Strengthening bioterrorism prevention: global biological materials management

The anthrax attacks of 2001 demonstrated that bioterrorism poses a significant threat to U.S. national security. This threat is increasing as a result of the rapid expansion in scale and technical capabilities of the global biotechnology industry, which is broadening the availability of materials, technologies, and expertise needed to produce a biological weapon and is lowering the barriers to biological weapons terrorism and proliferation. At the same time, there has been a rise of sophisticated yet loosely networked transnational terrorist groups that have shown an interest in bioterrorism. The United States must confront this convergence. Although the U.S. government pursues many different biodefense programs to bolster its ability to detect and respond to a bioterrorist attack, these efforts must be augmented with preventive measures to meet today's international challenges. U.S. Homeland Security Presidential Directive 10 of April 2004 defines "Prevention and Protection" as one of the four essential pillars of the U.S. response to the bioterrorist threat. However, while bioscience and policy experts have proposed a variety of preventive initiatives, the creation of such programs has been slow and limited. Global biological materials management, which would focus on identifying and protecting those biological materials at the greatest risk of being used maliciously, is one potential solution. Such an approach would augment current U.S. biodefense efforts, provide the international community an effective means of mitigating the global threat of bioterrorism, and strengthen the international community's battle against emerging infectious disease.     

新工科背景下高校生物安全人才培养体系建设北大核心CSCD

近年来,全球生物安全形势日趋严峻,重大传染病疫情、生物技术误用和谬用、生物武器等生物安全威胁不断显现,生物安全已跃升为我国国家安全的重要组成部分;而与此同时,生物安全作为一门新兴的交叉型学科,其教育体系的建立与完善还处于起步阶段。受国内外生物安全形势、生物安全产业发展以及国家安全学学科设立的影响,凸显了我国在生物安全这一交叉领域的人才储备的短板和不足。尤其在新工科建设背景下,更加显现出生物安全人才培养的重要性。本文根据作者在实际教学中的经验,从建立交叉融合课程体系、构建创新性教学模式、探索通识教育改革方案和完善持续改进机制等几个方面,系统介绍了新工科背景下完善生物安全领域人才体系的具体措施。     

Community response grids: using information technology to help communities respond to bioterror emergencies

Access to accurate and trusted information is vital in preparing for, responding to, and recovering from an emergency. To facilitate response in large-scale emergency situations, Community Response Grids (CRGs) integrate Internet and mobile technologies to enable residents to report information, professional emergency responders to disseminate instructions, and residents to assist one another. CRGs use technology to help residents and professional emergency responders to work together in community response to emergencies, including bioterrorism events. In a time of increased danger from bioterrorist threats, the application of advanced information and communication technologies to community response is vital in confronting such threats. This article describes CRGs, their underlying concepts, development efforts, their relevance to biosecurity and bioterrorism, and future research issues in the use of technology to facilitate community response.     

What's hot in animal biosafety?

In recent years, the emergence or re-emergence of critical issues in infectious disease and public health has presented new challenges and opportunities for laboratory animal care professionals. The re-emergence of bioterrorism as a threat activity of individuals or small groups has caused a heightened awareness of biosecurity and improved biosafety. The need for animal work involving high-risk or high-consequence pathogens and for arthropod-borne diseases has stimulated renewed interest in animal biosafety matters, particularly for work in containment. Application of these principles to animals retained in outdoor environments has been a consequence of disease eradication programs. The anticipated global eradication of wild poliovirus has prompted the promulgation of new biosafety guidelines for future laboratory and animal work. Increased concern regarding the use of biologically derived toxins and hazardous chemicals has stimulated a new categorization of facility containment based on risk assessment. Recognition that prion disease agents and other high-consequence pathogens require safe handling and thorough destruction during terminal decontamination treatment has led to the development of new biosafety guidelines and technologies. The implementation of these guidelines and technologies will promote state-of-the-art research while minimizing risk to laboratory animals, researchers, and the environment.     

