The evolutionary psychology of sexual harassment in organizations

We explore the value of theory developed in the field of evolutionary psychology for predicting and explaining patterns of sociosexual interaction between men and women in the workplace. In particular, we focus on assessing the value of this theoretical framework for increasing our understanding of the behavioral phenomenon of sexual harassment in organizations. To do this, we develop hypotheses based on a consideration of the evolved psychological mechanisms which have been proposed by evolutionary psychologists to underly human sexual behavior. We then review the existing literature on sociosexual behavior and sexual harassment within the workplace as a preliminary test of predictions concerning the expected profile, reaction, and motivation of recipients and initiators of sexual advances in the workplace. We also analyze the expected effect of novel aspects of the organizational environment on overt sexual behavior. This theory predicts, for example, that most sexual harassment will be initiated by men, and that young, single women will be the most frequent victims. This theory also predicts that women will generally experience a more negative reaction than men to sexual advances in the workplace, but that this emotional response will be mediated by other factors such as the profile of the initiator. The available data generally confirm these and other related predictions. Moreover, these results are quite consistent with other studies of the evolutionary psychology of human sexuality. We discuss the implications for theory in this area, and suggest some potentially fruitful avenues for original empirical research on human sexual behavior, inside or outside the workplace.     

The Evolution of Human Brain Development

The human brain is a large and complex organ, setting us apart from other primates. It allows us to exhibit highly sophisticated cognitive and behavioral abilities. Therefore, our brain??s size and morphology are defining features of our species and our fossil ancestors and relatives. Endocasts, i.e., internal casts of the bony braincase, provide evidence about brain size and morphology in fossils. Based on endocasts, we know that our ancestors?? brains increased overall in size and underwent several reorganizational changes. However, it is difficult to relate evolutionary changes of size and shape of endocasts to evolutionary changes of cognition and behavior. We argue here that an understanding of the tempo and mode of brain development can help to interpret the evolution of our brain and the associated cognitive and behavioral changes. To do so, we review structural brain development, cognitive development, and ontogenetic changes of endocranial size and shape in living individuals on the one hand, and ontogenetic patterns (size increase and shape change) in fossil hominins and their evolutionary change on the other hand. Tightly integrating our knowledge on these different levels will be the key of future work on the evolution of human brain development.     

Insights into the Evolutionary Features of Human Neurodegenerative Diseases

Comparative analyses between human disease and non-disease genes are of great interest in understanding human disease gene evolution. However, the progression of neurodegenerative diseases (NDD) involving amyloid formation in specific brain regions is still unknown. Therefore, in this study, we mainly focused our analysis on the evolutionary features of human NDD genes with respect to non-disease genes. Here, we observed that human NDD genes are evolutionarily conserved relative to non-disease genes. To elucidate the conserved nature of NDD genes, we incorporated the evolutionary attributes like gene expression level, number of regulatory miRNAs, protein connectivity, intrinsic disorder content and relative aggregation propensity in our analysis. Our studies demonstrate that NDD genes have higher gene expression levels in favor of their lower evolutionary rates. Additionally, we observed that NDD genes have higher number of different regulatory miRNAs target sites and also have higher interaction partners than the non-disease genes. Moreover, miRNA targeted genes are known to have higher disorder content. In contrast, our analysis exclusively established that NDD genes have lower disorder content. In favor of our analysis, we found that NDD gene encoded proteins are enriched with multi interface hubs (party hubs) with lower disorder contents. Since, proteins with higher disorder content need to adapt special structure to reduce their aggregation propensity, NDD proteins found to have elevated relative aggregation propensity (RAP) in support of their lower disorder content. Finally, our categorical regression analysis confirmed the underlined relative dominance of protein connectivity, 3′UTR length, RAP, nature of hubs (singlish/multi interface) and disorder content for such evolutionary rates variation between human NDD genes and non-disease genes.     

Toward an adequate mathematical model of mental space: conscious/unconscious dynamics on m-adic trees

We try to perform geometrization of cognitive science and psychology by representing information states of cognitive systems by points of mental space given by a hierarchic m-adic tree. Associations are represented by balls and ideas by collections of balls. We consider dynamics of ideas based on lifting of dynamics of mental points. We apply our dynamical model for modeling of flows of unconscious and conscious information in the human brain. In a series of models, Models 1–3, we consider cognitive systems with increasing complexity of psychological behavior determined by structure of flows of associations and ideas.     

