Monitoring the Early Signs of Cognitive Decline in Elderly by Computer Games: An MRI Study

BackgroundIt is anticipated that current and future preventive therapies will likely be more effective in the early stages of dementia, when everyday functioning is not affected. Accordingly the early identification of people at risk is particularly important. In most cases, when subjects visit an expert and are examined using neuropsychological tests, the disease has already been developed. Contrary to this cognitive games are played by healthy, well functioning elderly people, subjects who should be monitored for early signs. Further advantages of cognitive games are their accessibility and their cost-effectiveness.PurposeThe aim of the investigation was to show that computer games can help to identify those who are at risk. In order to validate games analysis was completed which measured the correlations between results of the ''Find the Pairs'' memory game and the volumes of the temporal brain regions previously found to be good predictors of later cognitive decline.ResultsThere was a correlation between the number of attempts and the time required to complete the memory game and the volume of the entorhinal cortex, the temporal pole, and the hippocampus. There was also a correlation between the results of the Paired Associates Learning (PAL) test and the memory game.ConclusionsThe results gathered support the initial hypothesis that healthy elderly subjects achieving lower scores in the memory game have increased level of atrophy in the temporal brain structures and showed a decreased performance in the PAL test. Based on these results it can be concluded that memory games may be useful in early screening for cognitive decline.     

An Application of Evolutionary Game Theory to Social Dilemmas: The Traveler's Dilemma and the Minimum Effort Coordination Game

The Traveler''s Dilemma game and the Minimum Effort Coordination game are two social dilemmas that have attracted considerable attention due to the fact that the predictions of classical game theory are at odds with the results found when the games are studied experimentally. Moreover, a direct application of deterministic evolutionary game theory, as embodied in the replicator dynamics, to these games does not explain the observed behavior. In this work, we formulate natural variants of these two games as smoothed continuous-strategy games. We study the evolutionary dynamics of these continuous-strategy games, both analytically and through agent-based simulations, and show that the behavior predicted theoretically is in accord with that observed experimentally. Thus, these variants of the Traveler''s Dilemma and the Minimum Effort Coordination games provide a simple resolution of the paradoxical behavior associated with the original games.     

Metabolic responses to Wii Fit™ video games at different game levels

The Wii Fit? is a form of interactive gaming designed to elicit health and fitness benefits to replace sedentary gaming. This study was designed to determine the effectiveness of Wii Fit? fitness games. The purpose of the study was to determine the %VO2max and energy expenditure from different Wii Fit? games at different levels including the step and hula games. Eight healthy young women completed a preliminary trial to determine VO2max and later played the Wii Fit? during 2 separate counterbalanced trials. During each session, subjects played levels of Wii Fit? games for 10 minutes each level. One session involved beginning and intermediate hula, and the other session involved beginning and intermediate steps. The VO2 was measured continuously via metabolic cart, and rating of perceived exertion (RPE) was assessed at the end of each game level. The lowest %VO2max, kcal·min, and RPE occurred during the beginning step game and the highest values occurred during the intermediate hula game. Respiratory exchange ratio was significantly higher in the intermediate hula than beginning hula game but was not significantly different between step game levels. The intermediate hula and step games produced the greatest energy expenditure with an equivalent effect of a walking speed of >5.63 km·h (>3.5 miles·h). This is the first study to determine the percentage of VO2max and caloric expenditure elicited by different Wii Fit? video games at different game levels in adults. Findings suggest that the Wii Fit? can be used as an effective activity for promoting physical health in this population.     

Models of cooperation based on the Prisoner's Dilemma and the Snowdrift game

Understanding the mechanisms that can lead to the evolution of cooperation through natural selection is a core problem in biology. Among the various attempts at constructing a theory of cooperation, game theory has played a central role. Here, we review models of cooperation that are based on two simple games: the Prisoner's Dilemma, and the Snowdrift game. Both games are two‐person games with two strategies, to cooperate and to defect, and both games are social dilemmas. In social dilemmas, cooperation is prone to exploitation by defectors, and the average payoff in populations at evolutionary equilibrium is lower than it would be in populations consisting of only cooperators. The difference between the games is that cooperation is not maintained in the Prisoner's Dilemma, but persists in the Snowdrift game at an intermediate frequency. As a consequence, insights gained from studying extensions of the two games differ substantially. We review the most salient results obtained from extensions such as iteration, spatial structure, continuously variable cooperative investments, and multi‐person interactions. Bridging the gap between theoretical and empirical research is one of the main challenges for future studies of cooperation, and we conclude by pointing out a number of promising natural systems in which the theory can be tested experimentally.     