Agricultural biosecurity

The prevention and control of new pest and disease introductions is an agricultural challenge which is attracting growing public interest. This interest is in part driven by an impression that the threat is increasing, but there has been little analysis of the changing rates of biosecurity threat, and existing evidence is equivocal. Traditional biosecurity systems for animals and plants differ substantially but are beginning to converge. Bio-economic modelling of risk will be a valuable tool in guiding the allocation of limited resources for biosecurity. The future of prevention and management systems will be strongly influenced by new technology and the growing role of the private sector. Overall, today''s biosecurity systems are challenged by changing national priorities regarding trade, by new concerns about environmental effects of biological invasions and by the question ‘who pays?’. Tomorrow''s systems may need to be quite different to be effective. We suggest three changes: an integration of plant and animal biosecurity around a common, proactive, risk-based approach; a greater focus on international cooperation to deal with threats at source; and a commitment to refocus biosecurity on building resilience to invasion into agroecosystems rather than building walls around them.     

Balancing bioenergy and biosecurity policies: estimating current and future climate suitability patterns for a bioenergy crop

In an apparent paradox, bioenergy crops offer potential benefits to a world adjusting to the challenges of climate change and declining fossil fuel stocks, as well as potential ecological and economic threats resulting from biological invasions. In considering this paradox it is important to understand that benefits and threats may not always be apparent in equal measure throughout the potential range of each candidate biofuel species. In some environments, a species could potentially produce valuable biological materials without posing a significant invasion threat. In this study, we develop a bioclimatic niche model for a candidate biofuel crop, Millettia pinnata, and apply the model to different climatic and irrigation scenarios to estimate the current and future patterns of climate suitability for its growth and naturalization. We use Australia as a case study for interpreting the niche model in terms that may be informative for both biofuels proponents and biosecurity regulators to plan management programmes that reflect the invasive potential in different areas. The model suggests that suitable growing conditions for M. pinnata in Australia are naturally restricted to the moist and semimoist tropics. Irrigation can extend the suitable growing conditions more widely throughout the tropics, and into more arid regions. Under future climate scenarios, suitable growing conditions for M. pinnata under natural rainfall contract towards the east coast, and extend southward into the subtropics. With irrigation, M. pinnata appears to have the potential in the future to naturalize across much of Australia. The bioclimatic modelling method demonstrated here is comparatively quick and easy, and can produce a rich array of data products to inform the interests of both bioenergy proponents and biosecurity regulators. We show how this modelling can support the development of spatially explicit biosecurity policies designed to manage invasion risks in a manner that balances bioenergy and biosecurity concerns.     

合成生物学生物安全风险评价与管理

合成生物学(synthetic biology)已迅速发展为生命科学最具发展潜力的分支学科之一,但它同时也会给生态环境和人类健康带来潜在的风险。结合国内外合成生物学发展现状,本文综述了基因回路(DNA-based biocircuits)、最小基因组(minimal genome)、原型细胞(protocells)、化学合成生物学(chemical synthetic biology)等涉及的风险评价、合成生物学与生物安全工程(biosafety engineering)、合成生物学对社会伦理道德法律的影响以及当前热点议题,如生物朋(黑)客(biopunk(or biohackery))、家置生物学(garage biology)、DIY生物学(do-it-yourselfbiology)、生物恐怖主义(bioterrorism)等方面的新进展。分析讨论了世界各国合成生物学以自律监管或技术为主的安全管理原则和基于5个不同政策干预点的5P管理策略的合理性与潜在不足。同时结合我国合成生物学当前研究进展以及现有的安全管理规范,提出了建立以安全评价为核心的法规体系、生物学生物安全规范以及加强研发单位内部管理和生物安全科普宣传等我国合成生物学安全管理制度与措施等建议。     

生物安全时代:新生物科技变革与国家安全治理*

科技进步改进了人类对天然生物危害因子的操控能力,在诱发新的生物安全危害形态的同时,也赋予了生物安全客体的源头难以追溯性、生物安全主体的多元性、生物安全危害演变机理的复杂性等特点。生物安全在很大程度上体现了非传统安全的非传统特点。随着生物科技与生物安全在推动人类社会发展进程的作用日益显著,21世纪或将成为生物安全的时代。新一轮生物科技变革及其与人类社会互动衍生的生物安全问题,已经逐渐触及人类安全观念和现代文明的内源性危机或挑战。全面提升国家生物安全能力、优化国家生物安全治理,不仅是世界各国的战略选择,也是对人类科技文明与政治文明的新探索。     

