Genetic characterization of swine influenza viruses isolated in Japan between 2009 and 2012

Eleven swine influenza viruses (SIVs) isolated from pigs in Japanese institutions between 2009 and 2012 were genetically characterized. Seven H1N1 were shown to have originated from A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses. Two H1N2 viruses contained H1 and N2 genes of Japanese H1N2 SIV origin together with internal genes of A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses. Two H3N2 viruses isolated during animal quarantine were identified as triple reassortant H3N2 viruses maintained among pigs in North America. This study shows that A(H1N1)pdm09 viruses and their reassortant strains are already present in domestic pigs in Japan and that novel SIVs are possibly being imported from abroad.     

Identification of reassortant pandemic H1N1 influenza virus in Korean pigs

Since the 2009 pandemic human H1N1 influenza A virus emerged in April 2009, novel reassortant strains have been identified throughout the world. This paper describes the detection and isolation of reassortant strains associated with human pandemic influenza H1N1 and swine influenza H1N2 (SIV) viruses in swine populations in South Korea. Two influenza H1N2 reassortants were detected, and subtyped by PCR. The strains were isolated using Madin- Darby canine kidney (MDCK) cells, and genetically characterized by phylogenetic analysis for genetic diversity. They consisted of human, avian, and swine virus genes that were originated from the 2009 pandemic H1N1 virus and a neuraminidase (NA) gene from H1N2 SIV previously isolated in North America. This identification of reassortment events in swine farms raises concern that reassortant strains may continuously circulate within swine populations, calling for the further study and surveillance of pandemic H1N1 among swine.     

Epidemiology and Genotypic Diversity of Eurasian Avian-Like H1N1 Swine Influenza Viruses in China

Eurasian avian-like H1 N1(EA H1 N1) swine influenza virus(SIV) outside European countries was first detected in Hong Kong Special Administrative Region(Hong Kong, SAR) of China in 2001. Afterwards, EA H1 N1 SIVs have become predominant in pig population in this country. However, the epidemiology and genotypic diversity of EA H1 N1 SIVs in China are still unknown. Here, we collected the EA H1 N1 SIVs sequences from China between 2001 and 2018 and analyzed the epidemic and phylogenic features, and key molecular markers of these EA H1 N1 SIVs. Our results showed that EA H1 N1 SIVs distributed in nineteen provinces/municipalities of China. After a long-time evolution and transmission, EA H1 N1 SIVs were continuously reassorted with other co-circulated influenza viruses, including 2009 pandemic H1 N1(A(H1 N1)pdm09), and triple reassortment H1 N2(TR H1 N2) influenza viruses, generated 11 genotypes. Genotype 3 and 5, both of which were the reassortments among EA H1 N1, A(H1 N1)pdm09 and TR H1 N2 viruses with different origins of M genes, have become predominant in pig population. Furthermore, key molecular signatures were identified in EA H1 N1 SIVs. Our study has drawn a genotypic diversity image of EA H1 N1 viruses, and could help to evaluate the potential risk of EA H1 N1 for pandemic preparedness and response.     

Expanded Cocirculation of Stable Subtypes,Emerging Lineages,and New Sporadic Reassortants of Porcine Influenza Viruses in Swine Populations in Northwest Germany

The emergence of the human 2009 pandemic H1N1 (H1N1pdm) virus from swine populations refocused public and scientific attention on swine as an important source of influenza A viruses bearing zoonotic potential. Widespread and year-round circulation of at least four stable lineages of porcine influenza viruses between 2009 and 2012 in a region of Germany with a high-density swine population is documented here. European avian influenza virus-derived H1N1 (H1N1av) viruses dominated the epidemiology, followed by human-derived subtypes H1N2 and H3N2. H1N1pdm viruses and, in particular, recently emerging reassortants between H1N1pdm and porcine HxN2 viruses (H1pdmN2) were detected in about 8% of cases. Further reassortants between these main lineages were diagnosed sporadically. Ongoing diversification both at the phylogenetic and at the antigenic level was evident for the H1N1av lineage and for some of its reassortants. The H1avN2 reassortant R1931/11 displayed conspicuously distinct genetic and antigenic features and was easily transmitted from pig to pig in an experimental infection. Continuing diverging evolution was also observed in the H1pdmN2 lineage. These viruses carry seven genome segments of the H1N1pdm virus, including a hemagglutinin gene that encodes a markedly antigenically altered protein. The zoonotic potential of this lineage remains to be determined. The results highlight the relevance of surveillance and control of porcine influenza virus infections. This is important for the health status of swine herds. In addition, a more exhaustive tracing of the formation, transmission, and spread of new reassortant influenza A viruses with unknown zoonotic potential is urgently required.     

