Ecological stability,evolutionary stability and the ESS maximum principle

Summary Since the fitness of each individual organism in a biological community may be affected by the strategies of all other individuals in the community, the essential element of a game exists. This game is an evolutionary game where the individual organisms (players) inherit their strategies from continuous play of the game through time. Here, the strategies are assumed to be constants associated with certain adaptive parameters (such as sunlight conversion efficiency for plants or body length in animals) in a set of differential equations which describe the population dynamics of the community. By means of natural selection, these parameters will evolve to a set of strategy values that natural selection, by itself, can no longer modify, i.e. an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS). For a given class of models, it is possible to predict the outcome of this evolutionary process by determining ESSs using an ESS maximum principle. However, heretofore, the proof of this principle has been based on a limited set of conditions. Herein, we generalize the proof by removing certain restrictions and use instead the concept of an ecological stable equilibrium (ESE). Individuals in a biological community will be at an ESE if fixing the strategies used by the individuals results in stable population densities subject to perturbations in those densities. We present both necessary and sufficient conditions for an ESE to exist and then use the ESE concept to provide a very simple proof of the ESS maximum principle (which is a necessary condition for an ESS). A simple example is used to illustrate the difference between a strategy that maximizes fitness and one that satisfies the ESS maximum principle. In general they are different. We also look for ESEs in Lotka—Volterra competition and use the maximum principle to determine when an ESE will be an ESS. Finally, we examine the applicability of these ideas to matrix games.     

Evolutionary Stability for Interactions among Kin under Quantitative Inheritance

The theory of evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS) predicts the long-term evolutionary outcome of frequency-dependent selection by making a number of simplifying assumptions about the genetic basis of inheritance. I use a symmetrized multilocus model of quantitative inheritance without mutation to analyze the results of interactions between pairs of related individuals and compare the equilibria to those found by ESS analysis. It is assumed that the fitness changes due to interactions can be approximated by the exponential of a quadratic surface. The major results are the following. (1) The evolutionarily stable phenotypes found by ESS analysis are always equilibria of the model studied here. (2) When relatives interact, one of the two conditions for stability of equilibria differs between the two models; this can be accounted for by positing that the inclusive fitness function for quantitative characters is slightly different from the inclusive fitness function for characters determined by a single locus. (3) The inclusion of environmental variance will in general change the equilibrium phenotype, but the equilibria of ESS analysis are changed to the same extent by environmental variance. (4) A class of genetically polymorphic equilibria occur, which in the present model are always unstable. These results expand the range of conditions under which one can validly predict the evolution of pairwise interactions using ESS analysis.     

Evolutionary stability in strategic models of single-locus frequency-dependent viability selection

The dynamic stability of an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is analyzed for a diploid species under individual viability selection. An individual's viability depends on the genotypic frequencies at a single autosomal locus through a payoff matrix determined by phenotypic behaviours (i.e. strategies). It is shown that an ESS of this payoff matrix is dynamically stable if there are at most three alleles — an intuitive result that strengthens the importance of static game-theoretic methods in genetic models.Author for correspondence     

Finite populations choose an optimal language

This paper studies the evolution of a proto-language in a finite population under the frequency-dependent Moran process. A proto-language can be seen as a collection of concept-to-sign mappings. An efficient proto-language is a bijective mapping from objects of communication to used signs and vice versa. Based on the comparison of fixation probabilities, a method for deriving conditions of evolutionary stability in a finite population [Nowak et al., 2004. Emergence of cooperation and evolutionary stability in finite populations. Nature 428, 246-650], it is shown that efficient proto-languages are the only strategies that are protected by selection, which means that no mutant strategy can have a fixation probability that is greater than the inverse population size. In passing, the paper provides interesting results about the comparison of fixation probabilities as well as Maynard Smith's notion of evolutionary stability for finite populations [Maynard Smith, 1988. Can a mixed strategy be stable in a finite population? J. Theor. Biol. 130, 247-251] that are generally true for games with a symmetric payoff function.     

Does frequency-dependent selection optimize fitness?

