Sick Again,Well Again: Sorcery,Christianity and Kinship in Northern Aboriginal Australia

This article concerns the ways in which Yolngu people of the Galiwin'ku settlement in northern Australia employ contemporary constructions of sorcery doctrines and Christian practices to rearticulate their kinship relations. In particular, I discuss the adaptation of sorcery ideas and accusations to present-day circumstances and the Christian healing processes that have emerged alongside traditional healing behaviours and biomedicine. Sorcery and Christianity at Galiwin'ku, I argue, are intertwined ethical models that enable the person and community to heal over and over again in accordance with the vicissitudes of postcolonial life. They continue the moral imperative of ‘looking after’ kin even as the net of ‘looking after’ has expanded to encompass new experiences, behaviours, and persons.     

Sickening Bodies: How Racism and Essentialism Feature in Aboriginal Women's Discourse about Health1

In the last decade there has been much interest in the concepts of ‘racism’ and ‘essentialism’ and the ways in which these notions have been appropriated by Aboriginal people to demarcate a specifically Aboriginal space (Cowlishaw 1986; Lattas 1993; Langton 1981; Morris 1988; Muecke 1992). Central to these concerns is the issue of black/white relations and the specificities of racial oppression. Following these concerns in this article I explore the nexus between the metaphorical dismemberment of self and the corporeal dismemberment of sickness which is reflected in the high mortality rates and disease patterns of Aboriginal people. I extend Fanon's concept that racism has the power to alienate ‘a man of colour’ from his own self-image to argue that it more than metaphorically breaks the human body (Fanon 1991). I provide a window into a much neglected area of research: how notions of illness and social relatedness are constructed in particular socio-historical circumstances. I explore the meanings of illness as expressed at the level of community and as a form of embodiment associated with unequal colonial relations. I focus on indigenous exegeses which articulate Aboriginal women's experience of illness and their sense of identity. I draw on the work of Leder (1990) to foreground a phenomenological view where selfhood is continually confronted by circumstances that make present the ‘body’ as a ‘sharp and searing presence threatening the self’. I also apply Sansom's (1982) model of illness and the significance of carers in an Aboriginal community to demonstrate a world-view of personhood that is diffused with other persons and things rather than a world-view that entails a highly individuated and bounded self. In this world-view adequate healing requires a reconstitution of social relations and a re-ordering of the racialised status quo.     

‘Agent Plus’ and ‘Practical Reasoner’: A Comparative Study of the Ethical Person

This paper explores an understanding of the person in terms of practical reason. Based on my fieldwork among the Jenu Kurumba and on ethnographic data on four other communities, I analyse how these five communities conceptualise the ethical person. To understand these concepts, I consult studies of an anthropology of ethics concerned with practical reason. Additionally I draw on Charles Taylor's concept of the ‘agent plus’ and Alasdair MacIntyre's notion of the ‘practical reasoner’. I argue that both Neo-Aristotelian notions are fundamentally important for understanding the concepts of the ethical person among the five cultural formations investigated in this paper.     

Converts,Christians and anthropologists: A critique of Mark Mosko’s partible penitent thesis

First advanced in a major essay published in 2010, Mark Mosko's ‘partible penitent’ thesis asserts that Melanesian and Christian cultures are based upon analogous conceptions of dividual personhood. Consequently, conversion in the region has been characterised by continuity rather than rupture, as argued most prominently by Joel Robbins. This essay offers an assessment of Mosko's thesis in terms of his critique of the theoretical and ethnographic literature and his recent application of the model to religious change in the Trobriand Islands. Robbins’ work proves more convincing and provocative on both theoretical and methodological grounds. Yet both approaches, which frame their analysis of Christianity in terms of conversion, appear increasingly out of sync with the experience of the vast majority of Melanesians who are more accurately considered active participants in a diverse global religious tradition rather than recipients of it.     

Unstable relations: a critical appraisal of indigeneity and environmentalism in contemporary Australia

The 1970s witnessed the emergence of a protest‐based environmental movement in Australia. We outline here the history of the unstable meeting of environmentalism and Aboriginal interests, before turning to Marcia Langton's recent critique of the progressive ‘green left’ in Australia. 1 We summarise Langton's argument: environmentalists would deny Aboriginal groups the benefits that flow from native title‐related agreements; environmentalists live at luxurious distance from the realities of remote and rural Aboriginal poverty and social problems; environmentalists exalt ‘noble savages’. We critique these claims on the basis that they pay inadequate attention to the structural inequities that underpin the market in native title interests and, further, deny the reality that Aboriginal groups often seek to form strategic alliances with green groups, arguing for conservation of their country on their own—or shared—terms. We argue that any appraisal of the present status of ‘green‐black’ relations needs to consider these factors seriously.     