Inferring Mathematical Equations Using Crowdsourcing

Crowdsourcing, understood as outsourcing work to a large network of people in the form of an open call, has been utilized successfully many times, including a very interesting concept involving the implementation of computer games with the objective of solving a scientific problem by employing users to play a game—so-called crowdsourced serious games. Our main objective was to verify whether such an approach could be successfully applied to the discovery of mathematical equations that explain experimental data gathered during the observation of a given dynamic system. Moreover, we wanted to compare it with an approach based on artificial intelligence that uses symbolic regression to find such formulae automatically. To achieve this, we designed and implemented an Internet game in which players attempt to design a spaceship representing an equation that models the observed system. The game was designed while considering that it should be easy to use for people without strong mathematical backgrounds. Moreover, we tried to make use of the collective intelligence observed in crowdsourced systems by enabling many players to collaborate on a single solution. The idea was tested on several hundred players playing almost 10,000 games and conducting a user opinion survey. The results prove that the proposed solution has very high potential. The function generated during weeklong tests was almost as precise as the analytical solution of the model of the system and, up to a certain complexity level of the formulae, it explained data better than the solution generated automatically by Eureqa, the leading software application for the implementation of symbolic regression. Moreover, we observed benefits of using crowdsourcing; the chain of consecutive solutions that led to the best solution was obtained by the continuous collaboration of several players.     

Group-size diversity in public goods games

Public goods games are models of social dilemmas where cooperators pay a cost for the production of a public good while defectors free ride on the contributions of cooperators. In the traditional framework of evolutionary game theory, the payoffs of cooperators and defectors result from interactions in groups formed by binomial sampling from an infinite population. Despite empirical evidence showing that group-size distributions in nature are highly heterogeneous, most models of social evolution assume that the group size is constant. In this article, I remove this assumption and explore the effects of having random group sizes on the evolutionary dynamics of public goods games. By a straightforward application of Jensen's inequality, I show that the outcome of general nonlinear public goods games depends not only on the average group size but also on the variance of the group-size distribution. This general result is illustrated with two nonlinear public goods games (the public goods game with discounting or synergy and the N-person volunteer's dilemma) and three different group-size distributions (Poisson, geometric, and Waring). The results suggest that failing to acknowledge the natural variation of group sizes can lead to an underestimation of the actual level of cooperation exhibited in evolving populations.     

Brain Training Game Boosts Executive Functions,Working Memory and Processing Speed in the Young Adults: A Randomized Controlled Trial

Background

Do brain training games work? The beneficial effects of brain training games are expected to transfer to other cognitive functions. Yet in all honesty, beneficial transfer effects of the commercial brain training games in young adults have little scientific basis. Here we investigated the impact of the brain training game (Brain Age) on a wide range of cognitive functions in young adults.

Methods

We conducted a double-blind (de facto masking) randomized controlled trial using a popular brain training game (Brain Age) and a popular puzzle game (Tetris). Thirty-two volunteers were recruited through an advertisement in the local newspaper and randomly assigned to either of two game groups (Brain Age, Tetris). Participants in both the Brain Age and the Tetris groups played their game for about 15 minutes per day, at least 5 days per week, for 4 weeks. Measures of the cognitive functions were conducted before and after training. Measures of the cognitive functions fell into eight categories (fluid intelligence, executive function, working memory, short-term memory, attention, processing speed, visual ability, and reading ability).

Results and Discussion

Our results showed that commercial brain training game improves executive functions, working memory, and processing speed in young adults. Moreover, the popular puzzle game can engender improvement attention and visuo-spatial ability compared to playing the brain training game. The present study showed the scientific evidence which the brain training game had the beneficial effects on cognitive functions (executive functions, working memory and processing speed) in the healthy young adults.

Conclusions

Our results do not indicate that everyone should play brain training games. However, the commercial brain training game might be a simple and convenient means to improve some cognitive functions. We believe that our findings are highly relevant to applications in educational and clinical fields.

Trial Registration

UMIN Clinical Trial Registry 000005618.     