In evolutionary biology, the axiom that natural selection tends ideally to maximize inclusive fitness of the individual or some other suitable quantity is often advanced (Cody, 1974; Maynard Smith, 1978; Krebs & McCleery, 1984; Houston et al., 1988). Moreover, the evolutionists generally distinguish two situations (Dawkins, 1980; Maynard Smith, 1982): one in which fitness is independent of the frequency of the phenotypes present in the population (frequency-independent selection), and one in which it does depend on this frequency (frequency-dependent selection). This led some authors such as Parker (1984), and more recently Parker & Maynard Smith (1990), to consider "a 2-speed optimization": frequency-independent selection should lead to a "simple optimum" at the end of the selective process, since all the individuals should have the same strategy and the mean fitness of the population should be maximized; frequency-dependent selection, formulated in terms of the theory of games, should lead to a "competitive optimum" even though the "evolutionary stable strategy" (or "ESS"; Maynard Smith & Price, 1973) characterizing the equilibrium "is not the strategy that maximizes fitness in a population sense" (Parker & Maynard Smith, 1990: 30). Our aim in this short communication is to criticize the concept of "competitive optimum" by Parker & Maynard Smith, as well as the general ability of natural selection to "maximize fitness", even in "phenotypic models" (Lloyd, 1977). These models, devoid of genetic constraints since each strategist is assumed to reproduce its own kind, are especially suitable for examining the ideal effect of natural selection.     

Discrete polymorphisms due to disruptive selection on a continuous trait--I: the one-locus case

We have investigated, numerically and analytically, long-term evolution under frequency-dependent disruptive selection of a continuous trait varying in a finite range and controlled by one diploid mendelian locus. We found that evolution converges towards a unique long-term equilibrium where only two extreme phenotypes are present with frequencies identical to those of the mixed strategy that would be the unique ESS of the game defined by the basic fitness function of the model. As long as this precise phenotypic composition is preserved, any genetic configuration of the polymorphism is equally acceptable (selectively neutral) at the equilibrium. Thus the number of alleles and their dominance pattern may vary considerably among different equilibrium populations. If genetic expression of the trait is variable but the amount of variability is genetically modifiable, disruptive selection, acting on such modifiers, produces a steady increase of expression variability before the equilibrium is attained. In this case a population at the long-term equilibrium might even be genetically monomorphic, with the phenotypic dimorphism resulting from purely random individual variation.     

Equilibrium structure and stability in a frequency-dependent,two-population diploid model

We investigate the equilibrium structure for an evolutionary genetic model in discrete time involving two monoecious populations subject to intraspecific and interspecific random pairwise interactions. A characterization for local stability of an equilibrium is found, related to the proximity of this equilibrium with evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS). This extends to a multi-population framework a principle initially proposed for single populations, which states that the mean population strategy at a locally stable equilibrium is as close as possible to an ESS.     

Long-term evolution of polygenic traits under frequency-dependent intraspecific competition

We analytically investigate the long-term evolution of a continuously varying quantitative character in a diploid population that is determined additively by a finite number of loci. The trait is under a mixture of frequency-dependent disruptive selection induced by intraspecific competition and frequency-independent stabilizing selection. Moreover, the trait is restricted to a finite range by constraints on the particular loci. Our investigations are based on explicit analytical results (provided by Bürger [2005. A multilocus analysis of intraspecific competition and stabilizing selection on a quantitative trait. J. Math. Biol. 50, 355-396]; Schneider [2006. A multilocus-multiallele analysis of frequency-dependent selection induced by intraspecific competition. J. Math. Biol. 52, 483-523]) on the short-term dynamics under the assumption of linkage equilibrium. We show that the population always reaches a long-term equilibrium (LTE), i.e., an equilibrium that is resistant against perturbations of mutations of sufficiently small effect. In general, several LTEs can coexist. They can be calculated explicitly, and we provide necessary and sufficient conditions for their existence. In the case that more than one LTE exists, we exemplify numerically that the evolutionary outcome depends crucially on the initial genetic architecture, on the joint distribution of mutational effects across loci, and on the particular realization of the mutation process. Therefore, long-term evolution cannot be predicted from the ecology alone. We further show that a partial order exists for the LTEs. The set of LTEs has a 'largest' element, an LTE which is reached during long-term evolution if the effects of the occurring mutant alleles are sufficiently large.     