Ancestors, magic, and exchange in Yolngu doctrines: extensions of the person in time and space

The article draws on the association drawn by Munn between Aboriginal ancestral transformations and the moral order, and the theory of partible persons, in order to re-examine Yolngu doctrines and related practices to do with totemic ancestors and their traces, magic and sorcery, and exchange. It argues that all three broad domains draw on beliefs about intrinsic relations between part and whole, image and object, and the intrinsic powers of bodily substance and spirits of the dead. These domains imply the extension of persons in time and space, and each relates to a rather distinct aspect of the moral-political order. The article shows that the strong dichotomy drawn by Durkheim and his followers between 'religion' and 'magic' obscures the connections between these domains, and neglects the instrumental aspect of Yolngu ancestral doctrines and practices.     

Everyone Will Be Jealous For That Mutika

In this paper I describe a phenomenon I refer to by its Aboriginal English name — ‘humbugging’ — in a western Arnhem Land Aboriginal settlement. By discussing the focal object in this phenomenon — the ‘mutika’ (car)¹ — I argue that a most interesting process of de-commoditization is occurring in this settlement. I use examples of humbugging to illustrate how the car in this community has tremendous symbolic as well as practical significance. I use. in particular, the work of Douglas and Isherwood (1979) and Appadurai et al. (1986), and argue that their ‘social life of things’ theoretical framework is appropriate for interpreting the importance of the ‘mutika’. I also suggest, however, that this framework needs to be re-thought in order to incorporate the challenge which de-commoditization presents to it.     

Autonomy,Natality and Freedom: A Liberal Re‐examination of Habermas in the Enhancement Debate

Jurgen Habermas has argued that carrying out pre‐natal germline enhancements would be inimical to the future child's autonomy. In this article, I suggest that many of the objections that have been made against Habermas' arguments by liberals in the enhancement debate misconstrue his claims. To explain why, I begin by explaining how Habermas' view of personal autonomy confers particular importance to the agent's embodiment and social environment. In view of this, I explain that it is possible to draw two arguments against germline enhancements from Habermas' thought. I call these arguments ‘the argument from negative freedom’ and ‘the argument from natality’. Although I argue that many of the common liberal objections to Habermas are not applicable when his arguments are properly understood, I go on to suggest ways in which supporters of enhancement might appropriately respond to Habermas' arguments.     

Swimming in and out of Focus: Second Contact,Vietnamese Migrant Others and Australian Selves

Anthropologists and others have always used the Other to define themselves. Using Michael Taussig's idea of ‘second contact’, I argue that this is inappropriate and that the imagined borders between us and them in relationships between Vietnamese and other Australians are less than stable, continually losing their polarity and swimming in and out of focus. In light of the Vietnamese migrant case, I argue that similar ethnographic research projects cannot rely on stable boundaries between the host and the migrant community to organise explanations. Rather than simply registering ‘cultural contacts’, we have to engage the interplay between the strange and the familiar in specific contexts. Furthermore, my reading of Vietnamese migrant identity obliges us to listen to Vietnamese Australian voices as they attempt to respond to the fluctuating interstices of an intercultural borderland. This implies the mutual anthropological interrogation of both self and other.     

Valuing Lives and Allocating Resources: A Defense of the Modified Youngest First Principle of Scarce Resource Distribution

In this paper, I argue that the ‘modified youngest first’ principle provides a morally appropriate criterion for making decisions regarding the distribution of scarce medical resources, and that it is morally preferable to the simple ‘youngest first’ principle. Based on the complete lives system's goal of maximizing complete lives rather than individual life episodes, I argue that essential to the value we see in complete lives is the first person value attributed by the experiencer of that life. For a life to be ‘complete’ or ‘incomplete,’ the subject of that life must be able to understand the concept of a complete life, to have started goals and projects, and to know what it would be for that life to be complete. As the very young are not able to do this, it can reasonably be said that their characteristically human lives have not yet begun, giving those accepting a complete lives approach good reason to accept the modified youngest first principle over a simple ‘youngest first’ approach.     

