify the effect of size on take-off velocity, a generic jumper model was scaled geometrically and evaluated numerically. While a 70-kg jumper took off at 2.65 m/s and raised its CM by 0.36 m after take-off, a perfectly geometrically similar jumper of 0.7 g reached a take-off velocity of 3.46 m/s and raised its CM by 0.61 m. The reason for the better performance of small jumpers is their higher efficacy in transforming the energy generated by the actuators into energy due to vertical velocity of the CM. Considering the ecological and evolutionary relevance of different definitions of jump height, size-dependent efficacy might explain why habitual jumping is especially prominent among small animals such as insects.     

Cybernetic formulation of the definition of life

A definition of life (a living individual) in cybernetic terms is proposed. In this formulation, life (a living individual) is defined as a network of inferior negative feedbacks (regulatory mechanisms) subordinated to (being at service of) a superior positive feedback (potential of expansion). It is suggested that this definition is the minimal definition, necessary and sufficient, for life to be distinguished from inanimate phenomena and, as such, it describes the essence of life. Subsequently, a quantitative expression for the amount of the biologically relevant ("purposeful") information (as opposed to the amount of information in the thermodynamic sense) is proposed. This is followed by the application of the formulated approach to different phenomena of a dubious status existing presently on the Earth as well as to the process of origination of life on our planet.     

Persistence despite perturbations for interacting populations

Two definitions of persistence despite perturbations in deterministic models are presented. The first definition, persistence despite frequent small perturbations, is shown to be equivalent to the existence of a positive attractor i.e. an attractor bounded away from extinction. The second definition, persistence despite rare large perturbations, is shown to be equivalent to permanence i.e. a positive attractor whose basin of attraction includes all positive states. Both definitions set up a natural dichotomy for classifying models of interacting populations. Namely, a model is either persistent despite perturbations or not. When it is not persistent, it follows that all initial conditions are prone to extinction due to perturbations of the appropriate type. For frequent small perturbations, this method of classification is shown to be generically robust: there is a dense set of models for which persistent (respectively, extinction prone) models lies within an open set of persistent (resp. extinction prone) models. For rare large perturbations, this method of classification is shown not to be generically robust. Namely, work of Josef Hofbauer and the author have shown there are open sets of ecological models containing a dense sets of permanent models and a dense set of extinction prone models. The merits and drawbacks of these different definitions are discussed.     

The chemical origins of life and its early evolution: an introduction

Can we look at contemporary biology and couple this with chemical insight to propose some plausible mechanisms for the origin of life on the planet? In what follows, we examine some promising chemical reactions by which the building blocks for nucleic acids might have been created about a billion years after the Earth formed. This could have led to self-assembling systems that were based on an all-RNA metabolism, where RNA is both catalytic and informational. We consider the breadth of RNA enzymes presently existing in biology, and to what extent these might have covered a wider range of chemistry in the RNA world. Ultimately, the RNA world would probably have given way to protein-based life quite quickly, and the origins of peptidyl transferase activity are discussed below.     

What's History Got to Do with It? A Response to Seddon's Definition of Reintroduction

A recent article in Restoration Ecology by Philip Seddon aims at unraveling the definitions of various types of species translocations—from reintroductions to assisted colonization—and points out the slippery slope of misused words. I argue here that defining reintroduction is not as straightforward as Seddon presents it. Commonly used definitions of what constitutes a reintroduction all include some reference to “historical” conditions, but what exactly that encompasses is left open. I examine two parts of the reintroduction confusion: first, how the guidance documents and laws define reintroduction and second, how these definitions might be interpreted when reintroductions are presented in public forums. Rather than moving away from reintroductions toward interventions of other names, I encourage scientists to use a broad definition of reintroduction presented by the IUCN to open up reintroduction as a viable label for bringing a species back to an area regardless of when it was previously there or why it became extinct.     

The definitions of metabolic control analysis revisited.

Various definitions of coefficients in metabolic control analysis are examined with respect to their theoretical consistency and practical applicability. We suggest agreement upon a definition for control coefficients which is clearly distinct from that for response coefficients, in such a way that the former describe inherent properties of the metabolic system while the latter refer to the influence of special parameters. Advantages and drawbacks of using normalized or non-normalized control coefficients are studied. It is shown that normalized control coefficients have the advantage of being invariant to a different rescaling of the particular fluxes. We demonstrate that some problems are easier to tackle if the consistency of time-independent control coefficients with their time-dependent counterparts is taken into account. It is shown that the matrix of flux control coefficients is an indempotent matrix. This allows an interpretation in terms of the transduction of the effect of parameter perturbations. Several aspects of the experimental measurement of control coefficients are discussed, with special reference to the different definitions.     

Putting information back into biological communication

At the heart of many debates on communication is the concept of information. There is an intuitive sense in which communication implies the transfer of some kind of information, probably the reason why information is an essential ingredient in most definitions of communication. However, information has also been an endless source of misunderstandings, and recent accounts have proposed that information should be dropped from a formal definition of communication. In this article, we re‐evaluate the merits and the internal logic of information‐based vs. information‐free approaches and conclude that information‐free approaches are conceptually incomplete and operationally hindered. Instead, we propose a functional notion of information that follows logically from previous adaptationist accounts. The ensuing definition of communication provides a wider, more inclusive theoretical scope that reflects more accurately the evolutionary scenario shaping animal signals. Additionally, it is a definition better equipped to deal with the extraordinary diversity of animal signals, facilitates the distinction of honest and deceptive signals at a proximate level and accommodates a number of conceptual and practical issues (e.g. redundancy, alerting components) that are lost when we fail to acknowledge the informative content of animal signals.     