ESS germination strategies in randomly varying environments. I. Logistic-type models

ESS germination strategies are studied in a model of annual plant population dynamics in a randomly varying environment. The possible strategies are different values of the annual germination fraction G, either constant over time or varying in response to a "cue" correlated with upcoming environmental conditions. The model generalizes D. Cohen's model (1966, J. Theor. Biol. 12, 119-129; 1968, J. Ecol. 56, 219-228) by allowing density-dependent per capita seed yields. ESSs are characterized in terms of the resulting harmonic mean growth rate of population density. The ESS criterion cannot be solved analytically, but qualitative relationships between the value of the ESS and other population parameters are obtained, and environments in which 100% germination is an ESS are identified. Some explicit predictions of the theory are summarized and compared with ideas of M. Westoby (1981, Amer. Nat. 118, 882-885). The results of this study are compared with those of Cohen (op. cit.) in a companion paper.     

Stochastic fluctuations in frequency-dependent selection: a one-locus, two-allele and two-phenotype model

Stochastic fluctuations in a simple frequency-dependent selection model with one-locus, two-alleles and two-phenotypes are investigated. The steady-state statistics of allele frequencies for an interior stable phenotypic equilibrium are shown to be similar to the stochastic fluctuations in standard evolutionary game dynamics [Tao, Y., Cressman, R., 2007. Stochastic fluctuations through intrinsic noise in evolutionary game dynamics. Bull. Math. Biol. 69, 1377-1399]. On the other hand, for an interior stable phenotypic or genotypic equilibrium, our main results show that the deterministic model cannot be used to predict the expectation of phenotypic frequency. The variance of phenotypic frequency for an interior stable genotypic equilibrium is more sensitive to the expected population size than for an interior stable phenotypic equilibrium. Furthermore, the stochastic fluctuations of allele frequency and phenotypic frequency can be considered approximately independent of each other for these genotypic equilibria, but not for phenotypic.     

Evolutionarily stable sets in the single-locus frequency-dependent model of natural selection

Recent developments in the static theory of evolutionarily stable sets (ESSets) are applied to the single-locus frequency-dependent model of natural selection. Particular emphasis is paid to the ESSet properties of the preimage of an ESS (or ESSet) under the genotype-phenotype map. When an ESS is realized in genetic equilibrium with redundancy in a diploid sexual population, the basic problem in biological terms is whether the corresponding set of allele frequencies is an evolutionarily stable set. The interesting question of the dynamic stability of this preimage is also discussed and a geometric condition developed which implies its evolutionary and dynamic stability.The authors appreciate detailed suggestions for improvement made by the reviewers of the original version of this paper. Financial assistance from the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada and from the Hungarian National Scientific Research Fund (OTKA Projects T029320 and T037271) is also gratefully acknowledged.     

COEVOLUTION AS AN EVOLUTIONARY GAME

Coevolution is modeled as a continuous game where the fitness-maximizing strategy of an individual is assumed to be a function of the strategy of other individuals who are also under selection to maximize fitness. An evolutionary stable strategy (ESS) is sought such that no rare alternative strategies can invade the community. The approach can be used to model coevolution because the ESS may be composed of a coalition of more than one strategy. This work, by modeling frequency-dependent selection, extends the approach of Roughgarden (1976) which only considered density-dependent selection. In particular, we show that the coevolutionary model of Rummel and Roughgarden (1985) does contain frequency-dependent selection, and thus, their application of Roughgarden's criterion for evolutionary stability to a model for which it is not applicable leads to the erroneous conclusion that the ecological and evolutionary processes are in conflict. The utility of the game theoretic approach is illustrated by two examples. The first considers an ESS composed of a single strategy, the second an ESS composed of a coalition of two strategies. Evolution occurs on a frequency-dependent adaptive landscape. For this reason, the approach is appropriate for modeling competitive speciation (Rosenzweig, 1978). Also, the game theoretic approach is designed to combine the interplay between the background environment (including the biotic components) and the evolutionary potential of the populations or organisms. The actual application of this theory will require knowledge of both.     

General analysis of frequency-dependent sexual selection at a multi-allelic locus

A general model is analyzed in which arbitrarily frequency-dependent selection acts on one sex of a diploid population with several alleles at one locus, as a result of viability or mating-success differences. The existence of boundary and polymorphic equilibria is examined, and conditions for local stability, internal and external, are obtained. The status of Hardy-Weinberg approximations in studying stability and approach to equilibria is also considered. The general principles are then applied to two specific models: one where genotypes fall into two phenotypic classes; and one with a hierarchy of dominance where viability and sexual selection are opposed. In the latter case it is found that, of all the equilibria present, there is one and only one which could possibly be stable: the existence of a unique globally stable equilibrium might then be inferred.     