Direct Sum Matrix Game with Prisoner's Dilemma and Snowdrift Game

A direct sum form is proposed for constructing a composite game from two games, prisoner''s dilemma and snowdrift game. This kind of direct sum form game is called a multiple roles game. The replicator dynamics of the multiple roles game with will-mixed populations is explored. The dynamical behaviors on square lattice are investigated by numerical simulation. It is found that the dynamical behaviors of population on square lattice depend on the mixing proportion of the two simple games. Mixing SD activities to pure PD population inhibits the proportion of cooperators in PD, and mixing PD activities to pure SD population stimulates the proportion of cooperators in SD. Besides spatial reciprocity, our results show that there are roles reciprocities between different types of individuals.     

Zero-knowledge cooperation in dilemma games

We consider a very simple adaptive rule that induces cooperative behavior in a large class of dilemma games. The rule has a Pavlovian flavor and can be described as win-continue, lose-reverse. It assumes no knowledge about the underlying structure of the environment (the "rules of the game") and requires very little cognitive effort. Both features make it an appealing candidate for explaining the emergence of cooperative behavior in non-human species.     

Unpredictability induced by unfocused games in evolutionary game dynamics

Evolutionary game theory is a basis of replicator systems and has applications ranging from animal behavior and human language to ecosystems and other hierarchical network systems. Most studies in evolutionary game dynamics have focused on a single game, but, in many situations, we see that many games are played simultaneously. We construct a replicator equation with plural games by assuming that a reward of a player is a simple summation of the reward of each game. Even if the numbers of the strategies of the games are different, its dynamics can be described in one replicator equation. We here show that when players play several games at the same time, the fate of a single game cannot be determined without knowing the structures of the whole other games. The most absorbing fact is that even if a single game has a ESS (evolutionary stable strategy), the relative frequencies of strategies in the game does not always converge to the ESS point when other games are played simultaneously.     

Brain training game improves executive functions and processing speed in the elderly: a randomized controlled trial

Background

The beneficial effects of brain training games are expected to transfer to other cognitive functions, but these beneficial effects are poorly understood. Here we investigate the impact of the brain training game (Brain Age) on cognitive functions in the elderly.

Methods and Results

Thirty-two elderly volunteers were recruited through an advertisement in the local newspaper and randomly assigned to either of two game groups (Brain Age, Tetris). This study was completed by 14 of the 16 members in the Brain Age group and 14 of the 16 members in the Tetris group. To maximize the benefit of the interventions, all participants were non-gamers who reported playing less than one hour of video games per week over the past 2 years. Participants in both the Brain Age and the Tetris groups played their game for about 15 minutes per day, at least 5 days per week, for 4 weeks. Each group played for a total of about 20 days. Measures of the cognitive functions were conducted before and after training. Measures of the cognitive functions fell into four categories (global cognitive status, executive functions, attention, and processing speed). Results showed that the effects of the brain training game were transferred to executive functions and to processing speed. However, the brain training game showed no transfer effect on any global cognitive status nor attention.

Conclusions

Our results showed that playing Brain Age for 4 weeks could lead to improve cognitive functions (executive functions and processing speed) in the elderly. This result indicated that there is a possibility which the elderly could improve executive functions and processing speed in short term training. The results need replication in large samples. Long-term effects and relevance for every-day functioning remain uncertain as yet.

Trial Registration

UMIN Clinical Trial Registry 000002825     

Exploring the effects of working for endowments on behaviour in standard economic games

In recent years, significant advances have been made in understanding the adaptive (ultimate) and mechanistic (proximate) explanations for the evolution and maintenance of cooperation. Studies of cooperative behaviour in humans invariably use economic games. These games have provided important insights into the mechanisms that maintain economic and social cooperation in our species. However, they usually rely on the division of monetary tokens which are given to participants by the investigator. The extent to which behaviour in such games may reflect behaviour in the real world of biological markets--where money must be earned and behavioural strategies incur real costs and benefits--is unclear. To provide new data on the potential scale of this problem, we investigated whether people behaved differently in two standard economic games (public goods game and dictator game) when they had to earn their monetary endowments through the completion of dull or physically demanding tasks, as compared with simply being given the endowment. The requirement for endowments to be 'earned' through labour did not affect behaviour in the dictator game. However, the requirement to complete a dull task reduced cooperation in the public goods game among the subset of participants who were not familiar with game theory. There has been some effort to test whether the conclusions drawn from standard, token-based cooperation games adequately reflect cooperative behaviour 'in the wild.' However, given the almost total reliance on such games to study cooperation, more exploration of this issue would be welcome. Our data are not unduly worrying, but they do suggest that further exploration is needed if we are to make general inferences about human behaviour from the results of structured economic games.     