Current and projected future risks of freshwater fish invasions in China

Biological invasions are a primary threat to global biodiversity, supporting mounting calls for the development of early‐warning systems to manage existing and emerging invaders. Here, we evaluated the geographical pattern of invasion risks of currently established and potentially emerging nonnative freshwater fishes in China by jointly considering the threats of introduction and establishment under climate change. Introduction threats were estimated according to proxies of human activities and propagule pressure for two primary pathways (aquaculture or ornamental). Establishment threats for 51 current and 64 potential invaders (based on whether having established or not self‐sustaining populations) were assessed using an ensemble of species distribution models under current (1960–1990) and future [2041–2060 (2050s) and 2061–2080 (2070s)] climate scenarios. Geographical patterns of invasion risk were then assessed by overlaying the threats of introduction and establishment for each species group both in present‐day and in the future. We found that eastern China displayed the highest threat of introduction. By contrast, southeastern and northwestern regions were identified as the most suitable for the establishment of both current and potential invaders. Under a changing climate, 83 out of 115 species displayed an increase in habitat suitability, resulting in an overall increase of 4.8% by 2050s and 7.1% by 2070s in the extent of suitable habitat for nonnative freshwater fishes. Taken together, invasion risk was found to be highest in southeastern China and lowest in the Tibet Plateau. Our research highlights the importance of assessing invasion risk by integrating the threats associated with the introduction and establishment stages. In particular, our findings revealed convergent patterns of invasion risk between current and potential nonnative freshwater fishes under climate change. Geographic patterns in hotspots of existing and emerging invasions provide critical insights to guide the allocation of resources to monitor and control existing and emerging invasions in China.     

The dual-use dilemma for the life sciences: perspectives, conundrums, and global solutions

The term "dual-use" traditionally has been used to describe technologies that could have both civilian and military usage, but this term has at least three different dimensions that pose a dilemma for modern biology and its possible misuse for hostile purposes: (1) ostensibly civilian facilities that are in fact intended for military or terrorist bioweapons development and production; (2) equipment and agents that could be misappropriated and misused for biological weapons development and production; and (3) the generation and dissemination of scientific knowledge that could be misapplied for biological weapons development and production. These three different aspects of the "dual-use dilemma" are frequently confused--each demands a distinct approach within a "web of prevention" in order to reduce the future risk of bioterrorism and biowarfare. This article discusses the nature of the different perspectives and divergent approaches as a contribution to finding a scientifically acceptable global solution to the problem posed by the dual-use dilemma. We propose that: (1) facilities that are intended for bioweapons development and production should be primarily prevented by a strengthened Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) effectively implemented in all nation states, one that includes provisions for adequate transparency to improve confidence and a mechanism for thorough inspections when there is sufficient cause, and enhanced law enforcement activities involving international cooperation and sharing of critical intelligence information; (2) potentially dual-use equipment and agents should be available to legitimate users for peaceful purposes, but strengthened national biosafety and physical and personnel biosecurity controls in all nations together with effective export controls should be implemented to limit the potential for the misappropriation of such equipment and materials; and (3) information should be openly accessible by the global scientific community, but a culture of responsible conduct involving the breadth of the international life sciences communities should be adopted to protect the ongoing revolution in the life sciences from being hijacked for hostile misuse of the knowledge generated and communicated by life scientists.     

Non-Threatening Other-Race Faces Capture Visual Attention: Evidence from a Dot-Probe Task

Visual attentional biases towards other-race faces have been attributed to the perceived threat value of such faces. It is possible, however, that they reflect the relative visual novelty of other-race faces. Here we demonstrate an attentional bias to other-race faces in the absence of perceived threat. White participants rated female East Asian faces as no more threatening than female own-race faces. Nevertheless, using a new dot-probe paradigm that can distinguish attentional capture and hold effects, we found that these other-race faces selectively captured visual attention. Importantly, this demonstration challenges previous interpretations of attentional biases to other-race faces as threat responses. Future studies will need to determine whether perceived threat increases attentional biases to other-race faces, beyond the levels seen here.     

