Index to the Journal of Russian and East European Psychology Volume 31 (January-December 1993)

Over the past twenty years there have been so many newly revealed facts and theoretical developments in the field of the psychology of emotions that, as C. Izard [14] remarked, one would be fully justified in speaking about a revolution in this area. While the motivating role of emotion remains unquestioned (and, furthermore, confirmed by the new data), the earlier idea that emotions have disorganizing and disadaptive effects has been replaced with the notion that emotions are a major adaptive mechanism. Thus, C. Izard asserts, "A fundamental principle of human behavior is that emotions energize and organize perception, thinking, and action" [14, p. 25]. All emotions, he says, have adaptive functions that developed over the course of evolution.     

Ostracism as a social and biological phenomenon: An introduction

Ostracism refers to the general process of rejection and exclusion, observed in human groups and in many other species. It occurs as “shunning” in small homogenous groups like the Amish or as rejection among children. Ostracism in various forms is also deeply embedded in our own legal tradition, and is used in the formal and informal legal procedures of other cultures, used to maintain order, to punish deviance, and to increase social cohesion. Hence, it is plausible to hypothesize that human ostracism may have physiological substrates or biological functions in addition to cultural, moral, and legal dimensions. Biological research shows that human emotions (anger, fear, reassurance, self-confidence) involve responses of the limbic system as well as ideas or thoughts in the cerebral cortex and that human behavior continually integrates biological and cultural factors. The legal system expresses and channels human behavior. For this reason laws should be more effective if their functions complement (rather than ignore) the function of the behavior being regulated. To look at law as it affects human behavior in the light of the life sciences does not imply the intention of finding a universally valid “natural law,” akin to theological or ideological doctrine. On the contrary, we find that humans can form radically different social systems due to the plasticity of their behavior. However, an interdisciplinary analysis of ostracism as a common area of behavior, combining biology, law, and the social sciences can produce insights that none of these fields alone can provide. Such an approach should increase our understanding of human nature and the functions of law.     

Human Rights Reasoning and Medical Law: A Sceptical Essay

I am sceptical as to the contribution that human rights can make to our evaluation of medical law. I will argue here that viewing medical law through a human rights framework provides no greater clarity, insight or focus. If anything, human rights reasoning clouds any bioethical or evaluative analysis. In Section 1 of this article, I outline the general structure of human rights reasoning. I will describe human rights reasoning as (a) reasoning from rights that each person has ‘by virtue of their humanity’, (b) reasoning from rights that provide ‘hard to defeat’ reasons for action and (c) reasoning from abstract norms to specified duties. I will then argue in Section 2 that, unless we (a) re‐conceive of human rights as narrow categories of liberties, it becomes (b) necessary for our human rights reasoning to gauge the normative force of each claim or liberty. When we apply this approach to disputes in medical law, we (in the best case scenario) end up (c) ‘looking straight through’ the human right to the (disagreement about) values and features that each person has by virtue of their humanity.     

cDNA representational difference analysis of the deltamelthrin-resistant and -susceptible populations in diamondback moth (Plutella xylostella L.)

Abstract:  The improved cDNA representational difference analysis was preliminarily used to analyse the genetic differences between the deltamethrin-susceptible and -resistant strain of the diamondback moth. The driver amplicon is the cDNA from the susceptible strain while the tester amplicon is from the resistant strain. After four rounds of subtractive hybridization, we obtained one different product, the size of which was about 200 bp. Comparisons between our sequencing results and data in GenBank show that there is one sequence which has a relatively high homology to the ubiquitin gene, but there are no reports indicating that its upregulated expression is correlated with insecticide resistance. Hence further studies are warranted.     

IS IT TIME FOR BIOETHICS TO GO EMPIRICAL?

Observers who note the increasing popularity of bioethics discussions often complain that the social sciences are poorly represented in discussions about things like abortion and stem-cell research. Critics say that bioethicists should be incorporating the methods and findings of social scientists, and should move towards making the discipline more empirically oriented. This way, critics argue, bioethics will remain relevant, and truly reflect the needs of actual people. Such recommendations ignore the diversity of viewpoints in bioethics, however. Bioethics can gain much from the methods and findings from ethnographies and similar research. But it is misleading to suggest that bioethicists are unaware of this potential benefit. Not only that, bioethicists are justified in having doubts about the utility of the social science approach in some cases. This is not because there is some inherent superiority in non-empirical approaches to moral argument. Rather, the doubts concern the nature of the facts that the sciences would provide. Perhaps the larger point is that disagreements about the relationship between facts and normative arguments should be seen as part of the normal inquiry in bioethics, not evidence that reform is needed.     