Evolutionary dynamics of continuous strategy games on graphs and social networks under weak selection

Understanding the emergence of cooperation among selfish individuals has been a long-standing puzzle, which has been studied by a variety of game models. Most previous studies presumed that interactions between individuals are discrete, but it seems unrealistic in real systems. Recently, there are increasing interests in studying game models with a continuous strategy space. Existing research work on continuous strategy games mainly focuses on well-mixed populations. Especially, little theoretical work has been conducted on their evolutionary dynamics in a structured population. In the previous work (Zhong et al., BioSystems, 2012), we showed that under strong selection, continuous and discrete strategies have significantly different equilibrium and game dynamics in spatially structured populations. In this paper, we further study evolutionary dynamics of continuous strategy games under weak selection in structured populations. By using the fixation probability based stochastic dynamics, we derive exact conditions of natural selection favoring cooperation for the death–birth updating scheme. We also present a network gain decomposition of the game equilibrium, which might provide a new view of the network reciprocity in a quantitative way. Finally, we make a detailed comparison between games using discrete and continuous strategies. As compared to the former, we find that for the latter (i) the same selection conditions are derived for the general 2 × 2 game; especially, the rule b/c > k in a simplified Prisoner's Dilemma is valid as well; however, (ii) for a coordination game, interestingly, the risk-dominant strategy is disfavored. Numerical simulations have also been conducted to validate our results.     

GROUP FORMATION AND THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIALITY

In spite of its intrinsic evolutionary instability, altruistic behavior in social groups is widespread in nature, spanning from organisms endowed with complex cognitive abilities to microbial populations. In this study, we show that if social individuals have an enhanced tendency to form groups and fitness increases with group cohesion, sociality can evolve and be maintained in the absence of actively assortative mechanisms such as kin recognition or nepotism toward other carriers of the social gene. When explicitly taken into account in a game‐theoretical framework, the process of group formation qualitatively changes the evolutionary dynamics with respect to games played in groups of constant size and equal grouping tendencies. The evolutionary consequences of the rules underpinning the group size distribution are discussed for a simple model of microbial aggregation by differential attachment, indicating a way to the evolution of sociality bereft of peer recognition.     

Concurrent Bursty Behavior of Social Sensors in Sporting Events

The advent of social media expands our ability to transmit information and connect with others instantly, which enables us to behave as “social sensors.” Here, we studied concurrent bursty behavior of Twitter users during major sporting events to determine their function as social sensors. We show that the degree of concurrent bursts in tweets (posts) and retweets (re-posts) works as a strong indicator of winning or losing a game. More specifically, our simple tweet analysis of Japanese professional baseball games in 2013 revealed that social sensors can immediately react to positive and negative events through bursts of tweets, but that positive events are more likely to induce a subsequent burst of retweets. We confirm that these findings also hold true for tweets related to Major League Baseball games in 2015. Furthermore, we demonstrate active interactions among social sensors by constructing retweet networks during a baseball game. The resulting networks commonly exhibited user clusters depending on the baseball team, with a scale-free connectedness that is indicative of a substantial difference in user popularity as an information source. While previous studies have mainly focused on bursts of tweets as a simple indicator of a real-world event, the temporal correlation between tweets and retweets implies unique aspects of social sensors, offering new insights into human behavior in a highly connected world.     

Evaluation of Public Engagement Activities to Promote Science in a Zoo Environment

Scientists are increasing their efforts to promote public engagement with their science, but the efficacy of the methods used is often not scientifically evaluated. Here, we designed, installed and evaluated the educational impact of interactive games on touchscreens at two primate research centres based in zoo environments. The games were designed to promote interest in and understanding of primates and comparative psychology, as a scaffold towards interest in science more generally and with the intention of targeting younger individuals (under 16''s). We used systematic observational techniques and questionnaires to assess the impact of the games on zoo visitors. The games facilitated increased interest in psychology and science in zoo visitors, and changed the knowledge of visitors, through demonstration of learning about specific scientific findings nested within the games. The impact of such devices was greatest on younger individuals (under 16''s) as they were significantly more likely to engage with the games. On the whole, therefore, this study demonstrates that interactive devices can be successful educational tools, and adds to the growing body of evidence that conducting research on public view in zoos can have a tangible impact on public engagement with science.     