社会认知神经科学的取向与研究进展

社会认知神经科学是社会心理学和认知神经科学相结合的新兴多学科研究领域,其强调在社会、认知与脑神经等三个层面的交互作用上去理解心理现象。前几年主要是对刻板印象、态度与态度改变、他人知觉、自我认知以及情绪与认知交互作用等方面进行了深入研究,其主要范式是应用认知神经科学的方法来验证社会心理学在这些范围内上的各种不同的理论观点,当前的研究主要集中在知觉和再认的社会标记、社会判断和归因、评价调节知觉和经验以及社会交互作用等传统的社会心理学方面,并取得了突破性进展。展望未来的研究,其将在系统准则研究发展的基础上,把当今的社会认知研究与认知神经科学在理论和方法论上整合起来,为揭示人类高级社会心理现象的神经基础,开辟一条崭新的研究道路。     

The evolutionary psychology of obsessive-compulsive disorder: the role of cognitive metarepresentation

Repetitive unpleasant thoughts and ritualized behaviors are the key features of obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD). The classical neuroethological models of OCD rely largely on behavioral similarities between animal stereotypies and human compulsive rituals and are unable to account for the cognitive component of OCD. The cognitive symptoms of OCD need to be addressed in an evolutionary psychological context that incorporates information about human brain evolution. OCD can be understood as an extreme on a continuum of evolved harm-avoidance strategies. A pathological exaggeration of our evolved capacity to cognitively represent future scenarios, including imagined consequences of our own thoughts and actions (metarepresentation), may be part of the set of evolved psychological mechanisms contributing to the psychopathology of OCD. The costly side of the adaptive ability to anticipate future needs or threats could be that etiologically heterogeneous affections of the underlying striatal-frontal brain circuits may render an individual vulnerable to develop OCD.     

The use and abuse of Darwinian psychology: Its impact on attempts to determine the evolutionary basis of human rape

This paper evaluates the impact of the recent theoretical shift to Darwinian psychology on attempts to determine the evolutionary basis of human rape. The first step in this evaluation is a summary of the debate over whether human rape is an adaptation or a by-product of other evolved differences between men and women as it was presented in a pre-Darwinian psychological framework. These early evolutionary explanations are then contrasted with more recent works addressing the same issue from the perspective of Darwinian psychology. It is concluded that while the new approach may have helped generate new predictions, it has also led to the unwarranted exclusion of relevant data, led to questionable interpretations of new types of data, introduced ambiguous jargon, and potentially jeopardized the testability of certain evolutionary explanations. The root of most of these problems is suggested to exist, not in the principles of Darwinian psychology, but in the exaggeration of the differences between Darwinian psychology and earlier evolutionary approaches.     

Toward an adequate mathematical model of mental space: Conscious/unconscious dynamics on m-adic trees

We try to perform geometrization of cognitive science and psychology by representing information states of cognitive systems by points of mental space given by a hierarchic m-adic tree. Associations are represented by balls and ideas by collections of balls. We consider dynamics of ideas based on lifting of dynamics of mental points. We apply our dynamical model for modeling of flows of unconscious and conscious information in the human brain. In a series of models, Models 1–3, we consider cognitive systems with increasing complexity of psychological behavior determined by structure of flows of associations and ideas.     

Developmental objections to evolutionary modularity

Evolutionary psychologists argue that selective pressures in our ancestral environment yield a highly specialized set of modular cognitive capacities. However, recent papers in developmental psychology and neuroscience claim that evolutionary accounts of modularity are incompatible with the flexibility and plasticity of the developing brain. Instead, they propose cortical and neuronal brain structures are fixed through interactions with our developmental environment. Buller and Gray Hardcastle contend that evolutionary accounts of cognitive development are unacceptably rigid in light of evidence of cortical plasticity. The developing structure of the brain is both too random and too sensitive to external stimuli to be the product of a fixed genetic mechanism. They also claim that the complexity of the human brain cannot be explained in terms of our meager genetic endowment. There simply are not enough genes to program the intricate neuronal structures that are essential to cognition. I argue that neither of these arguments are persuasive. Small numbers of genes can function to determine diverse phenotypical outcomes through evolutionarily selected developmental systems. Similarly, theories of modularity do not rule out the possibility that innate cognitive systems exploit environmental regularities to guide the developing structure of the brain. Consequently, the anti-adaptionist consequences of these positions should be rejected.     

