Medicine and the call for a moral epistemology

For over a century, medicine has prided itself on its scientific orientation and technological accomplishments. But a conceptual crack lies at the foundation of contemporary medicine, one that may be characterized as a conflict between medicine's scientific epistemology and its moral philosophy. Moral refers to value, and more specifically in the clinical setting, to how facts must be ordered by the values attached to them. A "moral epistemology" seeks to bring these two domains into closer proximity. Clinical facts always reside in a complex array of systems that confer specific and often unique meanings to any finding. An integration of unsteady norms and the intuitive inference arising from the individuality of disease expression require that judgments order facts into their proper placement. And beyond this relaxed view of objectivity, clinical care must also incorporate judgments arising from the patient's (as well as the physician's) social and psychological realms that are removed from scientific concerns. Together, these various kinds of value judgments erect the scaffold of clinical care, in which a more complex moral epistemology emerges. A comprehensive biopsychosocial model of illness and its treatment articulates this integrated orientation, but until medicine embraces a philosophy that legitimates the full integration of facts and values, the appeal of such an approach will remain limited and its application ineffective.     

From applied ethics to empirical ethics to contextual ethics

Bioethics became applied ethics when it was assimilated to moral philosophy. Because deduction is the rationality of moral philosophy, subsuming facts under moral principles to deduce conclusions about what ought to be done became the prescribed reasoning of bioethics, and bioethics became a theory comprised of moral principles. Bioethicists now realize that applied ethics is too abstract and spare to apprehend the specificity, particularity, complexity and contingency of real moral issues. Empirical ethics and contextual ethics are needed to incorporate these features into morality, not just bioethics. The relevant facts and features of problems have to be identified, investigated and framed coherently, and potential resolutions have to be constructed and assessed. Moreover, these tasks are pursued and melded within manifold contexts, for example, families, work and health care systems, as well as societal, economic, legal and political backgrounds and encompassing worldviews. This naturalist orientation and both empirical ethics and contextual ethics require judgment, but how can judgment be rational? Rationality, fortunately, is more expansive than deductive reasoning. Judgment is rational when it emanates from a rational process of deliberation, and a process of deliberation is rational when it uses the resources of non‐formal reason: observation, creative construction, formal and informal reasoning methods and systematic critical assessment. Empirical ethics and contextual ethics recognize that finite, fallible human beings live in complex, dynamic, contingent worlds, and they foster creative, critical deliberation and employ non‐formal reason to make rational moral judgments.     

A Reflection on Moral Distress in Nursing Together With a Current Application of the Concept

The concept of moral distress can be extended from clinical settings to larger environmental concerns affecting health care. Moral distress—a common experience in complex societies—arises when individuals have clear moral judgments about societal practices, but have difficulty in finding a venue in which to express concerns. Since health care is large in scale and climate change is proving to be a major environmental problem, scaling down health care is inevitably a necessary element for mitigating climate change. Because it is extremely challenging to discuss these concerns in health care settings, those concerned about climate change and health care experience distress. This article outlines some philosophical concepts and perspectives that may be useful in mitigating this distress.     

Moral dilemmas in (not) treating patients who feel they are a burden

Working as clinical ethicists in an academic hospital, we find that practitioners tend to take a principle‐based approach to moral dilemmas when it comes to (not) treating patients who feel like a burden, in which respect for autonomy tends to trump other principles. We argue that this approach insufficiently deals with the moral doubts of professionals with regard to feeling that you are a burden as a motive to decline or withdraw from treatment. Neither does it take into adequately account the specific needs of the patient that might underlie their feeling of being a burden to others. We propose a care ethics approach as an alternative. It focuses on being attentive and responsive to the caring needs of those involved in the care process—which can be much more specific than either receiving or withdrawing from treatment. This approach considers these needs in the context of the patient's identity, biography and relationships, and regards autonomy as relational rather than as individual. We illustrate the difference between these two approaches by means of the case of Mrs K. Furthermore, we show that a care ethics approach is in line with interventions that are found to alleviate feeling a burden and maintain that facilitating moral case deliberation among practitioners can supports them in taking a care ethics approach to moral dilemmas in (not) treating patients who feel like a burden.     

El anciano con enfermedad avanzada de órgano. Consideraciones desde la geriatría,la medicina paliativa y la bioética

Objective

To analyze the literature as regards the knowledge, skills and attitudes that these disciplines can provide in improving technical, ethical and human quality health care in the elderly with advanced organ failure, multimorbidity, frailty and progressive dementia.