Isolation and genetic characterization of new reassortant H3N1 swine influenza virus from pigs in the midwestern United States

Since the introduction of H3N2 swine influenza viruses (SIVs) into U.S. swine in 1998, H1N2 and H1N1 reassortant viruses have emerged from reassortment between classical H1N1 and H3N2 viruses. In 2004, a new reassortant H3N1 virus (A/Swine/Minnesota/00395/2004) was identified from coughing pigs. Phylogenetic analyses revealed a hemagglutinin segment similar to those of contemporary cluster III H3N2 SIVs and a neuraminidase sequence of contemporary H1N1 origin. The internal genes were of swine, human, and avian influenza virus origin, similar to those of contemporary U.S. cluster III H3N2 SIVs. The recovery of H3N1 is further evidence of reassortment among SIVs and justifies continuous surveillance.     

Emergence and dissemination of a swine H3N2 reassortant influenza virus with 2009 pandemic H1N1 genes in pigs in China

The 2009 pandemic influenza virus (pdm/09) has been frequently introduced to pigs and has reassorted with other swine viruses. Recently, H3N2 reassortants with pdm/09-like internal genes were isolated in Guangxi and Hong Kong, China. Genetic and epidemiological analyses suggest that these viruses have circulated in swine for some time. This is the first evidence that swine reassortant viruses with pdm/09-like genes may have become established in the field, altering the landscape of human and swine influenza.     

Isolation and genetic characterization of avian-like H1N1 and novel ressortant H1N2 influenza viruses from pigs in China

As pigs are susceptible to both human and avian influenza viruses, they have been proposed to be intermediate hosts or mixing vessels for the generation of pandemic influenza viruses through reassortment or adaptation to the mammalian host. In this study, we reported avian-like H1N1 and novel ressortant H1N2 influenza viruses from pigs in China. Homology and phylogenetic analyses showed that the H1N1 virus (A/swine/Zhejiang/1/07) was closely to avian-like H1N1 viruses and seemed to be derived from the European swine H1N1 viruses, which was for the first time reported in China; and the two H1N2 viruses (A/swine/Shanghai/1/07 and A/swine/Guangxi/13/06) were novel ressortant H1N2 influenza viruses containing genes from the classical swine (HA, NP, M and NS), human (NA and PB1) and avian (PB2 and PA) lineages, which indicted that the reassortment among human, avian, and swine influenza viruses had taken place in pigs in China and resulted in the generation of new viruses. The isolation of avian-like H1N1 influenza virus originated from the European swine H1N1 viruses, especially the emergence of two novel ressortant H1N2 influenza viruses provides further evidence that pigs serve as intermediate hosts or “mixing vessels”, and swine influenza virus surveillance in China should be given a high priority.     

Characterization of an artificial swine-origin influenza virus with the same gene combination as H1N1/2009 virus: a genesis clue of pandemic strain

Pandemic H1N1/2009 influenza virus, derived from a reassortment of avian, human, and swine influenza viruses, possesses a unique gene segment combination that had not been detected previously in animal and human populations. Whether such a gene combination could result in the pathogenicity and transmission as H1N1/2009 virus remains unclear. In the present study, we used reverse genetics to construct a reassortant virus (rH1N1) with the same gene combination as H1N1/2009 virus (NA and M genes from a Eurasian avian-like H1N1 swine virus and another six genes from a North American triple-reassortant H1N2 swine virus). Characterization of rH1N1 in mice showed that this virus had higher replicability and pathogenicity than those of the seasonal human H1N1 and Eurasian avian-like swine H1N1 viruses, but was similar to the H1N1/2009 and triple-reassortant H1N2 viruses. Experiments performed on guinea pigs showed that rH1N1 was not transmissible, whereas pandemic H1N1/2009 displayed efficient transmissibility. To further determine which gene segment played a key role in transmissibility, we constructed a series of reassortants derived from rH1N1 and H1N1/2009 viruses. Direct contact transmission studies demonstrated that the HA and NS genes contributed to the transmission of H1N1/2009 virus. Second, the HA gene of H1N1/2009 virus, when combined with the H1N1/2009 NA gene, conferred efficient contact transmission among guinea pigs. The present results reveal that not only gene segment reassortment but also amino acid mutation were needed for the generation of the pandemic influenza virus.     

