Mind blindness and the brain in autism.

Experimental evidence shows that the inability to attribute mental states, such as desires and beliefs, to self and others (mentalizing) explains the social and communication impairments of individuals with autism. Brain imaging studies in normal volunteers highlight a circumscribed network that is active during mentalizing and links medial prefrontal regions with posterior superior temporal sulcus and temporal poles. The brain abnormality that results in mentalizing failure in autism may involve weak connections between components of this system.     

Metacognition and mentalizing are associated with distinct neural representations of decision uncertainty

Metacognition and mentalizing are both associated with meta-level mental state representations. Conventionally, metacognition refers to monitoring one’s own cognitive processes, while mentalizing refers to monitoring others’ cognitive processes. However, this self-other dichotomy is insufficient to delineate the 2 high-level mental processes. We here used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) to systematically investigate the neural representations of different levels of decision uncertainty in monitoring different targets (the current self, the past self [PS], and others) performing a perceptual decision-making task. Our results reveal diverse formats of internal mental state representations of decision uncertainty in mentalizing, separate from the associations with external cue information. External cue information was commonly represented in the right inferior parietal lobe (IPL) across the mentalizing tasks. However, the internal mental states of decision uncertainty attributed to others were uniquely represented in the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex (dmPFC), rather than the temporoparietal junction (TPJ) that also represented the object-level mental states of decision inaccuracy attributed to others. Further, the object-level and meta-level mental states of decision uncertainty, when attributed to the PS, were represented in the precuneus and the lateral frontopolar cortex (lFPC), respectively. In contrast, the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex (dACC) represented currently experienced decision uncertainty in metacognition, and also uncertainty about the estimated decision uncertainty (estimate uncertainty), but not the estimated decision uncertainty per se in mentalizing. Hence, our findings identify neural signatures to clearly delineate metacognition and mentalizing and further imply distinct neural computations on internal mental states of decision uncertainty during metacognition and mentalizing.

The relationship between metacognition and mentalizing is still a matter of debate, as both are associated with meta-representations. This study adapts a task paradigm used in metacognition to apply in mentalizing and compares the neural representations of decision uncertainty in metacognition and mentalizing.     

Large Scale Brain Functional Networks Support Sentence Comprehension: Evidence from Both Explicit and Implicit Language Tasks

Previous studies have indicated that sentences are comprehended via widespread brain regions in the fronto-temporo-parietal network in explicit language tasks (e.g., semantic congruency judgment tasks), and through restricted temporal or frontal regions in implicit language tasks (e.g., font size judgment tasks). This discrepancy has raised questions regarding a common network for sentence comprehension that acts regardless of task effect and whether different tasks modulate network properties. To this end, we constructed brain functional networks based on 27 subjects’ fMRI data that was collected while performing explicit and implicit language tasks. We found that network properties and network hubs corresponding to the implicit language task were similar to those associated with the explicit language task. We also found common hubs in occipital, temporal and frontal regions in both tasks. Compared with the implicit language task, the explicit language task resulted in greater global efficiency and increased integrated betweenness centrality of the left inferior frontal gyrus, which is a key region related to sentence comprehension. These results suggest that brain functional networks support both explicit and implicit sentence comprehension; in addition, these two types of language tasks may modulate the properties of brain functional networks.     

Dissociable medial prefrontal contributions to judgments of similar and dissimilar others

Human social interaction requires the recognition that other people are governed by the same types of mental states-beliefs, desires, intentions-that guide one's own behavior. We used functional neuroimaging to examine how perceivers make mental state inferences when such self-other overlap can be assumed (when the other is similar to oneself) and when it cannot (when the other is dissimilar from oneself). We observed a double dissociation such that mentalizing about a similar other engaged a region of ventral mPFC linked to self-referential thought, whereas mentalizing about a dissimilar other engaged a more dorsal subregion of mPFC. The overlap between judgments of self and similar others suggests the plausibility of "simulation" accounts of social cognition, which posit that perceivers can use knowledge about themselves to infer the mental states of others.     