Material and methods

A comprehensive review focused on available references on the interrelationship between geriatric medicine and palliative medicine, education in bioethics, prognostic tools, functional status, and the humanization of health care.

Results

Advance care planning, comprehensive geriatric assessment, the study of the values of the patient and their introduction in decision-making process, as well as the need to promote moral, care, and healthcare organizational ethics, are essential elements to achieve this objective.

Conclusions

Practitioners and healthcare organizations should seek excellence as a moral requirement. To achieve this, there is a priority to acquire virtues of care and fundamental concepts of geriatric and palliative medicine, assessing functional status, advance care planning and patient/family needs as essential issues to protect, care for and promote them in all care settings.     

Futility and the obligations of physicians

It is becoming increasingly common (at least in the United States) for doctors to appeal to futility judgments as the basis for certain types of clinical decisions, such as the decision to withhold CPR. The clinical use of futility judgments raises two basic questions regarding futility. First, how is the concept of futility to be understood? Secondly, once we have a clearer understanding of futility, what role should determinations of futility play in clinical decision-making? Much of the discussion about the concept of futility has centered on the value-ladenness of futility judgments. I argue that futility determinations need to be distinguished from two other types of value-based judgments, namely, identification of the goals of treatment and treatment decisions based on an assessment of the benefits and burdens of treatment. If this distinction is sound, it suggests a very limited role for futility determinations in clinical decisionmaking, a role which should serve to promote communication between doctor and patient.     

Moral intuition: Its neural substrates and normative significance

Philosophers use the phrase "moral intuition" to describe the appearance in consciousness of moral judgments or assessments without any awareness of having gone through a conscious reasoning process that produces this assessment. This paper investigates the neural substrates of moral intuition. We propose that moral intuitions are part of a larger set of social intuitions that guide us through complex, highly uncertain and rapidly changing social interactions. Such intuitions are shaped by learning. The neural substrates for moral intuition include fronto-insular, cingulate, and orbito-frontal cortices and associated subcortical structure such as the septum, basil ganglia and amygdala. Understanding the role of these structures undercuts many philosophical doctrines concerning the status of moral intuitions, but vindicates the claim that they can sometimes play a legitimate role in moral decision-making.     

The other side of trust in health care: prescribing drugs with the potential for abuse

Defining a nonpaternalistic yet achievable form of trust in medicine in an era of simultaneous patient empowerment and institutional control has been and remains an important task of bioethics. The 'crisis of trust' in medicine has been viewed mainly as the problem of getting patients to trust their health care providers, especially physicians. However, since paradigmatic cases of trust are mutual, bioethicists must pay more attention to physician trust in patients. A physician's view of the reasonableness of trust in a particular patient is affected not just by his or her relationship with that patient, but also by what is going on institutionally, professionally, legally and politically with regard to a given treatment or intervention. Since general moral principles are insufficient in determining the moral value and reasonableness of trust in particular instances, I discuss in detail the role of trust and distrust in the specific case of treating patients with medications implicated in drug abuse. I conclude that it is important to become aware, first, of the clinical significance of physician trust and distrust in patients, and second, of the many factors which inform both of these moral attitudes. These two claims together suggest that a central, but overlooked, virtue of medical practice is reflective, context-responsive trust in patients.     

COMPETENCE,PRACTICAL RATIONALITY AND WHAT A PATIENT VALUES

According to the principle of patient autonomy, patients have the right to be self‐determining in decisions about their own medical care, which includes the right to refuse treatment. However, a treatment refusal may legitimately be overridden in cases where the decision is judged to be incompetent. It has recently been proposed that in assessments of competence, attention should be paid to the evaluative judgments that guide patients' treatment decisions. In this paper I examine this claim in light of theories of practical rationality, focusing on the difficult case of an anorexic person who is judged to be competent and refuses treatment, thereby putting themselves at risk of serious harm. I argue that the standard criteria for competence assess whether a treatment decision satisfies the goals of practical decision‐making, and that this same criterion can be applied to a patient's decision‐guiding commitments. As a consequence I propose that a particular understanding of practical rationality offers a theoretical framework for justifying involuntary treatment in the anorexia case.     

