Cognitive neuroscience and the law

Advances in cognitive neuroscience now allow us to use physiological techniques to measure and assess mental states under a growing set of circumstances. The implication of this growing ability has not been lost on the western legal community. If biologists can accurately measure mental state, then legal conflicts that turn on the true mental states of individuals might well be resolvable with techniques ranging from electroencephalography to functional magnetic resonance imaging. Therefore, legal practitioners have increasingly sought to employ cognitive neuroscientific methods and data as evidence to influence legal proceedings. This poses a risk, because these scientific methodologies have largely been designed and validated for experimental use only. Their subsequent use in legal proceedings is an application for which they were not intended, and for which those methods are inadequately tested. We propose that neurobiologists, who might inadvertently contribute to this situation, should be aware of how their papers will be read by the legal community and should play a more active role in educating and engaging with that community.     

The law and neuroscience

Some of the implications for law of recent discoveries in neuroscience are considered in a new program established by the MacArthur Foundation. A group of neuroscientists, lawyers, philosophers, and jurists are examining issues in criminal law and, in particular, problems in responsibility and prediction and problems in legal decision making.     

Unformed minds: Juveniles,neuroscience, and the law

Recently, the question of adolescent culpability has been brought before the Supreme Court of the United States for reconsideration. Neuroscience, adolescent advocates claim, is teaching us that young people cannot be found fully responsible for their actions. The reason: their brains are not fully formed. Here I consider the history of the use of scientific evidence in the courtroom, a number of adolescent murder cases, and the data now emerging from neuroscience, and argue that when it comes to brains, judges, just like the rest of us, are unnecessarily impressed. Ultimately, how we determine culpability should rest on normative and ethical considerations rather than on scientific ones.     

For Parkin,it's not all or nothing

Mitochondria accumulate damage over time, which can lead to impairment of cell function by excessive production of reactive oxygen species. The PINK1/Parkin pathway therefore monitors the quality of the mitochondrial population and stimulates the elimination of depolarized organelles by mitophagy. In this issue of The EMBO Journal, McLelland et al ( 2014 ) show that this pathway also responds to mild oxidative damage, and instead of inducing mitophagy, allows oxidized proteins to be sorted into mitochondria‐derived vesicles (MDVs) that are transported to lysosomes.     

How neuroscience might advance the law

This essay discusses the strengths and limitations of the new, growing field of law and biology and suggests that advancements in neuroscience can help to bolster that field. It also briefly discusses some ways that neuroscience can help to improve the workings of law more generally.     

A cognitive neuroscience framework for understanding causal reasoning and the law

Over the past couple of decades, there have been great developments in the fields of psychology and cognitive neuroscience that have allowed the advancement of our understanding of how people make judgements about causality in several domains. We provide a review of some of the contemporary psychological models of causal thinking that are directly relevant to legal reasoning. In addition, we cover some exciting new research using advanced neuroimaging techniques that have helped to uncover the underlying neural signatures of complex causal reasoning. Through the use of functional imaging, we provide a first-hand look at how the brain responds to evidence that is either consistent or inconsistent with one's beliefs and expectations. Based on the data covered in this review, we propose some ideas for how the effectiveness of causal reasoning, especially as it pertains to legal decision-making, may be facilitated.     

Life,the universe and everything

The Formal Darwinism project probes the connections between the dynamics of natural selection and the design of organisms. Here, I explain why this work should be of interest to philosophers, arguing that it is the natural development in a long-running scholarly enquiry into the meaning of life. I then review some of my own work which has applied the tools of Formal Darwinism to address issues concerning the units of adaptation in social evolution, leading to a deeper understanding of the adaptation of individual organisms. Finally, I sketch some directions Formal Darwinism to explore beyond the biological sciences, with a focus upon cosmology.     