The medial temporal lobe supports conceptual implicit memory

The medial temporal lobe (MTL) is generally thought to be critical for explicit, but not implicit, memory. Here, we demonstrate that the perirhinal cortex (PRc), within the MTL, plays a role in conceptually-driven implicit memory. Amnesic patients with MTL lesions that converged on the left PRc exhibited deficits on two conceptual implicit tasks (i.e., exemplar generation and semantic decision). A separate functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study in healthy subjects indicated that PRc activation during encoding of words was predictive of subsequent exemplar generation. Moreover, across subjects, the magnitude of the fMRI and behavioral conceptual priming effects were directly related. Additionally, the PRc region implicated in the fMRI study was the same region of maximal lesion overlap in the patients with impaired conceptual priming. These patient and imaging results converge to suggest that the PRc plays a critical role in conceptual implicit memory, and possibly conceptual processing in general.     

The context of temporal processing is represented in the multidimensional relationships between timing tasks

In the present study we determined the performance interrelations of ten different tasks that involved the processing of temporal intervals in the subsecond range, using multidimensional analyses. Twenty human subjects executed the following explicit timing tasks: interval categorization and discrimination (perceptual tasks), and single and multiple interval tapping (production tasks). In addition, the subjects performed a continuous circle-drawing task that has been considered an implicit timing paradigm, since time is an emergent property of the produced spatial trajectory. All tasks could be also classified as single or multiple interval paradigms. Auditory or visual markers were used to define the intervals. Performance variability, a measure that reflects the temporal and non-temporal processes for each task, was used to construct a dissimilarity matrix that quantifies the distances between pairs of tasks. Hierarchical clustering and multidimensional scaling were carried out on the dissimilarity matrix, and the results showed a prominent segregation of explicit and implicit timing tasks, and a clear grouping between single and multiple interval paradigms. In contrast, other variables such as the marker modality were not as crucial to explain the performance between tasks. Thus, using this methodology we revealed a probable functional arrangement of neural systems engaged during different timing behaviors.     

From temporal processing to developmental language disorders: mind the gap

The ‘rapid temporal processing’ and the ‘temporal sampling framework’ hypotheses have been proposed to account for the deficits in language and literacy development seen in specific language impairment and dyslexia. This paper reviews these hypotheses and concludes that the proposed causal chains between the presumed auditory processing deficits and the observed behavioural manifestation of the disorders are vague and not well established empirically. Several problems and limitations are identified. Most data concern correlations between distantly related tasks, and there is considerable heterogeneity and variability in performance as well as concerns about reliability and validity. Little attention is paid to the distinction between ostensibly perceptual and metalinguistic tasks or between implicit and explicit modes of performance, yet measures are assumed to be pure indicators of underlying processes or representations. The possibility that diagnostic categories do not refer to causally and behaviourally homogeneous groups needs to be taken seriously, taking into account genetic and neurodevelopmental studies to construct multiple-risk models. To make progress in the field, cognitive models of each task must be specified, including performance domains that are predicted to be deficient versus intact, testing multiple indicators of latent constructs and demonstrating construct reliability and validity.     

The Neural Bases of Directed and Spontaneous Mental State Attributions to Group Agents

In daily life, perceivers often need to predict and interpret the behavior of group agents, such as corporations and governments. Although research has investigated how perceivers reason about individual members of particular groups, less is known about how perceivers reason about group agents themselves. The present studies investigate how perceivers understand group agents by investigating the extent to which understanding the ‘mind’ of the group as a whole shares important properties and processes with understanding the minds of individuals. Experiment 1 demonstrates that perceivers are sometimes willing to attribute a mental state to a group as a whole even when they are not willing to attribute that mental state to any of the individual members of the group, suggesting that perceivers can reason about the beliefs and desires of group agents over and above those of their individual members. Experiment 2 demonstrates that the degree of activation in brain regions associated with attributing mental states to individuals—i.e., brain regions associated with mentalizing or theory-of-mind, including the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), temporo-parietal junction (TPJ), and precuneus—does not distinguish individual from group targets, either when reading statements about those targets'' mental states (directed) or when attributing mental states implicitly in order to predict their behavior (spontaneous). Together, these results help to illuminate the processes that support understanding group agents themselves.     