Episodic memory and common sense: how far apart?

Research has revealed facts about human memory in general and episodic memory in particular that deviate from both common sense and previously accepted ideas. This paper discusses some of these deviations in light of the proceedings of The Royal Society's Discussion Meeting on episodic memory. Retrieval processes play a more critical role in memory than commonly assumed; people can remember events that never happened; and conscious thoughts about one's personal past can take two distinct forms-'autonoetic' remembering and 'noetic' knowing. The serial-dependent-independent (SPI) model of the relations among episodic, semantic and perceptual memory systems accounts for a number of puzzling phenomena, such as some amnesic patients' preserved recognition memory and their ability to learn new semantic facts, and holds that episodic remembering of perceptual information can occur only by virtue of its mediation through semantic memory. Although common sense endows many animals with the ability to remember their past experiences, as yet there is no evidence that humanlike episodic memory-defined in terms of subjective time, self, and autonoetic awareness-is present in any other species.     

Humanity and natural selection

In some modern biological images of the human species human action is reduced to a consequence of natural selection, that is, to a tendency to maximize fitness. The precise nature and scope of the theory of natural selection are, however, undecided; yet in evolutionary interpretations of human society neodarwinism is often treated as a dogma, and natural selection sometimes becomes a transcendental force. There are instances of changes in gene frequencies, in human as well as other populations, that conform with neodarwinian (“socio-biological”) presumptions; but it is not known to what extent the evolution of the human (or other) species has been due to such changes. There is still less ground for explaining the diversity of human societies in this way.The image-makers also make illegitimate use of the comparative method: familiar features of human conduct, such as favoring kin and reciprocation, are used in accounts of animal behavior, and are then rediscovered among human beings; during this two-way transfer, the meanings of words are changed; altruism, egoism, and deceit lose their moral content, and the complex human idea of kin is reduced to a measure of genetical similarity.The intention of neodarwinists is to reveal a human nature determined by evolutionary processes, but one of the most important distinctive features of our species is the plasticity of our behavior, attitudes, and intentions. Moreover, if neodarwinian premises are accepted, to speak of intention is misleading, and there are no independent criteria by which neodarwinian (or any other) arguments may be judged: all one does is regulated by the need to maximise one's inclusive fitness. Hence much writing in this field wavers between an uncompromising reduction of human action to considerations of population genetics, on the one hand, and a recognition that there are other kinds of authentic knowledge about human beings, on the other. Among the latter is historical knowledge.The neodarwinian images of humanity emphasize human depravity. In their misanthropy they reflect the outlook of conservative pessimists who have influenced European thought for two and a half millennia, and whose views imply that most attempts to improve the human condition are against nature and so must fail.An alternative, which corresponds to the facts of everyday life and of history, is that human beings are capable of rejecting what is conventionally held to be inevitable, and of determining their destiny by conscious, deliberate action.     

Information,Representation, Biology

Biosemiotics contains at its core fundamental issues of naturalism: are normative properties, such as meaning, referent, and others, part of the natural world, or are they part of a second, intentional and normative, metaphysical realm — one that might be analogically applied to natural phenomena, such as within biological cells — but a realm that nevertheless remains metaphysically distinct? Such issues are manifestations of a fundamental metaphysical split between a “natural” realm and a realm of normativity and intentionality. This problematic metaphysical split derives from conceptual problems originating with the Pre-Socratics; transcending that split requires correcting those problems. In particular, transcending that split requires a model of metaphysical emergence, and, in particular, normative emergence. This paper will limn that argument regarding metaphysical emergence, but focus most strongly on an overview of a model of normative, representational emergence that overcomes that metaphysical diremption.     