Reassortment events among swine influenza A viruses in China: implications for the origin of the 2009 influenza pandemic

That pigs may play a pivotal role in the emergence of pandemic influenza was indicated by the recent H1N1/2009 human pandemic, likely caused by a reassortant between viruses of the American triple-reassortant (TR) and Eurasian avian-like (EA) swine influenza lineages. As China has the largest human and pig populations in the world and is the only place where both TR and EA viruses have been reported to cocirculate, it is potentially the source of the H1N1/2009 pandemic virus. To examine this, the genome sequences of 405 swine influenza viruses from China were analyzed. Thirty-six TR and EA reassortant viruses were identified before and after the occurrence of the pandemic. Several of these TR-EA reassortant viruses had genotypes with most segments having the same lineage origin as the segments of the H1N1/2009 pandemic virus. However, these viruses were generated from independent reassortment events throughout our survey period and were not associated with the current pandemic. One TR-EA reassortant, which is least similar to the pandemic virus, has persisted since 2007, while all the other variants appear to be transient. Despite frequent reassortment events between TR and EA lineage viruses in China, evidence for the genesis of the 2009 pandemic virus in pigs in this region is still absent.     

Close relationship between the 2009 H1N1 virus and South Dakota AIV strains

Although previous publications suggest the 2009 pandemic influenza A (H1N1) virus was reassorted from swine viruses of North America and Eurasia, the immediate ancestry still remains elusive due to the big evolutionary distance between the 2009 H1N1 virus and the previously isolated strains. Since the unveiling of the 2009 H1N1 influenza, great deal of interest has been drawn to influenza, consequently a large number of influenza virus sequences have been deposited into the public sequence databases. Blast analysis demonstrated that the recently submitted 2007 South Dakota avian influenza virus strains and other North American avian strains contained genetic segments very closely related to the 2009 H1N1 virus, which suggests these avian influenza viruses are very close relatives of the 2009 H1N1 virus. Phylogenetic analyses also indicate that the 2009 H1N1 viruses are associated with both avian and swine influenza viruses circulating in North America. Since the migrating wild birds are preferable to pigs as the carrier to spread the influenza viruses across vast distances, it is very likely that birds played an important role in the inter-continental evolution of the 2009 H1N1 virus. It is essential to understand the evolutionary route of the emerging influenza virus in order to find a way to prevent further emerging cases. This study suggests the close relationship between 2009 pandemic virus and the North America avian viruses and underscores enhanced surveillance of influenza in birds for understanding the evolution of the 2009 pandemic influenza.     

Combination of PB2 271A and SR polymorphism at positions 590/591 is critical for viral replication and virulence of swine influenza virus in cultured cells and in vivo

Triple reassortant swine influenza viruses (SIVs) and 2009 pandemic H1N1 (pH1N1) virus contain an avian-origin PB2 with 271A, 590S, 591R, and 627E. To evaluate the role of PB2 271A, 590S, and 591R in the replication and virulence of SIV, single (1930-TX98-PB2-271T)-, double (1930-TX98-PB2-590A591A)-, and triple (1930-TX98-PB2-271T590A591A)-mutated viruses were generated in the background of the H1N1 A/swine/Iowa/15/30 (1930) virus with an avian-origin PB2 from the triple-reassortant A/swine/Texas/4199-2/98 (TX98) virus, called the parental 1930-TX98-PB2. Compared to parental virus and single- and double-mutated viruses, the triple-mutated virus replicated less efficiently in cell cultures and was attenuated in mice. These results suggest that a combination of 271A with the 590/591 SR polymorphism is critical for pH1N1 and triple-reassortant SIVs for efficient replication and adaptation in mammals.     