Do Implicit and Explicit Measures of the Sense of Agency Measure the Same Thing?

The sense of agency (SoA) refers to perceived causality of the self, i.e. the feeling of causing something to happen. The SoA has been probed using a variety of explicit and implicit measures. Explicit measures include rating scales and questionnaires. Implicit measures, which include sensory attenuation and temporal binding, use perceptual differences between self- and externally generated stimuli as measures of the SoA. In the present study, we investigated whether the different measures tap into the same self-attribution processes by determining whether individual differences on implicit and explicit measures of SoA are correlated. Participants performed tasks in which they triggered tones via key presses (operant condition) or passively listened to tones triggered by a computer (observational condition). We replicated previously reported effects of sensory attenuation and temporal binding. Surprisingly the two implicit measures of SoA were not significantly correlated with each other, nor did they correlate with the explicit measures of SoA. Our results suggest that some explicit and implicit measures of the SoA may tap into different processes.     

Implicit and Explicit Representations of Hand Position in Tool Use

Understanding the interactions of visual and proprioceptive information in tool use is important as it is the basis for learning of the tool''s kinematic transformation and thus skilled performance. This study investigated how the CNS combines seen cursor positions and felt hand positions under a visuo-motor rotation paradigm. Young and older adult participants performed aiming movements on a digitizer while looking at rotated visual feedback on a monitor. After each movement, they judged either the proprioceptively sensed hand direction or the visually sensed cursor direction. We identified asymmetric mutual biases with a strong visual dominance. Furthermore, we found a number of differences between explicit and implicit judgments of hand directions. The explicit judgments had considerably larger variability than the implicit judgments. The bias toward the cursor direction for the explicit judgments was about twice as strong as for the implicit judgments. The individual biases of explicit and implicit judgments were uncorrelated. Biases of these judgments exhibited opposite sequential effects. Moreover, age-related changes were also different between these judgments. The judgment variability was decreased and the bias toward the cursor direction was increased with increasing age only for the explicit judgments. These results indicate distinct explicit and implicit neural representations of hand direction, similar to the notion of distinct visual systems.     

Is This Car Looking at You? How Anthropomorphism Predicts Fusiform Face Area Activation when Seeing Cars

Anthropomorphism encompasses the attribution of human characteristics to non-living objects. In particular the human tendency to see faces in cars has long been noticed, yet its neural correlates are unknown. We set out to investigate whether the fusiform face area (FFA) is associated with seeing human features in car fronts, or whether, the higher-level theory of mind network (ToM), namely temporoparietal junction (TPJ) and medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) show a link to anthropomorphism. Twenty participants underwent fMRI scanning during a passive car-front viewing task. We extracted brain activity from FFA, TPJ and MPFC. After the fMRI session participants were asked to spontaneously list adjectives that characterize each car front. Five raters judged the degree to which each adjective can be applied as a characteristic of human beings. By means of linear mixed models we found that the implicit tendency to anthropomorphize individual car fronts predicts FFA, but not TPJ or MPFC activity. The results point to an important role of FFA in the phenomenon of ascribing human attributes to non-living objects. Interestingly, brain regions that have been associated with thinking about beliefs and mental states of others (TPJ, MPFC) do not seem to be related to anthropomorphism of car fronts.     

Dissociation of Neural Substrates of Response Inhibition to Negative Information between Implicit and Explicit Facial Go/Nogo Tasks: Evidence from an Electrophysiological Study

Background

Although ample evidence suggests that emotion and response inhibition are interrelated at the behavioral and neural levels, neural substrates of response inhibition to negative facial information remain unclear. Thus we used event-related potential (ERP) methods to explore the effects of explicit and implicit facial expression processing in response inhibition.

Methods

We used implicit (gender categorization) and explicit emotional Go/Nogo tasks (emotion categorization) in which neutral and sad faces were presented. Electrophysiological markers at the scalp and the voxel level were analyzed during the two tasks.

