Conjecture and explanation: A reply to Reydon

Reydon (2012) comments on my account of how-possibly explanation (Forber, 2010). I distinguish between three types of explanation (global how-possibly, local how-possibly, and how actually) and argue that these distinctions track various roles explanations play in evolutionary biology. While Reydon accepts the distinctions, he questions whether the two different types of how-possibly explanation count as genuine explanations. He summarizes his analysis with a slogan: “global how-possibly explanations are explanations but not how-possibly; local explanations are how-possibly but not explanations.” Reydon’s commentary raises a number of insightful points, and I will not be able to address them all. Instead, after clarifying certain points in my original paper (4 1), I will respond to Reydon’s slogan by addressing whether global how-possibly explanations should count as explaining how possible (4 2), and what (so-called) local how-possibly explanations are, if not explanations (4 3).     

Confirmation and explaining how possible

Confirmation in evolutionary biology depends on what biologists take to be the genuine rivals. Investigating what constrains the scope of biological possibility provides part of the story: explaining how possible helps determine what counts as a genuine rival and thus informs confirmation. To clarify the criteria for genuine rivalry I distinguish between global and local constraints on biological possibility, and offer an account of how-possibly explanation. To sharpen the connection between confirmation and explaining how possible I discuss the view that formal inquiry can provide a kind of confirmation-theoretic support for evolutionary models, and offer an example of how-possibly explanation interacting with testing practice.     

How-possibly explanations in biology

Biologists in many different fields of research give how-possibly explanations of the phenomena they study. Although such explanations lack empirical support, and might be regarded by some as unscientific, they play an important heuristic role in biology by helping biologists develop theories and concepts and suggesting new areas of research. How-possibly explanations serve as a useful framework for conducting research in the absence of adequate empiri cal data, and they can even become how-actually explanations if they gain enough empirical support.I am grateful to Robert Brandon and Michael Resnik for helpful comments and criticism.     

Inferential explanations in biology

Among philosophers of science, there is now a widespread agreement that the DN model of explanation is poorly equipped to account for explanations in biology. Rather than identifying laws, so the consensus goes, researchers explain biological capacities by constructing a model of the underlying mechanism.We think that the dichotomy between DN explanations and mechanistic explanations is misleading. In this article, we argue that there are cases in which biological capacities are explained without constructing a model of the underlying mechanism. Although these explanations do not conform to Hempel’s DN model (they do not deduce the explanandum from laws of nature), they do invoke more or less stable generalisations. Because they invoke generalisations and have the form of an argument, we call them inferential explanations. We support this claim by considering two examples of explanations of biological capacities: pigeon navigation and photoperiodism. Next, we will argue that these non-mechanistic explanations are crucial to biology in three ways: (i) sometimes, they are the only thing we have (there is no alternative available), (ii) they are heuristically useful, and (iii) they provide genuine understanding and so are interesting in their own right.In the last sections we discuss the relation between types of explanations and types of experiments and situate our views within some relevant debates on explanatory power and explanatory virtues.     

Adaptation and novelty: teleological explanations in evolutionary biology

Knives, birds' wings, and mountain slopes are used for certain purposes: cutting, flying, and climbing. A bird's wings have in common with knives that they have been 'designed' for the purpose they serve, which purpose accounts for their existence, whereas mountain slopes have come about by geological processes independently of their uses for climbing. A bird's wings differ from a knife in that they have not been designed or produced by any conscious agent; rather, the wings, like the slopes, are outcomes of natural processes without any intentional causation. Evolutionary biologists use teleological language and teleological explanations. I propose that this use is appropriate, because teleological explanations are hypotheses that can be subject to empirical testing. The distinctiveness of teleological hypotheses is that they account for the existence of a feature in terms of the function it serves; for example, wings have evolved and persist because flying is beneficial to birds by increasing their chances of surviving and reproducing. Features of organisms that are explained with teleological hypotheses include structures, such as wings; processes, such as development from egg to adult; and behaviours, such as nest building. A proximate explanation of these features is the function they serve; an ultimate explanation that they all share is their contribution to the reproductive fitness of the organisms. I distinguish several kinds of teleological explanations, such as natural and artificial, as well as bounded and unbounded, some of which but not others apply to biological explanations.     