Beyond the DP/DSS controversy

Paul Turke's “Which humans behave adaptively, and why does it matter?” shows, if he we are to take him as being representative of “Darwinian social science” in general, that his school of thought has moved surprisingly close to that of its “Darwinian psychology” critics in accepting the importance if not the primacy of the psychological level of explanation in applying evolutionary theory to human behavior. Disagreements continue over whether the adaptiveness of current behavior should be viewed as an occasionally interesting question because of the light it can shed on evolved psychological mechanisms, or whether, as Turke maintains, it is the central question for human sociobiology. In any event, the “vertically integrated approach,” utterly ignored by Turke, incorporates Darwinian Psychology and is far more powerful than is Turke's approach in explicating the relationship between genes and culture, thereby rendering the current debate pointless.     

Deconstructing memory in Drosophila

Unlike most organ systems, which have evolved to maintain homeostasis, the brain has been selected to sense and adapt to environmental stimuli by constantly altering interactions in a gene network that functions within a larger neural network. This unique feature of the central nervous system provides a remarkable plasticity of behavior, but also makes experimental investigations challenging. Each experimental intervention ramifies through both gene and neural networks, resulting in unpredicted and sometimes confusing phenotypic adaptations. Experimental dissection of mechanisms underlying behavioral plasticity ultimately must accomplish an integration across many levels of biological organization, including genetic pathways acting within individual neurons, neural network interactions which feed back to gene function, and phenotypic observations at the behavioral level. This dissection will be more easily accomplished for model systems such as Drosophila, which, compared with mammals, have relatively simple and manipulable nervous systems and genomes. The evolutionary conservation of behavioral phenotype and the underlying gene function ensures that much of what we learn in such model systems will be relevant to human cognition. In this essay, we have not attempted to review the entire Drosophila memory field. Instead, we have tried to discuss particular findings that provide some level of intellectual synthesis across three levels of biological organization: behavior, neural circuitry and biochemical pathways. We have attempted to use this integrative approach to evaluate distinct mechanistic hypotheses, and to propose critical experiments that will advance this field.     

Splendours and miseries of the brain

In this speculative essay, I examine two evolutionary developments underlying the enormous success of the human brain: its capacity to acquire knowledge and its variability across individuals. A feature of an efficient knowledge-acquiring system is, I believe, its capacity to abstract and to formulate ideals. Both attributes carry with them a clash between experience of the particular and what the brain has developed from experience of the many. Both therefore can lead to much disappointment in our daily lives. This disappointment is heightened by the fact that both abstraction and ideals are subject to variability in time within an individual and between individuals. Variability, which is a cherished source for evolutionary selection, can also be an isolating and individualizing feature in society. Thus the very features of the human brain which underlie our enormous evolutionary success can also be a major source of our misery.     

Human brain glycogen phosphorylase. Cloning, sequence analysis, chromosomal mapping, tissue expression, and comparison with the human liver and muscle isozymes