Results

We detected a task, emotion and trial type interaction effect in the Nogo-P3 stage. Larger Nogo-P3 amplitudes during sad conditions versus neutral conditions were detected with explicit tasks. However, the amplitude differences between the two conditions were not significant for implicit tasks. Source analyses on P3 component revealed that right inferior frontal junction (rIFJ) was involved during this stage. The current source density (CSD) of rIFJ was higher with sad conditions compared to neutral conditions for explicit tasks, rather than for implicit tasks.

Conclusions

The findings indicated that response inhibition was modulated by sad facial information at the action inhibition stage when facial expressions were processed explicitly rather than implicitly. The rIFJ may be a key brain region in emotion regulation.     

Anterior medial prefrontal cortex exhibits activation during task preparation but deactivation during task execution

Background

The anterior prefrontal cortex (PFC) exhibits activation during some cognitive tasks, including episodic memory, reasoning, attention, multitasking, task sets, decision making, mentalizing, and processing of self-referenced information. However, the medial part of anterior PFC is part of the default mode network (DMN), which shows deactivation during various goal-directed cognitive tasks compared to a resting baseline. One possible factor for this pattern is that activity in the anterior medial PFC (MPFC) is affected by dynamic allocation of attentional resources depending on task demands. We investigated this possibility using an event related fMRI with a face working memory task.

Methodology/Principal Findings

Sixteen students participated in a single fMRI session. They were asked to form a task set to remember the faces (Face memory condition) or to ignore them (No face memory condition), then they were given 6 seconds of preparation period before the onset of the face stimuli. During this 6-second period, four single digits were presented one at a time at the center of the display, and participants were asked to add them and to remember the final answer. When participants formed a task set to remember faces, the anterior MPFC exhibited activation during a task preparation period but deactivation during a task execution period within a single trial.

Conclusions/Significance

The results suggest that the anterior MPFC plays a role in task set formation but is not involved in execution of the face working memory task. Therefore, when attentional resources are allocated to other brain regions during task execution, the anterior MPFC shows deactivation. The results suggest that activation and deactivation in the anterior MPFC are affected by dynamic allocation of processing resources across different phases of processing.     

The time course of the influence of valence and arousal on the implicit processing of affective pictures

In the current study, we investigated the time course of the implicit processing of affective pictures with an orthogonal design of valence (negative vs. positive) by arousal (low vs. high). Previous studies with explicit tasks suggested that valence mainly modulates early event-related potential (ERP) components, whereas arousal mainly modulates late components. However, in this study with an implicit task, we observed significant interactions between valence and arousal at both early and late stages over both parietal and frontal sites, which were reflected by three different ERP components: P2a (100-200 ms), N2 (200-300 ms), and P3 (300-400 ms). Furthermore, there was also a significant main effect of arousal on P2b (200-300 ms) over parieto-occipital sites. Our results suggest that valence and arousal effects on implicit affective processing are more complicated than previous ERP studies with explicit tasks have revealed.     

The social brain?

The notion that there is a 'social brain' in humans specialized for social interactions has received considerable support from brain imaging and, to a lesser extent, from lesion studies. Specific roles for the various components of the social brain are beginning to emerge. For example, the amygdala attaches emotional value to faces, enabling us to recognize expressions such as fear and trustworthiness, while the posterior superior temporal sulcus predicts the end point of the complex trajectories created when agents act upon the world. It has proved more difficult to assign a role to medial prefrontal cortex, which is consistently activated when people think about mental states. I suggest that this region may have a special role in the second-order representations needed for communicative acts when we have to represent someone else's representation of our own mental state. These cognitive processes are not specifically social, since they can be applied in other domains. However, these cognitive processes have been driven to ever higher levels of sophistication by the complexities of social interaction.     

Brand Discrimination: An Implicit Measure of the Strength of Mental Brand Representations

While mental associations between a brand and its marketing elements are an important part of brand equity, previous research has yet to provide a sound methodology to measure the strength of these links. The following studies present the development and validation of an implicit measure to assess the strength of mental representations of brand elements in the mind of the consumer. The measure described in this paper, which we call the Brand Discrimination task, requires participants to identify whether images of brand elements (e.g. color, logo, packaging) belong to a target brand or not. Signal detection theory (SDT) is used to calculate a Brand Discrimination index which gives a measure of overall recognition accuracy for a brand’s elements in the context of its competitors. A series of five studies shows that the Brand Discrimination task can discriminate between strong and weak brands, increases when mental representations of brands are experimentally strengthened, is relatively stable across time, and can predict brand choice, independently and while controlling for other explicit and implicit brand evaluation measures. Together, these studies provide unique evidence for the importance of mental brand representations in marketing and consumer behavior, along with a research methodology to measure this important consumer-based brand attribute.     