Ultimate explanations concern the adaptive rationale for organism design

My understanding is that proximate explanations concern adaptive mechanism and that ultimate explanations concern adaptive rationale. Viewed in this light, the two kinds of explanation are quite distinct, but they interact in a complementary way to give a full understanding of biological adaptations. In contrast, Laland et al. (2013)—following a literal reading of Mayr (Science 134:1501–1506, 1961)—have characterized ultimate explanations as concerning any and all mechanisms that have operated over the course of an organism’s evolutionary history. This has unfortunate consequences, such as allowing random drift to form the basis for ultimate explanations, and allowing proximate and ultimate explanations to bleed into each other until their distinction is meaningless. Here, I suggest Laland et al’s explanatory framework of “reciprocal causation” is not conducive to successful biological science, and that they have misunderstood key elements of the theory of Darwinian adaptation.     

Robustness in evolutionary explanations: a positive account

Robustness analysis is widespread in science, but philosophers have struggled to justify its confirmatory power. We provide a positive account of robustness by analysing some explicit and implicit uses of within and across-model robustness in evolutionary theory. We argue that appeals to robustness are usually difficult to justify because they aim to increase the likeliness that a phenomenon obtains. However, we show that robust results are necessary (under certain conditions) for explanations of phenomena with specific properties. Across-model robustness is necessary for how-possibly explanations of multiply instantiated phenomena, while within-model robustness is necessary for explanations of phenomena with multiple evolutionary starting points. In such cases, the appeal of robustness is explanatory rather than confirmatory.     

Physical explanations and biological explanations,empirical laws and a priori laws

Philosophers intent upon characterizing the difference between physics and biology often seize upon the purported fact that physical explanations conform more closely to the covering law model than biological explanations. Central to this purported difference is the role of laws of nature in the explanations of these two sciences. However, I argue that, although certain important differences between physics and biology can be highlighted by differences between physical and biological explanations, these differences are not differences in the degree to which those explanations conform to the covering law model, which fits biology about as well as it does physics.     

Developmental plasticity and evolutionary explanations

Developmental plasticity looks like a promising bridge between ecological and developmental perspectives on evolution. Yet, there is no consensus on whether plasticity is part of the explanation for adaptive evolution or an optional “add‐on” to genes and natural selection. Here, we suggest that these differences in opinion are caused by differences in the simplifying assumptions, and particular idealizations, that enable evolutionary explanation. We outline why idealizations designed to explain evolution through natural selection prevent an understanding of the role of development, and vice versa. We show that representing plasticity as a reaction norm conforms with the idealizations of selective explanations, which can give the false impression that plasticity has no explanatory power for adaptive evolution. Finally, we use examples to illustrate why evolutionary explanations that include developmental plasticity may in fact be more satisfactory than explanations that solely refer to genes and natural selection.     

Personhood diagnostics: personal attributes and clinical explanations of pain

This article examines an explanation circulating within a U.S. multidisciplinary pediatric pain clinic that links the neurobiology of functional pain disorders to desirable personal attributes such as smartness and creativity. Drawing on ethnographic observations and the analysis of video-recorded clinical interactions and focusing on two cases, I introduce the term personhood diagnostics to explore how the explanatory framework worked not only to pinpoint a pathophysiological mechanism for pain to legitimize it as "real" but also to cast patients as virtuous persons. In doing so, it laid the groundwork for an ethic of clinical care that privileged the patient's responsibility for treatment. Within this narrative logic, diagnostic explanations reveal not only causal pathways but also predictive claims about recovery. By considering what is at stake when personal attributes are marshaled within a neurobiological diagnostic register that also lays out the patient's role in healing, this article complicates psychosomatic accounts of pain.     

Two explanations of the dawn chorus compared: how monotonically changing light levels favour a short break from singing

I used optimality modelling to compare two of the most plausible and general explanations for the dawn and dusk peaks in bird song output. Kacelnik's explanation is that foraging is inefficient in poor light, but that social interactions are less affected, making singing more worthwhile than foraging. McNamara et al.'s explanation is based on stochasticity in foraging success and overnight energy requirements; it has been extensively analysed with stochastic dynamic programming models. Both explanations are now incorporated into this sort of model. I used various functions to link success of foraging and singing to time of day, but assumed that above some light level there is no further effect. Kacelnik's explanation has as strong an effect as stochasticity in generating dawn and dusk choruses. It also predicts short pauses in the singing output just after the dawn chorus and before the dusk chorus. The former arises because birds delay foraging when it will become more profitable later, until foraging success reaches a plateau, when the energetic debt accumulated makes them forage. The principle of this see-saw double switch in behaviours may apply to other explanations for the dawn chorus, and to other shifts in behaviour when conditions change gradually. The model predicts that from day to day cloud cover determines when a dawn chorus starts, but that overnight temperature and wind strength have more effect on chorus intensity and duration. I discuss what sort of observational and experimental data on singing routines would better test this model. Copyright 2002 The Association for the Study of Animal Behaviour. Published by Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.     