Virulence and genetic compatibility of polymerase reassortant viruses derived from the pandemic (H1N1) 2009 influenza virus and circulating influenza A viruses

Gene mutations and reassortment are key mechanisms by which influenza A virus acquires virulence factors. To evaluate the role of the viral polymerase replication machinery in producing virulent pandemic (H1N1) 2009 influenza viruses, we generated various polymerase point mutants (PB2, 627K/701N; PB1, expression of PB1-F2 protein; and PA, 97I) and reassortant viruses with various sources of influenza viruses by reverse genetics. Although the point mutations produced no significant change in pathogenicity, reassortment between the pandemic A/California/04/09 (CA04, H1N1) and current human and animal influenza viruses produced variants possessing a broad spectrum of pathogenicity in the mouse model. Although most polymerase reassortants had attenuated pathogenicity (including those containing seasonal human H3N2 and high-pathogenicity H5N1 virus segments) compared to that of the parental CA04 (H1N1) virus, some recombinants had significantly enhanced virulence. Unexpectedly, one of the five highly virulent reassortants contained a A/Swine/Korea/JNS06/04(H3N2)-like PB2 gene with no known virulence factors; the other four had mammalian-passaged avian-like genes encoding PB2 featuring 627K, PA featuring 97I, or both. Overall, the reassorted polymerase complexes were only moderately compatible for virus rescue, probably because of disrupted molecular interactions involving viral or host proteins. Although we observed close cooperation between PB2 and PB1 from similar virus origins, we found that PA appears to be crucial in maintaining viral gene functions in the context of the CA04 (H1N1) virus. These observations provide helpful insights into the pathogenic potential of reassortant influenza viruses composed of the pandemic (H1N1) 2009 influenza virus and prevailing human or animal influenza viruses that could emerge in the future.     

Novel reassortment of Eurasian avian-like and pandemic/2009 influenza viruses in swine: infectious potential for humans

Pigs are considered to be intermediate hosts and "mixing vessels," facilitating the genesis of pandemic influenza viruses, as demonstrated by the emergence of the 2009 H1N1 pandemic (pdm/09) virus. The prevalence and repeated introduction of the pdm/09 virus into pigs raises the possibility of generating novel swine influenza viruses with the potential to infect humans. To address this, an active influenza surveillance program was conducted with slaughtered pigs in abattoirs in southern China. Over 50% of the pigs tested were found to be seropositive for one or more H1 influenza viruses, most commonly pdm/09-like viruses. Out of 36 virus isolates detected, one group of novel reassortants had Eurasian avian-like swine H1N1 surface genes and pdm/09 internal genes. Animal experiments showed that this virus transmitted effectively from pig to pig and from pig to ferret, and it could also replicate in ex vivo human lung tissue. Immunization against the 2009 pandemic virus gave only partial protection to ferrets. The continuing prevalence of the pdm/09 virus in pigs could lead to the genesis of novel swine reassortant viruses with the potential to infect humans.     

Origin and molecular characterization of the human-infecting H6N1 influenza virus in Taiwan

In June 2013, the first human H6N1 influenza virus infection was confirmed in Taiwan. However, the origin and molecular characterization of this virus, A/Taiwan/2/2013 (H6N1), have not been well studied thus far. In the present report, we performed phylogenetic and coalescent analyses of this virus and compared its molecular profile/characteristics with other closely related strains. Molecular characterization of H6N1 revealed that it is a typical avian influenza virus of low pathogenicity, which might not replicate and propagate well in the upper airway in mammals. Phylogenetic analysis revealed that the virus clusters with A/chicken/Taiwan/A2837/2013 (H6N1) in seven genes, except PB1. For the PB1 gene, A/Taiwan/2/2013 was clustered with a different H6N1 lineage from A/chicken/Taiwan/A2837/2013. Although a previous study demonstrated that the PB2, PA, and M genes of A/Taiwan/2/2013 might be derived from the H5N2 viruses, coalescent analyses revealed that these H5N2 viruses were derived from more recent strains than that of the ancestor of A/Taiwan/2/2013. Therefore, we propose that A/Taiwan/2/2013 is a reassortant from different H6N1 lineages circulating in chickens in Taiwan. Furthermore, compared to avian isolates, a single P186L (H3 numbering) substitution in the hemagglutinin H6 of the human isolate might increase the mammalian receptor binding and, hence, this strain’s pathogenicity in humans. Overall, human infection with this virus seems an accidental event and is unlikely to cause an influenza pandemic. However, its co-circulation and potential reassortment with other influenza subtypes are still worthy of attention.     