Evolutionarily stable strategies in differential and difference equation models

Summary A definition for an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is given which is applicable to a general differential equation population model and two difference equation analogs. With the introduction of a fitnessgenerating function, it is possible to develop necessary conditions for the determination of an ESS for each of these systems. In most situations, an ESS for one system will also be an ESS for the other. Necessary conditions for an ESS are obtained. Under certain restrictions, they are shown to be valid, even under an unstable equilibrium in population density. the results are illustrated with an example which has the same ESS solution whether a continuous or discrete model is used. The behavior of the ESS for the discrete model is then examined under unstable equilibrium conditions in population density.     

Long-term stability from fixation probabilities in finite populations: new perspectives for ESS theory

For mixed strategies in finite populations, long-term stability is defined with respect to the probability of fixation of a mutant. Under weak selection, necessary and sufficient conditions are obtained using a diffusion approximation of the Wright-Fisher model or exact solutions for the Moran model. These differ from the usual ESS conditions if the strategies affect fertility instead of viability, leading to a game matrix depending on the population size, or if the mutant mixed strategy uses a new pure strategy. In this case, the mutant deviation must not exceed some threshold value depending on the population size. In a diploid population, long-term stability may not occur unless there is partial dominance. In the case of sex allocation, continuous stability of an even sex ratio is ascertained. If sex allocation is random, an evolutionary decrease of the variance is predicted.     

Multi-species evolutionary dynamics

Dynamical attainability of an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) through the process of mutations and natural selection has mostly been addressed through the use of the continuously stable strategy (CSS) concept for species evolutionary games in which strategies are drawn from a continuum, and by the adaptive trait dynamics method. We address the issue of dynamical attainability of an ESS in coevolving species through the use of the concept of an ESNIS. It is shown that the definition of an ESNIS coalition for coevolving species is not in general equivalent to other definitions for CSS given in the literature. We show under some additional conditions that, in a dynamic system which involves the strategies of a dimorphic ESNIS coalition and at most two strategies that are not members of ESNIS coalition, the ESNIS coalition will emerge as the winner. In addition an ESNIS will be approached because of the invasion structure of strategies in its neighborhood. This proves that under the above conditions an ESNIS has a better chance of being attained than a strategy coalition which is a CSS. The theory developed is applied to a class of coevolutionary game models with Lotka–Volterra type interactions and we show that for such models, an ESS coalition will be dynamically attainable through mutations and natural selection if the ESS coalition is also an ESNIS coalition.Co-ordinating editor: Metz     

Runaway social games,genetic cycles driven by alternative male and female strategies,and the origin of morphs

Analysis of evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS) and decade-long field studies indicate that two color morphs of female side-blotched lizards exhibit density- and frequency-dependent strategies. Orange females are r-strategists: they lay large clutches of small progeny that are favored at low density. Conversely, yellow females are K-strategists: they lay small clutches of large progeny that are favored when carrying capacity is exceeded and the population crashes to low density. Interactions among three male morphs resembles a rock-paper-scissors (RPS) game. Fertilization success of males depends on frequency of neighboring morphs. Orange males usurp territory from blue neighbors and thereby mate with many females. However, orange males are vulnerable to cuckoldry by sneaky yellow males that mimic females. The yellow strategy is thwarted in turn by the mate-guarding strategy of blue. Sinervo and Lively (1996) developed a simple asexual model of the RPS game. Here, we model the dynamics of male and female morphs with one- and two-locus genetic models. Male and female games were considered in isolation and modeled as games that were genetically coupled by the same locus. Parameters for payoff matrices, which describe the force of frequency-dependent selection in ESS games, were estimated from free-ranging animals. Period of cycles in nature was 5 years for males and 2 years for females. Only the one locus model with three alleles (o, b, y) was capable of driving rapid cycles in male and female games. Furthermore, the o allele must be dominant to the y allele in females. Finally, the amplitude of male cycles was only reproduced in genetic models which allowed for irreversible plasticity of by genotypes, which is consistent with hormonally-induced changes that transform some males with yellow to dark blue. We also critique experimental designs that are necessary to detect density- and frequency-dependent selection in nature. Finally, runaway ESS games are discussed in the context of self-reinforcing genetic correlations that build and promote the formation of morphotypic variation.     