We have cloned the cDNA encoding a new isozyme of glycogen phosphorylase (1,4-D-glucan:orthosphosphate D-glucosyltransferase, EC 2.4.1.1) from a cDNA library prepared from a human brain astrocytoma cell line. Blot-hybridization analysis reveals that this message is preferentially expressed in human brain, but is also found at a low level in human fetal liver and adult liver and muscle tissues. Although previous studies have suggested that the major isozyme of phosphorylase found in all fetal tissues is the brain type, our data show that the predominant mRNA in fetal liver (24-week gestation) is the adult liver form. The protein sequence deduced from the nucleotide sequence of the brain phosphorylase cDNA is 862 amino acids long compared with 846 and 841 amino acids for the liver and muscle isozymes, respectively; the greater length of brain phosphorylase is entirely due to an extension at the far C-terminal portion of the protein. The muscle and brain isozymes share greater identity with regard to nucleotide and deduced amino acid sequences, codon usage, and nucleotide composition than either do with the liver sequence, suggesting a closer evolutionary relationship between them. Spot blot hybridization of the brain phosphorylase cDNA to laser-sorted human chromosome fractions, and Southern blot analysis of hamster/human hybrid cell line DNA reveals that the exact homolog of the newly cloned cDNA maps to chromosome 20, but that a slightly less homologous gene is found on chromosome 10 as well. The liver and muscle genes have previously been localized to chromosomes 14 and 11, respectively. This suggests that the phosphorylase genes evolved by duplication and translocation of a common ancestral gene, leading to divergence of elements controlling gene expression and of structural features of the phosphorylase proteins that confer tissue-specific functional properties.     

Toward an evolutionary forensic psychology

Most theories of crime have not explored intensively biological and especially evolutionary explanations for criminal behavior. Ellis presents a valuable new perspective that proposes that attention to physiological mechanisms shaped by evolutionary forces can provide insights into the causes of crime and sex differences in the patterns of crime. We discuss other theories and research relevant to Ellis' theory. We also propose that an evolutionary psychological perspective of crime will help to invigorate research and lead to a better understanding of criminality. An integrated evolutionary forensic psychology will help to explain sources of conflict between individuals, situations in which conflict leads to victimization, and victim defenses and coping mechanisms.     

Evolutionary psychology’s moral implications

In this paper, I critically summarize John Cartwrtight’s Evolution and Human Behavior and evaluate what he says about certain moral implications of Darwinian views of human behavior. He takes a Darwinism-doesn’t-rock-the-boat approach and argues that Darwinism, even if it is allied with evolutionary psychology, does not give us reason to be worried about the alterability of our behavior, nor does it give us reason to think that we may have to change our ordinary practices and views concerning free-will and moral responsibility. In response, I contend that Darwinism, when it is allied with evolutionary psychology, makes for a more potent cocktail than Cartwright suspects.     

Integrating the Multiple Biological Causes of Human Behavior

I introduce a range of examples of different causal hypotheses about human mate selection. The hypotheses I focus on come from evolutionary psychology, fluctuating asymmetry research and chemical signaling research. I argue that a major obstacle facing an integrated biology of human behavior is the lack of a causal framework that shows how multiple proximate causal mechanisms can act together to produce components of our behavior.     

How cooperation became the norm

Most of the contributions to Cooperation and Its Evolution grapple with the distinctive challenges presented by the project of explaining human sociality. Many of these puzzles have a ‘chicken and egg’ character: our virtually unparalleled capacity for large-scale cooperation is the product of psychological, behavioural, and demographic changes in our recent evolutionary history, and these changes are linked by complex patterns of reciprocal dependence. There is much we do not yet understand about the timing of these changes, and about the order in which different aspects of human social psychology (co-)evolved. In this review essay, I discuss four such puzzles the volume raises. These concern punishment and norm-psychology, moral judgement and the moral emotions, hierarchy and top-down coercion, and property rights and legal systems.     

It takes two: sexual strategies and game theory

David Buss’s Sexual Strategies Theory is one of the major evolutionary psychological research programmes, but, as I try to show in this paper, its theoretical and empirical foundations cannot yet be seen to be fully compelling. This lack of cogency comes about due to Buss’s failure to attend to the interactive nature of his subject matter, which leads him to overlook two classic and well known issues of game theoretic and evolutionary biological analysis. Firstly, Buss pays insufficient attention to the fact that, since mate choice is a cooperative decision, what is adaptive for the two sexes individually is irrelevant to the evolutionary explanation of our sexual strategies; instead, all that matters is what is adaptive given the choices made by the other sex. Secondly, Buss does not pay enough attention to the difference between polymorphic and monomorphic evolutionarily stable states in his attempt to empirically confirm his theory. Because of this, the data he presents and analyses are unable to show that natural selection is the most important element in the explanation of the origins of our sexual strategies. In this way, I try to make clear that, at least as things stand now, Buss has failed to provide compelling grounds for thinking that Sexual Strategies Theory can make a major contribution to human psychology.