Connecting neuroscience and law: anticipatory discourse and the role of sociotechnical imaginaries

In recent years, attempts have increasingly been made to connect neuroscience and law. Scientists and lawyers are imagining and actively fostering the realization of futures in which neuroscience will play a prominent role in the activity of courts. In this article I take these debates as my empirical object. I trace the emergence of neurolegal discourse, explore its focus on free will and lie detection, and show how expectations about the potential role neuroscience might play in the law are being embedded in new research programs and funding streams. In so doing, I analyze the role of particular “sociotechnical imaginaries” in stimulating, directing and restricting neurolegal discourse and highlight the ways in which new visions of law, science and scientists are produced in the process. Sociotechnical imaginaries are shown to be salient in structuring anticipatory discourse, and represent a key target for social scientific intervention in such debates.     

Vitamin E, antioxidant and nothing more

All of the naturally occurring vitamin E forms, as well as those of synthetic all-rac-alpha-tocopherol, have relatively similar antioxidant properties, so why does the body prefer alpha-tocopherol as its unique form of vitamin E? We propose the hypothesis that all of the observations concerning the in vivo mechanism of action of alpha-tocopherol result from its role as a potent lipid-soluble antioxidant. The purpose of this review then is to describe the evidence for alpha-tocopherol's in vivo function and to make the claim that alpha-tocopherol's major vitamin function, if not only function, is that of a peroxyl radical scavenger. The importance of this function is to maintain the integrity of long-chain polyunsaturated fatty acids in the membranes of cells and thus maintain their bioactivity. That is to say that these bioactive lipids are important signaling molecules and that changes in their amounts, or in their loss due to oxidation, are the key cellular events that are responded to by cells. The various signaling pathways that have been described by others to be under alpha-tocopherol regulation appear rather to be dependent on the oxidative stress of the cell or tissue under question. Moreover, it seems unlikely that these pathways are specifically under the control of alpha-tocopherol given that various antioxidants other than alpha-tocopherol and various oxidative stressors can manipulate their responses. Thus, virtually all of the variation and scope of vitamin E's biological activity can be seen and understood in the light of protection of polyunsaturated fatty acids and the membrane qualities (fluidity, phase separation, and lipid domains) that polyunsaturated fatty acids bring about.     

Mechanisms, determination and the metaphysics of neuroscience

In this paper, I evaluate recently defended mechanistic accounts of the unity of neuroscience from a metaphysical point of view. Considering the mechanistic framework in general (Sections 2 and 3), I argue that explanations of this kind are essentially reductive (Section 4). The reductive character of mechanistic explanations provides a sufficiency criterion, according to which the mechanism underlying a certain phenomenon is sufficient for the latter. Thus, the concept of supervenience can be used in order to describe the relation between mechanisms and phenomena (Section 5). Against this background, I show that the mechanistic framework is subject to the causal exclusion problem and faces the classical metaphysical options when it comes to the relations obtaining between different levels of mechanisms (Section 6). Finally, an attempt to improve the metaphysics of mechanisms is made (Section 7) and further difficulties are pointed out (Section 8).     

For everything a season: Smoke-induced seed germination and seedling recruitment in a Western Australian Banksia woodland

Abstract The influence of factors associated with fire on seed germination of Australian native species is generally well documented, but examples involving the use of smoke as a fire analogue for ecological research remain limited. The role of season of treatment in the efficacy of smoke as a promotive germination agent was investigated over two growing seasons using natural soil stored seedbanks in Banksia woodland near Perth, Western Australia. Smoke was applied to unburnt sites in the autumn, winter and spring of 1994. Germinant emergence and seedling survival of 37 species representing 18 families was monitored in both unburnt sites and in adjacent, recently burnt sites until the second spring after treatment (October 1995). Recruitment from seed was found to be profoundly affected by the season in which dormancy breaking treatment had been applied. The promotive effect extended beyond the initial year of application. For the majority of the species investigated, application of smoke to unburnt sites in autumn promoted a significantly greater germination response than treatment in winter or spring. In only three cases (introduced annuals, the Fabaceae and Hibbenia amplexicaulis) did autumn smoke treatment not yield better germination than in summer-burnt counterparts. However, in almost half of the cases examined, proportions of seedlings surviving past their first summer after emergence in burnt areas were consistently greater than those in smoked or untreated sites. Most notably, no seedlings emerging during the spring of the first year of study survived into the following summer. Implications of the results with respect to future seed bank research and management of native vegetation are discussed.