Explanatory unification and natural selection explanations

The debate between the dynamical and the statistical interpretations of natural selection is centred on the question of whether all explanations that employ the concepts of natural selection and drift are reducible to causal explanations. The proponents of the statistical interpretation answer negatively, but insist on the fact that selection/drift arguments are explanatory. However, they remain unclear on where the explanatory power comes from. The proponents of the dynamical interpretation answer positively and try to reduce selection/drift arguments to some of the most prominent accounts of causal explanation. In turn, they face the criticism raised by statisticalists that current accounts of causation have to be violated in some of their core conditions or otherwise used in a very loose manner in order to account for selection/drift explanations. We propose a reconciliation of both interpretations by conveying evolutionary explanations within the unificationist model of scientific explanation. Therefore, we argue that the explanatory power in natural selection arguments is a result of successful unification of individual- and population-level facts. A short case study based on research on sympatric speciation will be presented as an example of how population- and individual-level facts are unified to explain the morphological mosaic of bill shape in island scrub jays (Aphelocoma insularis).     

Organisms as natural purposes: the contemporary evolutionary perspective

Kant's conception of organisms as natural purposes raises a challenge to the adequacy of mechanistic explanation in biology. Certain features of organisms appear to be inexplicable by appeal to mechanical law alone. Some biological phenomena, it seems, can only be accounted for teleologically. Contemporary evolutionary biology has by and large ignored this challenge. It is widely held that Darwin's theory of natural selection gives us an adequate, wholly mechanical account of the nature of organisms. In contemporary biology, the category of the organism plays virtually no explanatory role. Contemporary evolutionary biology is a science of sub-organismal entities-replicators. I argue that recent advances in developmental biology demonstrate the inadequacy of sub-organismal mechanism. The category of the organism, construed as a 'natural purpose' should play an ineliminable role in explaining ontogenetic development and adaptive evolution. According to Kant the natural purposiveness of organisms cannot be demonstrated to be an objective principle in nature, nor can purposiveness figure in genuine explain. I attempt to argue, by appeal to recent work on self-organization, that the purposiveness of organisms is a natural phenomenon, and, by appeal to the apparatus of invariance explanation, that biological purposiveness provides genuine, ineliminable biological explanations.     

Demonic explanations of disease among Moroccan Jews in Israel

Demonic explanations of disease preserved among Moroccan Jews living in two Israeli moshavim are described and analyzed. Applied most often to sira, a traditional ailment involving somatic and anxiety symptoms, these explanations are construed as a two-level ordered sequence of steps including elements from both ordinary reality and the demonic world. Traditional patients are usually more aware of the manifest chain of precipitating events centering around emotional consequences of a real trauma. Their rabbi-healers, however, are predisposed towards molding these events into a covert-demonic pattern, the core of which involves a human injuring a jinn and the latter's retaliation. In the explanatory scheme the real-traumatic and the demonic plots are intermingled and this fusion lends the etiological sequence a meaningful rationale as exemplified by two case illustrations. Nevertheless, our analysis renders the demonic substratum quite vulnerable, since the manifest-traumatic plot may be singled out as an autonomous explanation under the impact of the mainstream of modern Israeli society. Reasons for the hitherto tenacious preservation of the demonic component among traditional segments in Israel are presented by comparing the explanatory status of demons and psychoanalytic concepts. Certain vulnerabilities of the demonic explanation which throw doubt upon its long-term survival in modern context are discussed as well.     