Globalizing biosecurity

A harmonized international regime that enhances biosecurity is needed to reduce the risk of bioterrorism. Like other security regimes, this will entail mutually reinforcing strands, which need to include: enactment of legally binding control of access to dangerous pathogens, transparency for sanctioned biodefense programs, technology transfer and assistance to developing countries to jointly advance biosafety and biosecurity, global awareness of the dual-use dilemma and the potential misuse of science by terrorists, and development of a global ethic of compliance. To work, this effort must be undertaken collectively, utilizing the international and regional institutions that already have a role to play in providing safety and security. Most notably, it must grow in a top-down manner from the Biological Weapons Convention accord, in which States Parties have agreed to ban the development of biological weapons, and in a bottom-up manner from the scientific and health communities, which are engaged in the research and public health efforts that must be protected against misuse-especially involving the World Health Organization.     

Strategic dilemmas of biosecurity in the European Union

Systems for societal/homeland security in both Europe and the United States are in flux to adjust to 21st century threats, such as terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflicts, state failures, and organized crime. It is important that reforms take place on both sides of the Atlantic that recognize the interdependence of Europe and the United States. Security, including biosecurity, for Europe is strongly connected to security in the U.S. Diseases transcend borders, and their consequences can be the same, irrespective of where the outbreak occurs or whether it is a natural occurrence or an act of bioterrorism. This article examines the political and strategic dilemmas and complexities that would confront the European Union (EU) in the event of a bioterrorism attack or a naturally occurring outbreak. Although several initiatives have been taken by the 15 member states and within the EU Commission, the EU is not institutionally prepared for transnational, rapidly moving diseases that could cause grave consequences in Europe and other regions, including the U.S. The prime responsibility for protecting European citizens against outbreaks rests with each member state. However, with intertwined and open European societies, the consequences would likely spill across borders. The EU Commission would have to become involved because such aspects as the internal market and freedom of movement would be affected. Responsibility, but not authority, would be pushed to the top. A coordinated EU response to such crises depends on European political leadership.     

Striking against bioterrorism with advanced proteomics and reference methods

The intentional use by terrorists of biological toxins as weapons has been of great concern for many years. Among the numerous toxins produced by plants, animals, algae, fungi, and bacteria, ricin is one of the most scrutinized by the media because it has already been used in biocrimes and acts of bioterrorism. Improving the analytical toolbox of national authorities to monitor these potential bioweapons all at once is of the utmost interest. MS/MS allows their absolute quantitation and exhibits advantageous sensitivity, discriminative power, multiplexing possibilities, and speed. In this issue of Proteomics, Gilquin et al. (Proteomics 2017, 17, 1600357) present a robust multiplex assay to quantify a set of eight toxins in the presence of a complex food matrix. This MS/MS reference method is based on scheduled SRM and high‐quality standards consisting of isotopically labeled versions of these toxins. Their results demonstrate robust reliability based on rather loose scheduling of SRM transitions and good sensitivity for the eight toxins, lower than their oral median lethal doses. In the face of an increased threat from terrorism, relevant reference assays based on advanced proteomics and high‐quality companion toxin standards are reliable and firm answers.     

肉毒毒素中和抗体的研究进展

肉毒毒素是目前已知毒性最强的细菌蛋白质,极少量便可以致人死亡,我国每年都有散发病例出现,并且它极有可能被用于恐怖行动或被一些国家用作生物战剂。肉毒毒素中和抗体是肉毒毒素中毒后惟一有效的药物。与马源的抗毒素血清相比,重组基因工程中和抗体具有很多优势,是目前肉毒毒素预防和治疗研究的主要方向。简要综述了肉毒毒素基因工程中和抗体研究现状、保护性抗原选择、体内外中和活性检测方法及研发难点、解决方法等。     

Hazards,threats and risks: lessons from the past to a defensive attitude for the future

Since ever infectious diseases have been a major hazard for the armed forces in operations. Nowadays our nations are facing the threat of terrorism, including bioterrorism. This threat is much more related to the potential disorganization of the society than to the lethal effects of the agents. Biological weapons are considered more like terror weapons than like mass destruction weapons, hence the importance of preparing specific defence measures. The know-how acquired from the struggle against natural infectious diseases is a useful help to face the biological weapon threats and risks. Likewise, the defence attitude is based on three pillars: anticipating, managing, and restoring. This military as well as civilian defence attitude applies to six important functions: (1) alert, (2) detection, diagnosis and identification, (3) medical countermeasures (drugs, vaccines and sera), (4) medical care in hospital, (5) training and information, (6) research and development of dedicated technologies.     