Probabilistic approach to obtain hit-size effectiveness functions which relate microdosimetry and radiobiology

A probabilistic approach has been developed to relate microdosimetry, biological effects, and radiation quality. It is used to derive, and subsequently apply, microdosimetry-based cellular response functions for different biological end points of relevance for radiological protection. The approach makes use of measurable microdosimetry spectra and avoids assumptions concerning the course of mechanisms of radiation action. Instead, it postulates a response function that is, and behaves like, the cumulative probability that a subcellular target structure will respond to a specific target-averaged ionization density. Statistical distributions are applied and their parameters are evaluated to characterize the randomness involved in the localization of sensitive sites and in the reactivity of the whole sensitive structure. The resulting response functions can be used for prediction of the effects of low-level radiation. Such predictions for some selected effects of a stochastic nature (mutagenesis, chromosome abnormalities, etc.) are presented as relative biological effectiveness values based on low doses of radiations with a wide range of linear energy transfer and compared with various quality factor specifications. Cellular response relationships, termed hit-size effectiveness functions, can also be applied directly in radiation protection metrology by incorporating them into the software used to process the readings of microdosimetric spectrometers. The derivation of the functions, rather than their uses in radiation protection, is the principal subject of this report.     

WHAT PUTS THE ‘YUCK’ IN THE YUCK FACTOR?

The advances in biotechnology have given rise to a discussion concerning the strong emotional reaction expressed by the public towards biotechnological innovations. This reaction has been named the ‘Yuck‐factor’ by several theorists of bioethics. Leon Kass, the former chairman of the President's council on bioethics, has appraised this public reaction as ‘an emotional expression of deep wisdom, beyond reason's power fully to articulate it’. 1 Similar arguments have been forwarded by the Catholic Church, several Protestant denominations and the Pro‐Life movement. Several bioethicists have, however, opposed the idea of a disgust‐based morality. 2 Recent findings in cognitive science support the view that the strong negative emotions people often experience when faced with biotechnological ideas are not expressions of inner wisdom. The negative emotions may rather be the result of a cognitive violation the biotechnological innovations easily cause. Due to their evolutionary background, people have certain automatic and quick cognitive tendencies routinely used for categorizing and reasoning about nature, usually termed ‘folk biology’. Biotechnological processes like hybridisation and cloning clearly violate several of the cognitive rules people naturally apply for the explanation and categorization of their natural environment. As the cognitive tendencies routinely applied to the explanation of biological world are violated, an emotional response of fear, disgust and of something unnatural being underway is easily provoked. It is suggested in this paper that the reason behind the Yuck‐factor is not a deep inner wisdom, but a violation of natural human cognitive tendencies concerning the biological world.     

A Review of Nature-Inspired Algorithms

The study of bionics bridges the functions, biological structures and organizational principles found in nature with our modern technologies, and numerous mathematical and metaheuristic algorithms have been developed along with the knowledge transferring process from the lifeforms to the human technologies. Output of bionics study includes not only physical products, but also various computation methods that can be applied in different areas. People have learnt from biological systems and structures to design and develop a number of different kinds of optimisation algorithms that have been widely used in both theoretical study and practical applications. In this paper, a number of selected nature-inspired algorithms are systematically reviewed and analyzed. Though the paper is mainly focused on the original principle behind each of the algorithm, their applications are also discussed.     

Anticipatory Functions, Digital-Analog Forms and Biosemiotics: Integrating the Tools to Model Information and Normativity in Autonomous Biological Agents

We argue that living systems process information such that functionality emerges in them on a continuous basis. We then provide a framework that can explain and model the normativity of biological functionality. In addition we offer an explanation of the anticipatory nature of functionality within our overall approach. We adopt a Peircean approach to Biosemiotics, and a dynamical approach to Digital-Analog relations and to the interplay between different levels of functionality in autonomous systems, taking an integrative approach. We then apply the underlying biosemiotic logic to a particular biological system, giving a model of the B-Cell Receptor signaling system, in order to demonstrate how biosemiotic concepts can be used to build an account of biological information and functionality. Next we show how this framework can be used to explain and model more complex aspects of biological normativity, for example, how cross-talk between different signaling pathways can be avoided. Overall, we describe an integrated theoretical framework for the emergence of normative functions and, consequently, for the way information is transduced across several interconnected organizational levels in an autonomous system, and we demonstrate how this can be applied in real biological phenomena. Our aim is to open the way towards realistic tools for the modeling of information and normativity in autonomous biological agents.     