Scientific progress and the prospects for culture-bound syndromes

This paper aims to show that the classification by the American Psychiatric Association (APA) in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) of a distinct listing of disorders known as Culture-Bound Syndromes (CBS) is misguided. I argue that the list of CBS (in Appendix I of the manual) comprises either (a) genuine disorders that should be included within the main body of the DSM; or (b) ersatz-disorders that serve a practical role for psychiatrists dealing with patients from certain cultures but will one day be eliminated or assimilated by bona fide DSM classifications. In support of these views I draw on claims from two key themes in the philosophy of science: (1) the claim that all folk (that is, non-scientific) explanations for phenomena are thoroughly theoretical and therefore fallible; and (2) the occurrence of theoretical elimination in the history of science. I contend that any ersatz-disorders located in the DSM that are judged to be radically false do not differ in kind from eliminated theories in the history of pre-science.     

Biological explanations and social responsibility

The aim of this paper is to show that critics of biological explanations of human nature may be granting too much to those who oppose such explanations when they argue that the truth of genetic determinism implies an end to critical evaluation and reform of our social institutions. This is the case because when we argue that biological determinism exempts us from social critique we are erroneously presupposing that our social values, practices, and institutions have nothing to do with what makes biological explanations troublesome. My argument is that what constitutes a problem for those who are concerned with social justice is not the fact that particular behaviours may be genetically determined, but the fact that our value system, and social institutions create the conditions that make such behaviours problematic. Thus, I will argue that even if genetic determinism were correct, the requirement of assessing and transforming our social practices and institutions would be far from superfluous. Biology is rarely destiny for human beings and the institutions they create.     

The role of fossils in phylogeny reconstruction: Why is it so difficult to integrate paleobiological and neontological evolutionary biology?

Why has it been so difficult to integrate paleontology and “mainstream” evolutionary biology? Two common answers are: (1) the two fields have fundamentally different aims, and (2) the tensions arise out of disciplinary squabbles for funding and prestige. This paper examines the role of fossil data in phylogeny reconstruction in order to assess these two explanations. I argue that while cladistics has provided a framework within which to integrate fossil character data, the stratigraphic (temporal) component of fossil data has been harder to integrate. A close examination of how fossil data have been used in phylogeny reconstruction suggests that neither explanation is adequate. While some of the tensions between the fields may be intellectual “turf wars,” the second explanation downplays the genuine difficulty of combining the distinctive data of the two fields. Furthermore, it is simply not the case that the two fields pursue completely distinct aims. Systematists do disagree about precisely how to represent phylogeny (e.g., minimalist cladograms or trees with varying levels of detail) but given that every tree presupposes a pattern of branching (a cladogram), these aims are not completely distinct. The central problem has been developing methods that allow scientists to incorporate the distinctive bodies of data generated by these two fields. Further case studies will be required to determine if this explanation holds for other areas of interaction between paleontology and neontology.     

Darwin was a teleologist

It is often claimed that one of Darwin's chief accomplishments was to provide biology with a non-teleological explanation of adaptation. A number of Darwin's closest associates, however, and Darwin himself, did not see it that way. In order to assess whether Darwin's version of evolutionary theory does or does not employ teleological explanation, two of his botanical studies are examined. The result of this examination is that Darwin sees selection explanations of adaptations as teleological explanations. The confusion in the nineteenth century about Darwin's attitude to teleology is argued to be a result of Darwin's teleological explanations not conforming to either of the dominant philosophical justifications of teleology at that time. Darwin's explanatory practices conform well, however, to recent defenses of the teleological character of selection explanations.I would like to thank John Beatty, David Hull and one of this journal's readers for constructive comments on an earlier draft of this paper.     

Constructing a query-able radial basis function artificial neural network

Artificial neural networks will be more widely accepted as standard engineering tools if their reasoning process can be made less opaque. This paper describes NetQuery, an explanation mechanism that extracts meaningful explanations from trained Radial Basis Function (RBF) networks. RBF networks are well suited for explanation generation because they contain a set of locally tuned units. Standard RBF networks are modified to identify dependencies between the inputs, to be sparsely connected, and to have an easily interpretable output layer. Given these modifications, the network architecture can be used to extract "Why?" and "Why not?" explanations from the network in terms of excitatory and inhibitory in-puts and their linear relationships, greatly simplified by a run-time pruning algorithm. These query results are validated by creating an expert system based on the explanations. NetQuery is also able to inform a user about a possible change in category for a given pattern by responding to a "How can I...?" query. This kind of query is extremely useful when analyzing the quality of a pattern set.