Differentiating Self-Projection from Simulation during Mentalizing: Evidence from fMRI

We asked participants to predict which of two colors a similar other (student) and a dissimilar other (retiree) likes better. We manipulated if color-pairs were two hues from the same color-category (e.g. green) or two conceptually different colors (e.g. green versus blue). In the former case, the mental state that has to be represented (i.e., the percept of two different hues of green) is predominantly non-conceptual or phenomenal in nature, which should promote mental simulation as a strategy for mentalizing. In the latter case, the mental state (i.e. the percept of green versus blue) can be captured in thought by concepts, which facilitates the use of theories for mentalizing. In line with the self-projection hypothesis, we found that cortical midline areas including vmPFC / orbitofrontal cortex and precuneus were preferentially activated for mentalizing about a similar other. However, activation was not affected by the nature of the color-difference, suggesting that self-projection subsumes simulation-like processes but is not limited to them. This indicates that self-projection is a universal strategy applied in different contexts—irrespective of the availability of theories for mentalizing. Along with midline activations linked to self-projection, we also observed activation in right lateral frontal and dorsal parietal areas showing a theory-like pattern. Taken together, this shows that mentalizing does not operate based on simulation or theory, but that both strategies are used concurrently to predict the choices of others.     

Implicit, predictive timing draws upon the same scalar representation of time as explicit timing

It is not yet known whether the scalar properties of explicit timing are also displayed by more implicit, predictive forms of timing. We investigated whether performance in both explicit and predictive timing tasks conformed to the two psychophysical properties of scalar timing: the Psychophysical law and Weber's law. Our explicit temporal generalization task required overt estimation of the duration of an empty interval bounded by visual markers, whereas our temporal expectancy task presented visual stimuli at temporally predictable intervals, which facilitated motor preparation thus speeding target detection. The Psychophysical Law and Weber's Law were modeled, respectively, by (1) the functional dependence between mean subjective time and real time (2) the linearity of the relationship between timing variability and duration. Results showed that performance for predictive, as well as explicit, timing conformed to both psychophysical properties of interval timing. Both tasks showed the same linear relationship between subjective and real time, demonstrating that the same representational mechanism is engaged whether it is transferred into an overt estimate of duration or used to optimise sensorimotor behavior. Moreover, variability increased with increasing duration during both tasks, consistent with a scalar representation of time in both predictive and explicit timing. However, timing variability was greater during predictive timing, at least for durations greater than 200 msec, and ascribable to temporal, rather than non-temporal, mechanisms engaged by the task. These results suggest that although the same internal representation of time was used in both tasks, its external manifestation varied as a function of temporal task goals.     

Are All Beliefs Equal? Implicit Belief Attributions Recruiting Core Brain Regions of Theory of Mind

Humans possess efficient mechanisms to behave adaptively in social contexts. They ascribe goals and beliefs to others and use these for behavioural predictions. Researchers argued for two separate mental attribution systems: an implicit and automatic one involved in online interactions, and an explicit one mainly used in offline deliberations. However, the underlying mechanisms of these systems and the types of beliefs represented in the implicit system are still unclear. Using neuroimaging methods, we show that the right temporo-parietal junction and the medial prefrontal cortex, brain regions consistently found to be involved in explicit mental state reasoning, are also recruited by spontaneous belief tracking. While the medial prefrontal cortex was more active when both the participant and another agent believed an object to be at a specific location, the right temporo-parietal junction was selectively activated during tracking the false beliefs of another agent about the presence, but not the absence of objects. While humans can explicitly attribute to a conspecific any possible belief they themselves can entertain, implicit belief tracking seems to be restricted to beliefs with specific contents, a content selectivity that may reflect a crucial functional characteristic and signature property of implicit belief attribution.