Evolutionarily stable strategies for a finite population and a variable contest size

This paper presents a generalization of Maynard Smith's concept of an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) to cover the cases of a finite population and a variable contest size. Both equilibrium and stability conditions are analysed. The standard Maynard Smith ESS with an infinite population and a contest size of two (pairwise contests) is shown to be a special case of this generalized ESS. An important implication of the generalized ESS is that in finite populations the behaviour of an ESS player is "spiteful", in the sense that an ESS player acts not only to increase his payoff but also to decrease the payoffs of his competitors. The degree of this "spiteful" behaviour is shown to increase with a decrease in the population size, and so is most likely to be observed in small populations. The paper concludes with an extended example: a symmetric two-pure-strategies two-player game for a finite population. It is shown that a mixed strategy ESS is globally stable against invasion by any one type of mutant strategist. The condition for the start of simultaneous invasion by two types of mutant is also given.     

Optimization under frequency-dependent selection

We consider a model of frequency-dependent selection, which we refer to as the Wildcard Model. A variety of more specific models, representing quite diverse biological situations, are covered by the Wildcard Model as particular cases. Two very different particular models that are subsumed by the Wildcard Model are the game theoretically motivated two-phenotype model of Lessard [Lessard, S.,1984. Evolutionary dynamics in frequency-dependent two-phenotype models, Theor. Popul. Biol. 25, 210-234], and the model of selection on a continuous trait due to intraspecific competition of Bürger [Bürger, R., 2005. A multilocus analysis of intraspecific competition and stabilizing selection on a quantitative trait. J. Math. Biol. 50 (4), 355-396] and Schneider [Schneider, K.A., 2006. A multilocus-multiallele analysis of frequency-dependent selection induced by intraspecific competition. J. Math. Biol. 52 (4), 483-523]. Both these models have been shown in the past to have a global Lyapunov function (LF) under appropriate genetic assumptions. We show that (i) the Wildcard Model in continuous time for a single multiallelic locus, or for multiple multiallelic loci in linkage equilibrium, has a global LF, of which the Lessard and Bürger-Scheneider LF are special cases in spite of their widely different biological interpretations; (ii) the LF of the Wildcard Model can be derived from an LF previously identified for a model of density- and frequency-dependent selection due to Lotka-Volterra competition, with one locus, multiple alleles, multiple species and continuous-time dynamics [Matessi, C., Jayakar, S.D., 1981. Coevolution of species in competition: A theoretical study. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA, 78 (2, part2), 1081-1084]. We extend the LF with density and frequency dependence to the multilocus case with linkage-equilibrium dynamics. As a possible application of our results, the optimization principle we established can be used as a tool in the study of long-term evolution of various models subsumed by the Wildcard Model based on explicit short-term dynamics.     

THE EVOLUTION OF STRATEGY VARIATION: WILL AN ESS EVOLVE?

Evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) models are widely viewed as predicting the strategy of an individual that when monomorphic or nearly so prevents a mutant with any other strategy from entering the population. In fact, the prediction of some of these models is ambiguous when the predicted strategy is "mixed", as in the case of a sex ratio, which may be regarded as a mixture of the subtraits "produce a daughter" and "produce a son." Some models predict only that such a mixture be manifested by the population as a whole, that is, as an "evolutionarily stable state"; consequently, strategy monomorphism or polymorphism is consistent with the prediction. The hawk-dove game and the sex-ratio game in a panmictic population are models that make such a "degenerate" prediction. We show here that the incorporation of population finiteness into degenerate models has effects for and against the evolution of a monomorphism (an ESS) that are of equal order in the population size, so that no one effect can be said to predominate. Therefore, we used Monte Carlo simulations to determine the probability that a finite population evolves to an ESS as opposed to a polymorphism. We show that the probability that an ESS will evolve is generally much less than has been reported and that this probability depends on the population size, the type of competition among individuals, and the number of and distribution of strategies in the initial population. We also demonstrate how the strength of natural selection on strategies can increase as population size decreases. This inverse dependency underscores the incorrectness of Fisher's and Wright's assumption that there is just one qualitative relationship between population size and the intensity of natural selection.