植物NAC转录因子的研究进展

NAC转录因子是特异存在于植物中的具有多种生物功能的新型转录因子.其家族成员N端含有保守NAC结构域(约150个氨基酸),C端为高度变异的转录激活区.NAC基因表达特异,功能涉及植物生长发育、激素调控和胁迫响应等重要方面.现综述植物NAC转录因子的基本结构、生物功能及新型膜相关转录因子的研究.     

ON THE MORALITY OF GUINEA‐PIG RECRUITMENT

Can it be wrong to conduct medical research on human subjects even with their informed consent and even when the transaction between the subjects and researchers is expected to be mutually beneficial? This question is especially pressing today in light of the rise of a semi‐professional class of ‘guinea pigs’– human research subjects that sell researchers a right of access to their bodies in exchange for money. Can these exchanges be morally problematic even when they are consensual and mutually beneficial? I argue that there are two general kinds of concern one can have about such transactions – concerns about the nature of what is sold and concerns about the conditions in which the selling occurs. The former involves worries about degradation and the possible wrongness of selling a right of access to one's body. These worries, I argue, are not very serious. The latter involves worries about coercion, exploitation, and undue influence – about how, by virtue of their ignorance, impulsiveness, or desperation, guinea pigs can be taken advantage of by medical researchers. These worries are quite serious but I argue that, at least in cases where the exchange between guinea pigs and researchers is consensual and mutually beneficial, they do not raise insurmountable moral problems.     

WHAT ‘EMPIRICAL TURN IN BIOETHICS’?

Uncertainty as to how we should articulate empirical data and normative reasoning seems to underlie most difficulties regarding the ‘empirical turn’ in bioethics. This article examines three different ways in which we could understand ‘empirical turn’. Using real facts in normative reasoning is trivial and would not represent a ‘turn’. Becoming an empirical discipline through a shift to the social and neurosciences would be a turn away from normative thinking, which we should not take. Conducting empirical research to inform normative reasoning is the usual meaning given to the term ‘empirical turn’. In this sense, however, the turn is incomplete. Bioethics has imported methodological tools from empirical disciplines, but too often it has not imported the standards to which researchers in these disciplines are held. Integrating empirical and normative approaches also represents true added difficulties. Addressing these issues from the standpoint of debates on the fact‐value distinction can cloud very real methodological concerns by displacing the debate to a level of abstraction where they need not be apparent. Ideally, empirical research in bioethics should meet standards for empirical and normative validity similar to those used in the source disciplines for these methods, and articulate these aspects clearly and appropriately. More modestly, criteria to ensure that none of these standards are completely left aside would improve the quality of empirical bioethics research and partly clear the air of critiques addressing its theoretical justification, when its rigour in the particularly difficult context of interdisciplinarity is what should be at stake.     

Normative Ethics Does Not Need a Foundation: It Needs More Science

The impact of science on ethics forms since long the subject of intense debate. Although there is a growing consensus that science can describe morality and explain its evolutionary origins, there is less consensus about the ability of science to provide input to the normative domain of ethics. Whereas defenders of a scientific normative ethics appeal to naturalism, its critics either see the naturalistic fallacy committed or argue that the relevance of science to normative ethics remains undemonstrated. In this paper, we argue that current scientific normative ethicists commit no fallacy, that criticisms of scientific ethics contradict each other, and that scientific insights are relevant to normative inquiries by informing ethics about the options open to the ethical debate. Moreover, when conceiving normative ethics as being a nonfoundational ethics, science can be used to evaluate every possible norm. This stands in contrast to foundational ethics in which some norms remain beyond scientific inquiry. Finally, we state that a difference in conception of normative ethics underlies the disagreement between proponents and opponents of a scientific ethics. Our argument is based on and preceded by a reconsideration of the notions naturalistic fallacy and foundational ethics. This argument differs from previous work in scientific ethics: whereas before the philosophical project of naturalizing the normative has been stressed, here we focus on concrete consequences of biological findings for normative decisions or on the day-to-day normative relevance of these scientific insights.     

植物NAC转录因子的结构功能及其表达调控研究进展

NAC转录因子是近十年来新发现的具有多种生物功能的植物特异转录因子。该家族转录因子的共同特点是其N端为保守的大约150个氨基酸的NAC结构域,C端为高度变异的转录调控区。它们在植物生长发育、激素调节和抵抗逆境等方面发挥着重要的作用。本文主要就植物NAC转录因子的基本结构特征、生物学功能、表达调控及其最新研究进展进行综述。