Adaptive group coordination and role differentiation

Many real world situations (potluck dinners, academic departments, sports teams, corporate divisions, committees, seminar classes, etc.) involve actors adjusting their contributions in order to achieve a mutually satisfactory group goal, a win-win result. However, the majority of human group research has involved situations where groups perform poorly because task constraints promote either individual maximization behavior or diffusion of responsibility, and even successful tasks generally involve the propagation of one correct solution through a group. Here we introduce a group task that requires complementary actions among participants in order to reach a shared goal. Without communication, group members submit numbers in an attempt to collectively sum to a randomly selected target number. After receiving group feedback, members adjust their submitted numbers until the target number is reached. For all groups, performance improves with task experience, and group reactivity decreases over rounds. Our empirical results provide evidence for adaptive coordination in human groups, and as the coordination costs increase with group size, large groups adapt through spontaneous role differentiation and self-consistency among members. We suggest several agent-based models with different rules for agent reactions, and we show that the empirical results are best fit by a flexible, adaptive agent strategy in which agents decrease their reactions when the group feedback changes. The task offers a simple experimental platform for studying the general problem of group coordination while maximizing group returns, and we distinguish the task from several games in behavioral game theory.     

An Extended N-Player Network Game and Simulation of Four Investment Strategies on a Complex Innovation Network

As computer science and complex network theory develop, non-cooperative games and their formation and application on complex networks have been important research topics. In the inter-firm innovation network, it is a typical game behavior for firms to invest in their alliance partners. Accounting for the possibility that firms can be resource constrained, this paper analyzes a coordination game using the Nash bargaining solution as allocation rules between firms in an inter-firm innovation network. We build an extended inter-firm n-player game based on nonidealized conditions, describe four investment strategies and simulate the strategies on an inter-firm innovation network in order to compare their performance. By analyzing the results of our experiments, we find that our proposed greedy strategy is the best-performing in most situations. We hope this study provides a theoretical insight into how firms make investment decisions.     

A dynamic over games drives selfish agents to win–win outcomes

Understanding human institutions, animal cultures and other social systems requires flexible formalisms that describe how their members change them from within. We introduce a framework for modelling how agents change the games they participate in. We contrast this between-game ‘institutional evolution’ with the more familiar within-game ‘behavioural evolution’. We model institutional change by following small numbers of persistent agents as they select and play a changing series of games. Starting from an initial game, a group of agents trace trajectories through game space by navigating to increasingly preferable games until they converge on ‘attractor’ games. Agents use their ‘institutional preferences'' for game features (such as stability, fairness and efficiency) to choose between neighbouring games. We use this framework to pose a pressing question: what kinds of games does institutional evolution select for; what is in the attractors? After computing institutional change trajectories over the two-player space, we find that attractors have disproportionately fair outcomes, even though the agents who produce them are strictly self-interested and indifferent to fairness. This seems to occur because game fairness co-occurs with the self-serving features these agents do actually prefer. We thus present institutional evolution as a mechanism for encouraging the spontaneous emergence of cooperation among small groups of inherently selfish agents, without space, reputation, repetition, or other more familiar mechanisms. Game space trajectories provide a flexible, testable formalism for modelling the interdependencies of behavioural and institutional evolutionary processes, as well as a mechanism for the evolution of cooperation.     

Parrondo’s Games Based on Complex Networks and the Paradoxical Effect

Parrondo’s games were first constructed using a simple tossing scenario, which demonstrates the following paradoxical situation: in sequences of games, a winning expectation may be obtained by playing the games in a random order, although each game (game A or game B) in the sequence may result in losing when played individually. The available Parrondo’s games based on the spatial niche (the neighboring environment) are applied in the regular networks. The neighbors of each node are the same in the regular graphs, whereas they are different in the complex networks. Here, Parrondo’s model based on complex networks is proposed, and a structure of game B applied in arbitrary topologies is constructed. The results confirm that Parrondo’s paradox occurs. Moreover, the size of the region of the parameter space that elicits Parrondo’s paradox depends on the heterogeneity of the degree distributions of the networks. The higher heterogeneity yields a larger region of the parameter space where the strong paradox occurs. In addition, we use scale-free networks to show that the network size has no significant influence on the region of the parameter space where the strong or weak Parrondo’s paradox occurs. The region of the parameter space where the strong Parrondo’s paradox occurs reduces slightly when the average degree of the network increases.