Self and Illness: Changing Relationships in Response to Life in the Community Following Prolonged Institutionalisation

Increasingly since the 1950s mentally ill people in the Western world have been removed from institutional care. In this paper I am concerned primarily with the response of psychiatric patients to living in a ‘normal’ community environment, in particular the extent to which they are able to assume new social roles and identities after long periods of institutional care. I conclude that despite persistent mental illness, deinstitutionalised patients have developed new roles and new identities, a new sense of independence, new coping abilities and a capacity to articulate future goals and desires. The findings are drawn from two and a half years fieldwork in an Australian capital city, where a group of long‐stay psychiatric in‐patients, who would not normally be considered for discharge, were given the opportunity to live in mainstream society. This accompanied the reduction of in‐patient beds and the eventual closure of a large psychiatric hospital as it amalgamated with another hospital nearby.     

Do the evolutionary origins of our moral beliefs undermine moral knowledge?

According to some recent arguments, (Joyce in The evolution of morality, MIT Press, Cambridge, 2006; Ruse and Wilson in Conceptual issues in evolutionary biology, MIT Press, Cambridge, 1995; Street in Philos Studies 127: 109–166, 2006) if our moral beliefs are products of natural selection, then we do not have moral knowledge. In defense of this inference, its proponents argue that natural selection is a process that fails to track moral facts. In this paper, I argue that our having moral knowledge is consistent with, (a) the hypothesis that our moral beliefs are products of natural selection, and (b) the claim (or a certain interpretation of the claim) that natural selection fails to track moral facts. I also argue that natural selection is a process that could track moral facts, albeit imperfectly. I do not argue that we do have moral knowledge. I argue instead that Darwinian considerations provide us with no reason to doubt that we do, and with some reasons to suppose that we might.     

Anti-infective therapy at the end of life: ethical decision-making in hospice-eligible patients

Clear guidelines addressing the ethically appropriate use of anti-infectives in the setting of hospice care do not exist. There is lack of understanding about key treatment decisions related to infection treatment for patients who are eligible for hospice care. Ethical concerns about anti-infective use at the end of life include: (1) delaying transition to hospice, (2) prolonging a dying process, (3) prescribing regimens incongruent with a short life expectancy and goals of care, (4) increasing the reservoir of potential resistant pathogens, (5) placing unreasonable costs on a capitated hospice system. Although anti-infectives are thought to be relatively safe, they can place a burden on patients and be inconsistent to particular care plans. The current complex, and at times fragmented, medical care often fails to address these issues in decision-making. In many ways, the ethics governing the end of life decisions related to dialysis, hydration/nutrition, and hypercalcemia parallel those of anti-infectives. In this article we articulate important elements in ethical decision-making in the application of anti-infectives for patients who are eligible for hospice care, and we point to the need for prospective studies to help refine particular guidelines in these cases.     

Patients' rights and physician accountability: problems with PSROs

Professional Standards Review Organizations (PSRO's) were established by federal legislation in 1972 to provide a mechanism for review, by locally-established groups of physicians, of the quality and appropriateness of care received by patients under Medicare or Medicaid. The author explores four normative problems associated with PSRO's: the problem of bureaucracy incapable of responding to individual needs; the problem of cost consciousness overcoming the commitment to quality; the problem of interfering with other societal values and goals; and the problem of value judgments being made by professionals rather than patients.     

Mental Health: The Search for a Definition

Various attempts to define the concept of “mental health” are examined. Value judgments permeate much mental health literature. Their use militates against obtaining an objective definition, capable of universal application. The acceptance of a definition including a value judgment implies taking an attitude toward a particular society and its social ideals.Present limits of competence only allow us to describe “mental health” conceptually. Such “untechnical” proposals are liable to be confused with “technical” (“scientific”) propositions. Multiple criteria are likely to be helpful in improving our concept of “mental health”.The intrusion of morals into the world of health is discussed as part of the contemporary intellectual dilemma of determined human behaviour versus human responsibility and the reality of moral values.It is suggested that “mental health” might consist simply of an individual''s possession of insight into his own personality, combined with an honest recognition and acceptance of his condition.     

Medicine, public health, and the ethics of rationing.

Physicians, like all citizens, have communal and private identities, each attending various associated roles and fulfilling diverse obligations. In light of these dual personae, we seek a moral philosophy which encompasses the responsibility for providing care to the patient and at the same time acknowledges the physician's role of arbiter of distributed care. In the traditional doctor/patient relationship, rationing, the admission that health resources are limited and must be distributed equitably by universally accepted criteria, is essentially ignored. When the physician assumes a population-based system of ethics to optimize care for all patients within a group, rationing is embraced as the realistic admission that any social action resides within boundaries--in this case health care resources--and that such restraints have economic consequences that present ethical choices. A common ground to accommodate these dual allegiances is offered by communitarian philosophy, whose outline and applicability is presented here as an alternative to the apparent moral opposition of optimized individual care and the requirement of community-wide distribution of limited health resources.     