Women,Productive Roles,and Monetisation of the ‘Service Mode’ in Aboriginal Australia: Perspectives from Katherine,Northern Territory

Anthropological discussions of the creation of social value have tended to be exchange- and object-centered. Recently, however, some Australianists have been trying to develop ethnographically more appropriate formulations of ‘value’ among Australian Aboriginal people. This paper suggests that part of what is required is a critical and comparative perspective on the status of valued ‘things’ compared to other forms of value. It suggests a ‘service’ framework for understanding value in certain Australian Aboriginal contexts (see Sansom 1988), one in which being for, doing and giving are valued as ‘help’. There follows examination of aspects of this ‘service’ mode among Aboriginal people of the town camps of Katherine in the Northern Territory; of its transformation over the long term, following these people's recent, definitive entry into a welfare-based cash economy, and implications of this transformation especially for women.     

Why Procreative Preferences May be Moral – And Why it May not Matter if They Aren't

There has been much argument over whether procreative selection is obligatory or wrong. Rebecca Bennett has recently challenged the assumption that procreative choices are properly moral choices, arguing that these views express mere preferences. This article challenges Bennett's view on two fronts. First, I argue that the Non‐Identity Problem does not show that there cannot be harmless wrongs – though this would require us to abandon the intuitively attractive ‘person‐affecting principle’, that may be a lesser cost than abandoning some more firmly‐held intuition. But, even if we accept Bennett's claim that these choices are not moral, that does not show them to be mere personal preferences. I argue that there is a class of non‐moral ‘categorical preferences’ that have much the same implications as moral preferences. If a moral preference for able‐bodied children is problematic (as Bennett claims), then so is a non‐moral categorical preference. Thus, showing that these preferences are not moral does not show that they are not problematic, since they may still be categorical.     

Tales of a stitched anus: fictions,analytics, and personhood in Kilimanjaro,Tanzania★

This article revisits the fiction explored by Sally Falk Moore more than forty years ago that initiation among the Chagga-speaking people of Tanzania's Kilimanjaro region involved men having their anuses plugged and stitched to ensure complete digestion. It combines historical sources and contemporary fieldwork material on which it deploys an anthropological analytic adopted from Marilyn Strathern's account of the partible person of Melanesia. The move makes room for the Chagga concept of horu and investigates how this life force is converted and conveyed by means of different parts of the body, which emerge as both effects of and means for its transfers and transformations. It renders the person a composite of social relations that are objectified in his or her body, and constitute persons as husbands and wives, and male and female. Gender categories and positions are thus modes of being that emerge as effects of particular relations. These also involve bodily alterations, like the stitched anus, that channel horu in specific forms and in certain directions for particular purposes. The result is not a partible person, but a vectorial person that is a conduit of life force.     

Hip Hop Aesthetics and the Will to Culture1

In this paper, based upon my field work with the self-styled ‘Hip Hop Community’ in Sydney, in the early 1990s, I examine the material processes by which ‘cultural’ significance is articulated to a number of key practices, specifically, break-dancing, rapping and graffiti. I argue that these practices are understood, within the scene, as being aesthetic practices, which operate to mimetically ‘represent’ a pre-existing cultural essence—Hip Hop. Using a Peircian semiotic model, I argue that the maintenance of performances of these key Hip Hop practices functions over time, within the Hip Hop community, to affirm the legitimacy, authenticity and reality of the idea of Hip Hop.     

`Two Laws‘, Ontologies,Histories: Ways of Being Aranda Today

At Hermannsburg, in central Australia, Western Aranda people frequently propose that they live by ‘two laws’, Aranda law and God's law. This is a common phenomenon remarked throughout northern Australia and analysed by a number of anthropologists in the past. This discussion throws new light on the issue by interpreting `two-laws' talk in terms of a culture of encompassment that marks the emergence of historical or ‘ethnic’ identities as Aboriginal people make the transition from an autonomous world to one in which they must engage in the practices of European orders that can come to dominate their lives. The discussion deploys ‘ontology’ and ‘ethnicity’ in order to mark different magnitudes of difference that can shape Aboriginal experience today.     

The practice of capoeira: diasporic black culture in Canada

Abstract

This article draws on ethnographic research with Canadians who practise the Afro-Brazilian martial art, capoeira, to discuss, renew and perform African heritage, black circulating cultures and Canadian nationalism. I make several incursions into Paul Gilroy's theory of the Black Atlantic. First I draw attention farther north to Canada to show that diaspora cultures reference an ‘elsewhere’ as they also come to represent ‘here’; capoeira is used to engage with local Aboriginal and multiculturalism politics. I overcome the little attention that has been paid in Gilroy-influenced black cultural studies to embodiment, corporeality and the particular movements of the sporting body, which are deployed to preserve and share diaspora cultures. This examination of the micropolitics of sport reveals the past, ‘tradition’ and ‘African’ symbols and heritage (roots), along with antiphony, innovation and transnational circulation (routes) as essential elements of black expressive cultures.     