A new definition of life

Chirality is often glossed over in theoretical or experimental discussions concerning the origin of life, but the ubiquity of homochiral building blocks in known biological systems demands explanation. Information theory can provide a quantitative framework for understanding the role of chirality in biology. Here I show how conclusions derived from information theory, in particular the concept of equivocation, can explain not only why chiral building blocks are necessary in living systems but also why a homochiral set of building blocks is necessary. These results lead to a new definition of life, and to the conclusion that the simplest form of life exists in the form of self-amplifying, autocatalytic reactions such as the Soai reaction.     

Defining biological communication

Communication is ubiquitous in biology, and agreement on terms essential for scientific progress. Yet there is no agreed definition of biological communication. Definitions couched in terms of adaptation are often used, but there is significant variability in exactly which criteria are invoked. An alternative is to define communication in terms of information transfer. This article reviews the merits of these approaches, and argues that the former is to be preferred, so long as we demand that both the signal and the response be adaptive, rather than just one or the other, as is common. Specific concerns with the definition are addressed, and it is then explained why an account of communication predicated on information transfer is necessarily derivative upon such an approach. Other alternatives and some variants of the adaptationist definition are also briefly discussed.     

The Soft Underbelly of Evolution?

Evolution and the origin of life are separate, if connected, topics, but they are frequently conflated??especially by creationists. Regarding the natural origin of life as ??the soft underbelly?? of evolution, creationists argue that it is impossible, improbable, or insusceptible to scientific investigation. Underlying their arguments is the hope that the failure of scientific research on the origin of life is evidence for a supernatural account. It is crucial for teachers to understand the nature of science in order to be able to explain why appeals to the supernatural are out of place in explaining the origin of life and why scientific research on the origin of life is not intrinsically a threat to faith.     

On the Origin of Language

Thomas Sebeok and Noam Chomsky are the acknowledged founding fathers of two research fields which are known respectively as Biosemiotics and Biolinguistics and which have been developed in parallel during the past 50 years. Both fields claim that language has biological roots and must be studied as a natural phenomenon, thus bringing to an end the old divide between nature and culture. In addition to this common goal, there are many other important similarities between them. Their definitions of language, for example, have much in common, despite the use of different terminologies. They both regard language as a faculty, or a modelling system, that appeared rapidly in the history of life and probably evolved as an exaptation from previous animal systems. Both accept that the fundamental characteristic of language is recursion, the ability to generate an unlimited number of structures from a finite set of elements (the property of ‘discrete infinity’). Both accept that human beings are born with a predisposition to acquire language in a few years and without apparent efforts (the innate component of language). In addition to similarities, however, there are also substantial differences between the two fields, and it is an historical fact that Sebeok and Chomsky made no attempt at resolving them. Biosemiotics and Biolinguistics have become two separate disciplines, and yet in the case of language they are studying the same phenomenon, so it should be possible to bring them together. Here it is shown that this is indeed the case. A convergence of the two fields does require a few basic readjustments in each of them, but leads to a unified framework that keeps the best of both disciplines and is in agreement with the experimental evidence. What is particularly important is that such a framework suggests immediately a new approach to the origin of language. More precisely, it suggests that the brain wiring processes that take place in all phases of human ontogenesis (embryonic, foetal, infant and child development) are based on organic codes, and it is the step-by-step appearance of these brain-wiring codes, in a condition that is referred to as cerebra bifida, that holds the key to the origin of language.     

The selection, testing and application of terrestrial insects as bioindicators

Although the uses and merits of terrestrial insects as indicators have been extensively discussed, there is a lack of clear definition, goal directedness and hypothesis testing in studies in the field. In an attempt to redress some of these issues and outline an approach for further studies, three categories of terrestrial insect indicators, corresponding to differences in their application, are proposed, i.e. environmental, ecological and biodiversity indicators. The procedures in terrestrial insect bioindicator studies should start with a clear definition of the study objectives and proposed use of the bioindicator, as well as with a consideration of the scale at which the study is to be carried out. Bioindication studies are conducted at a variety of spatial and temporal scales within the context of earth-system processes, but the objectives of the study will largely determine the scale at which it would be optimally conducted. There is a tendency for studies to be conducted below their space-time scaling functions, giving them apparent predictability. The selection of potential indicator taxa or groups is then based on a priori suitability criteria, the identification of predictive relationships between the indicator and environmental variables and, most importantly, the development and testing of hypotheses according to the correlative patterns found. Finally, recommendations for the use of the indicator in monitoring should be made. Although advocating rigorous, long-term protocols to identify indicators may presently be questionable in the face of the urgency with which conservation decisions have to be made, this approach is critical if bioindicators are to be used with any measurable degree of confidence.