Blame the Patient,Blame the Doctor or Blame the System? A Meta-Synthesis of Qualitative Studies of Patient Safety in Primary Care

Objective

Studies of patient safety in health care have traditionally focused on hospital medicine. However, recent years have seen more research located in primary care settings which have different features compared to secondary care. This study set out to synthesize published qualitative research concerning patient safety in primary care in order to build a conceptual model.

Method

Meta-ethnography, an interpretive synthesis method whereby third order interpretations are produced that best describe the groups of findings contained in the reports of primary studies.

Results

Forty-eight studies were included as 5 discrete subsets where the findings were translated into one another: patients’ perspectives of safety, staff perspectives of safety, medication safety, systems or organisational issues and the primary/secondary care interface. The studies were focused predominantly on issues seen to either improve or compromise patient safety. These issues related to the characteristics or behaviour of patients, staff or clinical systems and interactions between staff, patients and staff, or people and systems. Electronic health records, protocols and guidelines could be seen to both degrade and improve patient safety in different circumstances. A conceptual reading of the studies pointed to patient safety as a subjective feeling or judgement grounded in moral views and with potentially hidden psychological consequences affecting care processes and relationships. The main threats to safety appeared to derive from ‘grand’ systems issues, for example involving service accessibility, resources or working hours which may not be amenable to effective intervention by individual practices or health workers, especially in the context of a public health system.

Conclusion

Overall, the findings underline the human elements in patient safety primary health care. The key to patient safety lies in effective face-to-face communication between patients and health care staff or between the different staff involved in the care of an individual patient. Electronic systems can compromise safety when they override the opportunities for face-to-face communication. The circumstances under which guidelines or protocols are seen to either compromise or improve patient safety needs further investigation.     

ARE MORAL PHILOSOPHERS MORAL EXPERTS?

In this paper I examine the question of whether ethicists are moral experts. I call people moral experts if their moral judgments are correct with high probability and for the right reasons. I defend three theses, while developing a version of the coherence theory of moral justification based on the differences between moral and nonmoral experience: The answer to the question of whether there are moral experts depends on the answer to the question of how to justify moral judgments. Deductivism and the coherence theory both provide some support for the opinion that moral experts exist in some way. I maintain – within the framework of a certain kind of coherence theory – that moral philosophers are ‘semi‐experts’.     

Pentecostal peacefulness: virtue ethics and the reception of theology in Nepal

The anthropology of Christianity has struggled to theorize the place of theology in Christian social life. Drawing on Alasdair MacIntyre's account of virtue ethics, in particular his concepts of practice, narrative, and moral tradition, I explore the reception of Pentecostal theology in the Nepali city of Bhaktapur. I show how local Christians have drawn on Pentecostal eschatology to develop a pacifistic ethics, allowing them to negotiate local social and religious conflicts. The belief that Christ has decisively defeated evil spirits allows local Christians to detach themselves from cycles of aggression connected with witchcraft accusations, providing a space of security in which to cultivate distinctive practices of care. Connecting this local theology with a wider tradition in Pentecostal moral thought, I argue that MacIntyre's virtue ethics provides a powerful tool for interpreting the relationship between local circumstance and extra‐local theology, and for studying cross‐cultural patterns of theological reception.     

Health care and the principle of fair equality of opportunity: a report from The Netherlands

In The Netherlands, the public funding of a number of health care services is controversial. What can we learn from this about the moral concerns that underlie these judgements? And, if there is anything to learn, can we use this improved understanding to scrutinise the adequacy of particular decisions concerning the public funding of health care services? In the present paper, I will analyse three cases: corrective surgey, In Vitro Fertilisation and liver transplantation. I will summarise the arguments that have been used to support or to challenge the public funding of these services. I will then assess the merits of Daniels’fair equality of opportunity account of justice in health care. Can this account improve our understanding of the moral concerns underlying our judgements about the public funding of these services? Can it serve to scrutinise the adequacy of particular decisions that are made concerning the public funding of health care services? My answer to both questions will be a qualified yes. Daniels’account can provide guidance, but not because we can deductively infer from it what is right and what is wrong. Instead, I will argue for a more casuistic use of the concept of fair equality of opportunity.