Shown but not Shared,Presented but not Proffered: Redefining Ritual Identity among Warlpiri Ritual Performers, 1990–2000

Little has been written on the construction and projection of indigenous social identity in public (‘non‐restricted’) ritual among Aboriginal Australians. Elsewhere, I have analysed nearly half a century of such public rituals (1946–1990) among the Warlpiri of Yuendumu in Central Australia, concentrating on the shifting forces of gender and kinship. This paper focuses on the key moments motivating senior Warlpiri women, since the 1990s, to reconfigure their ritual participation and roles in inter‐indigenous ceremonial events. I analyse how these women participate in inter‐Aboriginal performances, exhibiting the iconic and sensory virtues of the Dreaming and weaving new forms of political identity, shaped by the pressures of neo‐colonialism, with female ambassadors of other Aboriginal groups. I argue that in this performative process women are reconfiguring the meanings of Aboriginalities and rearticulating their connectedness to one another, a connectedness rooted in their beliefs and responsibilities towards the Dreaming.     

Envy and egalitarianism in Aboriginal Australia: An integrative approach

The word ‘envy’ directs attention to feelings and cognitions that are especially important sources of information in our complicated sociality. As it is delimited by philosophers, economists, psychologists and others, envy is conceptually nested within a family that includes evil eye beliefs, inequity aversion, strong reciprocity and social comparison. Although the accumulation of work in these areas is substantial, anthropological treatments of envy are rare. Given repeated assertions of envy's universality and its potential importance for understanding widespread aspects of the human condition, a comparative eye seems essential. I present an account of ‘jealous’ in Aboriginal Australia via a framework that casts emotions as emerging from the interaction of psychobiological and sociocultural processes. According to this perspective, ‘envy’ should not be regarded as an invariant human condition but rather as a Western version of what, in a more generic human form, may both defend the individual and the larger sociality.     

The sanctity of life as a sacred value

The doctrine of the sanctity of life has traditionally been characterised as a Judeo-Christian doctrine that has it that bodily human life is an intrinsic good and that it is always impermissible to kill an innocent human. Abortion and euthanasia are often assumed to violate the doctrine. The doctrine is usually understood as being derived from religious dogma and, as such, not amenable to debate. I show that this characterisation of the doctrine is problematic in a number of ways, and I go on to rethink the doctrine. In doing so I follow in the footsteps of Ronald Dworkin, who offered a characterisation of the doctrine in his 1993 Life's Dominion, drawing on a conceptualisation of sacredness that is radically different from standard ones and not dependent on religious dogma. I'll argue that although Dworkin's efforts have much to recommend, his conceptualisation of sacredness is inadequate. Dworkin attempted to reconceptualise sacredness ‘from the armchair’. Here I explain how sacred values are thought of in anthropology and psychology and argue that the sanctity of human life should be understood in the same way. I'll explain how doing so allows us to resolve a number of conceptual problems that bedevil standard characterisations of the doctrine of the sanctity of life. I'll also consider the possibility of a compromise over the sanctity of human life, and as a consequence, compromise over the permissibility of abortion and euthanasia. I'll argue that such compromise is possible, albeit difficult to achieve.     

Giving the silent majority a stronger voice? Initiatives to empower Muslim women as part of the UK's ‘War on Terror’

Abstract

This article provides a gendered analysis of the ‘War on Terror’ in the UK context. Specifically it looks at initiatives to empower Muslim women, which were part of New Labour's Preventing Violent Extremism (PVE) agenda, the impetus for which stemmed from the idea that, as ‘the silent majority’, women need to be given a ‘stronger voice’. Based on analysis of qualitative interviews, this article situates these initiatives within a broader policy landscape of debates on multiculturalism, community cohesion and Britishness. It explores interviewees' understandings of Muslim women's silence in relation to those suggested by policy discourse, considering the ways in which the state's attempt to ‘give voice’ worked in practice. I argue that the operation of such initiatives continued to constrain Muslim women's voices, restricting ‘voice’ to a narrow range of speakers speaking about a narrow range of issues.