High genetic and antigenic similarity between a swine H3N2 influenza A virus and a prior human influenza vaccine virus: A possible immune pressure-driven cross-species transmission

In late April of 2009, a global outbreak of human influenza was reported. The causative agent is a highly unusual reassortant H1N1 influenza virus carrying genetic segments derived from swine, human and avian influenza viruses. In this study, we compared the HA, NA and other gene segments of a swine H3N2 influenza A virus, A/Swine/Guangdong/z5/2003, which was isolated from pigs in 2003 in Guangdong Province, China, to the predominant human and swine H3N2 viruses. We found that the similarity of gene segments of A/Swine/Guangdong/z5/2003 was closer to Moscow/99-like human H3N2 virus than Europe swine H3N2 viruses during 1999-2002. These results suggest that A/Swine/Guangdong/z5/2003 may be porcine in origin, possibly being driven by human immune pressure induced by either natural H3N2 virus infection or use of A/Moscow/10/99 (H3N2)-based human influenza vaccine. The results further confirm that swine may play a dual role as a “shelter” for hosting influenza virus from humans or birds and as a “mixing vessel” for generating reassortant influenza viruses, such as the one causing current influenza pandemic.     

Alternative Reassortment Events Leading to Transmissible H9N1 Influenza Viruses in the Ferret Model

Influenza A H9N2 viruses are common poultry pathogens that occasionally infect swine and humans. It has been shown previously with H9N2 viruses that reassortment can generate novel viruses with increased transmissibility. Here, we demonstrate the modeling power of a novel transfection-based inoculation system to select reassortant viruses under in vivo selective pressure. Plasmids containing the genes from an H9N2 virus and a pandemic H1N1 (pH1N1) virus were transfected into HEK 293T cells to potentially generate the full panel of possible H9 reassortants. These cells were then used to inoculate ferrets, and the population dynamics were studied. Two respiratory-droplet-transmissible H9N1 viruses were selected by this method, indicating a selective pressure in ferrets for the novel combination of surface genes. These results show that a transfection-based inoculation system is a fast and efficient method to model reassortment and highlight the risk of reassortment between H9N2 and pH1N1 viruses.     

Rapid detection and subtyping of human influenza A viruses and reassortants by pyrosequencing

Background

Given the continuing co-circulation of the 2009 H1N1 pandemic influenza A viruses with seasonal H3N2 viruses, rapid and reliable detection of newly emerging influenza reassortant viruses is important to enhance our influenza surveillance.

Methodology/Principal Findings

A novel pyrosequencing assay was developed for the rapid identification and subtyping of potential human influenza A virus reassortants based on all eight gene segments of the virus. Except for HA and NA genes, one universal set of primers was used to amplify and subtype each of the six internal genes. With this method, all eight gene segments of 57 laboratory isolates and 17 original specimens of seasonal H1N1, H3N2 and 2009 H1N1 pandemic viruses were correctly matched with their corresponding subtypes. In addition, this method was shown to be capable of detecting reassortant viruses by correctly identifying the source of all 8 gene segments from three vaccine production reassortant viruses and three H1N2 viruses.

Conclusions/Significance

In summary, this pyrosequencing assay is a sensitive and specific procedure for screening large numbers of viruses for reassortment events amongst the commonly circulating human influenza A viruses, which is more rapid and cheaper than using conventional sequencing approaches.     