Biological threat characterization research: a critical component of national biodefense

Biological warfare (BW) threat assessments identify and prioritize BW threats to civilian and military populations. In an ideal world, they provide policymakers with clear and compelling guidance to prioritize biodefense research, development, testing, evaluation, and acquisition of countermeasures. Unfortunately, the biodefense community does not exist in an ideal world. National security professionals responsible for crafting BW threat assessments often are challenged by factors that limit the clarity and/or timeliness of those assessments. Moreover, the potential for life science advances to enhance threats enabled by state programs and the possibility that non-state actors may pursue crude but effective BW methodologies will drastically expand the scope of the perceived threat. Appropriate investment of federal biodefense funds will require some mechanism for validating and prioritizing present and future threats. Ideally, such a mechanism will incorporate empirical data targeted to elucidate actual hazards. In this regard, the Department of Homeland Security's creation of a Biological Threat Characterization Program for the technical validation of threat agents will be a valuable addition to the nation's overall biodefense strategy. This article articulates the need for a coordinated national biological threat characterization program, discusses some of the principal challenges associated with such research, and suggests a few options for their resolution.     

Bio-safety and bio-security: A major global concern for ongoing COVID-19 pandemic

Besides its impacts on governance, economics, human culture, geostrategic partnership and environment, globalization greatly exerted control over science and security policies. Biosecurity is the critical job of efforts, policy and preparation to protect health of human, animal and environmental against any biological threats. With the transition into a global village, the possibility of biosecurity breaches has significantly increased. The COVID-19 pandemic is an example of an infringement on biosecurity that has posed a serious threat to the world. Since the first report on the recognition of COVID-19, a number of governments have taken preventive measures, like; lockdown, screening and early detection of suspected and implementing the required response to protect the loss of life and economy. Unfortunately, some of these measures have only recently been taken in some countries, which have contributed significantly to an increased morbidity and loss of life on a daily basis. In this article, the biological risks affecting human, animal and environmental conditions, biosafety violations and preventive measures have been discussed in order to reduce the outbreak and impacts of a pandemic like COVID-19.     

The Sound of Danger: Threat Sensitivity to Predator Vocalizations,Alarm Calls,and Novelty in Gulls

The threat sensitivity hypothesis predicts that organisms will evaluate the relative danger of and respond differentially to varying degrees of predation threat. Doing so allows potential prey to balance the costs and benefits of anti-predator behaviors. Threat sensitivity has undergone limited testing in the auditory modality, and the relative threat level of auditory cues from different sources is difficult to infer across populations when variables such as background risk and experience are not properly controlled. We experimentally exposed a single population of two sympatric gull species to auditory stimuli representing a range of potential threats in order to compare the relative threat of heterospecific alarm calls, conspecific alarms calls, predator vocalizations, and novel auditory cues. Gulls were able to discriminate among a diverse set of threat indicators and respond in a graded manner commensurate with the level of threat. Vocalizations of two potential predators, the human voice and bald eagle call, differed in their threat level compared to each other and to alarm calls. Conspecific alarm calls were more threatening than heterospecfic alarm calls to the larger great black-backed gull, but the smaller herring gull weighed both equally. A novel cue elicited a response intermediate between known threats and a known non-threat in herring gulls, but not great black-backed gulls. Our results show that the relative threat level of auditory cues from different sources is highly species-dependent, and that caution should be exercised when comparing graded and threshold threat sensitive responses.     

Planning for exercises of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) forensic capabilities

A forensic capability to help identify perpetrators and exclude innocent people should be an integral part of a strategy against terrorist attacks. Exercises have been conducted to increase our preparedness and response capabilities to chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) terrorist attacks. However, incorporating forensic components into these exercises has been deficient. CBRN investigations rely on forensic results, so the need to integrate a forensic component and forensics experts into comprehensive exercises is paramount. This article provides guidance for planning and executing exercises at local, state, federal, and international levels that test the effectiveness of forensic capabilities for CBRN threats. The guidelines presented here apply both to situations where forensics is only a component of a more general exercise and where forensics is the primary focus of the exercise.