中国“人-猪-禽”基因重排H1N2亚型猪流感病毒全基因克隆及遗传进化的研究

[目的]为了研究2006年从广西病猪肺组织中分离的H1N2亚型猪流感病毒(SIV)A/Swine/Guangxi/13/2006(H1N2)(Sw/Gx/13/06)的遗传学特性和8个基因的来源.[方法]运用RT PCR方法对其全基因进行了克隆并运用分子生物学软件对其基因序列进行了遗传进化分析.[结果]血凝素(HA)、核蛋白(NP)、基质蛋白(M)和非结构蛋白(NS)基因来源于猪古典H1N1亚型流感病毒;神经氨酸酶(NA)和聚合酶蛋白(PB1)基因来源于人的H3N2亚型流感病毒;聚合酶蛋白(PA)和聚合酶蛋白(PB2)基因来自于禽流感病毒.[结论]可见Sw/GX/13/06是一株"人-猪-禽"三源基因重排H1N2亚型SIV且与美国(1999-2001年)和韩国(2002年)分离到该型病毒的有明显的亲缘关系.据我们所知,这是中国首次报道含有禽流感病毒基因片段的重排H1N2 SIV,该病毒是否对养猪业和人类公共卫生健康具有潜在的威胁,有待于进一步研究.     

新世纪流感大流行的思考

2009年从墨西哥开始暴发了一场席卷全世界的流感疫情．此次大流行的毒株,甲型H1N1病毒,包含了猪源、禽源和人源流感病毒的基因片段．研究该毒株的基因重配、进化历程及其生物学特性,将对防控此次流行具有重要意义．目前,该毒株的遗传进化关系已明确,通过遗传性状分析可获知该毒株可能的生物学性状,但流感大流行动向、毒株遗传变化、毒力及致病性变化仍在密切监控中．流感病毒生态系统具有复杂性,其基因组易突变、易重配、易在自然宿主保存,使得流感大流行存在一定的必然性．正视流感大流行的威胁,积极提高流感病毒在生态系统中的监控,加强流行病学调查,发展疫苗与药物,建立有效公共卫生保障体系,才能降低流感大流行的破坏性．     

Tissue tropism of swine influenza viruses and reassortants in ex vivo cultures of the human respiratory tract and conjunctiva

The 2009 pandemic influenza H1N1 (H1N1pdm) virus was generated by reassortment of swine influenza viruses of different lineages. This was the first influenza pandemic to emerge in over 4 decades and the first to occur after the realization that influenza pandemics arise from influenza viruses of animals. In order to understand the biological determinants of pandemic emergence, it is relevant to compare the tropism of different lineages of swine influenza viruses and reassortants derived from them with that of 2009 pandemic H1N1 (H1N1pdm) and seasonal influenza H1N1 viruses in ex vivo cultures of the human nasopharynx, bronchus, alveoli, and conjunctiva. We hypothesized that virus which can transmit efficiently between humans replicated well in the human upper airways. As previously reported, H1N1pdm and seasonal H1N1 viruses replicated efficiently in the nasopharyngeal, bronchial, and alveolar epithelium. In contrast, representative viruses from the classical swine (CS) (H1N1) lineage could not infect human respiratory epithelium; Eurasian avian-like swine (EA) (H1N1) viruses only infected alveolar epithelium and North American triple-reassortant (TRIG) viruses only infected the bronchial epithelium albeit inefficiently. Interestingly, a naturally occurring triple-reassortant swine virus, A/SW/HK/915/04 (H1N2), with a matrix gene segment of EA swine derivation (i.e., differing from H1N1pdm only in lacking a neuraminidase [NA] gene of EA derivation) readily infected and replicated in human nasopharyngeal and bronchial epithelia but not in the lung. A recombinant sw915 with the NA from H1N1pdm retained its tropism for the bronchus and acquired additional replication competence for alveolar epithelium. In contrast to H1N1pdm, none of the swine viruses tested nor seasonal H1N1 had tropism in human conjunctiva. Recombinant viruses generated by swapping the surface proteins (hemagglutinin and NA) of H1N1pdm and seasonal H1N1 virus demonstrated that these two gene segments together are key determinants of conjunctival tropism. Overall, these findings suggest that ex vivo cultures of the human respiratory tract provide a useful biological model for assessing the human health risk of swine influenza viruses.